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

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ANNALS OF AMERICA.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1. Introduction. § 2. Breaking up of the cantonments at French Mills. § 3. Affair at La Cole mill. § 4. General Wilkinson suspended. § 5. March of Brown's army to the Niagara. § 6. Holmes' expedition on the Thames. § 7. Situation of affairs on lake Ontario. § 8. Attack on the towns on the American margin of the lake. § 9. Capture of a British detachment at Sandy-bay. § 10. Burning of Long Point.

§ 1. THE war with Great Britain, during the two first campaigns, was productive of no events which materially altered the situation of the two countries. With sufficient occupation for her troops in the European peninsula, and with every nerve strained in bringing forth her pecuniary resources, for the support of her allies in Russia and Germany, Great Britain was unable to make any effectual impression on the United States, and could not even have preserved her North American provinces, but for the raw and undisciplined state of the American forces, and the want of knowledge and experience in their commanders. But, amidst all the reverses that attended the first efforts of the army of America, the native bravery of her sons was sufficiently apparent. The events even of the first two campaigns sufficiently proved, that nothing but habits of discipline and able leaders were wanting to convert this rude mass into a body of warriors, not unworthy to defend the soil of freedom, and to carry vengeance against the most powerful aggressors upon the rights of their country.

While the army was thus acquiring discipline in the fields of Upper Canada, and in the pathless deserts of Ohio, the republican navy had an apparently still more difficult task to perform. Having annihilated the navies of Europe, in the course of a twenty years war, Britain was enabled fearlessly to cover our coasts with her thousand ships of war. The navy of America was an object of ridicule with the British nation, and it was confidently predicted in her legislative assembly, that in a few

short months the "half dozen fir-built frigates, with a piece of striped bunting at the mast-head" would be swept from the ocean. Nay, even the forebodings of our friends were but little more favourable. What could a few frigates and sloops of war effect against a fleet, which had succeeded in breaking down every naval power in the world, and who could exclaim, almost without an hyperbole,

> "The winds and seas are Britain's wide domain,
> "And not a sail but by permission spreads*."

But this arduous task was undertaken with undaunted firmness, and the result was as brilliant as unexpected. Frigate met with frigate, and fleet with fleet, and the flag of the conquerors of the world was repeatedly struck to the infant navy of the rude republicans. To hide the disgrace, the enemy was fain to claim kindred with those they had affected to call a degenerate and outcast race, or to resort to the more unfair and mean subterfuge of designating as "seventy-fours in disguise," the same frigates which they had had numerous opportunities of examining, both in our ports and their own, and which but a few months before they had laughed to scorn. The British vessels were also made to undergo a metamorphosis, but in an inverse ratio to that of the Americans. Their ships, brigs, schooners, and sloops were converted into gun-boats†, in the futile hope of tearing the wreath from the brows of the noble Perry, whose modest demeanour and humane conduct was such as to extort the reluctant applause even of those who submitted to his prowess.

Instead, therefore, of being confined to our ports, or swept from the ocean, the little navy of America visited every sea, and everywhere unfurled her stripes and stars. Nor did the coasts of the mistress of the ocean escape. Vessels were even captured in her own narrow seas.

Meanwhile the British navy was employed in the vain attempt of "hermetically sealing the American ports," or in harassing the coasts of the Chesapeake by petty marauding excursions, whose prime object seems to have been the burning of farm-houses and oyster-boats, or the plundering stock and tobacco, on this extensive and defenceless frontier.

But by the occurrence of one of the most wonderful events in this most wonderful era, the war was now to assume a very

* British Naval Register.

† See the proceedings of the court martial on the trial of captain Barclay, in the documents at the end of this volume.

different aspect. Our republican institutions were destined to undergo a fiery trial, and the hitherto problematical question to be resolved, whether a free government, which derived its chief strength from public opinion, was capable of sustaining itself single-handed during a conflict with a power possessed of apparently boundless resources, and whose armies had just returned from "conquering the conquerors of Europe," and dictating an ignominious peace in their capital. Nor were other unfavourable circumstances wanting to darken the cloud which hung over America at this eventful period. The treasury, one of the principal sinews of war, was nearly beggared by the temporising policy and ruinous expedients which had been resorted to, and the policy of the enemy had succeeded in draining the country of its circulating medium to such an extent, as to induce a general stoppage of specie payments by the banks in almost every section of the country. Perhaps a more interesting period of American history never occurred than this crisis presented.

§ 2. The main body of the American army on the Canadian frontier, remained inactive through the winter in their cantonments at French Mills. Preparations, however, were early made for the opening of the ensuing campaign; and towards the middle of February, after having destroyed their temporary barracks, and the major part of their boats, the army marched in two columns, the one under general Brown for Sackett's Harbour, the other towards lake Champlain, under general Macomb. General Wilkinson remained one day behind for the protection of the rear, and then followed Macomb to Plattsburg. The march of both columns was unmolested by the enemy.

§ 3. No further movements were made until the end of March, when general Wilkinson, learning that general Brown had marched from Sackett's Harbour against Fort Niagara, determined upon attempting a diversion in his favour. He accordingly put his army in motion on the Odelltown road, and, entering Canada on the 30th of March, advanced against a position occupied by the enemy on the river La Cole, where the British had fortified a large stone mill, and erected a block-house and other defences.

An eighteen pounder had been ordered forward to effect the destruction of the mill, but it broke down, and after being repaired, the only road of approach, through a deep forest, was reported to be impracticable to a gun of such weight. An opinion prevailed with the chief engineer, and several of the best informed officers, that an iron twelve would suffice to make a

breach; but after a fair and tedious experiment, at a distance of only three hundred yards, it was discovered that the battery could make no impression.

During this cannonade, which was returned by a sloop and some gun-boats from Isle aux Noix, several sorties and desperate charges were made from the mill upon the American battery; these were repulsed with great coolness by the covering corps, and the whole body engaged displayed the utmost gallantry and bravery, during the affair. The conduct of captain M'Pherson, who commanded the battery, is particularly noticed by general Wilkinson, who also states that he was admirably seconded by lieutenants Larrabee and Sheldon. M'Pherson and Larrabee were both severely wounded.

Finding all attempts to make a breach unsuccessful, general Wilkinson withdrew the battery, called in his detachments, and after removing the dead and wounded, and every thing else, fell back, unmolested, the same evening, about three miles, to Odelltown, a small town just within the Canada lines.

The force of the British at the position of La Cole, was reported, from a source on which reliance might be placed, at 2500 men. That of the Americans is unofficially stated at between three and four thousand. A small part of this force, however, was actually engaged. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded on this occasion was between 80 and 90. That of the British was 10 killed, 46 wounded, and 4 missing.

§ 4. This inauspicious opening of the campaign, joined to the failure of the expedition against Montreal the preceding autumn, threw a great deal of odium on general Wilkinson, and he was shortly after superceded in the command by general Izard*.

§ 5. Meantime general Brown, after remaining for a short period at Sackett's Harbour, put his troops in motion towards the Niagara frontier. Expectations were entertained that he would immediately drive the enemy from his position in the American territory†, but these expectations were disappointed. During the spring months, tranquillity reigned uninterrupted along the whole line of the Upper Canada frontier, save by a few partial encounters, which shall be noticed in the order in which they occurred.

§ 6. A small force, consisting of about 180 rangers and mounted infantry, under captain Holmes, was dispatched by

* General Wilkinson's trial will be noticed in a subsequent part of this work. He was honourably acquitted of all the charges exhibited against him.

† Fort Niagara.

lieutenant-colonel Butler, the commander at Detroit, against Delaware, a British post on the river Thames. This detachment had set out with artillery, but the state of the country presenting invincible obstacles to its transportation, it was left behind. By these means, and by sending back the sick to Detroit, Holmes' little force was diminished to about 160 men.

On the 3d of March, intelligence was received, that a body of the enemy, nearly double his force, was descending the Thames, one half of whom were regulars, and the remainder militia and Indians. Holmes immediately retreated a few miles, and took an excellent position on the western bank of a creek, which ran through a deep and wide ravine. Captain Gill was left with a few rangers, to cover the rear, and watch the motions of the enemy; but hardly had the main body encamped, before they were joined by the rangers, who had been driven in, after exchanging a few shots with the British advanced corps, in a vain attempt to reconnoitre their force.

During the night of the 3d, the British encamped upon the eastern heights, and next morning succeeded in drawing captain Holmes from his position by a well-contrived stratagem, which, had it been skilfully followed up, could hardly have failed to eventuate in the destruction of the American detachment. Fortunately, however, this was not the case. At sun-rise the enemy exhibited a small and scattered force on the opposite heights, who retreated, after ineffectually firing at the American camp, and the reconnoitering party reported, that the retreat was conducted with precipitation, the baggage left scattered on the road, and that, judging from their trail and fires, they could not exceed seventy men. Mortified at the idea of having retrograded from this diminutive force, Holmes instantly commenced the pursuit, and resumed the idea of attacking the enemy's post. He had not, however, proceeded beyond five miles, when his advance discovered the enemy, in considerable force, arranging themselves for battle.

The stratagem of the enemy being now apparent, captain Holmes instantly took advantage of the blunder which they had committed, in not throwing themselves in his rear, and thus placing his detachment between a fortified position and a superior force; and happily he soon regained his former position. Here, placing the horses and baggage in the centre, he formed his troops a-foot in a hollow square, to prevent the necessity of evolution, which such raw troops were incompetent to perform in action. Holmes thus calmly waited the approach of the enemy, in defiance of the murmurs of his men,

who were unanimously in favour of a retreat, thinking it madness to engage with so superior a force.

The attack was commenced simultaneously on every front, the militia and Indians attacking from the north, west, and south, with savage yells and bugles sounding, and the regulars charging up the heights from the ravine on the east. The latter bravely approached to within 20 paces of the American line, against the most destructive fire. But the front section being shot to pieces, those who followed much thinned and wounded, and many of the officers cut down, they were forced to abandon the charge, and take cover in the woods in diffused order, within from 15 to 30 paces of their antagonists. The charge of the British regulars thus repulsed, they had recourse to their ammunition, and the firing encreased on both sides with great vivacity. The American regulars, being uncovered, were ordered to kneel, that the brow of the heights might assist in screening them from the view of the enemy. But the enemy's cover also proved insufficient, a common sized tree being unable to protect even one man from the extended line of Americans, much less the squads that often stood and breathed their last together.

On the other three sides the firing was also sustained with much coolness, and with considerable loss to the foe. The troops on those sides being protected by logs hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, both the rifle and musket were aimed at leisure, with that deadly certainty which distinguishes the American backwoodsman. Unable to sustain so unequal a contest, therefore, and favoured by the shades of twilight, the British commenced a general retreat, after an hour's close and gallant conflict.

Captain Holmes declined a pursuit, as the enemy were still superior both in numbers and discipline, and as the night would have insured success to an ambuscade. Besides, as the creek would have to be passed and the heights ascended, the attempt to pursue would have given the enemy the same advantage which produced their defeat, as it could be passed on horseback at no other point; and the troops being fatigued and frostbitten, and their shoes cut to pieces by the frozen ground, it was not possible to pursue on foot. Captain Holmes accordingly returned to Detroit.

The American loss, in killed and wounded, on this occasion, amounted only to a non-commissioned officer and six privates; the British official account states their loss at 14 killed, 51 wounded, 1 missing, and 1 officer wounded and taken. Two of the officers were killed, and the same number wounded.

This statement does not include the loss of the Indians. The whole American force in action consisted of 150 rank and file, of whom, including the rangers, 70 were militia. The British regulars alone were from 150 to 180 strong, and the militia and Indians fought upon three sides of the square.

§ 7. On lake Ontario, the British still preserved the superiority which the addition to their squadron had conferred on them the preceding autumn. Measures, however, were in rapid progress at Sackett's Harbour, towards placing the hostile fleets on a more equal footing. A handsome ship, rated 44 guns, and carrying 58, was launched on the first of May. While this vessel was on the stocks, an unsuccessful attempt was made by the enemy to blow her up. The boats employed in this enterprise were discovered by the American guard-boats in the bay, and were forced to fly, after throwing their kegs of powder overboard*.

* The following is a correct view of the rival squadrons during the greater part of this campaign. The Superior was launched in May, and was not ready for sea till the end of July. Commodore Yeo again acquired the ascendency towards the end of the season by the addition to his squadron of a vessel, which was commonly designated "the big ship." The contest on this lake seems rather to have been, who could build the fastest, than who could fight the best.

British Squadron.

	FORCE.
Ship Prince Regent, sir J. L. Yeo, com. O'Connor, captain,	58
Princess Charlotte,	44
Montreal (late Wolf),	25
Niagara (late Royal George),	24
Brig Star (late Melville),	18
—— (late Earl Moira),	18
—— (late Sidney Smith),	16
Schr. ——,	16
	219

Besides the above, there were about 20 heavy gun-boats, and two or three small schooners mounting heavy guns.

American Squadron.

	Rate.	*A. Force.*
Ship Superior, Isaac Chauncey, com.	44	58
Mohawk, John Smith,	32	42
General Pike, Jacob Jones,	24	28
Madison, Wm. M. Crane,	20	22
Brig Jefferson, Charles G. Ridgely,	18	21
Jones, Melanct. T. Woolsey,	18	21
Sylph, Jesse D. Elliot,	16	18
Oneida, Thomas Brown,	14	14
Schr. Lady of the Lake†, Marvin P. Mix,	1	1
		225

† This vessel is a small pilot-boat built schooner for a tender and repeater.

Commodore Yeo pursued a similar policy to that which governed him the preceding summer. As long as he was manifestly superior in force to Chauncey, his fleet ruled the lake; but nothing could induce him to hazard an engagement, when the force of his rival was nearly equal to his. During that part of the summer, when this was the case, he lay snug in Kingston harbour. This is by no means said in disparagement of the British commander; for every circumstance shows that this was the wisest policy, and perhaps the only one which could have saved Upper Canada.

§ 8. On the 5th of May the British naval force under sir James Lucas Yeo, consisting of four large ships, three brigs, and a number of gun and other boats, appeared off the village of Oswego, having on board seven companies of infantry, a detachment of artillery, and a battalion of marines, under the command of lieutenant-general Drummond. This post being but occasionally, and not recently occupied by regular troops, was in a bad state of defence. It was garrisoned by about 300 regulars, under lieutenant-colonel Mitchell, who had only arrived a few days before. Lieutenant Woolsey of the navy, with a small body of seamen, was also at the village, and as soon as the fleet appeared, the neighbouring militia were called in. About one o'clock the fleet approached, and 15 boats, large and crowded with troops, at a given signal moved slowly to the shore. These were preceded by gun-boats, sent to rake the woods and cover the landing, while the larger vessels opened a fire upon the fort. As soon as the debarking boats got within range of the shot from the shore batteries, a very successful fire opened upon them, which twice compelled them to retire. They at length returned to the ships, and the whole stood off from the shore for better anchorage. Several boats which had been deserted by the enemy were taken up in the evening, one of which was 60 feet long, carried thirty-six oars and three sails, and could accommodate 150 men. She had received a ball through her bow, and was nearly filled with water.

At day-break next morning the fleet appeared bearing up under easy sail, and about noon the frigates took a position directly against the fort and batteries, and opened a heavy fire, which was kept up for three hours, while the brigs, schooners, and gun-boats covered by their fire the debarkation of the troops. The Americans were now forced to retreat into the rear of the fort, where two companies met the advancing columns of the enemy, while the others engaged their flanks. Lieutenant

Pearce of the navy, and some seamen, joined in the attack, and fought with their characteristic bravery. After a short action, Mitchell again commenced a retreat, which was effected in good order, destroying the bridges in his rear. Indeed a retreat had become necessary for the protection of the stores at the falls, 13 miles in the rear of the fort, which were supposed to form the principal object of the expedition.

Early in the morning of the 7th, the British evacuated the place, and retired to their shipping, after destroying the fort and those public stores which they could not carry away. These stores were not important, the most valuable having been deposited at the falls.

The American official account states their loss at 6 killed, 38 wounded, and 25 missing; that of the British states theirs at 19 killed and 75 wounded. Among them were several officers. Mitchell states the force landed at 1550 men, while the Americans engaged did not exceed 300, being 4 companies of the 3d artillery under captains Boyle, Romayne, M'Intyre, and Pierce, a company of light artillery under captain Melvin, and a small detachment of sailors under lieutenant Pearce of the navy.

A short time after this event, the British fleet appeared near the mouth of the Gennesee river, where about 160 volunteers were stationed, with one piece of artillery. Captain Stone, the commanding officer, dispatched expresses for assistance to different quarters. The following day the commodore's new ship came to anchor off the mouth of the river, and sent an officer on shore with a flag, demanding the surrender of the place, and promising to respect private property in case no resistance should be made, and all public property faithfully disclosed and given up. General Porter arrived while the flag was on shore, and returned for answer that the place would be defended to the last extremity. On the return of the flag, two gun-boats, with from 200 to 300 men on board, advanced to the river, which is about a mile from the town and battery, and commenced a heavy cannonade, directed partly to the town, and partly to bodies of troops who had been placed in ravines near the mouth of the river, to intercept the retreat of the gun-boats, in case they should enter.

At the expiration of an hour and a half, during which time they threw a great number of rockets, shells, and shot of different descriptions, from grape to 68 lbs., a second flag was sent from the commodore's ship, requiring, in the name of the commander of the forces, an immediate surrender, and threatening that if the demand was not complied with, he would

land 1200 regular troops and 400 Indians; that if he should lose a single man, he would raze the town and destroy every vestige of property; and that it was his request that the women and children might be immediately removed, as he could not be accountable for the conduct of the Indians. He was told that the answer to his demand had already been explicitly given; that they were prepared to meet him, the women and children having been disposed of; and that if another flag should be sent on the subject of a surrender, it would not be protected. The flag returned with the gun-boats to the fleet, the whole of which came to anchor about a mile from the shore, where they lay until 8 o'clock on Saturday morning, and then left the place.

On the evening of the following day, the British squadron was discovered making towards Pulteneyville, another small village on the margin of lake Ontario, and information was sent to general Swift, who repaired thither in the course of the night, with 130 volunteers and militia. Next morning a flag was sent on shore, demanding a peaceable surrender of all public property, and threatening an immediate destruction of the village in case of refusal. General Swift returned for answer, that he should oppose any attempt to land, by all the means in his power. Soon after the return of the flag, however, general Swift was induced, by the pressing solicitations and entreaties of the inhabitants of the town, to permit one of its citizens to go to the enemy with a flag, and offer the surrender of the property contained in a store-house at the water's edge, consisting of about 100 barrels of flour considerably damaged, on condition that the commanding officer would stipulate not to take any other, nor molest the inhabitants. But before its return, the enemy sent their gun-boats with several hundred men on shore, who took possession of the flour in the store, and were proceeding to further depredations, when general Swift commenced a fire upon them from an adjacent wood, which wounded several, and became so harassing as to induce them to re-embark. They then commenced a cannonade from the fleet upon the town, which was continued for some time, but with no other injury than a few shot holes through the houses.

§ 9. A short time after these affairs took place, two British gun-boats and five barges, some of which contained howitzers, manned by about 200 sailors and marines, under the command of captain Popham of the royal navy, were captured by a detachment of 120 riflemen and a few Oneida warriors, under

the command of major Appling, of the first United States rifle regiment.

Major Appling had been detached to protect the cannon and naval stores at Oswego, destined for commodore Chauncey's fleet. They were embarked on board a flotilla of boats, in charge of captain Woolsey of the navy, and had arrived safely in Sandy Creek. Here they were pursued by the enemy who was gallantly met by the riflemen, and after an action of a few minutes, beaten and taken, without the loss of a man; an Indian and one rifleman only being wounded.

The riflemen were most judiciously posted along the bank, a short distance below captain Woolsey's boats, where the creek is narrow and shoal. Most of the men having withdrawn from the boats, the enemy gave three cheers at the prospect of the rich prize before him. His joy, however, was of short duration, for at this moment the riflemen poured forth their deadly fire, which in about ten minutes terminated in his total defeat, leaving an officer and 13 men killed, two officers and 28 men wounded (the officers and many of the men dangerously); the residue, consisting of 10 officers and 133 men, taken prisoners.

Major Appling speaks in the highest terms of the courage and good conduct of his officers and men. Captain Harris with his troop of dragoons, and captain Melvin with his two field-pieces, had made a rapid march, and would in a few minutes have been ready to participate in the action, had the enemy been able to make a stand.

The captured officers and men spoke in the highest terms of commendation of major Appling and his rifle corps, to whose humane and spirited conduct they are probably indebted for the preservation of their lives. The Indians were the first to reach the enemy after they submitted, and had commenced executing the savage rule of warfare, sanctioned by Anglo-Indian example at the river Raisin, Lewistown, Tuscarora, &c. of murdering their prisoners, when the major and his men happily arrived, and succeeded, by a prompt and determined course, though not without violence, in terminating the tragic scene*.

No further events took place on this lake during the war worth recording, excepting the capture and destruction of a gun-boat at the head of the St. Lawrence, and the burning of

* An Indian chief is said to have given vent to his feelings on this occasion in language similar to the following:—"When British come to Buffalo, they kill white man, they kill Indian, they kill woman, they burn all houses—when British come here, you no let Indian kill him—you give him eat—this no good."

a vessel of war on the stocks at Presque Isle. Both these exploits were performed by lieutenant Gregory.

§ 10. Nothing of importance took place on lake Erie. The only hostile event that occurred was the destruction of some mills employed in manufacturing flour for the British army, at Long Point, by colonel Campbell, with a detachment of 500 or 600 men from Erie. The mills and some houses occupied as stores were burned. About 50 dragoons stationed there as a guard made their escape, when the party returned without losing a man. This event, which was certainly not strictly justified by the laws of war, though sanctioned by the practice of the enemy, was an unauthorised act on the part of colonel Campbell. A court of enquiry was held on his conduct, whose opinion was unanimously pronounced as follows:

"That, considering the important supplies of bread-stuffs, which from the evidence it appears the enemy's forces derived from the flour-manufacturing mills at and near to Dover, colonel Campbell was warranted in destroying those mills, according to the laws and usages of war, and, for a like reason, the court think him justified in burning the distilleries under the said laws and usages. The saw-mills and carding machine, from their contiguity to the other mills, were, as the court conceives, necessarily involved in one and the same burning.

"In respect to the burning of the dwelling and other houses in the village of Dover, the court are fully of opinion that colonel Campbell has erred; that he can derive no justification from the fact, that the owners of these houses were actively opposed to the American interests in the present war, or from the other facts, that some of them were at the conflagration of Buffalo. In their partizan services it does not appear to the court, that the inhabitants of Dover have done more than their proper allegiance required of them; and the destruction of Buffalo, by a lieutenant-general of the enemy's regular forces, was emphatically the wrong of the British government itself, rendered such by its subsequent adoption of the measure, and ought not to be ascribed to a few Canadians who were present at the time.

"Acts of retaliation, on the part of a nation proud of its rights, and conscious of the power of enforcing them, should, in the opinion of the court, be reluctantly resorted to, and only by instructions from the highest in authority. That no such instructions were given in the case under consideration, is not merely inferred from the absence of evidence to that effect, but is candidly admitted by colonel Campbell in his official re-

port (which is in evidence), wherein he expressly states—'This expedition was undertaken by me without orders, and upon my own responsibility.'

"The court, in delivering the above opinion unfavourable to colonel Campbell, are fully aware of the strong incentives to a just indignation which must have been present to his mind at the time of this visit to Dover—the massacres of the Raisin and the Miami were not yet forgotten, and the more recent devastation of the entire Niagara frontier, accompanied by many acts of savage barbarity, was fresh in remembrance. That these recollections should have aroused his feelings and have swayed his judgment, does not excite wonder but regret, and there is still left for admiration his kind and amiable treatment of the women and children of Dover, abandoned by their natural protectors."

CHAPTER II.

§ 1. Capture of Fort Erie. § 2. Battle of Chippewa plains. § 3. Battle of Bridgewater. § 4. Attack upon Buffalo. § 5. Siege of Fort Erie. § 6. General assault of the works. § 7. Capture of two schooners on lake Erie. § 8. Critical situation of the garrison in Fort Erie. § 9. Brilliant sortie § 10. The British raise the siege. § 11. Expedition under general Bissel. § 12. M'Arthur's expedition towards Burlington Heights. § 13. Evacuation of Canada.

§ 1. MEANWHILE general Brown was occupied in collecting and disciplining his forces, and preparing for the invasion of Canada. On the evening of the 2d of July, general orders were issued for the embarkation of the troops by day-light next morning, when the army, consisting of two brigades, and a body of New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers and Indians, under general P. B. Porter, were landed on the opposite shore, without opposition. The first brigade, under general Scott, and the artillery corps, under major Hindman, landed nearly a mile below Fort Erie, while general Ripley, with the second brigade, made the shore about the same distance above. The fort was soon completely invested, and a battery of long eighteens being planted in a position which commanded it, the garrison, consisting of 137 men, including officers, surrendered prisoners of war. Several pieces of ordnance were found in the fort, and some military stores.

§ 2. Having placed a small garrison in Fort Erie to secure his rear, Brown moved forward the following day to Chippewa plains, where he encamped for the night, after some skirmishing with the enemy.

The American pickets were several times attacked on the morning of the 5th, by small parties of the British. About four in the afternoon, general Porter, with the volunteers and Indians, was ordered to advance from the rear of the American camp, and take a circuit through the woods to the left, in hopes of getting beyond the skirmishing parties of the enemy, and cutting off their retreat, and to favour this purpose the advance were ordered to fall back gradually under the enemy's fire. In about half an hour, however, Porter's advance met the light parties in the woods, and drove them until the whole column of the British was met in order of battle. From the

clouds of dust and the heavy firing, general Brown concluded that the entire force of the British was in motion, and instantly gave orders for general Scott to advance with his brigade and Towson's artillery, and meet them on the plain in front of the American camp. In a few minutes Scott was in close action with a superior force of British regulars.

By this time Porter's volunteers having given way and fled, the left flank of Scott's brigade became much exposed. General Ripley was accordingly ordered to advance with a part of the reserve, and skirting the woods on the left, in order to keep out of view, endeavour to gain the rear of the enemy's right flank. The greatest exertions were made to gain this position, but in vain. Such was the gallantry and impetuosity of the brigade of general Scott, that its advance upon the enemy was not to be checked. Major Jessup, commanding the battalion on the left flank, finding himself pressed both in front and in flank, and his men falling fast around him, ordered his battalion to "support arms and advance." Amidst the most destructive fire this order was promptly obeyed, and he soon gained a more secure position, and returned upon the enemy so galling a discharge, as caused them to retire.

The whole line of the British now fell back, and the American troops closely pressed upon them. As soon as the former gained the sloping ground descending towards Chippewa, they broke and ran to their works, distant about a quarter of a mile, and the batteries opening on the American line, considerably checked the pursuit. Brown now ordered the ordnance to be brought up, with the intention of forcing the works. But on their being examined, he was induced, by the lateness of the hour, and the advice of his officers, to order the forces to retire to camp.

The American official account states their loss at 60 killed, 248 wounded, and 19 missing. The British officially state theirs at 133 killed, 320 wounded, and 46 missing.

Dispirited as was the public mind at this period, the intelligence of this brilliant and unexpected opening of the campaign on the Niagara could not fail of being most joyfully received. The total overthrow of the French power had a few months before liberated the whole of the British forces in Europe. A considerable portion of lord Wellington's army, flushed with their late successes in Spain, had arrived in Canada, and were actually opposed to Brown at Chippewa, while all our maritime towns were threatened by Britain's victorious armies, whose arrival was momentarily expected on the coast. When the intelligence of the stupendous events in Europe was

first received, many consoled themselves with the idea, that the magnanimity of Great Britain would freely grant in her prosperity, what they had insisted we never could force from her in her adversity. Sincerely taking for realities the pretexts on which our neutral rights had been infringed, they thought the question of impressment, now the almost single subject of dispute, could easily be amicably arranged, when the affairs of the world were so altered as to render it nearly impossible that Great Britain could ever again be reduced to the necessity of "fighting for her existence;" or, at all events, as the peace in Europe had effectually removed the cause, and as the American government declined insisting on a formal relinquishment of the practice, no difficulty would be thrown in the way of a general and complete pacification of the world.

This illusion was soon dissipated. By the next advices from Europe it was learned, that the cry for vengeance upon the Americans was almost unanimous throughout the British empire. The president was threatened with the fate of Bonaparte, and it was said that the American peace ought to be dictated in Washington, as that of Europe had been at Paris. Even in parliament* the idea was held out that peace ought not to be thought of till America had received a signal punishment, for having dared to declare war upon them while their forces were engaged in "delivering Europe" from its oppressor†. The commencement of the negociations for peace, which had been proposed by the British court, was suspended, and strenuous efforts were made to send to America as commanding a force as possible.

Under these circumstances, a victory gained by the raw troops of America over the veterans of Wellington, superior in numbers to the victors‡, upon an open plain, and upon a

* Sir Joseph Yorke, one of the lords of the admiralty, said in parliament, "we have Mr. Madison to depose before we can lay down our arms."

† At a dinner given to lord Hill, who was on the eve of sailing at the head of an expedition against New-Orleans, he stated the period when he should embark for America, and added, that "he had no doubt, with the means already there, together with those on the way, and what were promised by his prince, he should humble the Yankees, and bring the contest to a speedy and successful termination." Happily for his lordship he was soon after superseded in the command by general Packenham.

‡ The British official account states the American forces to have been superior in number. This apparent contradiction may be reconciled by observing, that a single brigade of the American troops achieved the victory; the volunteers having fled before the action commenced, while the brigade of general Ripley had not arrived on the ground, when the British took shelter behind their works.

spot chosen by the British general, had a most beneficial tendency, by dispelling the dread which the prowess of the British troops in Spain could not have failed to have produced in the minds of their opponents. This battle was to the army what the victory of captain Hull had been to the navy; and the confidence which it thus inspired was surely most justly founded, for every man felt that the victory had been gained by superior skill and discipline: it was not the fruit of any accidental mistake or confusion in the army of the enemy, or of one of those movements of temporary panic on one side, or excitement on the other, which sometimes give a victory to irregular courage over veteran and disciplined valour.

After so signal a defeat, the British could not be induced to hazard another engagement. They abandoned their works at Chippewa, and burning their barracks, retired to fort Niagara and fort George, closely followed by Brown. Here he expected to receive some heavy guns and reinforcements from Sackett's Harbour; but on the 23d of July he received a letter by express from general Gaines, advising him that that port was blockaded by a superior British force, and that commodore Chauncey was confined to his bed with a fever. Thus disappointed in his expectations of being enabled to reduce the forts at the mouth of the Niagara, Brown determined to disencumber the army of baggage, and march directly for Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, he fell back upon Chippewa.

§ 3. About noon on the 25th, general Brown was advised by an express from Lewistown, that the British were following him, and were in considerable force in Queenstown and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived with reinforcements at Niagara during the preceding night, and that a number of boats were in view, moving up the river. Shortly after, intelligence was brought that the enemy were landing at Lewistown, and that the baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in danger of immediate capture. In order to recal the British from this object, Brown determined to put the army in motion towards Queenstown, and accordingly general Scott was directed to advance with the first brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, with orders to report if the enemy appeared, and if necessary to call for assistance. On his arrival near the falls, Scott learned that the enemy was in force directly in his front, a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. He immediately advanced upon them, after

dispatching a messenger to general Brown with this intelligence.

The report of the cannon and small arms reached general Brown before the messenger, and orders were instantly issued for general Ripley to march to the support of general Scott, with the second brigade and all the artillery, and Brown himself repaired with all speed to the scene of action, whence he sent orders for general Porter to advance with his volunteers. On reaching the field of battle, general Brown found that Scott had passed the wood, and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments, and Towson's artillery, the 25th having been thrown to the right to be governed by circumstances. The contest was close and desperate, and the American troops, far inferior in numbers, suffered severely.

Meanwhile major Jessup, who commanded the 25th regiment, taking advantage of a fault committed by the British commander, by leaving a road unguarded on his left, threw himself promptly into the rear of the enemy, where he was enabled to operate with the happiest effect. The slaughter was dreadful; the enemy's line fled down the road at the third or fourth fire. The capture of general Riall, with a large escort of officers of rank, was part of the trophies of Jessup's intrepidity and skill; and, but for the impression of an unfounded report, under which he unfortunately remained for a few minutes, lieutenant general Drummond, the commander of the British forces, would inevitably have fallen into his hands, an event which would, in all probability, have completed the disaster of the British army. Drummond was completely in Jessup's power; but being confidently informed that the first brigade was cut in pieces, and finding himself with less than 200 men, and without any prospect of support, in the midst of an overwhelming hostile force, he thought of nothing, for the moment, but to make good his retreat, and save his command. Of this temporary suspense of the advance of the American column, general Drummond availed himself to make his escape. Among the officers captured, was one of general Drummond's aids-de-camp, who had been dispatched from the front line to order up the reserve, with a view to fall on Scott with the concentrated force of the whole army, and overwhelm him at a single effort. Nor would it have been possible to prevent this catastrophe, had the reserve arrived in time; the force with which general Scott would then have been obliged to contend being nearly quadruple that of his own. By the fortunate capture, however, of the British

aid-de-camp, before the completion of the service on which he had been ordered, the enemy's reserve was not brought into action until the arrival of general Ripley's brigade, which prevented the disaster which must otherwise have ensued*.

Though the second brigade pressed forward with the greatest ardour, the battle had raged for an hour before it could arrive on the field, by which time it was nearly dark. The enemy fell back on its approach. In order to disengage the exhausted troops of the first brigade, the fresh troops were ordered to pass Scott's line, and display in front, a movement which was immediately executed by Ripley. Meanwhile the enemy, being reconnoitered, was found to have taken a new position, and occupied a height with his artillery, supported by a line of infantry, which gave him great advantages, it being the key to the whole position. To secure the victory, it was necessary to carry his artillery and seize the height. For this purpose the second brigade advanced upon the Queenstown road, and the first regiment of infantry, which had arrived that day, and was attached to neither of the brigades, was formed in a line facing the enemy's on the height, with a view of drawing his fire and attracting his attention, as the second brigade advanced on his left flank to carry his artillery.

As soon as the first regiment approached its position, colonel Miller was ordered to advance with the 21st regiment, and carry the artillery on the height with the bayonet. The first regiment gave way under the fire of the enemy; but Miller, undaunted by this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried the heights and cannon in a masterly style. General Ripley followed on the right with the 23d re-

* "A trait in his conduct highly honorable to colonel Jessup is, that his humanity as a man triumphed over his technical duty as an officer. Such was, for a time, his situation in the field, that every prisoner he took, by impeding his operations against the enemy, not only injured the cause in which he was engaged, but endangered the safety of his own corps. According to the canons of war, therefore, his duty, as we believe, was, to make no prisoners, but to put to death every man who might oppose him in arms. Regardless, however, of these sanguinary statutes, and listening only to the voice of mercy, he gave quarter to all that surrendered to him, although conscious they would diminish his effective force, and that he must necessarily suffer them again to escape. This conduct was noticed by some of the British officers, and commended as highly honorable to the young American. Had Jessup been less humane as a man, and more technically rigid as an officer, he might have acted, as the aid-de-camp of general Drummond acknowledged, with more deadly effect against the enemy. But he knew the road to glory better. The fairest wreath in the hero's chaplet is that which is entwined by the hand of mercy."—*Port Folio.*

giment. It had some desperate fighting, which caused it to faulter, but it was promptly rallied, and brought up.

The enemy being now driven from their commanding ground, the whole brigade, with the volunteers and artillery, and the first regiment, which had been rallied, were formed in line, with the captured cannon, nine pieces, in the rear. Here they were soon joined by major Jessup, with the 25th, the regiment that had acted with such effect in the rear of the enemy's left. In this situation the American troops withstood three distinct desperate attacks of the enemy, who had rallied his broken corps, and received reinforcements. In each of them he was repulsed with great slaughter, so near being his approach, that the buttons of the men were distinctly seen through the darkness by the flash of the muskets, and many prisoners were taken at the point of the bayonet, principally by Porter's volunteers. During the second attack general Scott was ordered up, who had been held in reserve with three of his battalions, from the moment of Ripley's arrival on the field. During the third effort of the enemy, the direction of Scott's column would have enabled him, in a few minutes, to have formed line in the rear of the enemy's right, and thus have brought him between two fires. But a flank fire from a concealed party of the enemy falling upon the centre of Scott's command, completely frustrated this intention. His column was severed in two; one part passing to the rear, the other by the right flank of platoons towards Ripley's main line.

This was the last effort of the British to regain his position and artillery, the American troops being left in quiet possession of the field. It was now nearly midnight, and generals Brown and Scott being both severely wounded, and all the troops much exhausted, the command was given to general Ripley, and he was instructed to return to camp, bringing with him the wounded and the artillery. The pieces, however, were found in so dismantled a state, and such had been the slaughter of the horses, that to remove them at that late hour was found to be impracticable.

On the return of the troops to camp, general Brown sent for general Ripley, and after giving him his reasons for the measure, ordered him to put the troops into the best possible condition; to give to them the necessary refreshment; to take with him the picquets and camp guards, and every other description of force; to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared.

General Ripley has been much blamed for the non-execution of this order, by which the captured cannon again fell into the hands of the British. General Brown, in his official report, says, "To this order he [Ripley] made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed." On the part of general Ripley it is stated, that his orders were, in case the enemy appeared in force, "to be governed entirely by circumstances." His orders, therefore, were executed. At day-break the army was arranged, and the march commenced, when circumstances of the most positive nature were made apparent, such as must have been in view in the discretionary part of the order, and in the full effect of which general Ripley commenced and effected the retreat which afterwards led him to Fort Erie. The troops, reduced to less than 1600 men, were marched on the 26th by general Ripley toward the field of battle. Motion was commenced at day-break, but difficulties incidental to the late losses prevented the advance before some time had been spent in re-organization and arrangement. The line of march being assumed, and the Chippewa crossed, general Ripley sent forward lieutenants Tappan of the 23d, and Riddle of the 15th, with their respective commands, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, strength, and movements. On examination, he was found in advance of his former position, on an eminence, strongly reinforced, as had been asserted by prisoners taken the preceding evening; his flanks, resting on a wood on one side, and on the river on the other, defied being turned or driven in; his artillery was planted so as to sweep the road; besides these advantages, he extended a line nearly double in length to that which could be displayed by our troops. To attack with two-thirds the force of the preceding evening an enemy thus increased, was an act of madness that the first thought rejected. The army was kept in the field and in motion long enough to be assured of the strength and position of the enemy; that information being confirmed, there remained but one course to prevent that enemy from impeding a retreat, which, had he been vigilant, he would previously have prevented. The army, therefore, immediately retrograded, and the retreat received the sanction of general Brown, previous to his crossing the Niagara*.

The American official account states their loss in this battle at 171 killed, 572 wounded, and 117 missing; the return of British prisoners presents an aggregate of 179, including major-general Riall, and a number of other officers.—The British

* Port Folio, Memoir of Major-General Ripley.

state their loss to be 84 killed, 559 wounded, 193 missing; their loss in prisoners they stated only at 41. Major-general Brown and brigadier-general Scott were among the wounded of the Americans, and lieutenant-general Drummond and major-general Riall among those of the British.

In consequence of the wounds of generals Brown and Scott, the command devolved on general Ripley, who pursued his retreat across the Chippewa, destroying the bridges in his rear, and throwing every possible impediment in the way of the enemy, in order to obstruct his advance. On the 27th of July, the army reached Fort Erie. Here it was determined to make a stand, and accordingly the lines of defence and fortification were immediately marked out, and by the unremitted exertions of the army, were completed on the 3d of August, the very day of the arrival of the enemy before them.

§ 4. Early in the morning of the 3d, an attempt was made to surprise Buffalo, with the intention, it is supposed, of re-capturing general Riall, and other British prisoners there, and destroying the public stores. About 2 in the morning, nine boat-loads of troops were landed on the American side, half a mile below Conjocta creek, on the upper bank of which, suspecting their intention, major Morgan had taken a position with a battalion of the first rifle regiment, consisting of 240 men. Here, during the preceding night, he had thrown up a battery of a few logs, and torn away the bridge. About four o'clock the British commenced the attack, sending a party before to repair the bridge, under cover of their fire. So heavy and deadly, however, was the fire opened by the riflemen, that they were compelled to retire. They then formed in the skirt of the wood, and kept up the fight at long shot, continually reinforcing from the Canada shore, until they had 23 boat-loads, when they attempted to outflank, by sending a large body up the creek to ford it. But a detachment of about 60 men being sent to dispute the passage, they were repulsed with considerable loss. The object now appearing unattainable, the enemy commenced their retreat, having previously thrown some troops on Squaw island, which enfiladed the creek, thus preventing their retreat from being harassed. Their superior numbers enabled them to take their wounded and most of their killed off the field; though some of the latter were afterwards found. A number of muskets and accoutrements were also collected, and some clothing that appeared to have been torn for the purpose of binding their wounds. Six British prisoners were taken, who stated their force to have consisted of from 12 to 1500 men. Although the action continued for two hours

and a half, the loss of the Americans was but trifling—two killed and eight wounded. The loss of the British was never ascertained, but it must have been quite disproportioned to that of the Americans.

§ 5. On the arrival of the British before Fort Erie, they perceived that the opportunity was lost of carrying the American works by a coup-de-main. Driving in the pickets, therefore, they made a regular investment of the place. The following day general Gaines arrived from Sackett's Harbour, and being senior in rank assumed the command. On the 6th, the rifle corps was sent to endeavour to draw out the enemy, in order to try his strength. Their orders were, to pass through the intervening woods, to amuse the British light troops until their strong columns should get in motion, when they should retire slowly to the plain, where a strong line was posted in readiness to receive the enemy. The riflemen accordingly met and drove the light troops into their lines, but although they kept the wood near two hours, they were not able to draw any part of the enemy's force after them. The British left eleven dead and three prisoners in the hands of the riflemen; but their loss was supposed to be much more considerable. The loss of the riflemen was five killed and three or four wounded.

The main camp of the British was planted about two miles distant. In front of it they threw up a line of partial circumvallation, extending around the American fortifications. This consisted of two lines of entrenchment, supported by block-houses; in front of these, at favourable points, batteries were erected, one of which enfiladed the American works.

The American position was on the margin of lake Erie, at the entrance of the Niagara river, on nearly a horizontal plain, twelve or fifteen feet above the surface of the water, possessing few natural advantages. It had been strengthened in front by temporary parapet breast-works, entrenchments, and abbatis, with two batteries and six field-pieces. The small unfinished fort, Erie, with a 24, 18, and 12 pounders, formed the north-east, and the Douglas battery, with an 18 and 6 pounder near the edge of the lake, the south-east angle on the right. The left was defended by a redoubt battery with six field-pieces, just thrown up on a small ridge. The rear was left open to the lake, bordered by a rocky shore of easy ascent. The battery on the left was defended by captain Towson; Fort Erie by captain Williams, with major Trimble's command of the 19th infantry; the batteries on the front by captains Biddle and Fanning; the whole of the artillery commanded by major Hindman. Parts of the 11th, 9th, and 22d infantry, were

posted on the right under the command of lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall. General Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 21st and 23d, defended the left. General Porter's brigade of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, with the riflemen, occupied the centre.

§ 6. During the 13th and 14th, the enemy kept up a brisk cannonade, which was sharply returned from the American batteries, without any considerable loss. One of their shells lodged in a small magazine, in Fort Erie, which was almost empty. It blew up with an explosion more awful in appearance than injurious in its effects, as it did not disable a man or derange a gun. A momentary cessation of the thunders of the artillery took place on both sides. This was followed by a loud and joyous shout by the British army, which was instantly returned on the part of the Americans, who, amidst the smoke of the explosion, renewed the contest by an animated roar of the heavy cannon.

From the supposed loss of ammunition, and the consequent depression such an event was likely to produce, general Gaines felt persuaded that this explosion would lead the enemy to assault, and made his arrangements accordingly. These suspicions were fully verified, by an attack that was made in the night between the 14th and 15th of August.

The night was dark, and the early part of it raining, but nevertheless one third of the troops were kept at their posts. At half past two o'clock, the right column of the enemy approached, and though enveloped in darkness, was distinctly heard on the American left, and promptly marked by the musketry under major Wood and captain Towson. Being mounted at the moment, Gaines repaired to the point of attack, where the sheet of fire rolling from Towson's battery, and the musketry of the left wing, enabled him to see the enemy's column of about 1500 men approaching on that point; his advance was not checked until it had approached within ten feet of the infantry. A line of loose brush, representing an abattis, only intervened; a column of the enemy attempted to pass round the abattis, through the water, where it was nearly breast-deep. Apprehending that this point would be carried, Gaines ordered a detachment of riflemen and infantry to its support, but at this moment the enemy were repulsed. They instantly renewed the charge, and were again driven back.

On the right, the fire of cannon and musketry announced the approach of the centre and left columns of the enemy, under colonels Drummond and Scott. The latter was received and repulsed by the 9th, under the command of captain Foster, and

captains Boughton and Harding's companies of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, aided by a six-pounder, judiciously posted by major M'Kee, chief engineer.

But the centre, led by colonel Drummond, was not long kept in check; it approached at once every assailable point of the fort, and with scaling-ladders ascended the parapet, where, however, it was repulsed with dreadful carnage. The assault was twice repeated, and as often checked; but the enemy having moved round in the ditch, covered by darkness, encreased by the heavy cloud of smoke which had rolled from the cannon and musketry, repeated the charge, re-ascended the ladders, and with their pikes, bayonets, and spears fell upon the American artillerists, and succeeded in capturing the bastion. Lieutenant M'Donough, being severely wounded, demanded quarter. It was refused by colonel Drummond. The lieutenant then seized a handspike, and nobly defended himself until he was shot down with a pistol by the monster who had refused him quarter, who often reiterated the order—"give the damned yankees no quarter." This officer, whose bravery, if it had been seasoned with virtue, would have entitled him to the admiration of every soldier—this hardened murderer soon met his fate. He was shot through the breast, while repeating the order "to give no quarter."

Several gallant attempts were made to recover the right bastion, but all proved unsuccessful. At this moment every operation was arrested by the explosion of some cartridges deposited in the end of the stone building adjoining the contested bastion. The explosion was tremendous and decisive: the bastion was restored by the flight of the British. At this moment captain Biddle was ordered to cause a field-piece to be posted so as to enfilade the exterior plain and salient glacis. Though not recovered from a severe contusion in the shoulder, received from one of the enemy's shells, Biddle promptly took his position, and served his field-piece with vivacity and effect. Captain Fanning's battery likewise played upon them at this time with great effect. The enemy were in a few moments entirely defeated, taken, or put to flight, leaving on the field 221 killed, 174 wounded, and 186 prisoners, including 14 officers killed and 7 wounded and prisoners. A large portion were severely wounded; the slightly wounded, it is presumed, were carried off.

The loss of the Americans during the assault was seventeen killed, fifty-six wounded, and eleven missing. The British acknowledge only 57 killed, 309 wounded, and 539 missing. During the preceding bombardment, the loss of the Americans was

7 killed, 19 severely and 17 slightly wounded. The loss of the British is not mentioned in their official account. This bombardment commenced at sun-rise on the morning of the 13th, and continued without intermission till 8 o'clock, P. M.; recommenced on the 14th, at day-light, with increased warmth; and did not end until an hour before the commencement of the assault on the morning of the 15th.

§ 7. During the night preceding the commencement of the bombardment of Fort Erie, an unfortunate affair for the American arms took place on the lake, just behind the fort, in the surprise and capture of two schooners, by a number of boats full of British soldiers. On the boats being hailed, they answered "provision-boats," a manœuvre which deceived the American officers, as boats from the fort had been in the habit of passing and re-passing through the night. The force being overwhelming, and the surprise complete, but little effectual resistance was made, and the enterprise was completely successful. The Americans had one killed and nine wounded. The loss of the assailants was more considerable.

§ 8. A short time after the assault on Fort Erie, general Gaines received a serious wound from the bursting of a shell, by which means the command once more devolved on general Ripley, till the 2d of September, when the state of his health allowed general Brown again to place himself at the head of his army.

The troops in Fort Erie began now to be generally considered as in a critical situation, and much solicitude to be expressed for the fate of the army that had thrown so much glory on the American name, menaced as it was in front by an enemy of superior force, whose numbers were constantly receiving additions, and whose batteries were every day becoming more formidable, while a river of difficult passage lay on their rear. Reinforcements were ordered on from Champlain, but they were yet far distant. But the genius of Brown was fully equal to the contingency, and the difficulties with which he was environed served only to add to the number of his laurels.

§ 9. Though frequent skirmishes occurred about this period, in which individual gallantry was amply displayed, yet no event of material consequence took place till the 17th of September, when, having suffered much from the fire of the enemy's batteries, and aware that a new one was about to be opened, general Brown resolved on a sortie in order to effect their destruction. The British infantry at this time consisted of three brigades, of 12 or 1500 men each, one of which was stationed at the works in front of Fort Erie, the other two occupied their camp

behind. Brown's intention therefore was, to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into action.

On the morning of the 17th, the infantry and riflemen, regulars and militia, were ordered to be paraded and put in readiness to march precisely at 12 o'clock. General Porter with the volunteers, colonel Gibson with the riflemen, and major Brooks with the 23d and 1st infantry, and a few dragoons acting as infantry, were ordered to move from the extreme left upon the enemy's right, by a passage opened through the woods for the occasion. General Miller was directed to station his command in the ravine between Fort Erie and the enemy's batteries, by passing them by detachment through the skirts of the wood—and the 21st infantry under general Ripley was posted as a corps of reserve between the new bastions of Fort Erie—all under cover, and out of the view of the enemy.

The left column, under the command of general Porter, which was destined to turn the enemy's right, having arrived near the British entrenchments, were ordered to advance and commence the action. Passing down the ravine, Brown judged from the report of the musketry that the action had commenced. Hastening, therefore, to general Miller, he directed him to seize the moment, and pierce the enemy's entrenchments between batteries No. 2 and 3. These orders were promptly and ably executed. Within 30 minutes after the first gun was fired, batteries No. 2 and 3, the enemy's line of entrenchments, and his two block-houses, were in possession of the Americans.

Soon after, battery No. 1 was abandoned by the British. The guns in each were then spiked or otherwise destroyed, and the magazine of No. 3 was blown up.

A few minutes before the explosion, the reserve had been ordered up under general Ripley, and as soon as he arrived on the ground, he was ordered to strengthen the front line, which was then engaged with the enemy, in order to protect the detachments employed in demolishing the captured works. While forming arrangements for acting on the enemy's camp during the moment of panic, Ripley received a severe wound. By this time, however, the object of the sortie being accomplished beyond the most sanguine expectations, general Miller had ordered the troops on the right to fall back; and, observing this movement, Brown sent his staff along the line to call in the other corps. Within a few minutes they retired from the ravine, and thence to the camp.

Thus, says general Brown, in his dispatch, 1000 regulars and an equal portion of militia, in one hour of close action, blasted the hopes of the enemy, destroyed the fruits of fifty days' labor, and diminished his effective force 1000 men at least.

In their official account of this sortie, the British published no returns of their loss, but from their vigorous resistance it must no doubt have been very great. Their loss in prisoners was 385. On the part of the Americans the killed amounted to 83, the wounded to 216, and the missing to a like number.

§ 10. A few days after this battle the British raised the siege, and retreated behind the Chippewa. Meanwhile the reinforcements from Plattsburg arrived at Sackett's Harbour, and after a few days' rest proceeded to the Niagara. They crossed that river on the ninth of October, when general Izard, being the senior officer, superceded general Brown in the command. On the 14th the army moved from fort Erie, with the design of bringing the enemy to action. An attempt was made to dispute the passage of a creek at Chippewa plains, but the American artillery soon compelled the enemy to retire to their fortified camp, when attempts were repeatedly made to draw them out the following day, but without effect. A partial engagement took place on the 19th, which closed the campaign on this peninsula.

§ 11. General Bissell marched from Black Creek on the morning of the 18th, with a body of about 900 men, for the purpose of seizing some provisions intended for the British troops. After driving before them a picket, of which they made the commanding officer prisoner, they encamped for the night, in the course of which the advanced picket was attacked by two companies of the Glengary light infantry, who were repulsed with loss. Next morning Bissell was attacked by a corps of about 1200 men, commanded by the marquis of Tweedale. The light corps and riflemen sustained the whole fire for about fifteen minutes, with the greatest gallantry, until the other troops were formed, and brought to their support.

The 5th regiment, under colonel Pinckney, was ordered to skirt the woods and turn the right flank of the enemy; the 14th, under major Bernard, to form in front, and advance to the support of the light troops; the 15th and 16th regiments were ordered to act as circumstances might require. The well-directed fire of the light corps, and the charge of the 14th, soon compelled the enemy to give ground; and on discovering that his right flank was turned by the 5th, he retreated in the utmost confusion, leaving some killed, wounded, and prison-

ers behind. Bissell pursued them to a ravine some distance from the scene where the action commenced. Not knowing the ground, he did not think proper to push them further, but soon after the country being reconnoitered, it was discovered that they had retreated to their strong holds. A large quantity of grain was found and destroyed; and, after burying the few soldiers who fell, and the enemy's dead who were left on the ground, the detachment returned to camp. The killed, wounded, and missing in this affair amounted to 67, of whom 12 were killed.

§ 12. Before leaving the affairs on this frontier, it will be proper to mention the expedition of mounted men under general M'Arthur, which proceeded from Detroit towards Burlington Heights, for the purpose of destroying the resources of general Drummond's army, and paralising any efforts which might be made against Detroit during the winter.

The detachment, consisting of about 720 Ohio and Kentucky volunteers, and a few Indians, left Detroit about the end of October. To mask the object of the expedition, a movement round lake St. Clair was rendered absolutely necessary. This circuit caused the troops to be exposed to many difficulties and hardships, in wading frequently along the shores of the lake; in the passage of several deep and rapid rivers, sometimes without boats, and on all occasions encountering swamps; yet, notwithstanding these obstacles, such was the secrecy and rapidity of the expedition, that the detachment was enabled to enter the town of Oxford, 140 miles in the enemy's country, before the inhabitants were apprised that a force was approaching.

On the succeeding day, the detachment proceeded to Burford, where the militia had been embodied in expectation of this expedition; but it was found that they had retreated, a few hours before, to Malcolm's mills, where they were joined by the militia from Long Point.

It was M'Arthur's intention to cross Grand River, as soon as possible, without regarding the militia collected at Malcolm's mills, and attack Burlington. But to his great mortification, the river was found high and rapid from the late excessive rains. Here also the news reached him that the American troops had re-crossed the Niagara, leaving only a strong garrison in fort Erie. These and other considerations presented serious objections to any attempt to pass the river; it was therefore determined to attack and defeat or disperse the militia at Malcolm's mills, move down the Long Point road through the Grand River settlement, destroy the valuable mills

in that quarter, and then return to the American territory, either by a movement across Grand River at the mouth to fort Erie, or along Talbot-street to the Thames.

To that effect, a detachment was directed to remain and engage the attention of the enemy, whilst the principal force should be withdrawn and marched to Malcolm's mills. The enemy, consisting of four or five hundred militia and a few Indians, was found fortified on commanding ground beyond a creek, deep and difficult of passage, except at a bridge immediately in front of their works, which had been destroyed. Arrangements were made for a joint attack on the front and rear. The Ohio troops, with the advance guard and Indians, were accordingly thrown across the creek under cover of a thick wood, to approach the enemy in rear, whilst the Kentucky troops were to attack in front, as soon as the attention of the enemy was engaged by the attack in the rear. The enemy would have been completely surprised and captured, had not an unfortunate yell by the Indians announced the approach of the detachment destined to attack their rear; they were, however, defeated and dispersed, with the loss, in the skirmishes on that day, of one captain and seventeen privates killed, nine privates wounded, and three captains, five subalterns, and one hundred and three privates made prisoners; whilst the loss of the Americans was only one killed and six wounded. Early next morning the enemy were pursued on the road to Dover, many made prisoners, and five valuable mills destroyed.

Apprehensive that the troops could not be supplied on the rout to fort Erie, and that difficulties would occur in the passage of Grand River, together with the uncertainty which existed as to the position of general Izard's army, M'Arthur was induced to return to Detroit by the way of Talbot-street and the Thames, which was happily effected on the 17th of November.

Thus this active body of men penetrated two hundred miles into the enemy's territory, destroyed two hundred stand of arms, together with five of their most valuable mills; paroled or dispersed the greater portion of the efficient militia of that part of Upper Canada west of Grand River; and then returned in safety to Detroit, with the loss of only one man.

§ 13. Meanwhile, the approach of winter rendering it necessary for the army to retire to comfortable quarters, general Izard crossed the major part of his troops into the American territory, leaving a garrison in Erie, which also was soon after withdrawn.

Thus ended a third campaign in Upper Canada, without a single important conquest being secured. The operations of the army under Brown, however, are not to be considered as worthless and inefficient. They have, in the most complete manner, effaced the stain thrown on the army by the imbecile efforts of its infancy, and have cast a lustre on the American name, by a series of the most brilliant victories, over troops heretofore considered matchless. Nor ought we to lose sight of the effect produced by these events on the country at large, actively engaged as was almost every citizen, in repelling, or in preparing to repel, the invaders of their homes. This effect was without doubt extensively beneficial; and perhaps it may not be improper to ascribe to Brown and his gallant companions in arms a part of that renown which the arms of the United States have acquired by the defeat, in almost every instance, of the powerful forces with which it has been assailed.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1. British depredations in the Chesapeake. § 2. Movements of Barney's flotilla. § 3. Measures for the defence of Baltimore and Washington. § 4. Arrival of the expedition under general Ross. § 5. Landing and movements of the British army. § 6. Battle of Bladensburg. § 7. Capture of Washington, and destruction of the public buildings. § 8. Retreat of the British. § 9. Fort Warburton blown up. § 10. Alexandria plundered. § 11. Preparations for cutting off the retreat of the plunderers. § 12. Bombardment of the batteries under commodores Porter and Perry. § 13. Commodore Rodgers' fire-ships. § 14. Defeat and death of sir Peter Parker.

§ 1. THE British squadron in the Chesapeake, under admiral Cockburn, still continued their system of plunder and devastation along the coasts of the bay, and the numerous rivers of which it forms the estuary. The principal, if not the only naval protection to this exposed coast, consisted of the flotilla under commodore Barney, but this presented but a very imperfect protection to this extensive line of frontier.

§ 2. On the 1st of June, the flotilla, making sail from the mouth of the Patuxent, with the wind from the northward, discovered two of the enemy's schooners down the bay. The schooners made signals and fired guns; when a large ship was seen getting under way, which dispatched a number of barges to the assistance of the schooners. Unfortunately at this time the wind shifted, which brought the ship to windward, and Barney was thus forced to put back into the Patuxent, whither he was followed by a seventy-four, three schooners, and seven barges with a fresh wind. But the gun-boats being in the rear, particularly one which was laden with provisions, Barney soon found it necessary to hazard an engagement to prevent their capture. Accordingly, bringing his sloop and one of the gun-boats to an anchor, he sent men on board of the provision boat, to assist in bringing her in, and made signals for his barges to return and join him. At this moment his sloop and gun-boat opened a fire on a schooner of the enemy, which was leading in with a number of barges. She immediately bore up, and got her boats ahead to tow her off, seeing which the American barges rowed down upon her and the other schooners, and gave them a number of shot at long distance. But

the chase was soon given up, and the flotilla returned to port. During the firing, a British barge threw a number of rockets, which did no execution.

On the 8th, the enemy being reinforced with a razee and a sloop of war brig, the flotilla moved up the Patuxent to the mouth of St. Leonard's creek, and on being followed by the British squadron, they moved up the creek about two miles, and moored in line, abreast, across the channel, where they prepared for action. The creek not being accessible to ships, the barges of the enemy, fifteen in number, were dispatched against the flotilla. As they approached, they advanced a rocket barge, at which several shot were fired by the flotilla, but they fell short, as rockets can be thrown a greater distance than shot. Barney, therefore, got his barges, thirteen in number, under weigh, and leaving the sloop and gun-boats at anchor, they rowed down upon the enemy, who precipitately fled from their position. The pursuit was continued till the flotilla came near the enemy's shipping, when, after firing a few shot, the American barges returned to their moorings. In the afternoon, the British barges again came up, again threw rockets, and were again pursued out of the creek.

During these encounters, the British are said to have suffered considerably. The large schooner was nearly destroyed, having several shot through her at the water's edge; her deck torn up, gun dismounted, and mainmast nearly cut off about half way up, and otherwise much cut. They ran her ashore to prevent her sinking. The commodore's boat was cut in two; a shot went through the rocket boat; one of the small schooners, carrying two thirty-two pounders, had a shot which raked her from aft forward. The boats generally suffered; but their loss was not ascertained.

On the 15th, the enemy having received further reinforcements, sent a detachment of boats up the river, which took possession of Benedict and Marlborough, the latter only 18 miles from Washington. After plundering a quantity of stock, and burning the tobacco warehouses, which, according to the British statement, contained 2500 hogsheads of tobacco, they returned to their ships.

Shortly after this affair, in order to extricate the flotilla from its confined situation, a battery was hastily thrown up on a point of land at the junction of St. Leonard's creek and the Patuxent, and a combined attack being made by the flotilla and a small body of infantry and artillery, the British squadron was forced to drop down the Patuxent, which enabled commodore Barney to pass his flotilla up that river.

§ 3. At this time no apprehensions were entertained of any serious attack being made on any important point by the enemy's forces in the Chesapeake. But towards the end of June, certain intelligence was received of the complete success of the allies in the subjugation of France, and government were led to believe, as well from communications received from our ministers abroad, as from the tone of the British prints, that a powerful force was about to be sent to the United States. A variety of considerations pointed to Washington City and Baltimore as prominent objects of attack.

Immediate measures of defence had therefore become necessary; and accordingly, a new military district was created, embracing the state of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and Potomack, the command of which was given to general Winder. A requisition was made on certain states for a corps of 93,500 militia, and the executive of each state was requested to detach and hold in readiness for immediate service their respective quotas. Of that requisition, 2000 effectives from the quota of Virginia; 5000 from that of Pennsylvania; 6000, the whole quota of Maryland; and 2000, the estimated number of the militia of the District of Columbia, were put at the disposition of general Winder, making an aggregate of 15,000, exclusive of about 1000 regulars. But this force, which, had it been well organized, and ready to meet the foe at any threatened point, would have been amply sufficient for defence, totally failed in the hour of need. From the tardiness incident to the present imperfect militia system of the United States, the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops could not be organized in time to meet the enemy, although the battle which sealed the fate of Washington did not take place till a month after they were called out. And even of the Maryland militia, nearly one half joined the army but half an hour before the action. A considerable part of this delay was occasioned by general Winder's not receiving the authority to call out the state troops for some time after it was issued, owing to his being constantly in motion at this period, in order to acquire a complete knowledge of the topography of the district.

§ 4. During the month of July, the enemy's fleet ascended both the Potomack and Patuxent, and committed great depredations, particularly on the former river. Admiral Cochrane arrived in the Chesapeake in the beginning of August, and on the 17th, the fleet, now in great force, was joined by admiral Malcolm, with the expedition from Bermuda, destined against Baltimore and Washington.

§ 5. The circumstance of Barney's flotilla having taken shelter at the head of the Patuxent proved extremely favourable to an attack on Washington, as it masked the intention of the enemy. This attack, therefore, being determined on, Cochrane moved his squadron up the river. Previously to his entering the Patuxent, however, he detached captain Gordon, with a number of ships and bombs to the Potomack, to bombard fort Warburton, with a view of destroying that fort, and opening a free communication above, as well as to cover the retreat of the army, should its return by the Bladensburg road be found too hazardous. Sir Peter Parker, with the Menelaus and some small vessels, was sent up the Chesapeake to make a diversion in that quarter. The remainder of the naval force, and the troops, moved up the Patuxent to Benedict, where the army was landed upon the 19th and 20th.

So soon as the necessary provisions and stores could be assembled and arranged, major-general Ross, with his army, moved towards Nottingham, while the British flotilla, consisting of the armed launches, pinnaces, barges, and other boats of the fleet, under admiral Cockburn, passed up the river, keeping on the right flank of the army, for the double purpose of supplying it with provisions, and, if necessary, of passing it over to the left bank of the river, which secured a safe retreat to the ships, should it be judged necessary. The army reached Nottingham on the 21st, and the following day arrived at Marlborough. The flotilla, keeping pace with the army, arrived within sight of Barney's flotilla on the 22d. It was instantly set on fire by a small party of sailors who had been left for that purpose, the commodore having previously joined general Winder with the greater part of his force. The flotilla soon blew up, excepting one vessel, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

While a large regular army, well disciplined and accoutred, accompanied with a strong naval force, was thus within 16 miles of the American capital, the principal part of the force destined to defend it had not arrived, and a considerable portion still remained at their homes. The actual force under general Winder only amounted to about 3000 men, of whom 1400 were regulars, including the marines and sea-fencibles under commodore Barney; the remainder were volunteers and militia, principally from the District of Columbia. The force of the enemy at this time was variously estimated. The best opinion made them from 5000 to 7000. They were without cavalry, and had only two small field-pieces and one howitzer,

drawn by men. Four hundred of the American troops were cavalry, and they had 17 pieces of artillery.

On the afternoon of the 23d the British army again set out, and after some skirmishing with the American advance, in which the latter were compelled to retreat, bivouacked for the night five miles in advance of Marlborough. Towards sunset, general Winder ordered his troops to retreat to Washington, that he might effect a union of his whole forces. To this he was also induced by the fear of a night attack, from the superiority of the enemy, and want of discipline in his troops, and knowing that in such an attack his superiority in artillery could not be used.

Meanwhile general Stansbury arrived at Bladensburg on the 22d with about 1300 Baltimore militia, and on the evening of the 23d he was joined by colonel Sterrett with another militia regiment from Baltimore, about 500 strong, a rifle battalion of about 150 men, and two companies of volunteer artillery, also about 150 strong; making Stansbury's whole force about 2100. Most of these troops were extremely fatigued by their march from Baltimore.

General Stansbury encamped during the night of the 23d on a hill near Bladensburg, with the intention of attacking the enemy at reveille next morning, in compliance with previous orders from general Winder. Near midnight, a firing from the advanced pickets on the road by which the enemy was expected, caused the troops to be prepared for action, and they were kept under arms till after two the following morning; and hardly had they again retired to their tents, when information was received from general Winder that he had retreated to the city by the Eastern branch bridge. As this movement of Winder exposed both the rear and right flank of Stansbury's troops, and his officers, whom he immediately consulted, were unanimous in opinion that his situation on the hill could not be defended with the force then under his command, worn down with hunger and fatigue as they were, it was considered indispensably necessary that the troops should immediately retire across the bridge at Bladensburg, and take a position which they could defend on the road between that place and the city. Orders were therefore instantly given to strike tents and prepare to march. In about thirty minutes, without noise or confusion, the whole were in motion, and about half past three in the morning passed the bridge at Bladensburg, which leads to the city of Washington. Securing the rear from surprise, the troops halted in the road till the approach of day,

with a view of finding some place where water could be had, that the men might partake of some refreshment.

§ 6. Early in the morning of the 24th, the troops were again put in motion towards the city, with a view of taking a stand on some more favourable ground for defence, when orders were received from general Winder to give the enemy battle at Bladensburg, should he move that way, and that he would join, if necessary. Stansbury immediately ordered his troops to retrace their steps to Bladensburg, and took a position to the west of that place, in an orchard on the left of the Washington road. Here his artillery, consisting of six six-pounders, posted themselves behind a small breastwork of earth, which had been lately thrown up, and the riflemen and infantry were posted in the rear and to the left, so as to protect the position. This battery commanded the pass into Bladensburg, and the bridge leading to Washington.

Meanwhile general Winder's troops, including commodore Barney's command, made a rapid march from Washington, and arrived upon the ground just as the enemy made their appearance behind Bladensburg. Colonel Beall, with about 800 militia from Annapolis, had crossed the bridge about half an hour before, and posted himself on the right of the Washington road. The force which had arrived from the city was formed in a second line on the right and left of the road in the rear of Stansbury's and Beall's command, the heavy artillery under commodore Barney being posted on or near the road.

About half after 12, while the second line was forming, the enemy approached, and the battle commenced. The Baltimore artillery opened their fire, and dispersed the enemy's light troops now advancing along the street of the village, who took a temporary cover behind the houses and trees, in loose order, and presented objects only occasionally for the fire of the cannon. The enemy then commenced throwing his rockets, and his light troops began to concentrate near the bridge, and to press across it and the river, which was fordable above. The Baltimore riflemen now united with the fire of the battery; and for some time with considerable effect. The enemy's column was not only dispersed while in the street, but while approaching the bridge they were thrown into some confusion, and the British officers were seen exerting themselves to press the soldiers on. Having now gained the bridge, the enemy passed it rapidly, and immediately flanked, formed the line, and advanced steadily on, which compelled the artillery and riflemen to give way. But they were soon rallied, and united with the other Baltimore troops at a small distance in the rear

of their first position. One of the pieces of artillery was abandoned and spiked.

A company of volunteer artillery from the city, under the command of captain Burch, and a small detachment near it, now opened a cross fire on the enemy, who were partially sheltered by the trees of an orchard, and kept up a galling fire on part of the American line. Colonel Sterret, with one of the Baltimore regiments, was ordered to advance, and made a prompt movement until ordered to halt; for at this moment the other two Baltimore regiments were thrown into confusion by the rockets of the enemy, and began to give way. In a few minutes they took to flight, in defiance of all the exertions of generals Winder and Stansbury and other officers. Burch's artillery and Sterret's regiment remained firm, until, being out-flanked, they were ordered to retreat, with a view of re-forming at a small distance in the rear. But instead of retiring in order, the militia regiment retreated in disorder and confusion. Thus was the first line, which consisted almost exclusively of Baltimore militia, totally routed and put to flight.

On the right colonels Beall and Hood, commanding the Annapolis militia, had thrown forward a small detachment, under colonel Kramer. After maintaining their ground for some time with considerable injury to the enemy, this advance was driven back on the main body. Their retreat exposed the enemy's column in the road to the city artillery, under major Peter, which continued an animated discharge on them till they came in contact with commodore Barney's command. Here the enemy met the greatest resistance, and sustained the greatest loss, while advancing upon the retreating line. When the British came in full view, and in a heavy column in the main road, Barney ordered an eighteen pounder to be opened upon them, which completely cleared the road, and repulsed them. In several attempts to rally and advance, the enemy were again repulsed, which induced them to flank to the right of the American line in an open field. Here three twelve-pounders opened upon them, and the flotilla men acted as infantry with considerable effect. The enemy continued flanking to the right, and pressed upon the Annapolis militia, which gave way after three or four rounds of ineffectual fire, while colonel Beall and other officers attempted to rally the men upon their high position. Commodore Barney's command now had the whole force of the enemy to contend with. The British never again, however, attempted to appear in force in front, but continuing to outflank, pushed forward a few scat-

tering sharp-shooters, by whom Barney was wounded, and several of his officers killed or wounded. Being now completely outflanked on both sides, the ammunition-waggons having gone off in disorder, and that which the marines and flotilla men had being exhausted, Barney ordered a retreat; in consequence of his wound, he himself was made prisoner. His pieces fell into the hands of the enemy.

The Georgetown and city militia, and the few regulars which were on the field, still remained firm; but being now also outflanked, they were ordered by general Winder to retreat, which was effected with as much order as the nature of the ground would permit. After retiring five or six hundred paces, they were halted and formed, but were again ordered to retreat, and to collect and form on the height near the capitol. Here they were joined by a regiment of Virginia militia, who had arrived in the city the preceding evening, but had been detained there by some difficulties which had arisen in furnishing them with arms and ammunition.

General Winder had endeavoured to direct the retreat of the Baltimore troops towards the city, but from the confusion in which they fled, was not able to effect it, and they directed their course northwardly towards Montgomery court-house. This wrong direction to their course was principally caused by their ignorance of there being a second line of troops behind them, general Winder's forces having arrived just as the action commenced.

The British estimated their loss in this battle at 64 killed, and 185 wounded. The loss of the Americans was estimated by the superintending surgeon at 10 or 12 killed, and about 30 wounded, some of whom afterwards died. The most probable estimate of the British force made it about 4500; of the American 6000; but it must be recollected that the enemy's troops were all regulars, who had seen service, and were led by able officers of great experience, while the American troops were all militia, with the exception of a few hundred seamen and regulars; that one half of them were not collected together till the day before the engagement, and about 800 did not arrive till a few minutes before its commencement; that from the uncertainty whether Baltimore, the city of Washington, or Fort Washington, would be selected as the point of attack, it was necessary that the troops should frequently change their positions, owing to which, and to alarms causelessly excited on the night of the 23d, they were all much fatigued, and many of them nearly exhausted, at the time when the hostile army was crossing the bridge; and finally,

that the officers commanding the troops were generally unknown to general Winder, and but a very small number of them had enjoyed the benefit of military instruction or experience. When these circumstances are taken into consideration, we think we shall not hazard much in asserting, now that the violent feelings of the moment have subsided, that the American militia rather gained than lost honour on the field of Bladensburg. The Baltimore troops fought gallantly, until forced to retreat by their flanks being turned. While retreating, by order of their commander, they were thrown into confusion by a new mode of warfare, of which the effects were to them totally unknown*. The bravery of Barney's command needs no comment, and the orderly retreat of the Annapolis and District of Columbia militia, in the face of a regular army of superior numbers (now that the Baltimore troops had dispersed), is above all praise.

A remarkable circumstance attendant on this battle was the presence of the American president and heads of departments. They retreated with the second line of troops to Washington, where a consultation was held with the commanding general as to the propriety of making a stand on the heights near the capitol, or in the capitol itself. General Winder stated, that the diminution of his force was such as to render it impossible to place his troops in a position which would prevent the enemy from taking him on the flanks as well as in front; and that no reasonable hope could be entertained, that any of the troops could be relied on to make a resistance as desperate as necessary, in an isolated building, which could not be supported by a sufficiency of troops without: indeed it would have taken nearly the whole of the troops, he said, to have sufficiently filled the two wings†, which would have left the enemy masters of every other part of the city, and given him the opportunity, without risk, in 24 hours to have starved them into a surrender. The objection equally applied to the occupation of any particular part of the city. It was accordingly determined to retire through Georgetown, and take post on the heights in the rear of that place, with a view of collecting together the whole of the forces.

It is impossible, says the commander of the militia of the district, in his dispatch; it is impossible to do justice to the

* Some of the finest troops of France were thrown into confusion by the rocket brigade at the battle of Leipsic.

† The two wings constituted the whole of the capitol, the central part of the building never having been erected. The wings were connected by a slight wooden gallery.

anguish evinced by the troops of Washington and Georgetown, on the receipt of this order. The idea of leaving their families, their houses, and their homes, at the mercy of an enraged enemy, was insupportable. To preserve that order which was maintained during the retreat, was now no longer practicable. As they retired through Washington and Georgetown, numbers were obtaining and taking leave to visit their homes, and again rejoining; and with ranks thus broken and scattered, they halted at night on the heights near Tenly Town, and on the ensuing day assembled at Montgomery court-house.

§ 7. Meanwhile general Ross, after halting his army a short time for refreshment, pushed on towards Washington, where he arrived unmolested about eight in the evening. Having stationed his main body on the heights about a mile and a half east of the capitol, he led his advance, consisting of about 700 men, into the deserted city.

Washington, though denominated a city, and though the seat of the federal government, possesses but an inconsiderable population, which is sparsely scattered over an extensive site. The capitol stands near the centre of the city; the president's palace and navy yard are each distant about a mile from that building, in opposite directions. Around each of these situations, stands what would elsewhere be denominated a village, and a few scattering rows of buildings have been erected on the avenue leading from the capitol to the president's house, and thence to Georgetown, each about a mile in length. The number of houses in the city does not exceed nine hundred; its inhabitants amount to about eight thousand. The capitol and the president's house are built of a beautiful white freestone, and have been deservedly esteemed the finest specimens of architecture in the United States, if not upon the continent. The capitol was in an unfinished state, the two wings only having been erected; the upper part of the north wing contained the senate-chamber, with the committee rooms, and office containing their archieves, and the congressional library, a valuable collection of books; in the lower part was the hall of the supreme court of the United States. The southern wing was exclusively devoted to the hall of the house of representatives and their necessary offices, the whole of the upper part being occupied by the hall and its galleries.

Washington, thus abandoned to the British arms, presented now a most deplorable scene. Though surrendered without the slightest opposition, and though totally without fortifica-

tions, the British naval and military commanders (admiral Cockburn and general Ross) immediately issued orders for, and personally superintended the conflagration of the public buildings, with all the testimonials of taste and literature which they contained. The capitol and the president's house, together with the costly and extensive buildings erected for the accommodation of the principal officers of government in the transaction of public business, were, on the memorable night of the 24th of August, consigned to the flames. The large hotel on the capitol hill, the great bridge across the Potomac, and the private rope-walks, shared the same fate.

A consultation had been held by the president and the heads of departments on the subject of the navy yard, on the morning preceding the battle of Bladensburg. The secretary of the navy described the situation of the public vessels, and the nature of the public property, at that establishment; the vast importance of the supplies, and of the shipping, to the enemy, particularly as there appeared to be no doubt of his squadron forming a junction with his army, should it succeed in the conquest of the capitol (general Winder having distinctly stated on the same morning, that Fort Washington could not be defended); and as, in this event, nothing could be more clear than that he would first plunder, and then destroy the buildings and improvements; or if unable to carry off the plunder and the shipping, he would destroy the whole. And if the junction should be formed, it would be a strong inducement to the enemy to remain, in order to launch the new frigate, which the force at his command would accomplish in four or five days. He would then carry off the whole of the public stores and shipping, and destroy the establishment; and, in the mean time, greatly extend the field of his plunder and devastation. Thus, in either case, whether the junction was formed, or whether the army alone entered the city, the loss or destruction of the whole of the public property at the navy yard was certain. It was, therefore, determined, as the result of this consultation, that the public shipping, and naval and military stores, and provisions at the navy yard, should be destroyed, in the event of the enemy's obtaining possession of the city. Agreeably to this determination, the trains, which had been previously laid, were fired on the approach of the enemy, and the public buildings, stores, and vessels were soon wrapped in flames, and were all destroyed, excepting the new schooner Lynx, which escaped in an extraordinary manner. The issuing store of the yard, and its contents,

which had escaped the original conflagration, were soon after totally destroyed by the enemy.

The only loss which the enemy sustained in the city was at Greenleaf's point. A detachment was sent down to destroy it, and in the midst of their devastations, a firebrand having been thrown into a dry well in which a quantity of powder had been previously hidden, it exploded with great violence, by which a number of lives were lost.

Nearly the whole of the male population having joined the army, a great number of houses were broken open and plundered by the blacks and a few disorderly inhabitants. The conduct of the British in general was orderly*.

The utmost efforts of general Winder were now devoted to collect his troops, and to prepare them to move down toward the city, and hang upon and strike at the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred. The next morning, however, intelligence was received that the enemy had moved from Washington the preceding night, and was in full march for Baltimore. Winder accordingly advanced as rapidly as was practicable to that city; but on his arrival at Snell's bridge, on the Patuxent, Winder learned that the enemy was proceeding to Marlborough, and not toward Baltimore.

§ 8. Having completed the destruction of the public buildings in the course of the 25th, the British left the city at nine that night, and by a rapid march reached Marlborough in the course of the next day. On the evening of the 29th they reached Benedict, and re-embarked the following day.

§ 9. Meanwhile captain Gordon proceeded up the Potomac with his squadron, consisting of two frigates, two bomb-vessels, two rocket-ships, and a schooner. Owing to the shoals, and contrary winds, they were not able to reach Fort Washington, about fifteen miles below the city, until the evening of the 27th, two days after the army under Ross had commenced their retreat. The bomb-ships immediately began to bombard the fort; but on the bursting of the first shell, the garrison was observed to retreat, and in a short time, to the great surprise of the British commander, the fort was blown up.

* The famous (or rather infamous) Cockburn must be excepted from this remark. He so far laid aside the dignity of a British admiral as meanly to revenge himself on the property of a printer, who, he said, had been giving him some hard rubs. A file of soldiers were employed to ransack his office and destroy his types and presses. What a magnanimous spectacle! what a chivalrous spirit was here displayed!

When the British army first left the Patuxent, their destination could not be foretold by general Winder. Baltimore, Fort Washington, and the federal city seemed equally threatened. Fort Washington, which commands the Potomac, was considered almost impregnable to any attack by water, though too weak to be defended against any large force by land. Captain Dyson, the commander, therefore, was instructed, in case the British army should approach his rear, to blow up the fort, and proceed with his command across the Potomack. But nothing was farther from the intention of general Winder than that this important post should be deserted, on being attacked by a naval force*.

§ 10. Nothing was now left to oppose the progress of the British squadron, and they proceeded slowly up the river to Alexandria, with their barges employed in sounding in advance.

On the day preceding the battle of Bladensburg, a committee of vigilance, which had been appointed by the inhabitants to watch over the safety of Alexandria, in this time of peril, despairing, they allege, of receiving any assistance from the general government, and having information of the rapid approach of the enemy towards the capital by land, and that their squadron was approaching Alexandria by water, deemed it their duty to recommend to the common council the passage of a resolution, that in case the British vessels should pass the fort, or their forces approach the town by land, and there should be no sufficient force to oppose them, with any reasonable prospect of success, they should appoint a committee to carry a flag to the officer commanding the enemy's force about to attack the town, and to procure the best terms in their power for the safety of persons, houses, and property. This resolution was unanimouly adopted by the common council, and on the arrival of the British at Washington, a flag was sent to the British commander there, to know what treatment might be expected from him, in case his troops should approach Alexandria, and should succeed in obtaining possession of the town. The deputation were assured by admiral Cockburn, that private property of all descriptions should be respected; that it

* Captain Dyson alleged, in justification, that he had learnt that the enemy had been reinforced at Benedict, 2000 strong, and that they were on their march to co-operate with the fleet, in addition to the force which left the city. But surely he should not have deserted his post on a vague rumour, which this must have been. He was shortly after tried by a court-martial, and dismissed the service.

was probable that fresh provisions and some flour might be wanted, but that whatever they did take should be paid for.

After the blowing up of Fort Washington a similar deputation was dispatched to the naval commander. But Gordon had other intentions than those avowed by Cockburn. He would give no reply until he had placed his shipping in such a position before the town, as would ensure assent to the hard terms he had decided to enforce. These were, the surrender of all naval and ordnance stores, public and private, and all the shipping and merchandize of the town. Gordon having arranged his vessels along the town, the defenceless inhabitants were forced to submit; and the plunderers took possession of three ships, three brigs, several bay and river craft, 16,000 barrels of flour, 1000 hogsheads of tobacco, 150 bales of cotton, and wine, sugar, and other articles to the value of about five thousand dollars.

§ 11. But though Gordon, with his buccaneering crew, had thus taken possession of Alexandria, without a single gun being fired against him, he was not destined to carry off his booty entirely unmolested. General Hungerford arrived near Alexandria with the Virginia militia, and commodores Rodgers, Porter, and Perry, with a detachment of sailors from Baltimore. It was not deemed proper to disturb the enemy at Alexandria, as that would probably cause the destruction of the place. Commodore Porter, therefore, proceeded down the river, and threw up an entrenchment on a bluff, not far from the ruins of the fort, on the opposite side of the river; and commodore Perry threw up another a little below. The arrival of a small despatch vessel, which had to fight its way past Porter's battery, convinced Gordon he had no time to lose, and he therefore precipitately left Alexandria, without waiting to destroy the stores which he had not the means of carrying off.

§ 12. To endeavour to clear the passage, Gordon first sent down a bomb-ship and two barges, one carrying a long thirty-two pounder, the other a mortar. These vessels commenced their operations on Porter's battery, the bomb-ship throwing shells in front, out of the reach of shot, the barges flanking on the right.

When the small vessel passed upwards, the preceding day, Porter had only two small four-pounders, but the same evening two eighteen pounders reached his position. His force consisted principally of sailors; some navy and militia officers and private citizens acted as volunteers. General Hungerford's militia, who were ordered to co-operate, were stationed

in the woods on each side of the battery, in such positions as would effectually protect its rear, in the event of the enemy's landing. These positions, it was supposed, would have enabled them to clear the enemy's decks with their musketry, and in a great measure serve to divert his fire from the battery, while the thick woods on the high bank would conceal them from view.

The firing lasted all day without intermission; several shells fell near, and burst over the battery, but this had no other effect than to accustom the militia to the danger. In the afternoon, Porter took an eighteen pounder to a more advanced point, about a mile distant, and commenced a fire on the bomb-ship, which did so much execution as to draw on him the fire of all the vessels, including a schooner and an eighteen gun brig which had dropped down that day.

The following day (August 3) Gordon left Alexandria with his prizes, which he anchored above the battery, out of the reach of the cannon. The bombarding vessels were reinforced by another bomb-ship, and a sloop of war fitted up as a rocket ship. The latter anchoring within reach of the battery, Porter was enabled to play on her with great effect, and compelled her to change her position. All this day and the succeeding night, the enemy kept up a brisk fire of shot, shells, and rockets.

§ 13. Within a few hours of the departure of the enemy, commodore Rodgers arrived at Alexandria from above, with three small fire-vessels, under the protection of four barges or cutters manned with about 60 seamen armed with muskets. He immediately proceeded to attack two frigates and a bomb-ship, which lay about two miles below. The failure of the wind, just as they were within reach of the enemy, prevented any beneficial effect being produced. On their approach, the whole of the enemy's boats were put in motion. Some were employed in towing off the fire-vessels, and the remainder in pursuit of Rodgers' cutters. They did not, however, venture to come within musket shot, though much superior both in force and numbers, but continued at a distance firing their great guns for about half an hour, and then retired to their ships.

The following day another fire-vessel was prepared; but it being calm, Rodgers ordered his lieutenant and the four cutters to proceed with a lighter, carrying an eighteen pounder, to attack a bomb-ship, which, in the anxiety of the enemy to get below the works which Porter and Perry had thrown up, had been left exposed to attack. At sun-set, however, just as he was about to give orders to attack the bomb, Rodgers discovered one of the enemy's frigates behind a point, which obliged

him to relinquish this determination, and give orders to proceed across to the Virginia shore, to haul up the boats, and place the lighter in a situation to be defended against the barges of the enemy.

About nine o'clock at night, Rodgers again shifted his situation to the opposite shore, owing to a man being seized under suspicious circumstances on the beach, near a small boat, about a mile above the enemy's headmost ship. The cutters were now hauled up, the lighter placed in an advantageous position, and the seamen on the top of a cliff overlooking the river. Scarcely had this arrangement been completed, when an attack was made by all the enemy's barges. It was met with great intrepidity, the enemy were thrown into confusion, and driven back with loss. The only injury which Rodgers sustained, was one man wounded on board the lighter.

The work at Porter's battery continued to go on; five light field-pieces, from four to six pounders, arrived and were planted, and hopes were entertained of soon receiving some long thirty-two pounders from Washington; a furnace was built for hot shot, and time only appeared necessary to make the battery formidable. The whole of the 4th and 5th, an incessant fire was kept up by the enemy night and day. He had once attempted landing at night, it is supposed with an intention of spiking the guns of the battery, but was repulsed by the picket guard. The plan of annoying him by advancing guns was now adopted with better effect than before. The rocket-ship lying close in shore, was much cut up by a twelve pounder and two sixes carried to a point; scarcely a shot missed its hull, and for one hour the fire of all the enemy's force was drawn to this point.

The want of ammunition now caused a suspension of firing at the battery at a most unfortunate moment, just as commodore Rodgers was approaching with his last fire-ship. The enemy being thus enabled to direct the whole of their attention towards him, Rodgers was forced to fire the vessel prematurely, and order his boats to retire, to prevent their being taken possession of by the numerous barges of the enemy.

Some thirty-two pounders now arrived at the battery, and carpenters were employed to make carriages. Two mortars, a large quantity of ammunition, and an abundance of shot and shells were also received; two barges were equipping, and every thing promised that the battery would speedily be put in a proper state for annoying the enemy. In the evening two frigates anchored above, making the whole force of the enemy opposed to the battery three frigates, three bomb-ships, a

sloop of war, a brig, a schooner, and two barges, carrying altogether 173 guns. The guns mounted in the battery were three 18 pounders, two 12 pounders, six 9 pounders, and two fours. The two mortars were without carriages, as were all the thirty-twos, for notwithstanding every effort was made, both at Washington and on the spot, they could not be completed in time.

On the morning of the 6th, the enemy showing a disposition to move, intelligence to that effect was sent to general Hungerford, and preparations made to meet them at the battery with hot shot. About 12 o'clock the two frigates got under way, with a fair wind and tide, and stood down; the rocket-sloop, bomb-vessels, brig, schooner, and prizes followed in succession, the gun-boats endeavouring to flank the battery on the right. Porter immediately dispatched an officer to general Hungerford, to request him to take the position agreed upon in the woods on the heights; but from the distance of his camp, and the quick approach of the enemy, he was unable to march before the firing commenced, and, after that period, it was rendered impossible, from the vast quantities of shot, shells, and rockets which were showered over the hills and fell among his troops.

As the enemy approached, a well-directed fire was kept up from the battery with hot and cold shot. The officers and men stood the broadsides of the ships with unparalleled firmness. But from the militia not making their appearance, the whole of the enemy's fire was directed at the battery. Porter, therefore, finding that in a few minutes all the enemy's force would be brought to bear on him, and entertaining no hopes of preventing his passing, as some of his men had already been killed and wounded, he determined not to make a useless sacrifice. When the enemy was on the point of anchoring abreast the battery, therefore, after sustaining his fire an hour and a quarter, the commodore directed the officers and men to retire behind a hill on the left, and be in readiness to charge the enemy if he should land to spike the guns. The two frigates anchored abreast, the bombs, sloops, and smaller vessels passed outside them, all pouring into the battery and neighbouring woods a tremendous fire of every description of missive. In the woods on the left, a company of riflemen from Jefferson county, Virginia, under captain George W. Humphreys, greatly distinguished themselves by a well-directed fire on the enemy's decks, as did a company of militia under the command of captain Gena, who was posted on the right. The first lost one man killed, and one sergeant and four privates wounded; the

latter two privates killed. After the bombs, gun-vessels, and prizes had all passed, the frigates proceeded down and anchored abreast of commodore Perry's battery, where a constant firing was kept up until after sun-set.

But the guns at Perry's battery were of too small calibre to make much impression on the enemy. A single eighteen pounder, which arrived only thirty minutes before the firing began, ill supplied with ammunition, was the only gun that could be of much service. The ammunition of this gun, and that of several of the six-pounders, being expended, and the fire of the enemy being very heavy, it was thought advisable to retire a short distance in the rear. This was done in good order, after sustaining their fire for more than an hour.

The advantageous situation of this battery prevented the enemy from doing much injury. Only one man was wounded. The number of killed and wounded at commodore Porter's battery did not exceed thirty. The loss of the enemy was seven killed, and thirty-five wounded.

§ 14. Sir Peter Parker, who was sent up the Chesapeake to make a diversion in favour of this expedition, was the least fortunate of the commanders. He met his death in a conflict with a small body of militia on the eastern shore of Maryland, under the command of colonel Reid.

A force of about 150 men was landed at night from his vessel, at the head of which he placed himself, with the intention of surprising the militia in their camp. The movement of the British barges, however, had been discovered, and every preparation was made to give them a warm reception. The camp and baggage were removed, and the troops posted on a rising ground, flanked on both sides with woods, with the artillery in the centre. The head of the enemy's column soon appeared, and received the fire of the American advance at 70 paces distance. Being pressed by superior numbers, the advance were ordered to retire, and form on the right of the line. The fire now became general, and was sustained by the militia with the most determined valour. The enemy pressed in front; but being foiled, he threw himself on the left flank, where his efforts were equally unavailing.

The fire of the enemy had nearly ceased, when Reid, the commander of the militia, was informed, that the cartridges were entirely expended in some parts of the line, and that none of the men had more than a few rounds, although each had brought twenty into the field. The artillery cartridges were entirely expended. Under these circumstances, the troops were ordered to fall back to a convenient spot where a

part of the line was fortified, for the purpose of distributing the remaining cartridges.

But the enemy having sustained a severe loss, found it more prudent to retreat than to pursue. They retired to the beach, carrying with them all the wounded they could find, among whom was sir Peter Parker, who expired a few minutes after being carried from the field. The loss of the British on this occasion was 14 killed, and 27 wounded. The Americans had only three wounded. Nothing but the want of ammunition could have saved the whole party of the British from capture.

§ 15. With the multitude, success in war is generally supposed to indicate wisdom in our rulers, while defeat is uniformly attributed either to their folly and weakness, or to treasonable purposes. The clamour which arose out of the disaster of our arms, which led to the capture of Washington, was particularly directed against general Winder, who commanded the American forces, and general Armstrong, the secretary of war, but chiefly against the latter. So violent was the ferment of the public mind in the District of Columbia, that the president was forced to yield to the clamour, and request the secretary to resign. His place was filled *pro tem.* by colonel Monroe, the secretary of state.

§ 16. The conduct of the British while in possession of Washington and Alexandria, is without a parallel in the history of civilized nations. In the wars of modern Europe, no examples of the kind, even among nations the most hostile to each other, can be traced. In the course of the last ten or twelve years, most of the capitals of the principal powers of Europe have been entered by Bonaparte, at the head of his victorious troops, yet no one instance of such wanton and unjustifiable destruction has been seen. And yet this is the chief whose conduct the British have affected to consider as outraging all the laws of civilized war.

But it has been attempted to justify this wanton destruction, under the plea of retaliation. Admiral Cochrane, in a letter to the secretary of state, dated the day previous to the debarkation of Ross's army, though not delivered till after the destruction of Washington, stated, that having been called upon by the governor-general of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton destruction committed by their army in Upper Canada, it had become imperiously his duty, conformably with the nature of the governor-general's application, to issue to the naval force under his command an order

to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as might be found assailable.

This general accusation was rebutted by Mr. Monroe, in his answer to this letter. The secretary declared it to have been the resolution of government, from the very commencement of the war, to wage it in a manner most consonant to the principles of humanity, and to those friendly relations which it was desirable to preserve between the two nations, after the restoration of peace. This resolution had never been deviated from, although it was perceived, with the deepest regret, that a spirit so just and humane was neither cherished nor acted upon by the British government. Without dwelling on the deplorable cruelties committed by the savages in the British ranks, and in British pay, on American prisoners at the river Raisin, which to this day have never been disavowed or atoned, I refer, continued the secretary, as more immediately connected with the subject of your letter, to the wanton desolation that was committed at Havre-de-Grace, and at Georgetown, early in the spring of 1813. These villages were burnt and ravaged by the naval forces of Great Britain, to the ruin of their unarmed inhabitants, who saw with astonishment that they derived no protection to their property from the laws of war. During the same season, scenes of invasion and pillage, carried on under the same authority, were witnessed all along the waters of the Chesapeake, to an extent inflicting the most serious private distress, and under circumstances that justified the suspicion, that revenge and cupidity, rather than the manly motives that should dictate the hostility of a high-minded foe, led to their perpetration.

Although these acts of desolation invited, if they did not impose on the government, the necessity of retaliation, yet in no instance has it been authorised*. The burning of the village of Newark, in Upper Canada, was posterior to the early outrages above enumerated. The village of Newark adjoined Fort George, and its destruction was justified by the officer who ordered it, on the ground that it became necessary in the mili-

* We have always been of opinion, that our government was highly reprehensible, if not in the failure to adopt retaliatory measures, at least to make a solemn appeal to the British government and to the world, on the subject of these devastations. The outrages were not committed in the heat of the moment, or by an inferior officer, but by parties which were generally led by an admiral, and apparently in a systematic manner. We cannot bring ourselves to believe, that if a decided stand had been taken, this abominable system of outrage would have continued to desolate the shores of the Chesapeake to the end of the war.

tary operations there. The act, however, was disavowed by the government. The burning which took place at Long Point was unauthorised by the government, and the conduct of the officer subjected to the investigation of a military tribunal. For the burning at St. David's, committed by stragglers, the officer who commanded in that quarter was dismissed without trial, for not preventing it.

I am commanded by the president distinctly to state, continued the secretary, that it as little comports with any orders which have been issued to the military and naval commanders of the United States, as it does with the established and known humanity of the American nation, to pursue a system which it appears you have adopted. This government owes it to itself, to the principles which it has ever held sacred, to disavow, as justly chargeable to it, any such wanton, cruel, and unjustifiable warfare. Whatever unauthorised irregularity may have been committed by any of its troops, it would have been ready, acting on these principles of sacred and eternal obligation, to disavow, and as far as might be practicable, to repair.

But the government, it appears, was mistaken in attributing this general charge against the American troops in Upper Canada, to the destruction of the villages alluded to in the secretary's letter. The governor of Canada, in an address to the provincial parliament, on the 24th of January, 1815, asserted, "that, as a just retribution, the proud capitol at Washington, had experienced a similar fate to that inflicted by an American force on the seat of government in Upper Canada;" and the chancellor of the exchequer, in a debate in the British parliament, on an address to the prince regent, in November, 1814, was still more explicit. The Americans at York, he asserted, "not only burnt the house of the governor, but also every house belonging to the meanest individual, even to a shell, and left the populace in the most wretched condition."

Thus, in the great as in the little world, one wrong inevitably treads on the heels of another. The same cowardly spirit which dictated the orders for devastating the American coast, was apparent on this occasion, when, cowering under the reproaches of their compatriots for the stain they had cast on the British arms, the ministry were forced to shelter themselves under the most base and malignant untruths. But the reign of falsehood is always short. These official assertions produced an investigation of the subject by congress, which must cover with shame the authors of this slander.

From this investigation it appears, that nothing was destroyed by the American commander, excepting the barracks and

public storehouses. That several of the most valuable public buildings were destroyed by the explosion of a magazine, which the British set fire to as the Americans entered the place, and which proved fatal to general Pike, and to vast numbers of his brave followers. That notwithstanding this great provocation for burning the town, nothing of the kind took place; a strong guard was set, with positive orders to prevent any plunder or depredation on the inhabitants; and when leaving the place, the commander of the American troops received a letter from judge Scott, chief justice of the superior court, in which he expressed his thanks for the humane treatment the inhabitants had experienced from his troops, and for the commander's particular attention to the safety of their persons and property. The destruction of public edifices for civil uses was not only unauthorised, but positively forbidden by the American commanders. It has recently, however, appeared, that a public building, of little value, called the parliament-house (not the government-house), in which it is said that an American scalp was found, as a part of the decoration of the speaker's chair, had been burnt; whether it was so, and if it was, whether it was an accidental consequence of the confusion in which the explosion of the magazine involved the town, or the unauthorised act of some exasperated individual, has not been ascertained. The silence of the military and civil officers of the provincial government of Canada, seem to indicate that the transaction was not deemed, when it occurred, a cause, either for retaliation or reproach.

The burning of Newark and of the Indian towns on the river Thames, commonly called the Moravian towns, are also adverted to in the report arising out of this investigation. The burning of Newark, it is stated, was vindicated by the American general, as necessary to his military operations; but as soon as the American government heard of it, instructions, dated the 6th of January, 1814, were given by the department of war, to major-general Wilkinson, "to disavow the conduct of the officer who committed it, and to transmit to governor Prevost a copy of the order, under colour of which that officer had acted." This disavowal was accordingly communicated, and on the 10th February, 1814, governor Prevost answered, "that it had been with great satisfaction he had received the assurance, that the perpetration of the burning of the town of Newark, was both unauthorised by the American government, and abhorrent to every American feeling; that if any outrages had ensued the wanton and unjustifiable destruction of Newark, passing the bounds of just retaliation, they were to be at-

tributed to the influence of irritated passions, on the part of the unfortunate sufferers by that event, which, in a state of active warfare, it had not been possible altogether to restrain; and that it was as little congenial to the disposition of his majesty's government, as it was to that of the government of the United States, deliberately to adopt any plan of policy, which had for its object the devastation of private property."

But the disavowal of the American government was not the only expiation of the unauthorised offence committed by its officer; for the British government undertook itself to redress the wrong. A few days after the burning of Newark, the British and Indian troops crossed the Niagara for this purpose; they surprised and seized Fort Niagara; they burnt the villages of Lewistown, Manchester, Tuscarora, Buffalo, and Black Rock, desolating the whole of the Niagara frontier, and dispersing the inhabitants in the extremity of the winter. Sir George Prevost himself appears to have been satisfied with the vengeance that had been inflicted; and, in his proclamation of the 12th of January, 1814, he expressly declared, that for the burning of Newark, "the opportunity of punishment had occurred; that a full measure of retaliation had taken place, and that it was not his intention to pursue further a system of warfare, so revolting to his own feelings, and so little congenial to the British character, unless the future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to it." With his answer to major-general Wilkinson, which has been already noticed, he transmitted a copy of the proclamation, "as expressive of the determination as to his future line of conduct," and added, "that he was happy to learn, that there was no probability, that any measures, on the part of the American government, would oblige him to depart from it."

The places usually called the Moravian towns, were mere collections of Indian huts and cabins, on the river Le Trench or Thames, not probably worth, in the whole, one thousand dollars. The Indians who inhabit them, among whom were some notoriously hostile to the United States, had made incursions the most cruel into their territory. When, therefore, the American army under general Harrison invaded Canada on the of , 1813, the huts and cabins of the hostile Indians were destroyed. But this species of warfare has been invariably pursued by every nation engaged in war with the Indians of the American continent. However it may be regretted on the score of humanity, it appears to be the necessary means of averting the still greater calamities of savage hostility; and it is believed, that the occurrence would never

have been made the subject of a charge against the American troops, if the fact had not been misrepresented or misunderstood. Many people at home, and most people abroad, have been led to suppose, that the Moravian towns were the peaceable settlements of a religious sect of Christians, and not the abode of a hostile tribe of savages.

But while excuses are thus framed with a view of palliating the devastation committed by the British army, not one attempt is made to palliate or excuse the navy for its plunder of the wealthy town of Alexandria, or for the system of pitiful pilfering which was carried on for two summers in the Chesapeake. Is the plunder and devastation of the property of private individuals, then, less heinous than the destruction of public edifices? or is the world so accustomed to the system of wholesale privateering, authorised by the laws of naval warfare, as to pass over without comment, when committed by naval officers, not only the sack of a large town, but the desolation of whole districts?

The general orders of Brown, on crossing the Niagara, form a pleasing contrast to the devastating threat of Cochrane. "Upon entering Canada," says he, "the laws of war* will govern: men found in arms, or otherwise engaged in the service of the enemy, will be treated as enemies; those behaving peaceably, and following their private occupations, will be treated as friends. Private property will in all cases be held sacred; public property, wherever found, will be seized and disposed of by the commanding general. Any plunderer shall be punished with death, who shall be found violating this order."

* "War is at best a savage thing, and wades through a sea of violence and injustice; yet even war itself has its laws, which men of honour will not depart from."—*Plutarch, life of* Camillus.

To the same purport, sings one of the favourite poets of the present day:

Fair as the earliest beam of eastern light,
When first by the bewildered pilgrim spied,
It smiles upon the dreary brow of night,
And silvers o'er the torrent's foaming tide,
And lights the fearful path on mountain side;
Fair as that beam, although the fairest far,
Giving to horror grace, to danger pride,
Shine martial Faith, and Courtesy's bright star,
Through all the wreckful storms that cloud the brow of War.

Lady of the Lake, Canto V.

CHAPTER IV.

§ 1. Effects resulting from the burning of Washington in Europe and in the United States. § 2. Attack upon Baltimore. § 3. Bombardment of Fort M'Henry. § 4. Retreat of the British. § 5. Proclamation of sir George Prevost. § 6. Repulse of the British at Otter Creek. § 7. Expedition against Plattsburg. § 8. Capture of the British squadron on Lake Champlain. § 9. Attack on the American works near Plattsburg. § 10. Retreat of Prevost.

§ 1. AN intelligent French writer, in noticing the capture of Berlin by the Russians in 1760, remarks, that two important military principles may be deduced from that event. 1st. That the possession of a capital does not decide the fate of a state, or even of a campaign. 2d. That in the modern art of war, *men* are of more importance than fortified places, and that a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, though all his strong holds be subdued, if he retain his soldiers and his constancy. If these observations be correct in their application to European capitals, how much more forcibly do they apply to that of the federal government, a mere open village, of about 8000 inhabitants, and in a country thinly populated! Indeed the capture of Washington cannot be viewed in any other light than as a predatory incursion, under the pretence of retaliation, but really with the view of striking terror and inducing submission, and at the same time producing an effect in Europe, where the occupation of the capital of their enemy, it was doubtless conceived, would be viewed as a most brilliant exploit. General Ross had neither the intention nor the means of holding Washington. Without artillery or stores, he was unable to remain longer than 24 hours, when a retreat was commenced under favour of the night, and even then this retreat would have been extremely hazardous, but for the disorganized state of his opponents, and their blameable deficiency in the article of intelligence. It is true, that had they remained a few days longer, a communication with their shipping would have been opened by the Potomac, but this arose from a circumstance that could not have been foreseen, and Ross certainly acted wisely in not calculating on the destruction of Fort Washington by its commander.

But the capture of Washington produced in Europe a very different effect from what was expected. The Gothic barbarity displayed in the wanton destruction of the public buildings roused the indignation of the whole continent, and even produced such a sensation in the British parliament, as to cause its instigators to resort to falsehood to shield them from the public odium. The agitation of the question also drew from the ministry a statement, that instructions had been sent to the coast of America to desist from further inflictions of vengeance.

The threats of devastation, and their practical operation in the District of Columbia, produced an electric effect throughout the union. A spirit of patriotism was kindled by the flames of the capitol, before which all party considerations and honest differences of opinion vanished. The war, at its commencement, was considered an inexpedient measure, by a large and respectable portion of the community. The mode of conducting it also, by the invasion of Canada, was condemned as inefficacious; as resembling more a war for foreign conquest, than a resolute assertion of our naval rights, which ought, it was said, to be conquered on the ocean. All aid, either in men or money, was consequently as much as possible withheld by those who embraced these sentiments. Party considerations had no doubt their effect in producing this result. It was not to be expected, that the opposition would fail to make use of the same popular topics which had been so successfully wielded against them when in power, and which had finally driven them from their seats. The dangers which threatened our republican institutions from a standing army, loans, &c. were now, as formerly, the favourite subjects of the *outs*, who wished to change places with the *ins*. In a government which depends so much on public sentiment as ours, its powers were thus necessarily paralysed, though perhaps not in the degree asserted by the *ins*, who of course wished a share of the odium arising from their tardy measures to fall on the *outs*.

But at this interesting crisis a new spirit pervaded the nation, which aroused it almost instantaneously to arms. Party rancour, for a moment, seemed utterly extinct; "this is not the time for speaking, but for acting," became the universal cry. All classes seemed inspired with military ardour; the young and the old, the rich and the poor, rushed into the ranks, came forward with their contributions, and assisted in the labour of raising works of defence. Nor were even the females idle at

this trying moment. Their labours were united in accoutring the volunteers, and in providing for their necessities.

These movements were little if at all regulated by the governments either of the states or of the union. It appeared as if the people, perceiving that the powers with which they had entrusted their rulers were either incompetent to the crisis, or had not been sufficiently acted on, had determined spontaneously to arise in their might, and take the defence of their respective neighbourhoods upon themselves. Committees of vigilance or defence were every where appointed by the people in their town-meetings, who collected money, arms, and ammunition, regulated the military movements of the citizens, and superintended their voluntary labour at the fortifications. Nor was the public enthusiasm unavailing. From this moment, almost every encounter with the enemy shed new lustre on the American arms, till the war finally closed in a blaze of glory at New-Orleans.

The unanimity which prevailed at this period cannot perhaps be exemplified more strikingly than by the proclamations of governor Chittenden.—Shortly after his election to the chief magistracy of Vermont, in the fall of 1813, Chittenden issued a proclamation, ordering a brigade of Vermont militia, then at Plattsburg, in the service of the United States, to return to their homes, on the pretence that it was highly improper that the militia should be placed under the command of and at the disposal of an officer of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction or controul of the executive of Vermont, and marched to the defence of a sister state, fully competent to all the purposes of self-defence. The militia refused compliance with this requisition, and the officers publicly addressed the governor, stating at large their reasons for this refusal. "We are not of that class," say they, "who believe that our duties as citizens or soldiers are circumscribed within the narrow limits of the town or state in which we reside; but that we are under a paramount obligation to our common country, to the great confederacy of states." "We conceive it our duty," they continue, "to declare unequivocally to your excellency, that we shall not obey your excellency's order for returning; but shall continue in the service of our country, until we are legally and honourably discharged. An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country will never be obeyed by us, although it proceeds from the governor and captain-general of Vermont." Adding, "We cannot perceive what other object your excellency could have in view than to embarrass the operations of the army, to excite mutiny

and sedition among the soldiers, and to induce them to desert, that they might forfeit the wages to which they are entitled for their patriotic services."

At this important crisis a very different stand was taken by the same governor. In his proclamation, dated September 19, 1814, he declares, that the war has assumed an entirely different character, since its first commencement, and has become almost exclusively defensive, and is prosecuted by the enemy with a spirit, unexampled during pending negociations for peace, which leaves no prospect of safety but in a manly and united determination to meet invasion at every point, and expel the invader. That, as the conflict has become a common and not a party concern, the time has now arrived when all degrading party distinctions and animosities, however we may have differed respecting the policy of declaring, or the mode of prosecuting the war, ought to be laid aside; that every heart may be stimulated, and every arm nerved, for the protection of our common country, our liberty, our altars, and our firesides; in the defence of which we may, with an humble confidence, look to heaven for assistance and protection. He therefore earnestly exhorts all the good people of Vermont, by that love of country, which so signally distinguished their fathers, in their glorious and successful struggle for independence, to unite both heart and hand, in defence of their common interest, and every thing dear to freemen.

§ 2. The British army having re-embarked on board the fleet in the Patuxent, admiral Cochrane moved down that river, and proceeded up the Chesapeake, and on the evening of the 10th of September appeared at the mouth of the Patapsco, about 14 miles from the city of Baltimore. Anticipating the debarkation of the troops, general Smith, who commanded at Baltimore, had ordered general Stricker to march, with a portion of his brigade of militia, towards North Point, near the mouth of the river, where it was expected the British would make a landing. His force consisted of 550 of the 5th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Sterrett; 620 of the 6th, under lieutenant-colonel Donald; 500 of the 27th, under lieutenant-colonel Long; 450 of the 39th, under lieutenant-colonel Fowler; 700 of the 51st, under lieutent-colonel Amey; 150 riflemen, under captain Dyer; 140 cavalry, under lieutenant-colonel Biays; and the Union Artillery of 75 men, with six four-pounders, under captain Montgomery; making an aggregate of 3185 effective men. Major Randal, with a light corps of riflemen and musquetry, taken from general Stansbury's brigade and the Pennsylvania volunteers, was

detached to the mouth of Bear Creek, with orders to co-operate with general Stricker, and to check any landing which the enemy might attempt in that quarter.

The troops moved towards North Point, by the main road, on the 11th, and at 3 o'clock, P. M. reached the meeting-house, near the head of Bear Creek, seven miles from the city. Here the brigade halted, with the exception of the cavalry, who were pushed forward to Gorsuch's farm, three miles in advance, and the riflemen, who took post near the blacksmith's shop, two miles in advance of the encampment. At 7 o'clock, on the morning of the 12th, information was received from the advanced videttes, that the enemy were debarking troops from and under cover of their gun-vessels, which lay off the bluff of North Point, within the mouth of Patapsco river. The baggage was immediately ordered back under a strong guard, and general Stricker took a good position at the junction of the two roads leading from Baltimore to North Point, having his right flanked by Bear Creek, and his left by a marsh. He here waited the approach of the enemy, having sent on an advance corps, under the command of major Heath, of the 5th regiment. This advance was met by that of the enemy, and after some skirmishing it returned to the line, the main body of the enemy being at a short distance in the rear of their advance. During this skirmishing, major-general Ross received a musket-ball through his arm into his breast, which proved fatal to him on his way to the water-side for re-embarkation. The command of the enemy's forces then devolved on colonel Brook. Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy's whole force came up and commenced the battle by some discharges of rockets, which were succeeded by the cannon from both sides, and soon after the action became general along the line. General Stricker gallantly maintained his ground against a great superiority of numbers during the space of an hour and twenty minutes, when the regiment on his left (the 51st) giving way, he was under the necessity of retiring to the ground in his rear, where he had stationed one regiment as a reserve. He here formed his brigade; but the enemy not thinking it advisable to pursue, he, in compliance with previous arrangements, fell back and took post on the left, a half mile in advance of the entrenchments, which had been thrown up on the hills surrounding Baltimore. About the time general Stricker had taken the ground just mentioned, he was joined by general Winder, who had been stationed on the west side of the city, but was now ordered to march with general Douglas's brigade of Virginia militia, and

the United States dragoons, under captain Bird, and take post on the left of general Stricker. During these movements, the brigades of generals Stansbury and Foreman, the seamen and marines, under commodore Rodgers, the Pennsylvania volunteers, under colonels Cobean and Findley, the Baltimore artillery, under colonel Harris, and the marine artillery, under captain Stiles, manned the trenches and batteries, and in this situation spent the night, all prepared to receive the enemy.

Next morning, the British appeared in front of the entrenchments, at the distance of two miles, on the Philadelphia road, from whence he had a full view of the position of the Americans. He manœuvred during the morning towards his right, as if with the intention of making a circuitous march, and coming down on the Harford or York roads. Generals Winder and Stricker were ordered to adapt their movements to those of the enemy, so as to baffle this supposed intention. They executed this order with great skill and judgment, by taking an advantageous position, stretching across the country, when the enemy was likely to approach the quarter he seemed to threaten. This movement induced the British to concentrate their forces in front, pushing his advance to within a mile of the entrenchments, driving in the videttes, and shewing an intention of attacking the position that evening. Smith, therefore, immediately drew generals Winder and Stricker nearer to the right of the enemy, with the intention of falling on his right or rear should he attack the entrenchments, or, if he declined it, of attacking him in the morning.

§ 3. As soon as the British troops had debarked at North Point, the fleet proceeded up the Patapsco, to bombard Fort M'Henry, which commands the entrance to the harbour of Baltimore. On the 13th, about sunrise, the British commenced the attack from their bomb-vessels, at the distance of about two miles, when, finding that the shells reached the fort, they anchored, and kept up an incessant and well-directed bombardment.

Fort M'Henry was commanded by lieutenant-colonel Armistead. The garrison consisted of one company of United States artillery, under captain Evans, and two companies of sea-fencibles, under captains Bunbury and Addison. Of these three companies, 35 men were unfortunately on the sick list, and unfit for duty. In contemplation of the attack, Armistead had been furnished with two companies of volunteer artillery from the city of Baltimore, under captain Berry and lieutenant-commandant Pennington, a company of volunteer artillerists, under judge Nicholson, who had proffered their services,

a detachment from commodore Barney's flotilla, under lieutenant Redman, and about six hundred infantry, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Stewart and major Lane, consisting of detachments from the 12th, 14th, 36th, and 38th regiments of United States troops—the total amounting to about a thousand effective men. Two batteries to the right of Fort M'Henry, upon the Patapsco, were manned, the one by lieutenant Newcombe, with a detachment of sailors, the other by lieutenant Webster, of the flotilla. The former was called Fort Covington, the latter the City Battery.

As soon as the British commenced the bombardment, the batteries at the fort were opened in return; but the firing soon ceased on the part of the Americans, as it was found that all the shot and shells fell considerably short of the British vessels. This was a most distressing circumstance to the troops in the fort, as it compelled them to remain inactive, though exposed to a constant and tremendous shower of shells. But though thus inactive, and without that security, which, in more regular fortifications, is provided for such occasions, not a man shrunk from his post.

About 2 o'clock, P. M. one of the twenty-four-pounders on the south-west bastion, under the immediate command of captain Nicholson, was dismounted by a shell, the explosion from which killed his second lieutenant, and wounded several of his men; the bustle necessarily produced in removing the wounded and remounting the gun probably induced the British to suspect that the garrison was in confusion, as three bomb-ships were immediately advanced. But the fire, which now opened from the fort, soon compelled them to seek shelter, by again withdrawing out of the reach of the guns, when the garrison gave three cheers, and again ceased firing.

The British continued throwing shells, with one or two slight intermissions, for twenty five hours, viz. from sunrise of the 13th till 7 o'clock, A. M. of the 14th of September. During the night, whilst the bombardment was the most severe, two or three rocket vessels and barges succeeded in passing Fort M'Henry, and getting up the Patapsco, but they were soon compelled to retire by the forts in that quarter. These forts also destroyed one of the barges, with all on board. It is supposed that the vessels that passed the fort contained picked men, with scaling ladders, for the purpose of storming.

§ 4. In the course of the night, admiral Cochrane held a communication with the commander of the land forces, and the enterprise being considered impracticable, it was mutually agreed to withdraw. Accordingly, while the bombardment

still continued, in order to distract the attention of the Americans, the retreat was commenced, Owing to the extreme darkness, and a continued rain, it was not discovered till daylight, when general Winder commenced a pursuit, with the Virginia brigade and the United States dragoons; at the same time major Randal was dispatched with his light corps in pursuit of the enemy's right, whilst the whole of the militia cavalry was put in motion for the same object. All the troops were, however, so worn out with continued watching, and with being under arms during three days and nights, exposed the greater part of the time to very inclement weather, that it was found impracticable to do any thing more than pick up a few stragglers.

The naval forces, as was before observed, continued the bombardment till seven o'clock. About nine they retired to North Point, where the embarkation of the troops commenced that evening, and was completed next day at one o'clock. It would have been impossible, even had the American troops been in a condition to act offensively, to have cut off any part of the enemy's rear guard during the embarkation, as the point where it was effected was defended from approach by a line of defences extending from Back river to Humphreys' creek, on the Patapsco, which had been thrown up previous to the arrival of the British.

The loss of the Americans, at the battle near North Point, was 24 killed, 139 wounded, and 50 prisoners. The loss of the British in this action was 39 killed, and 251 wounded. The loss in the fort was only 4 killed and 24 wounded; no list of killed and wounded on board the squadron has been published. From the best calculations that could be made, from fifteen to eighteen hundred shells were thrown by the enemy. A few of these fell short. A large proportion burst over the fort, throwing their fragments around, and threatening destruction. Many passed over, and about four hundred fell within the works. Two of the public buildings were materially injured, the others but slightly.

The effect produced by the joyful intelligence of the failure of the attempt upon Baltimore, may be more easily conceived than expressed, when it is considered that almost every large town being equally threatened with devastation, the case of Baltimore came home to every individual bosom. But one moment before, the public dismay seemed to have reached its acme; and the most gloomy anticipations seemed about to be realized.

§ 5. While admiral Cochrane was threatening the country along the Chesapeake, by order of sir George Prevost, the latter was leading an army and navy into the United States, but holding very different language. Though he could direct the British forces in the south to lay waste and desolate, he was too fearful of the re action of such barbarous orders to dare to utter them at the head of his own troops. Here his language was of the softest and most conciliatory nature. On entering the state of New-York, he "makes known to its peaceable and unoffending inhabitants, that they have no cause for alarm from this invasion of their country, for the safety of themselves and families, or for the security of their property. He explicitly assures them, that as long as they continue to demean themselves peaceably, they shall be protected in the quiet possession of their homes, and permitted freely to pursue their usual occupations. It is against the government of the United States, by whom this unjust and unprovoked war has been declared, and against those who support it, either openly or secretly, that the arms of his majesty are directed. The quiet and unoffending inhabitants, not found in arms, or otherwise not aiding in hostilities, shall meet with kind usage and generous treatment; and all just complaints against any of his majesty's subjects, offering violence to them, to their families, or to their possessions, shall be immediately redressed." With these fair words, sir George Prevost led his army against Plattsburg, about the beginning of September, while the fleet proceeded on his left up the lake, in order to make a contemporaneous attack on the Americans by land and water.

§ 6. Previous to this invasion, no military movements took place in this quarter, excepting an attack which was made on an American battery at the mouth of Otter Creek, on the 14th of May, by the British naval forces on the lake. In this affair the British were repulsed with loss.

But during the months of July and August, the army from the Garonne, which had so greatly distinguished itself under general Wellington, arrived in the St. Lawrence; and part of the troops being sent up to the Niagara, the remainder, consisting of about 14,000 men, were organized by sir George Prevost, agreeably to the orders of the prince regent, for the purpose of undertaking an expedition into the state of New-York. There is good reason to suppose, that if this expedition had been successful, a powerful attempt would have followed from another quarter on the city of New-York, in order, by seizing

the line of the Hudson, completely to cut off the New England states.

The British troops were concentrated on the frontiers of Lower Canada, and took possession of Champlain on the 3d of September. The best part of the American troops in this quarter had previously been formed into a division, which had marched towards the Niagara, under general Izard. General Macomb, as senior officer, had been left in command. But excepting four companies of the 6th regiment, he had not an organized battalion. The garrison was composed of convalescents and recruits of the new regiments, not exceeding 1500 effective men for duty; all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.

Finding from the proclamations of the enemy, and his impressment of the waggons and teams in his vicinity, that an attack on Plattsburg was determined on, every exertion was made to place the works in a state of defence; and, to create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men, they were divided into detachments, and placed near the several forts; Macomb declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own work, and bound to defend it to the last extremity.

As soon as the force of the enemy was ascertained, general Macomb called on general Mooers, of the New-York militia, and arranged with him plans for bringing forth the militia en masse. The inhabitants of Plattsburg fled with their families and effects, except a few men and some boys, who formed themselves into a party, received rifles, and were exceedingly useful.

By the 4th of the month general Mooers collected about seven hundred militia, and advanced seven miles on the Beckman Town road, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced; also to obstruct the roads with fallen trees, and to break up the bridges. On the lake road, at Dead Creek bridge, two hundred men had been posted under captain Sproul of the 13th regiment, with orders to abbatis the woods, to place obstructions in the road, and to fortify himself; to this party were added two field-pieces. In advance of this position, was lieutenant-colonel Appling, with 110 riflemen, watching the movements of the enemy, and procuring intelligence.

It was ascertained, that before day-light on the 6th, the enemy would advance in two columns, on the two roads before mentioned, dividing at Sampson's, a little below Chazy village. The column on the Beckman Town road proceeded

with great rapidity; the militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and, except a few brave men, fell back precipitately in the greatest disorder, although the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flankers and advanced patroles. The night previous, major Wool had been ordered to advance with a detachment of 250 men to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Captain Leonard, of the light artillery, was also directed to proceed with two pieces to be on the ground before day; but he did not make his appearance until 8 o'clock, when the enemy had approached within two miles of the village. Major Wool, with his party, disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their general and staff officers; although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not possibly cut them off. The state dragoons of New-York wear red coats, and they being on the heights to watch the enemy, gave constant alarm to the militia, who mistook them for the enemy, and feared his getting in their rear.

Finding the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburg, general Macomb dispatched his aid-de-camp to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to order lieutenant-colonel Appling to fall on the enemy's right flank. The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column debouching from the woods. Here he poured in a destructive fire from his riflemen, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with major Wool. The field-pieces did considerable execution among the enemy's columns. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column. This column, however, was much impeded by obstructions thrown in the way, and by the removal of the bridge at Dead creek; as it passed the creek and beach, the galleys kept up on it a lively and galling fire.

The village of Plattsburg is situated on the north-west side of the small river Saranac, near where it falls into lake Champlain. The American works were situated on the opposite side of the river.

Every road was now full of troops crowding on all sides in upon Plattsburg. The field-pieces were therefore ordered to retire across the bridge, and form a battery, for its protection, and to cover the retreat of the infantry, which was accordingly done, and the parties of Appling and Wool, as well as that of Sproul, retired alternately, keeping up a brisk fire until they got under cover of the works. The enemy's light troops then

took possession of the houses near the bridge, and kept up a constant firing from the windows and balconies, but a few hot shot from the American works, which put the houses in flames, soon obliged these sharp-shooters to retire. The whole day, until it was too late to see, the enemy's light troops endeavoured to drive the guards from the bridge, but they paid dearly for their perseverance. An attempt was also made to cross the upper bridge, where the militia resolutely drove them back. The troops being now all on the south side of the Saranac, the planks were taken off the bridges, and piled up in the form of breastworks to cover the parties intended to dispute the passage, which afterwards enabled them to hold the bridges against very superior numbers.

From the 7th to the 11th, the enemy was employed in getting on his battering train, and erecting his batteries and approaches, and constantly skirmishing at the bridges and fords. By this time, the militia of New-York and the volunteers of Vermont were pouring in from all quarters. They were all placed along the Saranac, to prevent the enemy's crossing the river, excepting a strong body sent in his rear to harass him day and night, and keep him in continual alarm. The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day, and the volunteers of Vermont were exceedingly serviceable. The regular troops, notwithstanding the constant skirmishing, and repeated endeavours of the enemy to cross the river, kept at their work day and night strengthening the defences, and evinced a determination to hold out to the last extremity.

§ 8. Meanwhile the British were strenuously engaged in preparing the fleet, which was destined to co-operate with the land forces. It appeared in view at Plattsburg early in the morning of the 11th. This fleet consisted of the frigate Confiance, carrying 39 guns, 27 of which were twenty-four-pounders; the brig Linnet, carrying 16 guns; the sloops Chub and Finch, each carrying 11 guns; and thirteen galleys, five of which carried two and the remainder one gun each. The American force consisted of the Saratoga, carrying 26 guns, eight of which were long twenty-four-pounders; the Eagle, 20 guns; the Ticonderoga 17; the Preble 7; and ten galleys, six of which carried two, the remainder one gun each. The British were superior, both in size and number of guns*.

At 8 in the morning, the American look-out-boat announced to commodore Macdonough, the commander of the squadron, the approach of the enemy. He at this time lay at anchor, in

*See a more particular statement of the strength of both fleets, in M'Donough's official letters, in this volume.

Plattsburg bay, calmly awaiting the approach of the British squadron, the fleet being moored in line, abreast of the works, with a division of five gun-boats on each flank. At 9, the British fleet anchored in line abreast of the American squadron, at about 300 yards distance, the Confiance opposed to the Saratoga, the Linnet to the Eagle; the British galleys and one of the sloops to the Ticonderoga, Preble, and the left division of the American galleys; the other sloop to the right division of the American galleys.

In this situation the whole force on both sides became engaged, the Saratoga suffering much from the heavy fire of the Confiance. But the fire of the Saratoga was also very destructive to her. The Ticonderoga likewise gallantly sustained her full share of the action. At half past 10 o'clock the Eagle, not being able to bring her guns to bear, cut her cable and anchored in a more eligible position, between the Saratoga and the Ticonderoga, where she very much annoyed the enemy, but unfortunately left the Saratoga exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's brig. The guns on the starboard side of the Saratoga being nearly all dismounted, or not manageable, a stern-anchor was let go, the bower-cable cut, and the ship winded with a fresh broadside on the enemy's ship, which soon after surrendered. A broadside was then sprung to bear on the brig, which surrendered in about fifteen minutes after.

The sloop that was opposed to the Eagle, had struck some time before, and drifted down the line; the sloop which was with their galleys having struck also. Three of the enemy's galleys were sunk, the others pulled off. The American flotilla were about obeying with alacrity the signal to follow them, when all the vessels were reported to the commodore as in a sinking state; it then became necessary to annul the signal to the galleys, and order their men to the pumps. The enemy's galleys thus got off in a shattered condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron that could stand to make sail on; the lower rigging, being nearly all shot away, hung down as though it had been just placed over the mast heads.

The Saratoga had fifty-five round shot in her hull; the Confiance one hundred and five. The Saratoga was twice set on fire by hot shot from the Confiance. The enemy's shot must have principally passed just over the heads of the sailors, as there were not twenty whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action, which lasted without intermission two hours and twenty minutes*.

* A cock, the "bird of war," was in the Saratoga, and repeatedly crowed from the shrouds during the action. A similar circumstance occurred in Fort M'Henry during the bombardment.

This naval engagement was in full view of both armies at Plattsburg. The killed on boartl the American squadron amounted to 52, the wounded to 58. The killed on board the captured vessels amounted to 84, including captain Downie, the commander of the squadron; the wounded amounted to 110; the loss on board the British galleys has never been ascertained. The number of men in the American squadron was 820; the British were supposed to exceed 1000.

§ 9. The batteries on shore were opened on the American works at the same instant that the engagement commenced on the lake, and continued throwing bomb-shells, sharpnells, balls, and Congreve rockets, until sun-set, when the bombardment ceased, every battery of the British being silenced. Three efforts were made to pass the river at the commencement of the cannonade and bombardment, with a view of assaulting the works, and an immense number of scaling-ladders had been prepared for that purpose. One of these attempts was made at the village bridge, another at the upper bridge, and a third at a ford about three miles from the works. The two first were repulsed by the regulars; at the ford by the volunteers and militia. Here the enemy suffered severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners; a considerable body having crossed the stream, all of whom were either killed, taken, or driven back. A whole company of the 76th regiment was here destroyed, the three lieutenants and twenty-seven men prisoners, the captain and the rest killed. The woods at this place were very favourable to the operations of the militia.

§ 10. The further prosecution of the expedition having become impracticable by the capture of the fleet, an event totally unlooked-for, at dusk the enemy withdrew his artillery from the batteries, and raised the siege; and at nine, under the cover of the night, sent off in a great hurry all the baggage he could find transport for, and also his artillery. At two, the next morning, the whole army precipitately retreated, leaving behind their sick and wounded; the commander left a note with the surgeon, requesting for them the humane attention of general Macomb.

Vast quantities of provisions were left behind and destroyed, also an immense quantity of bomb-shells, cannon-balls, grape-shot, ammunition, flints, &c. intrenching tools of all sorts, and tents and marquees. A great deal was afterwards found concealed in the ponds and creeks, and buried in the ground, and a vast quantity was carried off by the inhabitants.

Such was the precipitancy of the retreat of the British, that they arrived at Chazy, a distance of eight miles, before their

flight was discovered. The light troops, volunteers, and militia pursued immediately; and some of the mounted men made prisoners of a few of the rear guard. A continual fall of rain and a violent storm, prevented further pursuit. Upwards of 300 deserters came in.

The British officers of the army and navy who were killed, were buried with the honours of war. The humane treatment of the Americans to the wounded, and their generous and polite attention to the prisoners, were gratefully mentioned by captain Pring (who succeeded to the command of the British fleet on the fall of captain Downie) in his official dispatch to the admiralty*.

Thus were two formidable invasions, in which both the sea and land-forces of Great Britain co-operated, totally frustrated, nearly at the same moment, while another British squadron was added to the trophies of the American navy.

* The humane attention to their prisoners, for which the Americans have been so remarkable, has led to most singular conclusions in England. Lord Liverpool said in parliament, that "in many places a strong disposition had been shown by the American people to put themselves under our protection, and that their treatment of our officers led to any conclusion rather than to the belief that they entertain any animosity against this country, or that they were not fully persuaded that the war was a war of unprovoked aggression on the part of their own government."

CHAPTER V.

§ 1. Operations in New England. § 2. Bombardment of Stonington. § 3. Proclamation of neutrality towards Eastport. § 4. Capture of that place. § 5. Capture of Castine. § 6. Destruction of the Adams frigate. § 7 Surrender of the country between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy bay. § 8. Expedition against Michillimackinac. § 9. Destruction of the establishment at St. Mary's. § 10. Attack on Michillimackinac. § 11. Destruction of the establishment at Nautauwasaga. § 12. Capture of the American blockading force on Lake Huron.

§ 1. DURING the first years of the war, the British affected to conciliate the New England states, by exempting their harbours from blockade, by refraining from the predatory incursions with which they teazed the southern coasts, and in one case, even proclaiming that a system of perfect neutrality was to be observed towards them by the sea and land forces of Great Britain. A different system was adopted this summer. The ports of New England were included in the sweeping system of blockading the whole of the American coast, repeated incursions were made for the destruction of private property, and finally a large portion of the District of Maine was invaded and captured by a powerful force by land and water.

§ 2. One of the most remarkable attacks, which occurred in the course of the campaign, was that made by sir Thomas Hardy upon Stonington, a small village in Connecticut, about 20 miles east from New London. On the 9th of August, commodore Hardy appeared off the village with one 74, one frigate, one bomb-ship, and two gun-brigs, and immediately summoned the place to surrender. In the course of the day, a number of flags passed to and from the place; the conditions required were, that the family of Mr. Stewart, late consul at New London, should be immediately sent off to the squadron; that the two guns in the battery should be removed; and that no torpedoes should be fitted from, or suffered to be in, the harbour. The terms being sent over to New London to general Cushing, the commanding officer of this district, he replied, that the request for the removal of Mr. Stewart's family

would be forwarded to Washington; with the others he would not comply.

In the evening, the British commenced the attack with rockets from one of the brigs: a great number of rockets were thrown, with little or no effect. The brig then hauled up within a short distance of the battery, and kept up a heavy and well-directed fire from guns of a very large calibre, which was returned by the two eighteen-pounders in the little battery, till their ammunition was expended. During this time the brig had grounded. A supply of ammunition having arrived from New London, the fire from the battery was re-commenced, and with such effect, that the brig slipped her cables, and towed off, out of reach of the eighteen-pounders, she having previously swung clear of the ground.

On the 10th, a number of flags passed; the commodore still insisting on his former terms. On the following morning, the last flag passed, with Hardy's ultimatum, at 11 o'clock, viz.: that Mrs. Stewart should be put on board by 2 o'clock P. M. or he would destroy the place. He, however, did not commence till 3 o'clock, at which time the bomb-ship commenced from two mortars, one a 15 inch and the other 13. The bombardment continued from this time till half past 8 in the evening, without intermission; the place was several times on fire, and as often put out by the soldiers and inhabitants.

At day-light on the 12th, the attack was re-commenced from the bomb-ship, seventy-four, and frigate, and continued, with little intermission, till half past 9, A. M. when the tide began to ebb, and the ships thought proper to haul off. In the afternoon they set sail, and left the sound by dark.

As commodore Hardy has never favoured the world with his official account of this valiant and famous affair, we are entirely at a loss to conjecture what could have been his motive. One *horse*, and one *goose* constituted the whole list of killed on shore; a lieutenant and three privates, of the militia, were slightly wounded by the bursting of a shell, and two men in the battery by a piece going off at half charge. The town was but little damaged, considering the tremendous cannonade and bombardment it sustained: one half of the houses were untouched, and not one entirely demolished, although every ship threw its shot completely over the point. Nearly 300 shells and fire-carcasses were thrown into the village, making, it was estimated, 50 tons of metal. Three or four tons of shot, carcasses, and bombs were collected by the inhabitants.—After the bombardment, it was learnt from good authority, that the

British had a number killed, and several badly wounded, by the fire from the two eighteen-pounders on shore.

§ 3. A few weeks after the declaration of war, sir J. C. Sherbroke, governor of Nova Scotia, &c., issued his proclamation, ordering and directing all his majesty's subjects, under his government, to abstain from molesting the inhabitants living on the shores of the United States, contiguous to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and on no account to molest the goods and unarmed coasting vessels, belonging to defenceless inhabitants on the frontiers, so long as they shall abstain on their part from any act of hostility and molestation towards the inhabitants of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; on the ground that predatory warfare carried on against defenceless inhabitants could answer no good purpose.

Another proclamation of the same date was issued by governor Sherbroke and admiral Sawyer, purporting, that having understood that the inhabitants of Eastport had manifested a disposition to avoid hostilities with the subjects of Great Britain, it is made known to them and all concerned, that from a wish to discourage, as far as possible, every species of depredatory warfare, which can only have a tendency to distress private individuals, they have respectively issued orders to the naval and land-forces, to respect the persons and property of the inhabitants of Eastport, so long as they shall carry on their usual and accustomed trade and intercourse with any part of these provinces, and reciprocally abstain from acts of hostility. Adding, that this system of perfect neutrality towards Eastport should not be departed from, without due and timely notice being previously given to the inhabitants.

Though some expressions in these proclamations appear as if they were intended as a mere cover for smuggling transactions, yet the humanity and good sense displayed in the acknowledgment "that no good could result from depredatory warfare, which can only have a tendency to distress private individuals," is worthy of high commendation, and it is sincerely to be regretted, that the same principle had not been universally acted on. It would have been worthy of two great and magnanimous nations to have waged war, "in a manner most consonant to the principles of humanity, and to those friendly relations, which it was desirable to preserve between the two nations, after the restoration of peace."

§ 4. Whether "due and timely notice was previously given" to the inhabitants of Eastport of the departure from this system of perfect neutrality, we have no means of ascertaining.

But about two years after the date of this proclamation*, the island on which it stands was captured by a British squadron, and formally taken possession of in the name of his Britannic majesty.

Eastport is situated on Moose Island, in Passamaquoddy bay. Although this island has been held by the Americans since the revolutionary war, the right to its sovereignty has never been settled, it being considered both by the Americans and British as within their boundary line. As soon as it was taken possession of by the British, the inhabitants were ordered to appear and declare their intention, whether they would take the oath of allegiance to his Britannic majesty; and were further notified, that all persons not disposed to take this oath, would be required to depart from the island in the course of seven days, unless special permission was granted to them to remain for a longer period. But a communication was also sent to the government of Massachusetts, stating, that the object of the British government was to obtain possession of the islands of Passamaquoddy bay, in consequence of their being considered within their boundary line; that they had no intention of carrying on offensive operations against the people residing on the continent, unless their conduct should oblige them to resort to the measure; and in the event of their remaining quiet, they should not be disturbed either in their property or persons.

§ 5. This resolution, however, of avoiding hostile operations against the inhabitants of the continent was adhered to for a much shorter period, than the "system of perfect neutrality," promised to be observed towards the inhabitants of Eastport. For the British ministry, elevated by the success of their arms in Europe, had come to the resolution to demand large and important cessions of territory from the United States. One of those cessions included that part of the District of Maine which lies eastward of Penobscot river, which they considered desirable on account of its securing to them a direct communication between Halifax and Quebec. Instructions were accordingly sent out to lieutenant-general Sherbroke, governor of Nova Scotia, &c. to effect the conquest of that part of Maine, of which it was intended to demand the cession. Towards the end of August an expedition sailed from Halifax, to accomplish the object in view. The troops were commanded by governor Sherbroke, the naval forces by rear-admiral Griffith.

* July 11, 1814.

It was governor Sherbroke's original intention first to have taken possession of Machias, and then proceed to Castine, on the Penobscot, but on the 30th of August the fleet fell in with the Rifleman sloop of war, from which information was obtained that the United States frigate Adams had arrived in the Penobscot; and that from the apprehension of being attacked by British cruizers, if she remained at the entrance of the river, she had run up as high as Hampden, where her guns had been landed, and mounted on shore for her protection.

This information determined governor Sherbroke to proceed first to the Penobscot, in order to arrive there before the Americans had time to strengthen themselves. The fleet arrived off Castine on the 1st of September. The small garrison in the fort not being able to resist the overwhelming force of the British, discharged their guns, blew up the fort, and retired. The enemy then took possession without opposition.

§ 6. The following day a considerable force was dispatched up the river to Hampden, in order to capture or destroy the Adams. Captain Morris, the commander, had received intelligence the day before of the arrival of the expedition off Castine, which was immediately forwarded to brigadier-general Blake, of the militia, with a request that he would direct such force as could be collected to repair immediately to Hampden. As the ship was prepared for heaving down, and in no situation to receive her armament, the attention of the seamen was immediately directed to the occupation of such positions on shore as would best enable them to protect her. By great and unremitted exertions, and the prompt assistance of all the inhabitants in the immediate vicinity, during the 1st and 2d, nine pieces were transported to a commanding eminence near the ship, one to the place selected by general Blake for his line of battle, fourteen upon a wharf commanding the river below, and one on a point covering the communication between the hill and wharf batteries—temporary platforms of loose plank were laid, and such other arrangements made as would enable them to dispute the passage of a naval force. Want of time prevented Morris from improving all the advantages of his position, and he was compelled to leave his rear and flanks to the defence of the militia, in case of attack by land troops.

Favoured by a fresh breeze, the British had advanced to within three miles of the Adams at sun-set on the 2d, with the Sylph mounting 22, and Peruvian 18 guns, and one transport, one tender, and ten barges, manned with seamen

from the Bulwark and Dragon, under the command of commodore Barrie. Troops were landed, under the command of colonel John, opposite their shipping, without any opposition, their numbers unknown, but supposed to be about 350. To oppose these troops, about 370 militia were then collected, assisted by lieutenant Lewis, of the United States artillery, who, by a forced march, had arrived from Castine, with his detachment of 28 men.

Many of the militia were without arms, and most of them without any ammunition, and, as the seamen were barely sufficient to man the batteries, the ship's muskets were distributed among the militia; the sick were sent across the creek, with orders for such as were able to secure themselves in the woods, in case of defeat. These arrangements were not concluded until late on the evening of the 2d.

During the night, the militia were reinforced by three companies. The British were also landed, and at five next morning, marched towards Hampden, in front of which the militia were advantageously posted. But they were not able to withstand the attack of the British regulars; they soon gave way and fled in confusion. Captain Morris and his sailors had now no alternative but precipitate retreat or captivity; their rear and flanks being entirely exposed, while they were destitute of any other defence on that side than their pikes and cutlasses. Lieutenant Wadsworth was therefore ordered to spike the guns, and retire across the bridge, which was done in perfect order, the marines under lieutenant Watson covering the rear. The remainder of Morris's force was at the same time ordered to spike the guns at the lower battery, fire the ship, and then join their companions across the creek.

Before these last orders were fully executed, the enemy appeared on the hill from which the militia had retired, and the seamen were consequently exposed to their fire for a short time while completing them. When they commenced their retreat, it was found to be impossible to gain the bridge; but they succeeded in fording the creek, and rejoining their companions, without receiving the slightest injury from the fire of the enemy.

The loss of the militia was estimated by the British at 30 or 40 killed, wounded, and *missing*, while their loss was only 1 killed, 8 wounded, and 1 missing. Captain Morris's loss was only a seaman and a marine made prisoner. He estimates the loss of the naval force opposed to him at 8 or 10 killed, and from 40 to 50 wounded, principally by the eighteen-poun-

der under charge of lieutenant Lewis, of the United States artillery.

§ 7. Machias being now the only post remaining between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy bay, a brigade was sent against it from Castine. It was taken without resistance, and colonel Pilkington, the British commander, was making arrangements to proceed into the interior of the country, when he received a letter from brigadier-general Brewer, commanding the district, engaging that the militia within the county of Washington should not bear arms, or in any way serve against his Britannic majesty during the war. A similar offer having been made by the civil officers and principal citizens of the county, a cessation of arms was agreed upon. Thus was this large district of country from the Penobscot eastward, taken possession of almost without resistance.

§ 8. Having now reviewed the most important transactions of the campaign on our maritime frontier, we will next direct our attention to the upper lakes in the north-west. After the capture of the British fleet on lake Erie, in 1813, an expedition against the important post of Michillimackinac had been contemplated; but the lateness of the season prevented its being carried into effect. Preparations were therefore made the following summer, and an expedition sailed from Detroit against the fort on the 3d of July, 1814; the troops under the command of colonel Croghan, the naval forces under captain Sinclair. The difficulties encountered on the flats of lake St. Clair, where there was only eight feet water, and the rapid current of the river, prevented the squadron from reaching lake Huron till the 12th. Thence the squadron shaped its course for Matchadash bay, and used every possible effort to gain it, but without effect. Not being able to find a pilot for that unfrequented part of the lake, and finding it filled with islands and sunken rocks, which must inevitably have proved the destruction of the fleet had they persisted, it being impossible to avoid them on account of the impenetrable fog with which the lake is almost continually covered; and finding the army already growing short of provisions, it was agreed between colonel Croghan and the commodore to push for the island of St. Joseph's, near the head of the lake, where the British had a small establishment, and here they arrived on the 20th. The fort being found deserted was destroyed.

§ 9. Whilst the squadron remained wind-bound at St. Joseph's, a detachment of infantry and artillery, under major Holmes, was dispatched in the launches, under the command

of lieutenant Turner, to St. Mary's, to break up the establishment at that place, and capture a schooner which lay there waiting for a cargo of flour for the North-West company's establishments on lake Superior, which had fallen into the hands of the American squadron by the capture of the schooner Minx, on its way from Michillimackinac to St. Mary's. The establishment, against which this expedition was directed, is a factory of the Montreal company, situated at the foot of the falls of St. Mary, the stream by which lake Superior discharges its waters into lake Huron. These falls are surmounted by a canal, by which goods are passed in boats from the vessels which navigate one lake to those which traverse the other.

The launches, under lieutenant Turner, were rowed night and day; but the distance being 60 miles, against a strong current, information of their approach reached the enemy about two hours before their arrival, carried by Indians in their light canoes. No resistance was made at the fort, but the British and Indians made their escape, carrying with them all the light valuable articles, such as peltry, clothes, &c. Turner, with his sailors and a few of the infantry, instantly proceeded to the head of the rapids, where the enemy, finding he could not get off with the vessel Turner was in quest of, set fire to her in several places and scuttled her. Turner, however, succeeded in boarding her, and by considerable exertions extinguished the flames, and secured her from sinking. But every effort failed to get her through the falls in safety. She bilged on her passage, and being immediately run on shore, was burnt. A part of the public property was brought away, and the remainder destroyed. All private property was respected.

§ 10. On the return of the launches to St. Joseph's, the squadron proceeded to Michillimackinac, where they arrived on the 26th. This place is, by nature, a second Gibraltar, being a high rock, inaccessible on every side, except the west: from the landing to the heights is nearly two miles, through a very thick wood. Finding that the British had strongly fortified the height overlooking the old fort, Croghan at once despaired of being able, with his small force, to carry the place by storm. He therefore determined to land and establish himself on some favourable position, whence he would be enabled to annoy the enemy by gradual and slow approaches, under cover of his artillery, of which he was superior to the enemy in point of metal. He was also induced to adopt this step by the supposition, that it would either induce the enemy to

attack him in his strong holds, or force the Indians and Canadians, the enemy's most efficient, and only disposable force, off the island, as they would be very unwilling to remain after a permanent footing should be taken.

Unfavourable weather prevented the landing of the troops till the 4th of August, when the whole force was disembarked on the west end of the island, under cover of the guns of the shipping. The line being quickly formed, advanced towards a field, which had been recommended as a suitable place for a camp, by persons who had lived several years on the island. Hardly had the troops arrived at the edge of the field, before intelligence was conveyed to colonel Croghan that the enemy was a short distance a-head, and in a few seconds a fire of shot and shells opened on the Americans, from a battery of four pieces.

The enemy's position was well selected; his line reached along the edge of the woods, at the farther extremity of the field, and was covered by a temporary breastwork. On reconnoitering the enemy, Croghan determined to change his position, which was now two lines, the militia forming the front. He accordingly ordered the battalion of regulars, under major Holmes, to advance to the right of the militia, thus to outflank the enemy, and by a vigorous effort gain his rear. But before this movement could be executed, a fire was opened by some Indians posted in a thick wood near the American right, which proved fatal to major Holmes, and severely wounded captain Desha, the next officer in rank. This unlucky fire, by depriving the battalion of the services of its most valuable officers, threw that part of the line into confusion, from which the best exertions of the officers were not able to recover it.

Finding it impossible to gain the enemy's left, owing to the impenetrable thickness of the woods, a charge was ordered to be made by the regulars immediately against the front. This charge, though made in some confusion, served to drive the enemy back in the woods, whence an annoying fire was kept up by the Indians. Lieutenant Morgan was now ordered up with a light piece to assist the left, which, at this time, was particularly galled; its fire soon forced the enemy to retire to a greater distance.

The position contemplated for the camp being now occupied, was found to be by no means tenable, from being interspersed with thickets, and every way intersected by ravines. Croghan determined, therefore, no longer to expose his force to the fire of an enemy deriving every advantage which could be ob-

tained from numbers and a knowledge of the position, and therefore ordered a retreat towards the shipping, which was immediately effected.

The loss of the Americans in this affair was 13 killed, 51 wounded, and 2 missing. The loss of the British has not been ascertained.

§ 11. Michillimackinac being thus found impregnable by assault, measures were adopted for starving it into submission, by cutting off its supplies. The whole of the troops, except three companies, were therefore dispatched in two of the vessels, to join general Brown on the Niagara, and the rest of the squadron directed their course to the east side of the lake, in order to break up any of the establishments of the enemy in that quarter. The only practicable lines of communication with the lower country, while the Americans were masters of lake Erie, was with Montreal by Outawas or Grand river, which is connected by means of a portage or carrying-place, with lake Nipissing, which latter empties itself into lake Huron by means of French river; or with York, by means of lake Simcoe and Nautauwasaga river. The first of these communications was learnt to be impracticable during the present season, on account of the marshy state of the portages. The squadron, therefore, proceeded to the mouth of the Nautauwasaga, where it arrived on the 13th of August, and the troops were immediately disembarked on the peninsula formed by the river and lake, for the purpose of fixing a camp.

On reconnoitering this position, a schooner, the only one possessed by the British in this quarter, was discovered in the river, a few hundred yards above, under cover of a block-house erected on a commanding situation on the opposite shore. On the following morning, a fire was opened by the shipping on the block house for a few minutes, but with little effect, owing to a thin wood intervening to obscure the view. Two howitzers, however, being landed, they commenced throwing shells, and in a few minutes one of the shells burst in the block-house, which shortly after blew up his magazine, allowing the enemy barely time to make his escape. The explosion set fire to a train which had been laid for the destruction of the vessel, and in an instant she was in flames. The necessary preparations had been made by commodore Sinclair for getting on board of her; but frequent and heavy explosions below deck made it too great a risk to attempt saving her. She was, therefore, with her cargo, entirely consumed.

§ 12. Colonel Croghan not thinking it advisable to fortify and garrison Nautauwasauga, the communication from York being so short and convenient, that any force left there might easily be cut off in the winter, the Scorpion and Tigress were left to blockade it closely, until the season should become too boisterous for boat transportation, and the remainder of the squadron returned to Detroit. But this blockade, which, had it been properly enforced, would probably soon have made a bloodless conquest of Michillimackinac, was soon put an end to by the capture of both the schooners. The Tigress was carried by boarding from the enemy's boats on the night of the 3d of September, and the Scorpion was surprised and taken by the Tigress, on the 6th, at the dawn of day. And thus, by the negligence of the officers, was the capture of Michillimackinac completely frustrated for this season.

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1. State of affairs in the Creek territory. § 2. Battle of Eccanachaca. § 3. Expedition of general Jackson. § 4. Attack on general Floyd's camp. § 5. Battle of the Horse-Shoe. § 6. Treaty of peace with the Creeks. § 7. Repulse of the British at Mobile. § 8. Proclamation of colonel Nichols. § 9. Destruction of the settlement at Barrataria. § 10. Capture of Pensacola. § 11. Capture of the American gun-boats on lake Borgne. § 12. Military preparations at New-Orleans. § 13. Landing of the British below the town. § 14. Battle of the 23d of December. § 15. Description of the country around New-Orleans. § 16. Operations of the British previous to the 8th of January. § 17. Battle of New-Orleans. § 18. Bombardment of Fort St. Philip. § 19. Capture of Fort Bowyer. § 20. Operations on the coast of South-Carolina and Georgia.

§ 1. THE forces employed in the war with the Creek Indians, a part of whose operations has already been detailed in the second volume of this work, were the Tennessee militia, under major-general Jackson, whose head-quarters were at Fort Strother, upon the Coosee river; the Georgia militia, under brigadier-general Floyd, whose operations were directed from the Chatahouchie; and a body of volunteers, in the southern part of the country of the Creeks, under the command of brigadier-general Claiborne. The settlements of the hostile Creeks were principally on and between the Tallapoosee and Coosee rivers. Here stood the towns of Tallushatches, Talledega, and Hillibee, which gave their names to the battles so called, which have already been noticed. The town of Autossee stood on the left bank of the Tallapoosee.

Notwithstanding the decisive victories that had been obtained by the American troops, and the heavy losses of the Indians, and the destruction of their principal towns, this brave people were still unsubdued. General Claiborne, therefore, marched a detachment from Fort Claiborne, on the 13th of December, 1813, with a view to the further destruction of their towns. Fort Claiborne is situated on the Alibama river, at no great distance above where, by its junction with the Tombigbeee, it forms the Mobile river. The object in view was a town called by the Creeks Eccanachaca, or Holy Ground. This place, Claiborne was informed, was occupied by a large body of the enemy, under the command of Weatherford, a

half-breed chief, who commanded the Indians that commenced the war by the destruction of the garrison at Fort Mims.

§ 2. When about 30 miles from the town, a stockade was erected for the security of the sick and the heavy baggage, and on the morning of the 22d the troops resumed their line of march. Their course lay chiefly through woods, without a track to guide them. On the morning of the 23d, the disposition for the attack was made. The troops advanced in three columns, a small body acting as a corps de reserve. About noon the right column came in view of the town, and was immediately vigorously attacked by the enemy, who had been apprised of their approach, and had chosen their field of action. Before the centre or the left could come generally into action, the enemy were repulsed, and flying in all directions, many of them casting away their arms.

Thirty of the Creeks were killed in this rencontre, and, judging from appearances, many were wounded. The loss on the part of the Americans was one killed and six wounded.

A pursuit was immediately ordered; but from the nature of the country nothing was effected. The town was nearly surrounded by swamps and deep ravines, which rendered the approach of the troops difficult, while it facilitated the escape of the Indians. In the town was found a large quantity of provisions, and immense property of various kinds, which the enemy, flying precipitately, were obliged to leave behind. All were destroyed, together with the village, consisting of about 200 houses. The Indians had barely time to remove their women and children across the Alibama, which runs near where the town stood. The town had been built since the commencement of hostilities, and was established as a place of security for the inhabitants of several villages.

In the house of Weatherford, the commander, was found a letter from the Spanish governor of Pensacola to the leader of the Creeks, stating, that he had represented their request of arms and munitions to the captain-general in Havanna, but had as yet received no answer. He was in hopes, however, he stated, of receiving them; and as soon as that took place, they should be informed.

The following day was occupied by the troops in destroying a town consisting of 60 houses, eight miles higher up the river, and in taking and destroying the boats of the enemy. At this place three Indians of some distinction were killed.

The term of service of the volunteers having now generally expired, they marched to Fort Stoddart, in order to be paid off.

§ 3. Soon after the battle of Talledega, general Jackson's army had been almost entirely broken up, by the expiration of the time of the militia, but on the 14th of January, he was joined at Fort Strother by about 800 new-raised volunteers from Tennessee, making his whole force, exclusive of Indians, 930. The term of service of the volunteers being short, and the men full of ardour to meet the enemy, he determined immediately to employ them in active service; and to this he was particularly induced by the information, that the Indians were concentrating with the view of attacking Fort Armstrong, a position about 50 miles above Fort Strother, on the same river, and also by his desire to make a diversion in favour of general Floyd, who was about making a movement to the Tallapoosee river, near its junction with the Coosee.

The volunteers therefore were marched across the river the day after their arrival, and on the next day, Jackson followed with the remainder of his force, consisting of the artillery company, with one six-pounder, one company of infantry of 48 men, two companies of spies, of about 30 men each, and a company of volunteer officers, headed by general Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men, under some misapprehension as to their term of service, and who still remained in the field waiting the orders of the government.

On the 17th, the troops took up the line of march, and on the night of the 18th encamped at Talledega Fort, where they were joined by between 200 and 300 friendly Indians; 65 of whom were Cherokees, the remainder Creeks. On the 20th, they encamped at Enotachopco, a small Hillibee village, about 12 miles from Emuckfau. Here Jackson began to perceive very plainly how little knowledge the spies had of the country, of the situation of the enemy, or of the distance the army was from them. The insubordination of the new troops, and the want of skill in most of their officers, also became more and more apparent. But their ardour to meet the enemy was not diminished; and Jackson had a sure reliance upon the guards, and the company of old volunteer officers, and upon the spies, in all about 125.

On the morning of the 21st, the troops marched from Enotachopco, as direct as possible for the bend of the Tallapoosee, and about 2 o'clock, P. M., the spies having discovered two of the enemy, endeavoured to overtake them, but failed. In the evening a large trail was perceived, which led to a new road, much beaten and lately travelled. Knowing that he must have arrived within the neighbourhood of a strong force,

and it being late in the day, Jackson determined to encamp, and reconnoitre the country in the night. He accordingly chose the best scite the country would admit, encamped in a hollow square, sent out spies and pickets, doubled the centinels, and made the necessary arrangements before dark for a night attack. About 10 o'clock at night one the pickets fired at three of the enemy, and killed one, but he was not found until the next day. At 11, the spies returned with the information, that there was a large encampment of Indians at the distance of about three miles, who, from their whooping and dancing, seemed to be apprized of the approach of the troops. One of these spies, an Indian in whom Jackson had great confidence, assured him that they were carrying off their women and children, and that the warriors would either make their escape or attack him before day. Being prepared at all all points, nothing remained to be done but to await their approach, if they meditated an attack, or to be ready, if they did not, to pursue and attack them at day-light.

While the troops were in this state of readiness, the enemy, about 6 o'clock in the morning, commenced a vigorous attack on the left flank, which was as vigorously met; the action continued to rage on that flank, and on the left of the rear, for about half an hour. So soon as it became light enough to pursue, the left wing, having sustained the heat of the action, and being somewhat weakened, was reinforced by a company of infantry, and was ordered and led on to the charge by general Coffee, who was well supported by all the officers and privates who composed that line. The enemy was completely routed at every point, and the friendly Indians joining in the pursuit, they were chased about two miles with considerable slaughter.

The chase being over, general Coffee was detached with 400 men and all the Indian force to burn the encampment; but with orders, if it was fortified, not to attack it, until the artillery could be sent forward to reduce it. On viewing the encampment and its strength, the general thought it most prudent to return, and guard the artillery thither. The wisdom of this step was soon discovered—in half an hour after his return to camp, a considerable force of the enemy made its appearance on Jackson's right flank, and commenced a brisk fire on a party of men, who had been on picket-guard the night before, and were then in search of the Indians they had fired upon. General Coffee immediately requested 200 men to turn their left flank, which were accordingly ordered; but, through some mistake, not more than 54 followed him, among

whom were the old volunteer officers. With these, however, he immediately commenced an attack on the left flank of the enemy, and Jackson ordered 200 of the friendly Indians to fall in upon their right flank, and co-operate with general Coffee. This order was promptly obeyed, and what was expected was realized. The enemy had intended the attack on the right as a feint, and, expecting to direct all Jackson's attention thither, meant to attack him again, and with their main force, on the left flank, which they had hoped to find weakened and in disorder. But they were disappointed; for Jackson had ordered the left flank to remain firm to its place, and the moment the alarm-gun was heard in that quarter, he repaired thither, and ordered captain Ferrill, part of the reserve, to support it. The whole line met the approach of the enemy with astonishing intrepidity, and having given a few fires, they forthwith charged with great vigour. The effect was immediate and inevitable. The enemy fled with precipitation, and were pursued to a considerable distance, by the left flank and the friendly Indians, with a galling and destructive fire.

In the mean time general Coffee was contending with a superior force of the enemy. The Indians who had been ordered to his support, and who had set out for this purpose, hearing the firing on the left, had returned to that quarter, and when the enemy were routed there, entered into the chase. That being now over, 100 of them were sent to the relief of Coffee, and as soon as they reached him, the charge was made and the enemy routed: they were pursued about three miles, and 45 of them slain, who were found. General Coffee was wounded in the body, and his aid-de-camp, A. Donaldson, killed, together with three others.

The camp was now fortified, in order that the troops might be the better prepared to repel any attack which might be made the following night, and next morning the troops set out on their return to Fort Strother, general Jackson not deeming it prudent to proceed farther on account of the scarcity of supplies, the number of his wounded, and the probability of the Indians receiving reinforcements from below. The retreat commenced at 10 o'clock on the 23d, and the troops were fortunate enough to reach Enotachopco before night, having passed a dangerous defile without interruption. The camp was again fortified. Having another defile to pass in the morning, across a deep creek, and between two hills, which Jackson had viewed with attention, as he passed on, and where he expected he might be attacked, he determined to pass it at another point, and gave directions to the guide and fatigue-

men accordingly. The general's expectation of an attack in the morning was increased by the signs of the night, and with it his caution. Before the wounded were removed from the interior of the camp, the front and rear-guards were formed, as well as the right and left columns, and the centre moved off in regular order, leading down a ridge to Enotachopco creek, at a point where it was clear of reeds, except immediately on its margin. A general order had been previously issued, pointing out the manner in which the men should be formed in the event of an attack on the front, or rear, or on the flanks, and the officers had been particularly cautioned to halt and form accordingly, the instant the word should be given.

The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering the creek, when an alarm-gun was heard in the rear. Having chosen the ground, Jackson expected there to have entirely cut off the enemy, by wheeling the right and left columns on their pivot, re-crossing the creek above and below, and falling in upon their flanks and rear. But, to his astonishment and mortification, when the word was given to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, the right and left columns of the rear-guard precipitately gave way. This shameful retreat was disastrous in the extreme: it drew along with it the greater part of the centre column, leaving not more than 25 men, who, being formed by colonel Carrol, maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain it. There was then left to repulse the enemy, the few who remained of the rear-guard, the artillery company, and captain Russell's company of spies. Their conduct, however, exceeded the highest expectations. Lieutenant Armstrong, who commanded the artillery company in the absence of captain Deadrick, who was confined by sickness, ordered them to form, and advanced to the top of the hill, whilst he and a few others dragged up the six-pounder. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion. Amidst the most galling fire from the enemy, more than ten times their number, they ascended the hill and maintained their position, until their piece was hauled up, when, having levelled it, they poured upon the enemy a fire of grape, re-loaded and fired again, charged and repulsed them*.

* General Jackson, in his official report, states some instances of perhaps the most deliberate bravery that have ever been recorded. The individuals mentioned were lieutenant Armstrong, Constantine Perkins, and Craven Jackson, all of the artillery, the two latter acting as gunners. In

A number of the troops now crossed the creek, and entered into the chase. Captain Gordon of the spies, who had rushed from the front, endeavoured to turn the left flank of the enemy, in which he partially succeeded, and colonel Carroll, colonel Higgins, and captains Elliot and Pipkins, pursued the enemy for more than two miles, who fled in consternation, throwing away their packs, and leaving 26 of their warriors dead on the field. This last defeat was decisive, the troops being no more disturbed in their retreat.

The loss sustained in these several engagements was 20 killed and 75 wounded, 4 of whom afterwards died. The loss of the enemy could not be accurately ascertained: 189 of their warriors were found dead; but this must fall considerably short of the number really killed. Their wounded can only be guessed at.

§ 4. Meanwhile general Floyd was advancing towards the Indian territory from Chatahouchie river. On the 27th of January his camp was attacked by a large body of Indians, at the hour usually chosen for their operations, viz. about an hour before day. They stole upon the centinels, fired upon them, and then with great impetuosity rushed upon the line. In 20 minutes the action became general, and the front of both flanks were closely pressed, but the gallant conduct of the officers, and the firmness of the men, repelled them at every point. As soon as it became light enough to distinguish objects, Floyd strengthened his right wing, to prepare them for a charge, and the cavalry was ordered to form in their rear, to act as circumstances should dictate. The order for the charge was promptly obeyed, and the enemy fled in every direction before the bayonet. The order was then given for the charge of the cavalry, who pursued and sabred fifteen of the enemy.

Thirty-seven Indians were left dead on the field. From the effusion of blood, and number of the war-clubs and head-dresses found in various directions, their loss must have been considerable. Floyd's loss was 17 killed, and 132 wounded.

§ 5. The Creeks being rather inspirited than cast down by their last encounters with the whites, more vigorous efforts

the hurry of the moment, in separating the gun from the limbers, the rammer and picker of the cannon were left tied to the limber: no sooner was this discovered, than Jackson, amidst the galling fire of the enemy, pulled out the ramrod of his musket and used it as a picker; primed with a cartridge, and fired the cannon. Perkins having pulled off his bayonet, used his musket as a rammer, and drove down the cartridge; and Jackson, using his former plan, again discharged her. Lieutenant Armstrong fell, just after the first fire of the cannon, exclaiming, as he lay, "my brave fellows, some of you may fall, but you must save the cannon."

became necessary. General Jackson, therefore, having received reinforcements of militia from Tennessee, and being joined by a considerable body of Cherokee and friendly Creek Indians, set out on another expedition to the Tallapoosee river. He put his army in motion from the Coosee river on the morning of the 24th of March, and having a passage of fifty-two and a half miles over the ridges which divide the waters of the two rivers, reached the bend of the Tallapoosee, three miles beyond where the engagement of the 22d of January took place, and at the southern extremity of New Youca, on the morning of the 27th.

This bend resembles in its curvature that of a horse-shoe, and is thence called by that name among the whites. Nature furnishes few situations as eligible for defence; and barbarians never rendered one more secure by art, than was this by the Creeks. Across the neck of land which leads into it from the north, they had erected a breastwork, of the greatest compactness and strength, from five to eight feet high, and prepared with double rows of port-holes very artfully arranged. The figure of this wall manifested no less skill in the projectors of it, than its construction; an army could not approach it without being exposed to a double and cross fire from the enemy, who lay in perfect security behind it. The area of this peninsula, thus bounded by breastworks, included about 80 or 100 acres.

In this bend the warriors from Oakfuskee, Oakchaya, New Youca, Hillabees, the Fish Ponds, and Eufauta towns, appriz-ed of Jackson's approach, had collected their strength. Their exact number was not ascertained; but it was believed to have been about 1000: and relying with the utmost confidence upon their strength, their situation, and the assurances of their prophets, they calculated on repulsing Jackson with great ease.

Early on the morning of the 27th, having encamped the preceding night at the distance of six miles from the bend, Jackson detached general Coffee with the mounted men, and nearly the whole of the Indian force, to pass the river at a ford about three miles below their encampment, and to surround the bend in such a manner that none of them should escape by attempting to cross the river. With the remainder of the forces Jackson proceeded along the point of land, which led to the front of their breastwork; and at half past 10 o'clock, planted his artillery on a small eminence, distant from the nearest point of the breastwork about 80 yards, and from its farthest about 250; from which a brisk fire was immediately opened upon its centre. Whenever the enemy showed them-

selves behind their works, or ventured to approach them, a galling fire was opened on them with musketry and rifles.

Meanwhile general Coffee, having crossed below, turned up the river, bearing away from its cliffs. When within half a mile of the village, which stood at the extremity of the peninsula, the savage yell was raised by the enemy. Expecting an immediate attack, Coffee drew up his forces in line of battle, in open hilly woodland, and moved forward in that position. The friendly Indians had been previously ordered to advance secretly and take possession of the bank of the river, and prevent the enemy from crossing on the approach of Jackson's main body in front. Accordingly, the fire of Jackson's cannon commencing when Coffee's troops were within about a quarter of a mile from the river, his Indians immediately rushed forward with great impetuosity to its banks. The militia were halted, and kept in order of battle, an attack on the rear being expected from the Oakfuskee villages, which lay on the river about eight miles below.

The fire of the cannon and small arms becoming now general and heavy in front, animated the Indians on the bank; and seeing about 100 of the warriors, and all the squaws and children of the enemy running about among the huts of the village on the opposite shore, they could no longer remain silent spectators. While some kept up a fire across the river (here about 120 yards wide), to prevent the enemy's approach to the bank, others plunged into the river and swam across for canoes, that lay on the other side in considerable numbers. Having succeeded in bringing them over, numbers embarked, and landing in the peninsula, advanced into the village, and soon drove the enemy from the huts up to the fortification, where they pursued and continued to annoy them during the whole action.

This movement of the friendly Indians leaving the river bank unguarded, made it necessary that a part of Coffee's line should take their place. A company of rangers were accordingly posted on the bank of the upper part, and a lieutenant with 40 men took possession of an island in the lower part of the bend.

Finding that the friendly Indians, notwithstanding the determined bravery they displayed, were wholly insufficient to dislodge the enemy, and that general Coffee had secured the opposite banks of the river, Jackson determined upon taking possession of the works by storm. Never were men better disposed for such an undertaking, than those by whom it was to be effected. They had entreated to be led to the charge

with the most pressing importunity; and received the order which was now given with the strongest demonstration of joy. The effect was such as this temper of mind foretold. The regular troops, led by colonel Williams and major Montgomery, were presently in possession of the nearer side of the breastwork; and the militia accompanied them in the charge with a vivacity and firmness which could not have been exceeded, and have seldom been equalled by troops of any description.

Having maintained for a few minutes a very obstinate contest, muzzle to muzzle, through the port-holes, in which many of the enemy's balls were welded to the American bayonets, they succeeded in gaining possession of the opposite side of the works. The event could then no longer be doubtful; the enemy, although many of them fought to the last with that kind of bravery which desperation inspires, were routed and cut to pieces. The whole margin of the river which surrounded the peninsula, was strewed with the slain: 557 were found, besides a great number who were thrown in the river by their surviving friends, and killed in attempting to pass it, by general Coffee's men, stationed on the opposite banks. Not more than 20 could have escaped. Among the dead was found their famous prophet Manahoee, shot in the mouth by a grape-shot, and two other prophets. Two or three women and children were killed by accident. The number of prisoners taken exceeded 300, all women and children excepting three or four.

The battle may be said to have continued with severity for about five hours; but the firing and the slaughter continued until it was suspended by the darkness of the night. The next morning it was resumed, and 16 of the enemy slain, who had concealed themselves under the banks.

Jackson's loss was 26 white men killed, and 107 wounded; 18 Cherokees killed, and 36 wounded; 5 friendly Creeks killed, and 11 wounded.

This most decisive battle completely broke the spirit as well as power of the hostile Creeks, who were never after able to make head against the troops of the United States. Jackson shortly after completely scoured the Coosee and Tallapoosee rivers, and the intervening country. A part of the enemy on the latter river, just before his arrival, made their escape across it, and fled in consternation towards Pensacola. Most of the inhabitants on the Coosee and the neighbouring country came in, and surrendered unconditionally. Many of the negroes taken at Fort Mims were delivered up, and one white woman, with her two children.

A detachment of militia from North and South Carolina, under the command of colonel Pearson, scoured the country below, upon the Alibama, took a number of prisoners, and received the submission of a great number of Creek warriors and prophets. On the return of Pearson's expedition, he had with him upwards of 600 of the late hostile Creeks, and nearly all the remaining negroes that had been captured at Fort Mims.

§ 6. On the 1st of August, the principal chiefs of the hostile Creeks met general Jackson at the fort called by his name, for the purpose of concluding articles of agreement and capitulation, which were agreed upon the 9th of the same month. By this treaty a large and valuable portion of their territory was ceded to the United States, as an equivalent for the expenses incurred in prosecuting the war, and the right of the United States to establish military posts and trading-houses, and to open roads within their territory, was acknowledged, as also the right to the free navigation of all their waters. The Creeks also engaged to make an immediate surrender of all the persons and property taken from the citizens of the United States, the friendly part of the Creek nation, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations, to the respective owners; and to surrender all the prophets and instigators of the war, whether foreigners or natives, who had not submitted to the arms of the United States, and become parties to these articles, if ever they should be found within the territory of the Creeks. It was also stipulated, that the Creeks should abandon all communication, and cease to hold any intercourse with any British or Spanish post, garrison, or town; and that they should not admit among them any agent or trader, who should not derive authority to hold commercial or other intercourse with them, by license from the president or authorized agent of the United States. The United States engaged to guarantee the remainder of their territory, and to restore all their prisoners; and, in consideration of the nation being reduced to extreme want, and not having at present the means of subsistence, the United States engaged, from motives of humanity, to continue to furnish them gratuitously with the necessaries of life, until the crops of corn could be considered competent to yield the nation a supply; and to establish trading-houses, to enable the nation by industry and economy to procure clothing.

Thus ended the Creek war, after a prodigious slaughter of those brave, misguided men, and the unconditional submission of the remainder, excepting a few who took refuge in

Florida. Nearly the whole of the Creek towns were destroyed.

§ 7. But hardly was the Indian war at an end, before new troubles sprang up in this quarter, and general Jackson was forced to encounter a much more formidable enemy. After concluding the treaty with the Creeks, Jackson moved his head-quarters to Mobile, where, on the 27th of August, he received information by express from Pensacola, that three British vessels had arrived there on the 25th, which, on the following day, had disembarked an immense quantity of arms, ammunition, munitions of war, and provisions; and marched into the Spanish fort between two and three hundred troops. He was likewise informed that thirteen sail of the line, with a large number of transports, bringing 10,000 troops, were daily expected.

On the receipt of this information, Jackson immediately dispatched an express to the governor of Tennessee at Nashville, requesting that the whole of the quota of the militia of that state should be organized, equipped, and brought into the field, without delay, and his adjutant-general, then in Tennessee, was instructed to make the necessary arrangements for immediately provisioning and bringing the troops to head-quarters.

The three vessels which had arrived at Pensacola, joined by another, soon after sailed from that port for Mobile, and on the 15th of September appeared off Fort Bowyer. The town of Mobile, where general Jackson had his head-quarters, is situated on the west side of the Mobile river, at its entrance into the bay of the same name. Mobile bay is about 30 miles long, and of considerable breadth; but its entrance is only 5 miles broad, and is completely commanded by Fort Bowyer, which is situated at the extreme point on the east side of the bay. The fort was occupied by a small garrison, commanded by major Lawrence, of the 2d infantry.

The British squadron, consisting of two ships and two brigs, appeared in sight about noon of the 15th, standing directly for the fort. At 4, in the afternoon, the battery was opened upon them; the firing was immediately returned from all the vessels. A force of 110 marines, commanded by colonel Nicholls, 200 Creek Indians, headed by captain Woodbine, of the British navy, and about 20 artillerists, had been previously landed in the rear of the fort, and opened a fire upon it from a twelve-pounder and a howitzer, but they did no execution, and were soon silenced by a few shot. The action continued without intermission on either side for nearly three

hours, when three of the vessels were compelled to retire. The commodore's ship, which mounted 22 thirty-two-pound carronades, having anchored nearest the fort, had her cable cut by the shot, and was so much disabled that she drifted on shore, within 600 yards of the battery; when, the other vessels being out of reach, such a tremendous fire was opened upon her, that she was set on fire and abandoned by such of her crew as survived. Out of a crew of 170 men, the commander and 20 men only escaped. On board of the other ship, 85 were killed and wounded; one of the brigs also was very considerably damaged; but her loss was not ascertained. The effective force in the fort was about 120 men; their loss was only four killed and five wounded. During the hottest part of the action, the flag-staff being shot away, the flag was immediately regained under a heavy fire of grape and canister, hoisted on a sponge staff, and planted on the parapet. The land-forces retreated by land to Pensacola, after having re-embarked their pieces.

§ 8. A short time previous to this attack, a proclamation was issued by Edward Nichols, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in the Floridas, and dated head-quarters, Pensacola, addressed to the inhabitants of Louisiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. In this address, the natives of Louisiana are called upon to assist the British forces in liberating their paternal soil from a fruitless, imbecile government; to abolish the American usurpation, and put the lawful owners of the soil in possession. The inhabitants of Kentucky and Tennessee are told that they have too long borne with grievous impositions; that the brunt of the war has fallen on their brave sons; and they are intreated to be imposed on no more, but either to range themselves under the standard of their forefathers, or observe a strict neutrality. If they complied with either of these offers, the address assured them, that whatever provisions they sent down should be paid for in dollars, and the safety of the persons bringing it, as well as the free navigation of the Mississippi, guaranteed.

The proclamation then calls to the view of the "men of Kentucky the conduct of those factions which hurried them into this cruel, unjust, and unnatural war, at a time when Great Britain was straining every nerve in defence of her own and the liberties of the world; when she was expending millions of her treasure in endeavouring to pull down one of the most formidable and dangerous tyrants that ever disgraced the form of man. When groaning Europe was in her last gasp, when Britons alone showed an undaunted front, basely did

these assassins endeavour to stab her from the rear; she has turned on them renovated from the bloody but successful struggle. Europe is happy and free, and she now hastens justly to avenge the unprovoked insult. Shew them," continued Nichols, "that you are not collectively unjust—leave that contemptible few to shift for themselves; let those slaves of the tyrant send an embassy to Elba, and implore his aid; but let every honest, upright American spurn them with merited contempt. After the experience of 21 years, can you any longer support those brawlers of liberty, who call it freedom, when themselves are no more free than their impostors? Be no longer their dupes, accept my offers, and all that is promised you in the proclamation, I guarantee to you, on the sacred word of a British officer."

A greater degree of ignorance of the nature of the people addressed, was perhaps never displayed, than was manifested in this proclamation. Nichols himself was enabled to take a pretty favourable view of its reception a few days after it was issued, as he headed the land forces employed against Fort Bowyer.

§ 9. Previous to the attack upon Mobile, Nichols had held out the most seducing offers to induce a band of lawless men, who had formed an establishment on the island of Barrataria, to enter into the British service in the operations planned against Lower Louisiana. But although these men were acting in the most lawless manner, and though they were actually proscribed by the American government, they would not consent to act the part of traitors. Instead of accepting the British offers, they procrastinated their answer, and immediately dispatched the intelligence to New-Orleans.

The Barratarians principally consisted of the officers and crews of French privateers, who, on the capture of Guadeloupe, the last of the French West-India islands, had repaired to Carthagena, and accepted commissions from the new government which had been established there. For the convenience of disposing of their prizes, these men resorted to Barrataria, and formed establishments in the island of Grand Terre, and other places along the coast of Louisiana to the west of the Mississippi, whence, it is said, they preyed indiscriminately upon the commerce of all nations, not excepting even that of the United States, in whose dominions they had thus unwarrantably settled themselves. The chief intercourse of the Barratarians was with New-Orleans, almost all their prize goods being smuggled into that port.

In the year 1813, this lawless colony excited the attention of the government of Louisiana, and a company was ordered out to break up the establishment. But this small force proved quite ineffectual: the whole party were surprised and captured before they reached the settlements of this resolute set of men. The naval force, however, being considerably strengthened in the summer of 1814, a new expedition was fitted out. On the 11th of September, commodore Patterson left New-Orleans, with a detachment of 70 of the 44th regiment of infantry, commanded by colonel Ross, and being joined by the schooner Caroline at Placquemine, and the gun-boats at the Balize, on the morning of the 16th made the island of Barrataria, and discovered a number of vessels in the harbour, some of which shewed Carthagenian colours. As soon as the squadron was perceived, the Barratarians formed their vessels, ten in number, into a line of battle near the entrance of the harbour; and Patterson also formed his vessels into a line of battle, consisting of six gun-boats, a tender, and a launch; the schooner Caroline drawing too much water to cross the bar. On the approach of the squadron, however, the Barratarians abandoned their vessels, and took to flight in all directions in their small boats, having previously fired two of their best schooners. The launch, with two gun-barges and the small boats, were immediately sent in pursuit, and all the vessels in the harbour were taken possession of, and the establishment on shore completely destroyed.

§ 10. The unprecedented conduct of the governor of Pensacola, in harbouring and aiding the British and their Indian allies, and in allowing them to fit out expeditions against the United States from that port, had been forcibly remonstrated against by general Jackson, but hitherto without effect. Having been reinforced by about 2000 Tennessee militia, which had marched to Mobile through the Indian country, Jackson, therefore, advanced towards Pensacola to demand redress. He reached the neighbourhood of that post on the afternoon of the 6th of November, and immediately sent a flag to communicate the object of his visit to the governor; but it was forced to return, being fired on from the batteries. Jackson then reconnoitered the fort, and finding it defended by both English and Spanish troops, determined to storm the town, and accordingly made the necessary arrangements for carrying his determination into effect the next day.

The troops were put in motion for the attack early on the 7th. Being encamped to the west of the town, Jackson calculated that the attack would be expected from that quarter.

To cherish this idea, part of the mounted men were sent to show themselves on the west, while the remainder of the troops passed in the rear of the fort, undiscovered, to the east of the town. When at the distance of a mile, the town appeared in full view. The troops, principally militia, with a few regulars, and some Choctaw Indians, advanced with the most undaunted courage, although a strong fort appeared ready to assail them on the right, seven British armed vessels on the left, and strong block-houses and batteries of cannon in front. On entering the town, a battery of two cannon was opened on the centre column, composed of the regulars, with ball and grape, and a shower of musquetry from the houses and gardens. The battery was immediately stormed, and the musquetry was soon silenced by the steady and well-directed fire of the regulars.

The governor now made his appearance with a flag, and begged for mercy, offering to surrender the town and fort unconditionally. Mercy was granted, and protection given to the citizens and their property, although the officer commanding the fort refused to give it up, and held it till near midnight, when he evacuated it with his troops. The British moved down to the Barrancas, a strong fort commanding the harbour, and, finding that Jackson had gained possession of the town, next morning spiked and dismounted the cannon, and blew up the fort, just as the American troops were preparing to march and storm the place.

The British then withdrew to their shipping, and general Jackson, having accomplished his object, evacuated the town, and returned to the American dominions.

§ 11. The dangers impending over New Orleans, from the threatened expedition of the British, now rendered the presence of general Jackson highly necessary at that city. He arrived there with his troops on the 2d of December, and immediate measures of defence were adopted, by embodying the militia, repairing the forts on the river, &c.

A few days after Jackson's arrival, the British fleet made their appearance in the Bay of St. Louis, and on the 12th, the fleet appeared in such strength off Ship island, as to induce lieutenant Jones, who commanded the American flotilla of gun-boats, to retire higher up the lake, to take a position to defend the passes to New Orleans. On the 13th, the American schooner Seahorse, which had been sent by the commodore that morning to the Bay of St. Louis, to assist in the removal of some public stores, was attacked by three of the enemy's barges. These were driven off, but being reinforced

by four others, the schooner was blown up by her crew, and the store-house set on fire. On the following day, the American flotilla, while becalmed, was attacked by 42 heavy launches and gun-barges, manned with 1000 men and officers, and after a vigorous resistance, for upwards of an hour, against this overwhelming force, the whole flotilla was captured by the enemy.

§ 12. The news of the arrival of the British squadron in these waters reached New Orleans on the 12th of December, and in a day or two after, martial law was proclaimed in the city, and the militia called out *en masse*. Large appropriations were made by the legislature of Louisiana for the erection of batteries, and granting bounties to seamen to enlist in the service; an embargo was laid for three days in order to stop the departure of those individuals; and a requisition was made by general Jackson of negroes to work on the fortifications, and all those found in the streets were impressed for that purpose, as well as all kinds of drays and carts. Four thousand Tennessee militia arrived by water on the 21st, and Jackson was further reinforced by the Barratarians, to whom an amnesty was granted by the general and the governor of Louisiana, on condition of their joining in the defence of the country.

§ 13. The loss of the gun-boats having given the enemy command of lake Borgne, he was enabled to choose his point of attack. It became, therefore, an object of importance to obstruct the numerous bayous and canals leading from that lake to the highlands on the Mississippi. This important service was committed to major-general Villere, commanding the district between the river and the lakes, who, being a native of the country, was presumed to be best acquainted with all these passes. Unfortunately, however, a picket which the general had established at the mouth of the bayou Bienvenu, and which, notwithstanding general Jackson's orders, had been left unobstructed, was completely surprised, and the enemy penetrated through a canal leading to his farm, about two leagues below the city, and succeeded in cutting off a company of militia stationed there. This intelligence was communicated to Jackson about 12 o'clock on the 23d. His force at this time consisted of parts of the 7th and 44th regiments, not exceeding 600 together, the city militia, a part of general Coffee's brigade of mounted gun-men, and the detached militia from the western division of Tennessee, under the command of major-general Carrol. These two last corps were stationed four miles above the city. Apprehending a

double attack by the way of Chef Menteur, general Carrol's force, and the militia of the city, were left posted on the Gentilly road, and at 5 o'clock, P. M. Jackson marched to meet the enemy, whom he was resolved to attack in his first position, with major Hind's dragoons, general Coffee's brigade, parts of the 7th and 44th regiments, the uniformed companies of militia, under the command of major Planche, 200 men of colour, chiefly from St. Domingo, and a detachment of artillery, under the direction of colonel M'Rea, with 2 six-pounders, under the command of lieutenant Spots, not exceeding in all 1500 men.

§ 14. Jackson arrived near the enemy's encampment about 7, and immediately made his dispositions for the attack. The enemy's forces, amounting at that time on land to about 3000, extended half a mile on the river, and in the rear nearly to the wood. General Coffee was ordered to turn their right, while, with the residue of the force, Jackson attacked his strongest position on the left near the river. Commodore Patterson, having dropped down the river in the schooner Caroline, was directed to open a fire upon their camp, which he executed about half after 7. This being the signal of attack, general Coffee's men, with their usual impetuosity, rushed on the enemy's right and entered their camp, while Jackson's troops advanced with equal ardour.

Unfortunately, a thick fog, which arose about eight o'clock, caused some confusion among the different corps. Fearing the consequences, under this circumstance, of the further prosecution of a night attack with troops then acting together for the first time, Jackson contented himself with lying on the field that night; and at four in the morning assumed a stronger position about two miles nearer to the city.

In this action the American loss was 24 killed, 115 wounded, and 74 missing; the British loss amounted to 46 killed, 167 wounded, and 64 missing.

§ 15. The country between New Orleans and the sea is one extensive swamp, excepting the immediate banks of the Mississippi. These banks are generally about a quarter of a mile wide, and being higher than the country behind, are dry, except in time of inundation, when the whole country would form one vast flood, were it not for the artificial banks or levees which have been erected for the preservation of the farms on this narrow, but fertile strip of land. The city of New Orleans itself is protected from the river in the same manner. At intervals there are *bayous* or outlets which pierce these banks; the water which flows through them, however,

never returns to the bed of the river, but finds its way to the Gulf of Mexico by other channels through the swamps.

From this description of the country, it will be perceived, that New Orleans is extremely susceptible of defence, and that over a certain proportion, numbers are nearly unavailing. The position taken up by general Jackson occupied both banks of the river. On the left it was simply a straight line of a front of about 1000 yards, with a parapet, the right resting on the river, and the left on a wood, which communicated with the swamp, and the passage of which had been rendered impracticable for troops. This line was strengthened by flank-works, and had a ditch with about four feet of water. On the right bank was a heavy battery of 15 guns, which enfiladed the whole front of the position on the left bank.

§ 16. The British having erected a battery in the night of the 26th, succeeded, on the following day, in blowing up the schooner Caroline, which lay becalmed a short distance above in the Mississippi. Her crew, however, had previously made their escape. Emboldened by this event, the enemy marched his whole force on the 28th up the levee, in the hope of driving the Americans from their position, and with this view opened upon them, at the distance of about half a mile, his bombs and rockets. He was repulsed, however, with the loss of 16 killed, and 38 wounded. The American loss was 7 killed, and 8 wounded.

Another attempt was made upon the American lines on the 1st of January. The enemy having the preceding night erected a battery near the works, in the morning opened a heavy fire from it, and made two bold attempts to force and turn the left wing, in both of which they were repulsed; and in the course of the night they retreated to their lines, leaving all their guns on the battery, which they had previously spiked, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, working-tools, and their dead unburied. Their loss on this occasion was 32 killed, 44 wounded, and 2 missing; that of the Americans, 11 killed and 23 wounded.

General Jackson was reinforced by 2500 Kentucky militia on the 4th, and on the 6th the British were joined by general Lambert, at the head of the second part of the expedition. Serious preparations were now made for storming the American works.

§ 17. On the night of the 7th, with infinite labour, the British succeeded in getting their boats into the Mississippi, by widening and deepening the channel of the bayou, from which they had about two weeks before effected their disembarka-

tion. Though these operations were not unperceived, it was not in Jackson's power to impede them by a general attack: the nature of the troops under his command, mostly militia, rendering it too hazardous to attempt extensive offensive movements in an open country, against a numerous and well-disciplined army. Although his forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, his strength had received very little addition; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, Jackson, however, took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object in view.

Early in the morning of the 8th, the enemy, after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and Congreve rockets, advanced their columns on the right and left to storm the entrenchments on the left bank of the Mississippi, throwing over a considerable force in his boats at the same time to the right bank. The entrenchments on the right bank, were occupied by general Morgan, with the New Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia, and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops; general Jackson, with the Tennessee and the remainder of the Kentucky militia, occupied the works on the left bank.

The columns of the enemy advanced in good order towards Jackson's entrenchments, the men shouldering their muskets, and all carrying fascines, and some with ladders. The batteries now opened an incessant fire on the British columns, which continued to advance in pretty good order, until, in a few minutes, the musketry of the militia joining their fire with that of the artillery, began to make an impression on them, which soon threw them into confusion. At this time the noise of the continued rolling fire resembled the concussion of tremendous peals of thunder. For some time the British officers succeeded in animating the courage of their troops, although every discharge from the batteries opened the columns, mowing down whole files, which were almost instantaneously replaced by new troops coming up close after the first: but these also shared the same fate, until at last, after 25 minutes continued firing, through which a few platoons advanced to the edge of the ditch, the columns broke and retreated in confusion.

A second attack was received in the same manner. The British were forced to retreat, with an immense loss. But vain was the attempt of the officers to bring them up a third time. The soldiers were insensible to every thing but danger, and

saw nothing but death, which had struck so many of their comrades.

Near the commencement of the attack, general Packenham, the British commander-in-chief, lost his life at the head of his troops, and soon after generals Keane and Gibbs were carried off the field dangerously wounded. A great many other officers of rank fell, and the plain between the front line of the British and the American works, a distance of 400 yards, was literally covered with the enemy's dead and wounded. At this time general Jackson's loss was only seven killed and six wounded.

The entire destruction of the British army had now been inevitable, had not an unfortunate occurrence at this moment taken place on the right bank of the river. The troops which had landed there were hardy enough to advance against the works, and at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with confidence, the Kentucky militia ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces. Commodore Patterson, who commanded the batteries, was of course forced to abandon them, after spiking his guns.

This unfortunate rout totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which he could annoy Jackson without hazard, and by means of which he might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of the success of the Americans on the other side of the river. It became, therefore, an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means which Jackson could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. But so great had been the loss of the British on the left bank, that they were not able to spare a sufficient number of troops to hold the position which they had gained on the right bank without jeopardizing the safety of the whole. The troops were therefore withdrawn, and Jackson immediately regained the lost position.

The spirit of atrocity and vengeance, which marked the conduct of the British during the campaign, was manifested even in this battle, although they suffered so signal a defeat. After their final repulse on the left bank, numbers of the American troops, prompted merely by sentiments of humanity, went, of their own accord, in front of their lines, to assist the wounded British, to give them drink, and to carry them (as they did several of them on their backs) within the lines. While they were thus employed, they were actually fired upon, and several killed. Yet the others, regardless of the danger,

persevered in their laudable purpose. This instance of baseness may have proceeded from individuals; nor would it in common cases be presumed, that the men were ordered to fire by their officers: but if the fact be, as has been repeatedly asserted without contradiction, that the watchword of the day was the significant words "*beauty and booty*," no charge would seem too atrocious for belief against the British commanders.

The total loss of the Americans in this action on both sides of the river, was 13 killed, 39 wounded, and 19 missing. The British acknowledge a loss of 293 killed, 1267 wounded, and 484 missing. About 1000 stand of arms of different descriptions were taken by the Americans.

The British having retired to their old position, continued to occupy it till the night of the 18th, although constantly annoyed by the American artillery on both sides of the river. At midnight they precipitately decamped, and returned to their boats, leaving behind, under medical attendance, 80 wounded, including two officers. Fourteen pieces of heavy artillery, and a quantity of shot, were also abandoned, and a great deal of powder, which, however, was previously destroyed. But, such was the situation of the ground which the enemy abandoned, and of that through which he retired, protected by canals, redoubts, entrenchments, and swamps on his right, and the river on his left, that Jackson could not, without encountering a risk which true policy did not seem to require or to authorise, attempt to annoy him much on his retreat. He took only eight prisoners.

Commodore Patterson, however, dispatched five boats and a gig, manned and armed with 50 men, under the command of Mr. Thomas Shields, purser on the New Orleans station, to annoy the retreat of the British. On the night of the 19th, a boat lying at anchor was captured by surprise, without resistance, containing 40 dragoons and 14 seamen. The prisoners exceeding the detachment in numbers, Shields returned, and placing them in charge of the army, again set out in pursuit, in the hope of intercepting some of the enemy's boats about day-light, but without success.

On the morning of the 21st, Shields once more pushed off among the transports of the enemy, and captured several, but unfortunately, owing to a strong contrary wind, he was not able to bring them off; some of them were therefore given up to the parolled prisoners, and the remainder destroyed. Seventy-eight prisoners were brought in by this intrepid little band.

§ 18. Meantime the British fleet having proceeded up the Mississippi, bombarded Fort St. Philip for eight or nine days; but not being able to make any impression, they commenced their retreat about the same time that the army above embarked in their boats, viz. on the 18th of January. The bombarding vessels were stationed most of the time out of the reach of the guns of the fort. Major Overton, the commander, lost only two killed and seven wounded.

We have never seen any official statement of the forces employed in this expedition; but the most probable calculation makes the force landed below New Orleans, about 15,000, viz. 11,000 land-troops, and 4000 sailors and marines. So confident were the British of success, that collectors of the customs and other civil officers attended the expedition, several of whom were among the prisoners taken by Shields, on the retreat of the army.

§ 19. As soon as the British troops were embarked on board their shipping, the squadron made for Mobile bay, and completely invested Fort Bowyer both by land and water. A large force was landed on the 18th of February, who made regular approaches, keeping up a constant firing, until the 11th, when, the approaches being within pistol-shot of the fort, colonel Lawrence was summoned to surrender. Resistance being unavailing against the overwhelming force of the enemy, articles of capitulation were agreed to, surrendering the fort to the British, the garrison, consisting of 366 men, including officers, being considered prisoners of war. On the 10th and 11th, general Winchester, who commanded at Mobile, threw a detachment across the bay for the relief of Fort Bowyer, but too late to effect any thing, except the capture of one of the British barges, with 17 men.

§ 20. While these operations were carried on in the Gulph of Mexico, a considerable force was stationed off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, menacing Charleston and Savannah. They took possession of Cumberland island, as a military station, but nothing of consequence was effected on the main, excepting the capture of St. Mary's, by a detachment under admiral Cockburn, who again returned to Cumberland island, after they effected their purpose by the destruction of the forts in the neighbourhood.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1. Cruize of the Essex. § 2. Captain Porter's reception at Valparaiso. § 3. Destruction of the British commerce in the Pacific. § 4. Happah war. § 5. Typee war. § 6. Madison's Island. § 7. Capture of the Essex. § 8. Sequel of the cruize. § 9. Result of the campaign on the ocean. § 10. Destruction of the General Armstrong. § 11. Peace between America and Great Britain. § 12. Its reception in the two countries. § 13. Lessons taught by the war.

§ 1. HAVING thus reviewed every important military event, we shall now turn our attention to the ocean, where our cruizers continued to range with unabated vigour, and where, to use the querulous language of the British journalists, "if they fight, they are sure to conquer; if they fly, they are sure to escape."

It will be recollected, that in October, 1812, the Constitution and Hornet sailed from Boston on a cruize, which proved memorable by the destruction of the Java by the former, and that of the Peacock by the latter. The Essex, captain Porter, sailed from the Delaware about the same time, under orders to join commodore Bainbridge, who commanded the squadron. Porter left the capes on the 28th of October, and steered for the Cape de Verd islands, the first appointed rendezvous, crossing the track of the homeward-bound British Indiamen, and the outward-bound West Indiamen. Without meeting any enemy's vessels, he reached St. Jago, and put into Port Praya for supplies. On the 29th of November he left the Cape de Verds for the Brazil coast. A few days after, a British packet was captured, with about $55,000 in specie, which being taken out, the vessel was dispatched with a prize-master to the United States.

The island of Fernando de Noronha, the second place of rendezvous, was reached on the 14th of December. Here Porter received a communication from the commodore, addressed to him under the fictitious title of sir James Lucas Yeo, stating that he would find him off Cape Frio. Without entering the port, therefore, the Essex stood to the southward. Near Rio de Janeiro a British schooner was captured, and

after taking the prisoners out, it was discovered, that about an hour before their capture, they had parted with a small convoy of British vessels, under charge of the Juniper, a three-masted schooner. All sail, therefore, was immediately made in pursuit, but every effort to reach them proved abortive. During the pursuit intelligence was received, from different vessels, first of the blockade of the Bonne Citoyenne by the Constitution and Hornet, and afterwards of the capture of an American vessel by the Montagu 74, which captain Porter strongly suspected to be the Hornet, with the addition that the Montagu had gone in pursuit of the frigate.

This intelligence removed all expectations of the Essex being enabled to join commodore Bainbridge; and it became absolutely necessary, therefore, for Porter to depart from the letter of his instructions. He accordingly determined to pursue that course which seemed best calculated to injure the enemy, and to enable the cruize to be prolonged. This could only be done by going into a friendly port, where supplies could be procured, without the danger of blockade; and the most suitable place for that purpose seemed to be the port of Conception, on the coast of Chili. The season, it being now the end of January, was, to be sure, far advanced for doubling Cape Horn; the stock of provisions also was short, and the ship in other respects not well supplied with stores for so long a cruize. But there appeared to Porter no other choice left, except capture, starvation, or blockade. This course seemed to him the more justifiable, also, as it accorded with the views of the secretary of the navy, as well as those of the commodore. Before the declaration of war, Porter had laid before the secretary a plan for annoying the enemy's commerce in the Pacific, which had been approved of; and prior to this cruize, commodore Bainbridge having requested his opinion as to the best mode of annoying the enemy, Porter had laid the same plan before him. This had also been approved of by the commodore, who signified his intention to pursue it, provided supplies of provisions could be procured. Although there was considerable responsibility attached to this proceeding, and the undertaking was greater than had yet been engaged in by any single ship in similar pursuits, yet the season admitting of no delay, Porter, immediately on getting to sea, stood to the southward, and the crew were put on short allowance of provisions, in order to husband them for the long voyage on which they were now embarked.

Cape Horn was doubled about the middle of February, amidst tremendous storms; and the Essex surmounted all the

dangers of hurricanes, fogs, and breakers, by the intrepidity of her commander, and the distinguished coolness and activity of her crew, to which the uncommondegree of health they enjoyed, from the judicious arrangements of captain Porter, not a little contributed. In the latitude of about 40° south, pleasant moderate weather succeeded to the incessant storms and severe cold experienced in the passage around the stormy cape, and on the 6th of March, the Essex came to an anchor off an uninhabited island called Mocha, in the latitude of about 38° 15′ S. about eight leagues distant from the coast of Chili. At Mocha, a considerable supply of fresh provisions was procured by shooting the wild hogs and horses which abound in that island. The flesh of the latter was found to be the preferable food, that of the hogs being tough.

§ 2. Porter, again steering his course along the iron-bound coast of Chili, on the 15th of March put into the port of Valparaiso, where, contrary to his expectations, he was received with the utmost attention and hospitality. This arose from the change which had lately taken place here, the Chilians having assumed the government, though without absolutely declaring themselves independent of old Spain. The arrival of an American frigate was considered a most happy event, and was celebrated in their capital, St. Jago, by illuminations and the ringing of bells. It was generally believed in Chili, that Porter had brought proposals for a friendly alliance, and assurances of assistance in their struggle for independence; and this construction he thought it politic rather to encourage, as it suited his views of readily obtaining supplies.

§ 3. The Essex remained a week at Valparaiso. During that time two Spanish vessels had sailed for Lima, which rendered its speedy departure necessary, as they would certainly communicate the intelligence of its arrival to the enemy, and as it was Porter's intention to visit that coast next, for, from all accounts, the coast of Peru, and from there to the Gallapagos islands, was the favourite fishing-ground of the British whalers. Porter accordingly ran down the coast of Chili and Peru, and thence proceeded to the Gallapagos islands. In this track he fell in with the Peruvian corsair, which he disarmed, and among the Gallapagos captured the three British whalers, of which an account has already been given in the second volume of this work*.

The Essex remained six months at the Gallapagos islands, during which, however, one trip was made to Tumbez, on the

* Annals, page 61.

coast of Peru, where a number of prisoners were landed on parole. During the cruize among those islands, the whole of the valuable British whale-vessels in the Pacific were captured, excepting one which had been laid up at Coquimbo for the want of guns, she having been disarmed by the government of Chili, in consequence of the active part she had taken in favour of the Peruvians, who adhered to Ferdinand. The value of these prizes to the enemy was estimated at two millions and a half of dollars. By this cruize, too, the whole of the American whale-ships were rescued from certain capture, and protected in those seas until the proper season for their return to the United States. The captured vessels were twelve in number, carrying, in the whole, 107 guns, and 302 men. Two of the prizes were given up to the prisoners, three were sent to Valparaiso, where they were laid up, and three were sent to the United States. Lieutenant Downes convoyed the prizes sent to Valparaiso, in another prize, which had been fitted up as a cruizer, under the name of the Essex Junior. He rejoined captain Porter at the Gallapagos on the 30th of September, and brought letters from Valparaiso, containing information that a squadron, under the command of commodore James Hillyar, consisting of the frigate Phoebe, of 36 guns, the Racoon and Cherub sloops of war, and a store-ship of 20 guns, had sailed from England in pursuit of the Essex. That the Racoon and Cherub had been seeking her for some time on the coast of Brazil, and had then proceeded in quest of her to the Pacific.

The Essex had now been nearly a year at sea, almost without intermission, and, as may be supposed, required considerable repairs to put her in a proper state to meet the enemy. Captain Porter, therefore, determined to steer for the Washington Islands for that purpose, and, on the 2d of October, the Essex, in company with the Essex Junior, Greenwich, Seringapatam, New Zealander, and the Sir Andrew Hammond, finally left the Gallapagos, or the Enchanted Isles, as some have called them, from the difficulty of clearing them, owing to the currents and baffling winds. These islands are described by captain Porter as being all of volcanic origin, and totally devoid of running streams. There are some few springs, but the water is quickly absorbed by the loose and thirsty lava and cinders, of which these islands are principally composed. When Porter visited them, their only inhabitants were tortoises, guanas, lizards, and snakes, but as he lost a number of goats which were put on shore to graze, the probability is that they will soon be stocked by these useful animals. The turtles

are in such abundance as to furnish plentiful supplies of fresh provision for ships stopping there.

§ 4. The Marquesas, of which the Washington groupe forms a part, are situated between the latitude of 6° and 11° S. and 136° and 142° W. from London. Captain Porter, with his squadron, arrived at the island called Nooaheevah by the natives, on which Porter bestowed the name of Madison's Island, in honour of the American president. Here a fine bay was discovered, which appeared to offer every advantage that could be desired. A friendly intercourse was soon opened with the natives dwelling near the beach; but their operations on shore were threatened to be disturbed by the natives of a neighbouring valley, who were at war with those among whom Porter had landed. On the capture of one of their strong holds, however, by a party of sailors, who accompanied the friendly natives, the hostile Indians gladly accepted of the peace offered by Porter, on the condition of establishing a friendly commerce with him. The Indians now erected a little village for the reception of the articles taken out of the Essex, in order to her repairs, and the greatest harmony prevailed between the Americans and most of the tribes of the island, who brought plentiful supplies of provisions in exchange for pieces of iron, fish-hooks, and whales' teeth.

§ 5. But the conduct of the Typees, one of the most numerous and warlike tribes in the island, again threatened to put a speedy stop to the useful intercourse established with the natives. They continually insulted the friendly Indians, calling them cowards for submitting to the white men, to whom they applied the most degrading epithets. In reply to a messenger whom Porter sent to their valley, to induce them to remain at peace, and to require an exchange of presents as a proof of their friendly disposition, they desired to know why they should seek his friendship, and why they should bring him hogs and fruit? If he was strong enough, they said, they knew he would come and take them: his not doing so was an acknowledgment of his weakness. Porter was extremely averse from engaging in a useless warfare with these people; but he conceived that necessity compelled him to take some steps to punish them, in order to secure the friendship of the other Indians, who made no secret of their belief that his backwardness to engage in war arose solely from cowardice. A distant day was therefore appointed for an expedition against the Typees, and in the mean while Porter practised every means to inspire them with peaceable views, by making them acquainted with the deadly effects of fire-arms. But

they felt too conscious of their numbers, and of the natural strength of their valley, surrounded by mountains impenetrable, as they believed, to white men, to listen to peaceable overtures; and in this disposition they were confirmed by the event of the first attempt made to enter their country. Thirty-five men, with captain Porter at their head, landed in their valley, but from the nature of the country, it was found impossible to make any impression on them with this small force; and after penetrating through marshes and thickets, through which they had to fight their way, the progress of the party was finally stopped by a strong wall seven feet high, flanked by impenetrable thickets.

The situation of the party was at this moment peculiarly hazardous. The surrounding hills were covered by those Indians, who at present professed friendship. Great numbers also had landed with them, but they had taken little or no part in the contest, and the appearance of a defeat, it was supposed, would bring on an attack from the tribe that had been before defeated, if not by the whole force of the island. A retreat was therefore feigned, in order to draw the Indians from their fort, and in an instant they rushed upon the party with hideous yells. The first and second which advanced were killed, and those who attempted to carry them off were wounded; on seeing which, they abandoned their dead, and precipitately retreated to their fort. Porter was now suffered to retreat nearly unmolested. On arriving at the beach a messenger was again dispatched to offer peace, but they only answered by a challenge to renew the contest.

Porter now determined to embark, as the Indians had all descended the hills, and the defeat of the white men by the Typees formed the universal topic of conversation. The punishment of the hostile natives being deemed, however, more important than ever, a large body was next day marched to their valley across the mountains, and notwithstanding the extreme difficulties of the route, penetrated into their country, and completely drove them out of the valley. We regret to say, that the whole of their villages were burned and laid waste, as, though the practice is usual in Indian warfare, we cannot perceive that the same necessity existed that can be urged for this measure in contests with the Indians in our own territory.

The Typees were now glad to accept of the same terms of peace which they had before scorned, and every tribe on the island courted the friendship of the whites.

§ 6. Previous to the Typee war, a fort had been erected in the valley where Porter first landed, by permission of the inhabitants, and the flag of the United States was hoisted, and the island formally taken possession of in the name of the American government, by the title of Madison's Island, under a salute of 17 guns. The object of the ceremony being explained to the inhabitants, they expressed much pleasure at the idea of being adopted *Mellickees*, as they called the Americans.

The Essex being now completely repaired, and provisions for four months laid in, she sailed for Valparaiso on the 12th of December, in company with the Essex Junior. The three prizes were secured under the guns of the fort, and left in charge of lieutenant Gamble of the marines, and 21 men, with orders to proceed to Valparaiso after a certain period.

§ 7. Shortly after captain Porter reached Valparaiso, commodore Hillyar arrived there in the Phœbe frigate, accompanied by the Cherub sloop of war. These ships, having been sent out expressly to seek for the Essex, were in prime order and equipment, with picked crews, and hoisted flags bearing the motto "God and country, British sailors' best rights: *traitors offend both.*" This was in opposition to Porter's motto of "Free trade and sailors' rights," and the latter part of it suggested, doubtless, by error industriously cherished, that the American crews were chiefly composed of English seamen. In reply to this motto, Porter hoisted at his mizen, "God, our country, and liberty: tyrants offend them." On entering the harbour, the Phoebe fell foul of the Essex in such manner as to lay her at the mercy of captain Porter; out of respect to the neutrality of the port, however, he did not take advantage of her exposed situation. This forbearance was afterwards acknowledged by commodore Hillyar, and he passed his word of honour to observe like conduct while they remained in port. They continued, therefore, while in harbour and on shore, in the mutual exchange of courtesies and kind offices, that should characterize the private intercourse between civilized and generous enemies; and the crews of the respective ships often mingled together, and passed nautical jokes and pleasantries from one to the other.

On getting their provisions on board, the Phœbe and Cherub went off the port, where they cruized for six weeks, rigorously blockading captain Porter. Their united force amounted to 81 guns and 500 men, in addition to which they took on board the crew of an English letter of marque lying in port. The force of the Essex consisted of but 46 guns, all of which, excepting six long twelves, were 32 pound carronades, only serviceable

in close fighting. Her crew, having been much reduced by the manning of prizes, amounted to but 255 men. The Essex Junior being only intended as a store-ship, mounted ten 18 pound carronades and ten short sixes, with a complement of only 60 men.

This vast superiority of force on the part of the enemy prevented all chance of encounter, on any thing like equal terms, unless by express covenant between the commanders. Captain Porter, therefore, endeavoured repeatedly to provoke a challenge (the inferiority of his frigate to the Phœbe not justifying him in making the challenge himself), but without effect. He tried frequently also to bring the Phœbe into single action; but this commodore Hillyar warily avoided, and always kept his ships so close together as to frustrate captain Porter's attempts. Finding it impossible to bring the enemy to equal combat, and fearing the arrival of additional force, which he understood was on the way, Porter determined to put to sea the first opportunity that should present. A rendezvous was accordingly opened for the Essex Junior, and having ascertained by repeated trials that the Essex was a superior sailer to either of the blockading ships, it was agreed that she should let the enemy chase her off; thereby giving the Essex Junior an opportunity of escaping.

On the next day, the 28th of March, 1814, the wind came on to blow fresh from the southward, and the Essex parted her larboard cable, and dragged her starboard anchor directly out to sea. Not a moment was lost in getting sail on the ship; but perceiving that the enemy was close in with the point forming the west side of the bay, and that there was a possibility of passing to windward, and escaping to sea by superior sailing, captain Porter resolved to hazard the attempt. He accordingly took in his top-gallant sails, and braced up for the purpose, but most unfortunately, on rounding the point, a heavy squall struck the ship, and carried away her main top-mast, precipitating the men who were aloft into the sea, who were drowned. Both ships now gave chase, and the crippled state of his ship left Porter no alternative but to endeavour to regain the port. Finding it impossible to get back to the common anchorage, he ran close into a small bay, about three quarters of a mile to leeward of the battery, on the east of the harbour, and let go his anchor within pistol-shot of the shore. Supposing the enemy would, as formerly, respect the neutrality of the place, he considered himself secure, and thought only of repairing the damages he had sustained. The wary and menacing approach of the hostile ships, however, displaying their motto flags, and

having jacks at all their masts' heads, soon showed him the real danger of his situation. With all possible dispatch, therefore, he got his ship ready for action, and endeavoured to get a spring on his cable, but had not succeeded, when, at 54 minutes past 3, P. M. the enemy commenced an attack.

At first the Phœbe placed herself under his stern, and the Cherub on his starboard bow; but the latter soon finding herself exposed to a hot fire, bore up and ran under his stern also, where both ships kept up a severe and raking fire. Porter succeeded three different times in getting springs on his cables, for the purpose of bringing his broadside to bear on the enemy, but they were as often shot away by the excessive fire to which he was exposed. He was obliged, therefore, to rely for defence against this tremendous attack merely on three long twelve-pounders, which he had run out of the stern-ports; and which were worked with such bravery and skill, as in half an hour to do great injury to both the enemy's ships, and induce them to haul off and repair damages. It was evidently the intention of commodore Hillyar to risk nothing from the daring courage of his antagonist, but to take the Essex at as cheap a rate as possible. All his manœuvres were deliberate and wary; he saw his antagonist completely at his mercy, and prepared to cut him up in the safest and surest manner. In the mean time the situation of the Essex was galling and provoking in the extreme; crippled and shattered, with many killed and wounded, she lay awaiting the convenience of the enemy, to renew the scene of slaughter, with scarce a hope of escape or revenge. Her brave crew, however, in place of being disheartened, were aroused to desperation, and by hoisting ensigns in their rigging, and jacks in different parts of the ship, evinced their defiance and determination to hold out to the last.

The enemy having repaired his damages, now placed himself, with both his ships, on the starboard quarter of the Essex, out of reach of her carronades, and where her stern-guns could not be brought to bear. Here he kept up a most destructive fire, which it was not in Porter's power to return; the latter, therefore, saw no hope of injuring him without getting under way and becoming the assailant. From the mangled state of his rigging, he could set no other than the flying jib; this he caused to be hoisted, cut his cable, and ran down on both ships, with an intention of laying the Phœbe on board.

For a short time he was enabled to close with the enemy, and the firing on both sides was tremendous. The decks of

the Essex were strewed with dead, and her cockpit filled with wounded; she had been several times on fire, and was in fact a perfect wreck; still a feeble hope sprung up that she might be saved, in consequence of the Cherub being compelled to haul off by her crippled state; she did not return to close action again, but kept up a distant firing with her long guns. The disabled state of the Essex, however, did not permit her to take advantage of this circumstance; for want of sail she was unable to keep at close quarters with the Phœbe, who, edging off, chose the distance which best suited her long guns, and kept up a tremendous fire, which made dreadful havoc among the crew of the Essex. Many of her guns were rendered useless, and many had their whole crews destroyed: they were manned from those that were disabled, and one gun in particular was three times manned; fifteen men were slain at it in the course of the action, though the captain of it escaped with only a slight wound. Captain Porter now gave up all hopes of closing with the enemy, but finding the wind favourable, determined to run his ship on shore, land the crew, and destroy her. He had approached within musket-shot of the shore, and had every prospect of succeeding, when, in an instant, the wind shifted from the land, and drove her down upon the Phœbe, exposing her again to a dreadful raking fire. The ship was now totally unmanageable; yet as her head was toward the enemy, and he to leeward, captain Porter again perceived a faint hope of boarding. At this moment lieutenant Downes of the Essex Junior came on board to receive orders, expecting that captain Porter would soon be a prisoner. His services could be of no avail in the deplorable state of the Essex, and finding from the enemy's putting his helm up, that the last attempt at boarding would not succeed, Downes was directed to return to his own ship, to be prepared for defending and destroying her in case of attack. He took with him several of the wounded, leaving three of his boat's crew on board to make room for them. The Cherub kept up a hot fire on him during his return.

The slaughter on board of the Essex now became horrible, the enemy continuing to rake her, while she was unable to bring a gun to bear in return. Still her commander, with an obstinacy that bordered on desperation, persisted in the unequal and almost hopeless conflict. Every expedient that a fertile and inventive mind could suggest was resorted to, in the forlorn hope that they might yet be enabled by some lucky chance to escape from the grasp of the foe. A halser was bent to the sheet-anchor, and the anchor cut from the bows, to

bring the ship's head round. This succeeded; the broadside of the Essex was again brought to bear; and as the enemy was much crippled, and unable to hold his own, Porter thought she might drift out of gun-shot before she discovered that he had anchored. The halser, however, unfortunately parted, and with it failed the last lingering hope of the Essex. The ship had taken fire several times during the action, but at this moment her situation was awful. She was on fire both forward and aft; the flames were bursting up each hatchway; a large quantity of powder below exploded, and word was given that the fire was near the magazine. Thus surrounded by horrors, without any chance of saving the ship, Porter turned his attention to rescuing as many of his brave companions as possible. Finding his distance from the shore did not exceed three-quarters of a mile, he hoped many would be able to save themselves should the ship blow up. His boats had been cut to pieces by the enemy's shot, but he advised such as could swim to jump overboard and make for shore. Some reached it, some were taken by the enemy, and some perished in the attempt; but most of this loyal and gallant crew preferred sharing the fate of their ship and their commander.

Those who remained on board now endeavoured to extinguish the flames, and having succeeded, went again to the guns, and kept up a firing for a few minutes; but the crew had by this time become so weakened, that all further resistance was in vain. Captain Porter summoned a consultation of the officers of divisions, but was surprised to find only acting lieutenant Stephen Decatur M'Knight remaining; of the others, some had been killed, others knocked overboard, and others carried below disabled by severe wounds. The accounts from every part of the ship were deplorable in the extreme; representing her in the most shattered and crippled condition, in imminent danger of sinking, and so crowded with the wounded, that even the birth-deck could contain no more, and many were killed while under the surgeon's hands. In the mean while the enemy, in consequence of the smoothness of the water and his secure distance, was enabled to keep up a deliberate and constant fire, aiming with coolness and certainty as if firing at a target, and hitting the hull at every shot. At length, utterly despairing of saving the ship, captain Porter was compelled, at 20 minutes past 6, P. M. to give the painful order to strike the colours. It is probable that the enemy did not perceive that the ship had surrendered, for he continued firing; several men were killed and wounded in diffe-

rent parts of the ship, and captain Porter, thinking he intended to show no quarter, was about to rehoist his flag and to fight until he sunk, when the enemy desisted his attack ten minutes after the surrender.

The loss on board the Essex was 58 killed, 39 wounded severely, 27 slightly, and 31 missing. The loss on board the British vessels was 5 killed and 10 wounded.

Thousands of the inhabitants of Valparaiso were spectators of the battle, covering the neighbouring heights: for it was fought so near the shore, that some of the shot even struck among the citizens, who, in the eagerness of their curiosity, had ventured down upon the beach. Touched by the forlorn situation of the Essex, and filled with admiration at the unflagging spirit and persevering bravery of her commander and crew, a generous anxiety ran throughout the multitude for their fate: bursts of delight arose when, by any vicissitude of battle, or prompt expedient, a chance seemed to turn up in their favour; and the eager spectators were seen to wring their hands, and uttered groans of sympathy, when the transient hope was defeated, and the gallant little frigate once more became an unresisting object of deliberate slaughter.

Though, from the distance and positions which the enemy chose, this battle was chiefly fought on Porter's part by six twelve-pounders only, yet great damage was done to the assailing ships. Their masts and yards were badly crippled, their hulls much cut up; the Phœbe, especially, received 18 twelve pound shot below her water line, some three feet under water. It was with some difficulty that the Phœbe and the Essex could be kept afloat until they anchored the next morning in the port of Valparaiso.

Captain Porter and his crew were paroled, and permitted to return to the United States in the Essex Junior, her armament being previously taken out. On arriving off the port of New York, they were overhauled by the Saturn razee, the authority of commodore Hillyar to grant a passport was questioned, and the Essex Junior detained. Captain Porter then told the boarding-officer that he gave up his parole, and considered himself a prisoner of war, and as such should use all means of escape. In consequence of this threat the Essex Junior was ordered to remain all night under the lee of the Saturn, but the next morning captain Porter put off in his boat, though thirty miles from shore; and, notwithstanding he was pursued by the Saturn, effected his escape, and landed safely on Long Island. The Essex Junior was, however, released, and arrived shortly after in New York.

§ 8. The small party left with lieutenant Gamble in charge of the prizes at Madison's island, met with a series of misfortunes, which eventuated in the loss of all the vessels, and the breaking up of the establishment. Hardly had the Essex got clear of the islands, before a hostile disposition was discovered in the natives; and in a few days they became so insolent, that Gamble conceived it to be absolutely necessary to land his men to recover by force of arms the articles they had stolen from his encampment, and to deter them from putting their threats into execution. Fortunately this was accomplished without the firing of a musket, and a perfect amity was kept up for several months afterwards.

On the 9th of May, while Gamble was preparing to depart for Valparaiso, an attack was made on his ship by the natives. His numbers had been previously reduced by desertion, and by a mutiny, which ended in the escape of the mutineers in one of the prizes. After suffering a severe loss in the scuffle with the natives, a breeze fortunately sprung up, which enabled the party to leave the bay. It being now reduced to eight souls, not more than three of whom were effective, it was impracticable to reach Valparaiso, which lay to windward. Gamble therefore steered for the Sandwich islands, where he was captured by the Cherub sloop of war.

The cruize of the Essex in the Pacific ocean will ever form one of the most memorable events in the history of our country, and posterity will hesitate whether most to admire the wisdom which devised, or the energy which carried it into execution. With a single ship, ill appointed for such a cruize, Porter boldly braved the terrors of the tempestuous cape, and by his successful intrepidity cut off the whole of the valuable commerce of the enemy in those waters, where Great Britain never dreamt that an American frigate would dare to make her appearance. For twelve months Porter lorded it over the Pacific, at the head of a little squadron of his own formation, without any expence to his country, his ships being fitted out, and furnished with provisions and stores solely from the fruits of his enterprise. Numerous ships were sent to the Pacific in pursuit of him, others were ordered to cruize in the China seas, off New Zealand, Timor, and New Holland, and a frigate sent to the river La Plata. These vessels, it is said, were ordered to effect his destruction without respect to the neutrality of any port in which he might have taken shelter, an order which was faithfully executed by commodore Hillyar, notwithstanding the honourable example set him by captain Porter. The gallant defence of the Essex adds another laurel

to the wreath which encircles our seamen, and, as was officially acknowledged by commodore Hillyar, "did honour to her brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of captain Porter, and those under his command."

§ 9. Meanwhile the remainder of our little navy continued to make every sea the theatre of their exploits. No more frigates, it is true, were added to the list of our naval triumphs; for, taught by sad experience, strict orders were issued by the British admiralty to their frigates, to avoid encounters with those of the United States, and indeed they were seldom allowed to put to sea alone. Six sloops of war, however, were captured; the Epervier by the Peacock, the Reindeer and Avon by the Wasp, the Penguin by the Hornet, and the Cyane and Levant by the Constitution frigate. The loss of the American navy at sea was two sloops of war and the President frigate, each of them by an overwhelming force. The limits of this work will not allow us to enter into a detail of the circumstances relating to these captures; but this is the less necessary, as the official statements will be found at the end of the volume.

The blockade of the American coast, which nominally extended from Rhode Island to the Mississippi, was, on the 25th of April, 1814, extended to every port of the United States. But neither our public nor our private cruizers were to be deterred from proceeding to sea by those paper blockades. An astonishing havoc was committed upon the English commerce, not only in the high seas, but on the coasts of Great Britain, in her channels, and even in the very mouths of her harbours. Such was the uneasiness and alarm created by the numerous captures of the Americans, that for a while insurance could not be effected at all to distant ports, and even for from England to Ireland, a few hours sail, a premium of five guineas per cent. was demanded.

The admiralty were besieged with memorials from the mercantile cities, and from the insurance offices; but they acknowledged the remedy to be beyond their power. In answer to numerous remonstrances on this subject, it was officially stated by Mr. Croker, that an ample force had been under the orders of the admirals on the different stations, and that during the time when the American depredations were stated to have taken place in St. George's channel, not fewer than three frigates and fourteen sloops of war were actually at sea for its protection.

The achievements of the American privateers have in many instances rivalled those of our public vessels; and we regret that our limits have hitherto prevented us from paying them

the attention they deserve. It would be improper, however, to pass over the gallant defence of the General Armstrong, by captain Reid and his brave crew, in the port of Fayal. This action forms but one out of the many instances in which the British commanders have set at nought the rights of neutrality, by the capture of American vessels in friendly ports; but in none has it been effected at such an expense of blood to the violators.

§ 10. On the 26th of September, about dusk, while the General Armstrong lay at anchor in Fayal harbour, the British brig Carnation hove in sight within gun-shot; and no sooner did she understand the character of the privateer, than she hauled close in and let go her anchor within pistol-shot of her. At the same time the Plantagenet 74, and the frigate Rota hove in sight, and after an interchange of signals between them and the Carnation, the latter threw out all her boats, and appeared to be making unusual exertions. The moon being near its full enabled captain Reid to observe these movements, which determined him to haul in nearer to the shore. Accordingly, after clearing for action, he got under way, and began to sweep in. The moment this was perceived by the Carnation, she cut her cable, made sail, and dispatched four boats in pursuit well manned and armed. On approaching the Armstrong, the boats were repeatedly hailed by captain Reid, but they made no answer, and only pulled with the greater speed. A fire was therefore opened upon them, which was immediately returned; but the boats soon cried for quarter, and hauled off. They then fled to their ships, and prepared for a second and more formidable attack: the privateer, in the mean time, was anchored within half cable's length of the shore, and within half pistol shot of the castle.

At 9 o'clock the Carnation was observed towing in a fleet of boats from the 74 and frigate. They soon after left her, and took their station in three divisions, under cover of a small reef of rocks, within about musket shot of the General Armstrong, where they continued to manœuvre for some time, the Carnation keeping under way to act with the boats, in case the privateer should attempt to escape. At length, about midnight, the boats were observed in motion, coming on in one direct line, in close order, to the number of 12 or 14, manned, as was afterwards learnt, by 400 men. A severe conflict ensued, which lasted near forty minutes, and terminated in the total defeat and partial destruction of the boats, with an immense slaughter on the part of the British.

During these attacks the shores were lined with inhabitants, who, from the brightness of the moon, had a favourable view of the scene. The governor, with most of the first people of the place, stood by, and saw the whole affair. After the second attack a note was sent from the governor to captain Lloyd, of the Plantagenet, who commanded the British squadron, begging him to desist from further hostilities; but Lloyd answered, that he was now determined to have the privateer, at the risk of knocking down the whole town; and that if the governor suffered the Americans to injure the privateer in any manner, he should consider the place an enemy's port, and treat it accordingly. Information to this effect being conveyed to captain Reid by the American consul, the wounded and dead were carried on shore, and the crew ordered to save their effects as fast as possible.

About day-light the Carnation stood close in to the Armstrong, and commenced a heavy fire; but after several broadsides, she hauled off, having received a shot in her hull, her rigging much cut, and her fore-topmast wounded. She soon after came in again, however, and anchored close to the privateer, when captain Reid ordered his crew to scuttle and abandon the vessel, to prevent the enemy from getting her off. She was soon afterwards boarded by the enemy's boats, and set fire to.

The loss of the Americans in this affair was only two killed and seven wounded; the British had 120 killed and 130 wounded. Several houses in the town were destroyed by the enemy's shot, and some of the inhabitants wounded. Two British sloops of war arrived a few days after, which were immediately taken into requisition to carry the wounded to England.

§ 11. In this situation stood affairs when a treaty of peace was agreed upon by the commissioners of the two nations at Ghent. The progress and conclusion of the negociation will come more properly under view in our history of the congressional proceedings. At present we shall merely remark, that after a tedious procrastination on the part of the British government, the negociation was commenced by the British commissioners bringing forward demands which could only have been acceded to by a degraded and conquered people, one of which was declared to be a *sine qua non*; and that, after finding that the only effect produced by these demands was the union of the whole American people to resist them, they were all withdrawn, and a treaty agreed on, simply placing the political rights and territories of the two nations on the same footing as previous to

the war. It was signed at Ghent on the 24th of December, and soon after ratified by the prince regent. It received its final ratification by the president on the 18th of February, 1815.

§ 12. This treaty was generally satisfactory to the American people, for, though it left the great questions of impressment and illegal blockades unsettled, it was believed, that the respect which the victories of the navy had inspired towards the American flag, would prevent a repetition of those outrages which preceded the war. The mighty changes which had taken place in Europe were believed to have the same tendency, by removing many of the pretexts on which these outrages were founded.

But although the peace with America was also a general subject of joy in Great Britain, much dissatisfaction was excited on the publication of the terms. The treaty formed, indeed, a deplorable contrast with the high-sounding threats and boasts of the ministry but a few months before; and after the demands which had been brought forward, it was conceived that it consummated the humiliation of the British ministry*. On an address being moved in the house of commons congratulating the prince regent on the re-establishment of peace, an amendment was moved, which, though it was not carried, shows in a striking manner the sentiments of a great part of the nation. The amendment proposed that the following should be substituted for the original address.

"To assure his royal highness that we contemplate with great satisfaction the restoration of a state of peace and amity between his majesty and the United States of North America; but we should deem ourselves highly deficient in the discharge of our duty towards his majesty and his people, were we not to express to his royal highness our deepest regret, that a measure so necessary to the welfare and prosperity of his majesty's dominions, was not sooner accomplished: that in reviewing the terms of the treaty which his royal highness has been graciously pleased to lay before us, we are at a loss to discover what were the causes which so long retarded its conclusion: that, in our opinion, the honour of his majesty's crown, and the interests of his people, both required that as soon as the peace of Europe had been established by the treaty signed at Paris, on the 8th day of May, in the last year, the speediest and most

* The public stocks experienced a considerable depression on the publication of the treaty, it being conceived, that nothing but the probability of a new war in Europe could have occasioned the *disgraceful compromise*, as the treaty was called by the government papers.

effectual measures should have been adopted for the negociation of a treaty of peace with the United States of North America; that the complete and entire cessation of hostilities in Europe had removed or suspended the operation of the causes, which had occasioned or accompanied the late war between his majesty and the United States; that the elevated and commanding station which the united kingdom then held amongst the nations of the world would have rendered the manifestation of a sincere wish for the restoration of the blessings of peace with the United States highly honourable to his majesty's counsels; and would have afforded the government and people of America the most unequivocal proofs of the generosity and magnanimity of the British nation; of a sincere desire to bury in lasting oblivion the recollection of that hostility which then unhappily subsisted, and of its anxious wish for the re-establishment of peace upon terms honourable and advantageous to both countries, and likely to insure its own permanency by the justice and liberality of its conditions: that we are the more deeply afflicted by the long and (as we deem it) unnecessary delay in the conclusion of peace, when we reflect upon the great and incomparable injury his majesty and his people have sustained, by the unnecessary and unprofitable waste of treasure, by the loss of so many distinguished and heroic officers, and of such numbers of brave, loyal, and experienced troops; and we most deeply lament that these calamities should be aggravated by mortifying reflections, that the fame of the British arms may appear to be diminished by the failure of the latest military enterprizes of the war. That it affords us, however, consolation to find, that peace is at length re-established; and to assure his royal highness, that it is the earnest wish and desire of this house to cultivate and maintain the most cordial and intimate union with the government and people of the United States.

"That we rely upon his royal highness's wisdom and goodness to cherish and preserve the most friendly relations between them and his majesty's subjects; and we confidently trust, that a corresponding disposition in the government and the people of the United States, will enable his royal highness to continue unimpaired, and undisturbed, the harmony now so happily restored between them; and that the two freest nations in the world may exhibit to mankind the grateful spectacle of mutual confidence and lasting peace."

§ 13. The experience of the war has taught us many useful lessons, which it is to be hoped our statesmen will not suffer to pass without profit. We have learnt that a large and efficient

revenue, not vulnerable from abroad, is essential to its successful conduct; and that a dependence on loans for the extra expences of war is fatal and ruinous.

We have learnt that a navy is not only the best and cheapest, but the only effectual defence against the invasion of a coast so extensive as that of the United States; that a navy is peculiarly suited to the genius of our country; and that, as it cannot possibly endanger our republican institutions, its size ought to keep pace with our means of supporting it.

We have also seen the advantages and defects of our militia system; and the necessity that exists for more clearly determining the powers of the general government on this and on other important questions. It is to be hoped that the present period of unexampled harmony will not be suffered to pass unimproved*.

* By the articles of confederation, the states appointed the regimental officers, the general government the field and general officers. Is there any solid objection to this plan?

CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1. Hartford Convention. § 2. Plan of defence adopted by the general government. § 3. Refusal of the militia. § 4. Extraordinary meeting of the legislature of Massachusetts. § 5. A convention of the New England states recommended. § 6. Appointment of and instruction to delegates. § 7. Meeting of the convention. § 8. Their proceedings. § 9. Fate of the measures recommended by the convention. § 10. Report of the committee of the senate of Pennsylvania on the subject.

§ 1. THE great variety of interesting military events which occurred during the war, has hitherto prevented us from paying that attention to the proceedings of the different state governments which their importance deserves. But the transactions relative to the convention of delegates, which sat in Hartford during the last year of the war had too momentous a tendency to be passed over in silence. We shall now therefore take a view of the proceedings of that body, and of the measures which led to its formation, in a manner as full as our limits will admit.

§ 2. Hardly had the war commenced, before a misunderstanding took place between the general government and some of the New England states, relative to their reciprocal rights and duties, arising out of this new state of things. It being equally impracticable and impolitic for the United States, to raise and maintain in service a sufficient body of regular forces, for the protection of a frontier several thousand miles in extent, it became necessary to place the principal reliance for defence upon the militia of each district. With this view the president had been authorized to call upon the executives of the several states for certain portions of the militia, which were ordered to be detached and held in readiness for active service, as soon as the approach of danger should render them necessary.

The principle upon which our government conducted the war seems to have been this: to employ the major part of the regular forces in offensive operations in the enemy's territory, which it was conceived would not only weaken him, but would keep those forces employed in defending his possessions, which might otherwise, with his extensive naval means, carry on the war in the most harassing manner, in the heart

of our own country. The remainder of the regulars to be distributed along the most exposed parts of the coast, to man the forts, and assist the militia in defensive measures. The maritime coast was accordingly divided into military districts, each of which was placed under the command of a brigadier-general in the regular service, and one or more companies of artillery, and a small portion of infantry attached to each command. This force was intended as the nucleus of a little army, to be formed, in case of invasion, of the militia, volunteers, or such other local force as might be specially organized for the purpose. The commanders were specially charged with the defence of their respective districts. It was enjoined on them to watch the movements of the enemy, to communicate them to the government, and to execute its orders in summoning to the field, on menace of invasion, such portions of the quotas of the militia of each state, within their respective districts, as had been provided for by acts of congress, and detailed by the department of war, as were thought necessary.

§ 3. Agreeably to this arrangement, after the declaration of war, general Dearborne called upon the governor of Massachusetts and Connecticut for a portion of the militia of each state, to assist in the defence of certain posts. These requisitions were refused on the following grounds: 1st. That the president had no power to call for any portion of the militia, for either of the purposes specified by the constitution, unless the executive of the state, on whose militia such call is made, admits that the case alleged exists, and approves the call. 2d. That when the militia of a state should be called into the service of the United States, no officer of the regular army had a right to command them, excepting the president of the United States in person.

This construction of the constitution was considered by the general government as altogether novel, as repugnant to its principles, and of very dangerous tendency; and they accordingly refused to recognize or pay the militia which had at different times been called out by those governors, unless they were called for by the district commanding general, and placed under his orders.

§ 4. Affairs remained nearly in this state till after the capture of Castine, when a large militia force was called for by general Dearborn, for the protection of Portland and Boston, and to assist in the defence of Portsmouth. The militia were called out, but as the general government still refused to

pay and support them unless they were put under the command of the general of the district, governor Strong, by the advice of his counsel, called an extraordinary meeting of the legislature, to consult with them what measures ought to be pursued. At this period, and for some time previous, a convention of the New England states for the purpose of seceding from the union was much talked of, and was even looked for with confidence by the British ministry. For, though the dispute respecting the militia formed the sole ostensible cause for calling a convention, many other grievances were complained of by the people of New England, who saw with extreme jealousy the diminution of their power and influence in the general government, by the rapid increase of population in the western states. The ruling party in New England accused the general government of a hostility to commerce, on which their prosperity principally depended, which they contended was fully displayed in the restrictive system which had preceded the war, and in the measure of war itself. These measures were also attributed to an undue partiality towards the French government, and a hostility to Great Britain, which led government to excuse all the hostile measures of the former, and exaggerate those of the latter.

§ 5. A few days after the meeting of the Massachusetts legislature, a report was presented by a joint committee of both houses, in which, after dwelling on the exposed and unprotected situation of the state, from the neglect of the general government to provide a sufficient regular force for that purpose, and its refusal to pay the militia unless they were called for by an officer of the regular army, and the expense incurred under his direction, it is recommended that delegates be appointed to meet and confer with delegates from the other New England states upon their grievances, and upon the best means of preserving their resources for their own defence, and to suggest measures for that purpose; and also to take measures, if they shall think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States, for a revisal of the constitution, which it was alleged had failed to secure to the eastern section of the union those equal rights and benefits which were the great objects of its formation. The report also recommended that 10,000 troops should be raised for the defence of the state, and that the governor should be authorized to borrow a million of dollars for that purpose.

§ 6. The measures recommended by the report being adopted, twelve delegates were appointed, and the rest of the New

England states were invited to appoint others to meet them in convention. The legislatures of Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were in session at this time. The two latter appointed delegates to meet those of Massachusetts, but under such restrictions as rendered the convention perfectly harmless. The Rhode Island members were appointed to confer on the common dangers, upon the best means of co-operating for mutual defence against the enemy, and upon the measures which it may be in the power of the New England states, *consistently with their obligations*, to adopt, to restore and secure to the people thereof their rights and privileges under the constitution of the United States. The resolution for appointing the Connecticut delegates was still more explicit. They were appointed "to consult what measures it may be expedient for those states to adopt, in the present situation of the country, which shall *not be inconsistent* with the *duty* which they owe to the government of the United States." The legislature of Vermont unanimously refused to send delegates, and the executive council of New Hampshire decided, that it was unnecessary to call together the legislature to decide upon the Massachusetts resolutions.

§ 7. Under these inauspicious circumstances the delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut met at Hartford on the 15th day of December. They were joined by two delegates sent from the counties of Grafton and Cheshire, New Hampshire, and one from the county of Windham, Vermont, who were without difficulty recognized. The convention sat with closed doors until the 4th of January, when they adjourned, after publishing a long report as the result of their conference.

§ 8. This report commences with an apology for its moderation, and a recital of "objections against precipitate measures tending to disunite the states," and then takes a view of the dangers and grievances affecting the New England states. The chief of these relates to the pretensions advanced by the national government on the subject of the militia, and its arrangement for the defence of the states, both of which are declared to be unwarranted either by the constitution or laws of the union. In connexion with this subject the report notices the measures then agitated by congress for the purpose of filling the ranks of the army, by authorizing the enlistment of minors, and by dividing the militia of the United States into classes, each of which should be obliged, under a certain penalty, to furnish a recruit for the regular army. These contemplated measures are denounced as infractions

of the constitution; and it is declared to be not only the right, but the duty of the individual states to take a decided stand in opposition to them, in case it is attempted to carry them into execution. "When emergencies occur," says the report, "which are either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of the delay incident to its forms, states, which have no common umpire, must be their own judges, and execute their own decisions."

The next subject embraced by the report is "the means of defence against the common enemy." As there appeared to the convention to be no room for reliance for defence upon the national government, and as it was impossible that they could do this from their own resources, and continue to sustain the burden of the national taxes, it was proposed that an arrangement should be entered into with the national government allowing the New England states to assume their own defence, the expense of which should be defrayed by the taxes raised by the general government in those states. Serious consequences are threatened in case the general government should refuse to enter into this arrangement. "In a state of things so solemn and trying as may then arise, the legislature of the states, or conventions of the whole people, or delegates appointed by them for the express purpose in another convention, must act as such urgent circumstances may then require."

The report then takes a review of the happy state of the nation, under the administrations of Washington and Adams, contrasted with the miserable abyss into which it is said to have been plunged by the profligacy and folly of its subsequent rulers. The former encouraged a belief of the transcendant perfection of the federal constitution, but the latter has exposed its imperfections, and shown that its amendment has become absolutely necessary. The amendments proposed by the convention were, that the slave representation should be done away; that a concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of congress should be necessary, to admit new states into the union, to interdict commercial intercourse with foreign nations, and to declare war unless in consequence of invasion; that no embargo should be laid for a longer term than sixty days; that no person to be hereafter naturalized should be eligible to any office in the national government; that no president should be elected a second time, and that the president should not be elected from the same state two terms in succession. These amendments were accompanied by a train of reasoning, of which we shall endeavour to present the pith.

The amendment respecting the slave-representation was not claimed as a right, but as the present regulation had, it was alleged, proved unjust and unequal in its operation, it was hoped that a sense of magnanimity and justice would reconcile the slave-holding states to a revision of this article.

The amendment relative to the admission of new states into the union was declared to be indispensable, as by that practice the balance of power which existed between the original parties to the constitutional compact had already been materially affected, and, unless the practice be modified, must ultimately be destroyed.

The argument adduced in favour of restricting the powers of congress in relation to embargo and the interdiction of commerce, was, that commerce, though a vital interest in the United States, the success of which is essential to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures, and to the wealth, finances, defence, and liberty of the nation, yet being necessarily conducted by a small minority, they are unable to protect themselves against the sudden and injudicious decisions of bare majorities, and the mistaken or oppressive projects of those who are not actively concerned in its pursuits. When therefore the past system of embargoes and commercial restrictions shall have been reviewed; when the fluctuation and inconsistency of public measures, betraying a want of information as well as feeling in the majority, shall have been considered; the reasonableness of some restrictions upon the power of a bare majority to repeat these oppressions will appear to be obvious.

The considerations which were conceived to call for the restriction on the power of making offensive war, were, that the genius of our institutions is unfavourable to its successful prosecution, while the felicity of our situation exempts us from its necessity. In this case, as in the former, those more immediately exposed to its effects are a minority of the nation. The majority, indeed, must feel at last; but this appeal to its sensibility comes too late. It was also alleged that the western states, remote from immediate danger, would not be averse from the occasional disturbances of the Atlantic states; and thus interest might combine with passion and intrigue to plunge the nation into needless wars.

The exclusion of foreigners from office is considered both politic and necessary. Why admit, to a participation in the government, it is asked, aliens, who were no parties to the

compact, who are ignorant of the nature of our institutions, and have no stake in the welfare of the country, but what is recent and transitory. It is surely a privilege sufficient to admit them, after due probation, to become citizens for all but political purposes.

The limitations respecting the office of president are considered necessary on account of the intrigues to which the present system gives rise. The first exertion of vast patronage, it is alleged, is directed towards the security of a new election. The interest of the country, the welfare of the people, even honest fame, and respect for the opinion of posterity, become secondary considerations. A president whose political career is limited to a single election may find no other interest than will be promoted by making it glorious to himself and beneficial to his country. But the hope of re-election is prolific of temptations, under which these magnanimous motives are deprived of their principal force. The repeated election of the president from any one state is said to afford inducements and means for intrigue which tend to create an undue local influence, and establish the domination of particular states. The justice of securing to every state a fair and equal chance for the election of this officer from its own citizens is apparent; and this object, it is alleged, would be essentially promoted by preventing an election from the same state twice in succession.

The convention conclude their report by recommending to the legislatures of the New England states to adopt effectual measures for protecting their citizens from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by congress subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the constitution; and to authorize an earnest and immediate application to the general government, requesting their consent to some arrangement whereby these states may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume on themselves the defence of their territory; and that a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within these states may be paid into their respective treasuries, and appropriated to the payment of the balance due them, and to their future defence; should this application be unsuccessful, and peace not be concluded, and the defence of these states be neglected as it had been since the commencement of the war, the convention expressed their opinion that the legislatures should appoint delegates to another convention to meet at Boston in the following June, with such powers and instructions as the exigencies of a crisis so

momentous may require. The convention also recommend, where it has not already been done, that the governors of the respective states be authorized to raise troops for defence; and that their amendments to the constitution should be adopted, and should be proposed to the other state legislatures, and, in such cases as may be deemed expedient, to a convention chosen by the people of each state.

§ 9. The report of the convention was laid before the New England legislatures. Massachusetts and Connecticut alone acted on that part which recommends an application to the general government for the produce of the taxes raised in the state to enable her to raise forces for her protection, and to pay for the militia called out under state authority, by appointing delegates to proceed to Washington. But government refused to receive them in their official capacity, and the peace soon rendered their application unnecessary. These states and Rhode Island also passed the amendments to the constitution, but they have elsewhere been uniformly rejected. One of the most luminous essays on this subject was a report of the committee of the senate of Pennsylvania on the proposed amendments, which perhaps is more deserving of attention from its proceeding from the pen of a federal member, who would naturally be inclined to treat the propositions of those states called federal with delicacy and attention. We shall therefore conclude by giving a concise view of this report, as a counterpart to that of the convention.

§ 10. The report commences by a short vindication of Pennsylvania from the suspicion of yielding up her judgment to the influence of interested motives. She has scarcely any slaves; she is at once agricultural as well as commercial; her relative importance can be but little affected by the addition of new states; and during the whole history of her connexion with the union, content with fulfilling her duties to it, she has neither claimed nor courted the elevation of any of her citizens to the chief magistracy.

The subject of slave-representation, which it is the object of the first amendment to do away, is acknowledged to be surrounded by difficulties. It presented important obstacles to the original formation of the constitution, which were eventually overcome by compromise. The relative situation of the slave-holding states have not altered in their favour since the adoption of the constitution. On the contrary, the number of slaves, and of course the power they confer, is actually decreasing in proportion to the whites. In 1790, the slaves were 697,697, out of 3,929,326, more than a *fifth* of

the whole population. In 1810, they were 1,191,365 out of 7,239,903, not quite a *sixth*. And the decrease must soon be greater, as the importation of slaves, which was allowed during 18 years of this period, is now prohibited. These calculations, applied to the progress of the black and white population among the slave-holding states themselves and to the relative strength of the representation caused by the slaves, shows that the balance of power established as to representation has not been deranged in favour of the slave-holding states, but, on the contrary, a gradual decline in their comparative representation has taken place.

But on the subject of the comparative influence of the states, those of New England have least of all reason to complain. The true sufferers in the confederacy, those who alone have cause to lament the disproportion between their strength and their power, are the large middle states. The efficient power of any state in the union does not depend on the number of its representatives in one branch of congress. It is compounded of the number of those representatives, and the number of its senators; nor can any true estimate of the relative importance of the states be formed, if this prominent consideration be overlooked. The senate is in fact the principal depositary of the national power. An integral branch of the legislature, none of the most ordinary acts of government can be performed without its consent; the high court of impeachment, it exercises the authority of a true judicial tribunal. The treaty-making power is there; no officer can be appointed without its consent. And so far are these privileges from being merely nominal, that we have seen that body reject the nominations of the president, refuse to ratify articles of a foreign treaty, and deny its assent to laws recommended by the president, and passed by the other branch of the legislature. The best test of power, therefore, is in the senate, and it is there that the complaining states actually enjoy an ample indemnity for all the inequalities in their representation. The state of Connecticut, of Vermont, or of New Hampshire does not possess a third of the population of New York or of Pennsylvania: yet they have each a voice in the senate equal to that of these states. For every inhabitant in Rhode Island there are more than ten in Pennsylvania, and more than twelve in New York: yet in all that concerns the commerce, the agriculture, the whole destinies of New York and Pennsylvania, the 76,000 people of Rhode Island have an equal voice with the 959,000 of New York, or the 810,000 of Pennsylvania. New York and Pennsylvania contain about

300,000 inhabitants more than all the five states east of the Hudson: yet those states have no less than ten voices in the senate, while New York and Pennsylvania have together only four. Compared with the slave-holding states this disparity, though less striking, is sufficiently obvious. The New England states enjoy another advantage. Their citizens have spread themselves all over the union; and a great number of the members of congress from the middle and western states are emigrants from the northern; whose early associations will give them a natural and honourable respect for the land of their nativity. From these considerations, the committee conclude, that if any change in the fundamental principle of representation be desirable, it should be a complete one, such a one as would place the real power of the government on the basis of its white population, and render the number not merely of representatives but of senators proportioned to the free white inhabitants of the union. Any alteration less than this would be only partial in its operation and would vary the terms of the original compact, without carrying into full and fair operation the new principle introduced into it.

With regard to new states the right as well as justice of varying their terms of admission are equally doubtful. A solemn stipulation was entered into respecting the territory north-west of the river Ohio, previous to the establishment of the federal constitution, which it is beyond the power of congress to alter; and to other parts of the vacant territory of the United States, it seems equally wise and judicious to allow a share of power correspondent to their growing wealth and population. The progress of our history has not taught us to apprehend danger from this source. Since the adoption of the constitution, five new states have been admitted into the union: one in the north, Vermont; one in the south, Louisiana; three in the west, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Thus it appears that no particular section of country has been a gainer by the admission of new states; and that the privilege of forming them has been accorded indiscriminately to all, in proportion as their powers have been developed.

The committee see little in the principle of the amendment limiting the duration of embargoes to recommend it; and they foresee in practice very serious inconveniencies from it. In most other nations, an embargo is principally used as a temporary detention, to conceal or to facilitate the departure of some expedition; but in addition to these causes, our peculiar situation gives to such a measure a character of defensive war, as well as of offensive hostility. An embargo may here

be imposed as a preliminary to war, for the purpose of retaining at home resources which might fall into the hands of adversaries, and of warning our citizens to seek shelter from impending hostilities. This country, too, stands in a relation to the world which no other nation occupies. The United States is a great granary, from which many other countries are supplied, and some have been occasionally fed. To withhold, for a time, those necessary supplies from a nation committing aggressions against us, is a measure of fair, obvious, and effectual hostility, by which the offending nation may be reclaimed to a just course of conduct. Such a measure should, therefore, be left, with the other incidents of war, to the discretion of congress. But it is obvious, that the efficacy of an embargo may depend on its duration. Approaching hostilities may not be averted or determined in 60 days. Within 60 days a refusal to furnish supplies may be productive of no inconvenience to an enemy. If it be said the embargo may be renewed, why the necessity of any limitation of time, since the same power which can renew a limited, may repeal an unqualified embargo, when circumstances require it. But, during the long recess of congress, it would be impracticable to renew an embargo every 60 days. The more judicious plan seems to be to trust the power where it now is; and this the more willingly, as our recent experience will have furnished the means of ascertaining the nature and the value of that species of restriction.

The amendment requiring two-thirds of both houses of congress to concur in order to interdict commercial intercourse with foreign nations is conceived by the committee to be equally improper and futile. The power of regulating intercourse with foreign nations, is so inherent and inseparable an incident of the sovereignty of the union, that it cannot be taken from it without impairing its most important functions. A majority of congress have now, and would have, even after the adoption of the amendment, the right of "regulating commerce with foreign nations." They have a right, by enormous duties on foreign merchandise, by imposition on foreign ships, by the various devices of commercial legislation, to establish a virtual interdict between us and foreign nations. It is not perceived, therefore, that any thing would be gained by requiring two-thirds to do nominally what a majority may do actually; and even the little thus gained from the sovereignty of the union would be not only without use, but actually injurious, by weakening some of the most essential and valuable powers of a well organized government.

The limitation of the power to declare war is considered equally dangerous to the freedom and greatness of the country. The distinction, also, drawn between offensive and defensive war would be wholly fallacious in practice. Offensive hostilities are often the best means of defence; and that surely would be a most impolitic arrangement, which would curb the sprit and fetter the strength of the nation, which would condemn it to witness the grossest insults and injuries, which would render it the inactive spectator of hostilities against us on the ocean, and the total annihilation of foreign commerce, until the enemy would relieve us from the thraldom of a small minority by an actual invasion of our soil; for such an arrangement would actually leave the whole nation at the mercy of a small minority, representing perhaps the least populous part of the union. Suppose, for instance, such a measure recommended by the president, and passed by two-thirds of the house of representatives. On the floor of the senate, if the members from Rhode Island, Vermont, New-Hampshire, Delaware, Georgia, and Louisiana combined, the law would be defeated; that is, the representatives of a white population of 766,786 souls, a population less than that of New York alone, or Pennsylvania alone, would have the power of controlling the whole union; the representatives of 910,959 souls would govern the fate of 7,239,903; about one-seventh part of the union would thus be made complete masters of the whole.

The rendering naturalized foreigners ineligible to office is also considered impolitic. There is scarcely a nation in Europe which does not habitually employ the talents of strangers, wherever they can be most useful. Even in England, the most fastidious of nations with regard to strangers, naturalization is in many respects more easy than in the United States. Within the present reign, several officers of high rank, both civil and military, are employed in important and confidential stations by the government of that country. In the general government the number of foreigners in office is but small, and we enjoy a greater security on this head than other nations from the deliberation with which the choice must be made, the probationary term of residence, and the certainty that no foreigner can rise to power but by the voluntary suffrage of the community. It may be fairly questioned, whether the total exclusion proposed is generous to others, or wise to ourselves. The revolutions of Europe may hereafter drive, as they have already driven, many an honourable and distinguished exile to the shelter of our hospitality. The dis-

tance which separates him from his native country is some guarantee, that he has not chosen his new residence from any motive of levity, but from deliberate choice; and when he has abjured his allegiance to that country; when his fortunes and family are fixed among us; when he has closed all the avenues to his return; when a long probation has evinced his attachment to our institutions; why should his mind continue still in exile, and why should the natural and honourable ambition for political distinction, be extinguished for ever in his breast? why, too, should we deprive ourselves of the choice of such a man, whose European experience may be useful, if the deliberate voice of the community is in his favour?

The independence of character which it is supposed will be secured by the proposed amendment relative to the election of president would be highly desirable; but it is believed that the inconveniences which would result from it would greatly overbalance its advantages. The instability and vacillation, for instance, which such frequent changes give to the administration; the denial to the nation of the future services of a president, who has proved himself eminently qualified for his office, and the destruction of one great inducement to good conduct in an officer, the hope of being rewarded by future confidence for past services.

With regard to the second branch of the amendment, experience has not proved the utility of selecting officers of any kind, with reference merely to their places of residence; and all those arrangements which indicate that we are citizens of a state, rather than citizens of the United States, are not now to be encouraged. It is wiser to leave the choice of the nation perfectly unrestrained: and to suffer the discernment of the country to select its best citizens, without regarding the section of the union where they may happen to reside.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE AFFAIR AT LA COLE.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated Province of Lower Canada, Odell Town, March 31, 1814.

Sir,

WE have had an affair with the enemy, in which our troops have given him another test of firmness and valour.

Pursuant to the designs communicated to you in my last, and to accomplish *your* views if in my power, I entered Canada yesterday morning, and was met by the enemy near this place about 11 o'clock, whom we forced at every point of attack on the route to La Cole, distant from hence one league, and from St. John's six. We reached the former post about three o'clock, and found there a strong corps in possession of a spacious lofty stone mill, of which I had received some information. An 18 pounder had been ordered forward to effect the destruction of this building; but it broke down, and after being repaired, the only road of approach through a deep forest was reported to be impracticable to a gun of such weight. An opinion prevailed at the same time with the chief engineer, major Totten, founded on intelligence previously received, and several of the best informed officers, that an iron twelve would suffice to make a breach; but after a fair and tedious experiment, at three hundred yards distance only, it was discovered our battery could make no impression.

Brigadier-generals Smith and Bissell covered our guns, and brigadier-general Macomb, with a select corps, formed the reserve. The enemy had been reported, from a source considered strictly confidential, at two thousand five hundred strong, and his first attack of my right favored the report, from the use he made of congreve rockets and other indications of deliberate preparation; the corps, therefore, were held in high order to receive his combined attack. Yet be-

lieving in the efficacy of our battery, dispositions had been made to intercept the enemy should he evacuate the post, and to give it the utmost effect, we were obliged to take ground near the margin of the field which encompassed the mill. During the cannonade, which was returned with vivacity by the enemy's galleys (I presume), several sorties and desperate charges were made from the mill upon our battery, which were repulsed with incredible coolness by the covering corps, at the expense of some blood and some lives on both sides; it is reported to me that in the last charge a captain of grenadiers and fifteen men fell together, but I cannot vouch for the fact. Finding all our attempts to make a breach unsuccessful, I withdrew the battery, called in my detachments, and having removed our dead and wounded and every thing else, fell back to this place about six o'clock.

Where a military corps appears to be universally animated by the same sensibilities, where the only competition is for danger and glory, individual distinctions seem improper, except in extraordinary cases, such as the conduct of the officers who commanded our battery yesterday. Capt. M'Pherson of the light artillery (my military secretary), impelled by the noble spirit which marks his whole character, asked permission to take part in the operations of the day with his proper arm; he was indulged, and being first for command, took charge of the pieces which followed the advance and formed our battery, in which he was seconded by lieutenants Larrabee and Sheldon. On opening his fire he seemed inclined to the opinion he could make an impression on the work, but he soon received a wound under the chin, which he tied up with his handkerchief, and continued at his piece until a second shot, which broke his thigh, brought him to the earth. Larrabee had kept his station until shot through the lungs, and Sheldon kept up the fire until ordered to retire.—The conduct of these gentlemen has, from the nature of their duties, been so conspicuously gallant as to attract the admiration of their brethren in arms, and should (I humbly conceive) be distinguished by the executive.

I have sent forward my wounded who can bear the movement to Plattsburgh or Burlington, and those who cannot will be provided for at Champlain.

I would hold this position until I receive further orders, were it not for the difficulty of transporting our provisions, and the impossibility to cover the troops; but I shall not retire further than Champlain, which will place us twenty five miles from St. John's, and forty-two from Montreal.

I cannot close this letter without confessing my obligations to my general and field officers, and to my general staff of every grade, for the able and prompt support I received from them. So small an affair does not merit so tedious a detail, but it warrants the remark that it will produce a degree of self confidence, of reciprocal trust, of harmony and friendly attachments in this corps highly beneficial to the service. It is a lesson of command to the officers, and of obedience to the soldiers, worth a whole year's drill of empty parades.

The returns of killed and wounded have not yet been furnished, but they will not exceed 80 or 90, including a captain and 4 subalterns, and this shall be furnished to-morrow or next day. For the information of their friends, you have at foot the names of the wounded officers.

With great respect, &c.

JA. WILKINSON.

Names of officers wounded.

Captain M'Pherson, Lieutenant Larrabee, light artillery.—Lieutenant Green, 11th infantry.—Lieutenant Parker, 14th infantry.—Lieutenant Kerr, rifle regiment.

The Honorable Secretary at War.

Head-Quarters L'Acadie, 31st March, 1814.

GENERAL ORDER.

His excellency the commander of the forces has received from major-general De Rottenburg, through major-general Vincent, the report of lieutenant-colonel Williams, 13th regiment, commanding St. John's and the posts in advance, on the Richelieu river—stating that the outposts on the communication leading from Odell Town, to Burtonville and La Cole Mill, were attacked at an early hour on the morning of the 30th instant by the enemy, in great force, collected from Burlington and Plattsburg, under the command of major-general Wilkinson. The piquets retreated in good order, before superior numbers of the enemy, disputing his advance. The advance on the Burtonville road was not persevered in; and the whole of the enemy's force was directed against the post of La Cole, entrusted to the command of major Handcock, of the 13th regiment, who reports that his piquets from a mile and a half in advance, being driven in, the enemy shortly after appeared in great force, and established a battery of three 12-pounders, which was opened on the mill block-house.

Major Handcock, receiving intelligence of the approach of the two flank companies of the 13th regiment to his relief, ordered an attack upon the enemy's guns, which, although executed with the greatest gallantry, could not succeed, in consequence of the surrounding woods being filled with infantry for their support. Another opportunity presented itself, and was instantly seized by the grenadier company of the Canadian fencibles and a company of voltigeurs, who having followed the movement of the enemy from the Burtonville road, with a view to reinforce the point attacked, made a spirited attempt to get possession of the enemy's guns; but although foiled in this object, from his very superior numbers, succeeded in gaining the block-house.

Both these gallant attacks have been attended with the loss of several brave soldiers. Captain Ellard, 13th regiment, was wounded while leading his company to the assault; and major Handcock regrets the temporary loss of his able services. He expresses himself indebted to captain Ritter, of the frontier light infantry, who, from his local knowledge of the country, was enabled to afford him the most essential service and information.

Major Handcock speaks in terms of the highest praise of the detachment of marines under lieutenants Caldwell and Burton; and expresses the strong obligations he feels himself under to captain Pring of the royal navy, for his prompt and able support, in bringing a sloop and the gun-boats from the Isle aux Noix to the mouth of La Cole river; from whence his fire was most destructive and galling to the enemy: and to lieutenant Creswick (R. N.), who was most active and zealous in landing two field-pieces and stores, and getting them from the boats to the mill block-house.

The enemy persevered in his attack until night-fall, when he withdrew his guns, and retreated by the road to Odell Town, having sustained a severe loss.

His excellency the commander of the forces most cordially agrees in the high tribute of praise bestowed by lieutenant-colonel Williams on major Handcock, for his most judicious and undaunted defence of the post committed to his charge, and to all the troops immediately engaged in its defence, for their spirited and determined good conduct.

The flank companies of the 13th regiment, the grenadiers of the Canadian fencibles, and the company of voltigeurs, seized with avidity the opportunities presented them to signalize their entire devotion to the service.

His excellency has only left to express his most entire ap-

probation of the judgment, zeal, and unwearied assiduity displayed by lieutenant-colonel Williams, 13th regiment, in his arrangements for the defence of the important posts placed under his immediate command, and to major-general Vincent, for the excellent disposition of the force under his orders, by which, without unnecessarily harassing the troops, that prompt support was instantly applied at every point of this extensive line of frontier, that the enemy's fourth attempt to invade this province, has, like his former efforts, recoiled on his own head with disgrace and defeat, from the bravery and steadiness of the advanced posts of the army. Nor can his excellency pass over the steady discipline and cheerful conduct evinced by all the troops brought forward to support the advanced posts in this most harassing and unfavourable season, without rendering to them that praise, which is most justly their due.

List of killed and wounded on the 30th March.

13th Regiment Grenadiers—8 rank and file killed—1 captain, 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 31 rank and file wounded.—13th Regiment Light Infantry—1 rank and file killed—1 serjeant, 8 rank and file wounded, 1 missing.—13th Regiment, captain Blake's company—1 rank and file killed.—Canadian Grenadiers—1 rank and file killed—3 rank and file wounded—2 rank and file missing.—Total killed—10 rank and file.—Wounded—1 captain, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 42 rank and file.—Missing—4 rank and file.—Officers wounded—captain Heard and ensign Whitford, 13th regiment.

EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-General, N. A.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE AFFAIR ON THE RIVER THAMES.

Copy of a Letter from Captain Holmes, to lieutenant-colonel Butler, commanding at Detroit, and transmitted to the Department of War by General Harrison.

Sir, *Fort Covington, March 10th*, 1814.

I have the honor to submit in writing, that the expedition sent under my command against the enemy's posts by your special orders of the 21st ultimo, had the good fortune on the 4th instant to meet and subdue a force double its own, fresh from the barracks, and led by a distinguished officer.

I had been compelled to leave the artillery, by the invinci-

ble difficulties of the route from Point au Plait to the Round O. No wheel carriage of any kind had ever attempted it before, and none will ever pass it until the brush and fallen timber are cut away, and the swamp causewayed or drained. After joining captain Gill, I began the march for Fort Talbot, but was soon convinced of its being impossible to reach the post, in time to secure any force which might be there or adjacent. This conviction, united with the information that the enemy had a force at Delaware upon the Thames, that I should be expected at Fort Talbot, and consequently, that a previous descent upon Delaware might deceive the foe, and lead him to expose me some point in defending others he might think menaced, and coupled with the possibility that hearing of captain Gill's march to the Round O, by M'Gregor's militia, whom he had pursued, a detachment had descended the Thames to intercept him, determined me to exercise the discretion allowed by the order, and to strike at once upon the river.

On the 3d instant, when only fifteen miles from Delaware, we received intelligence that the enemy had left Delaware with the intention of descending the river, and that we should probably meet him in one hour; that his force consisted of a light company from the Royal Scots, mustering for duty 120 men; a light company from the 89th regiment of foot (efficiency not known); Caldwell's Indians, and M'Gregor's militia: amounting in all to about 300 men. My command originally had not exceeded 180 rank and file. Hunger, cold, and fatigue had brought on disease, and though none died, all were exceedingly depressed, and sixteen had been ordered home as unable to continue the march. I resolved therefore to avoid the conflict on equal grounds, and immediately retreated five miles for the sake of a good position, on the western bank of the Twenty Mile Creek, leaving captain Gill with twenty rangers to cover the rear, and to watch the enemy's motions. We had encamped but a few minutes, when captain Gill joined, after exchanging shots with the enemy's advance, in vainly attempting to reconnoitre his force. The Twenty Mile Creek runs from north to south, through a deep and wide ravine, and of course is flanked east and west by lofty heights. My camp was formed upon the western heights. The enemy's upon the opposite. During the night of the 3d all was quiet. At sun-rise on the 4th, the enemy appeared thinly upon the opposite heights, fired upon us without effect, and vanished. After waiting some time for their re-appearance, lieutenant Knox of the rangers was sent to reconnoitre.

On his return, he reported that the enemy had retreated with the utmost precipitation, leaving his baggage scattered upon the road, and that his trail and fires made him out not more than seventy men. Mortified at the supposition of having retrograded from this diminutive force, I instantly commenced the pursuit, with the design of attacking Delaware before the opening of another day. We had not however proceeded beyond five miles, when captain Lee, commanding the advance, discovered the enemy in considerable force, arranging himself for battle. The symptoms of fear and flight were now easily traced to the purpose of seducing me from the heights, and so far the plan succeeded. But the enemy failed to improve the advantage. If he had thrown his chief force across the ravine above the road, and occupied our camp when relinquished, thus obstructing my communication to the rear, I should have been driven upon Delaware against a superior force, since found to be stationed there, or forced to take the wilderness for Fort Talbot, without forage or provisions. Heaven averted this calamity. We soon regained the position at Twenty Mile Creek, and though the rangers were greatly disheartened by the retreat, and to a man insisted upon not fighting the enemy, we decided an exhibit to that spot the scene of death or victory.

I was induced to adopt the order of the *hollow square*, to prevent the necessity of evolution, which I knew all the troops were incompetent to perform in action. The detachments of the 24th and 28th infantry occupied the brow of the heights. The detachment from the garrison of Detroit formed the north front of the square, the rangers the west, and the militia the south. Our horses and baggage stood in the centre. The enemy threw his militia and Indians across the ravine above the road, and commenced the action with savage yells and bugles sounding from the north, west, and south. His regulars at the same time charged down the road from the opposite heights, crossed the bridge, and charged up the heights we occupied within twenty steps of the American line, and against the most destructive fire. But his front section was shot to pieces. Those who followed were much thinned and wounded. His officers were soon cut down, and his antagonists continued to evince a degree of animation that bespoke at once their boldness and security. He therefore abandoned the charge, and took cover in the woods at diffused order, between fifteen, twenty, and thirty paces of our line, and placed all hope upon his ammunition.

Our regulars, being uncovered, were ordered to kneel, that

the brow of the heights might partly screen them from the enemy's view. The firing increased on both sides with great vivacity But the crisis was over. I knew the enemy dared not uncover, and of course no second charge would be attempted. On the north, west, and south front the firing had been sustained with much coolness, and with considerable loss to the foe. Our troops on those fronts being protected by logs, hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, both the rifle and the musket were aimed at leisure, perhaps always told. The enemy at last became persuaded that Providence had sealed the fortune of the day. His cover on the east front was insufficient; for as he had charged in column of sections, and therefore, when dispersing on either side of the road, was unable to extend his flanks, and as our regulars presented an extended front from the beginning, it is evident that a common sized tree could not protect even one man, much less the squads that often stood and breathed their last together; and yet upon his regulars the enemy relied for victory. In concert therefore, and favored by the shades of twilight, he commenced a general retreat after one hour's close and gallant conflict.

I did not pursue, for the following reasons. 1. We had triumphed against numbers and discipline, and were therefore under no obligation of honour to incur additional hazard. 2. In these requisites (numbers and discipline) the enemy were still superior, and the night would have insured success to an ambuscade. 3. The enemy's bugle sounded *the close* upon the opposite heights. If then we had pursued, we must have passed over to him as he did to us, because the creek could be passed on horseback at no other point, and the troops being fatigued and frost bitten, and their shoes cut to pieces by the frozen ground, it was not possible to pursue on foot. It follows, that the attempt to pursue would have given the enemy the same advantage that produced the defeat.

Our loss in killed and wounded amounted to a non-commissioned officer and six privates; but the blood of between 80 and 90 brave Englishmen, and among them 4 officers, avenged their fall. The commander, captain Barden of the 89th, is supposed to have been killed at an early stage of the contest. The whole American force in action consisted of one hundred and fifty rank and file, of whom seventy were militia, including the rangers. The enemy's regulars alone were from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and eighty strong, and his militia and Indians fought upon three fronts of our square.

I am much indebted to all my regular officers, and trust their names will be mentioned to the army and to the war department. Without intending a discrimination it must be acknowledged that the exertions of lieutenants Kouns and Henry of the 28th and Jackson and Potter of the 24th were most conspicuous, because fortune had opposed them to the main strength of the foe. Captain Lee of the Michigan dragoons was of great assistance before the action at the head of the advance and spies, and my warmest thanks are due to acting sailing-master Darling of the United States schooner Somers, who had volunteered to command the artillery. Ensign Heard of the 28th, acting as volunteer adjutant, merits my acknowledgments, and especially for his zeal in defending my opinion against a final retreat, when others permitted their hopes to sink beneath the pressure of the moment.

The enemy's wounded and prisoners were treated with the utmost humanity.—Though some of our men were marching in their stocking feet, they were not permitted to take a shoe even from the dead.

I have the honor, to be with perfect respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) A. H. HOLMES,
Captain 24th Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, commanding the Territory of Michigan and its dependencies.

Adjutant-General's Office, Quebec, 10th March, 1814.

GENERAL ORDERS.

His excellency the commander of the forces has received from lieutenant-general Drummond, the report of captain Stewart, of the Royal Scots, of an affair which took place between the detachment under the orders of that officer, and a body of the enemy, on the 4th instant, at Longwood, in advance of Delaware town.

Captain Stewart reports, that receiving a report late on the night of the 3d instant, from captain Caldwell, that a party of the enemy had been seen in Longwood, he directed the flank companies of the Royal Scots and the light company of the 89th regiment, under the immediate command of captain Basden, 89th regiment, to march at day-break to the support of captain Caldwell; and that at 5 o'clock in the evening the enemy was discovered, in very superior force, posted

the brow of the heights might partly screen them from the enemy's view. The firing increased on both sides with great vivacity But the crisis was over. I knew the enemy dared not uncover, and of course no second charge would be attempted. On the north, west, and south front the firing had been sustained with much coolness, and with considerable loss to the foe. Our troops on those fronts being protected by logs, hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, both the rifle and the musket were aimed at leisure, perhaps always told. The enemy at last became persuaded that Providence had sealed the fortune of the day. His cover on the east front was insufficient; for as he had charged in column of sections, and therefore, when dispersing on either side of the road, was unable to extend his flanks, and as our regulars presented an extended front from the beginning, it is evident that a common sized tree could not protect even one man, much less the squads that often stood and breathed their last together; and yet upon his regulars the enemy relied for victory. In concert therefore, and favored by the shades of twilight, he commenced a general retreat after one hour's close and gallant conflict.

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on a commanding eminence, strongly entrenched with log breast-works; this post was instantly attacked in the most gallant manner, by the flank companies in front, while captain Caldwell's company of rangers and a detachment of the royal Kent militia made a flank movement to the right, and a small band of Indians to the left, with a view of gaining the rear of the position; and after repeated efforts to dislodge the enemy, in an arduous and spirited contest of an hour and a half duration, which terminated with the daylight, the troops were reluctantly withdrawn, having suffered severely, principally in officers.

The enemy has since abandoned his position in Longwood.

List of the killed, wounded, and missing.

Royal Scots light company—1 captain, 9 rank and file killed—1 lieutenant, 3 serjeants, 31 rank and file wounded—1 bugler missing.—89th light company—1 lieutenant, 3 rank and file killed—1 captain, 1 serjeant, and 7 rank and file wounded—volunteer Pagoot wounded and taken prisoner.—Royal Kent volunteers— 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, and 5 rank and file wounded.

Names of officers killed and wounded.

Captain D. Johnson, Royal Scots, and lieutenant P. Grame, 89th regiment, killed. Captain Bustle, 89th regiment, and lieutenant A. Macdonald, Royal Scots, wounded.

OPERATIONS ON LAKE ONTARIO.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States ship General Pike,
Sackett's Harbour, 25th April, 1814.

Sir,

The Lady of the Lake (which I have kept cruizing as a look-out vessel between the Gallows and Kingston ever since the ice broke up) having a commanding breeze yesterday, ran close into Kingston and shewed her colours, which were answered by the enemy's fleet and batteries—His old fleet lay moored off the town with all sails bent and top-gallant yards across—a number of gun-boats also appeared to be ready—one only of the new ships had her lower masts in, the other appeared to be preparing to take masts in.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honorable William Jones, Secretary af the Navy, Washington.

From the same to the same.

United States Ship General Pike,
Sackett's Harbour, April 27, 1814.

Sir,

The night of the 25th instant, two of our guard-boats fell in with three of the enemy's boats in the bay. Lieutenant Dudley (the officer of the guard) hailed, and was answered, "guard boats"—this however not being satisfactory, he repeated the hail, but was not answered—finding that the strange boats were attempting to cut him off from the shore, he fired upon them—the enemy laying upon their oars a short time, pulled in towards Bull Rock Point, without returning the fire. Lieutenant Dudley returned to the fleet and got a reinforcement of boats—but nothing more was seen of the enemy that night.

Yesterday morning I directed both shores of Shermont Bay to be examined, to see whether the enemy had not secreted himself in some of the small creeks. Nothing however, was discovered, except six barrels of powder, found in the water near the shore, where our gun-boats fired on the enemy; these barrels were all slung in such a manner, that one man could take two across his shoulder and carry them; each barrel had a hole bored in the head of about an inch diameter, with a wooden plug in it; these barrels of powder were evidently fitted for the purpose of blowing our large ship up, if the enemy could have got in undiscovered, by placing them under the ship's bottom, and putting a piece of slow match or port fire to the hole in the head, which would burn a sufficient time to allow the parties to escape before the fire would communicate to the powder; this also accounts for the enemy not returning the fire of our boats, for having so much powder in, he was apprehensive of accidents, which no doubt induced him to heave it overboard, to be p epared to return the fire if he was pursued.

It would have been impossible for the enemy to have succeeded, even if he had eluded our guard-boats (which here are two lines of)—for, independent of all the approaches by water being secured by the booms, the Madison is moored across the large ship's stern, within 20 yards, and her guns loaded with cannister and bags of musket balls, to rake under

the bottom, if necessary. A lieutenant, two midshipmen, and ten men are on watch under the ship's bottom every night, besides a marine guard outside of her—with all these precautions, I think that it would be impossible for an enemy to land near the ship-yard unobserved. However, after this discovery of the enemy's intentions, we shall redouble our vigilance and exertions to preserve our fleet, to meet the enemy fairly upon the lake.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States ship General Pike,

Sir, *Sackett's Harbour, May* 1, 1814.

I am happy to have it in my power to inform you that the United States ship '*Superior*,' was launched this morning, without accident.

The Superior is an uncommon beautiful, well-built ship, something larger than the President, and could mount 64 guns, if it was thought advisable to put as many upon her. This ship has been built in the short space of eighty days, and when it is taken into view, that the two brigs of 500 tons each have also been built, rigged, and completely fitted for service since the first of February, it will be acknowledged that the mechanics employed on this station have done their duty.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE ATTACK ON OSWEGO.

Copy of a letter from Major-general Brown to the Secretary at war, dated Head Quarters, Sackett's Harbour, May 12, 1814.

Sir,

Inclosed is an abstract from the report of lieutenant-colonel Mitchell, of the affair at Oswego. Being well satisfied with the manner in which the colonel executed my orders, and with the evidence given of steady discipline and gallant conduct on the part of the troops, I have noticed them in the general order, a copy of which is inclosed.

The enemy's object was the naval and military stores deposited at the Falls, 13 miles in the rear of the fort. These were protected.

The stores at the fort and village were not important.

I am, &c.

JACOB BROWN,
Major General.

Hon. Secretary of War.

REPORT.

I informed you of my arrival at Fort Oswego on the 30th ult. This post being but occasionally and not recently occupied by regular troops, was in a bad state of defence. Of cannon we had but five old guns, three of which had lost their trunnions. What could be done in the way of repair was effected—new platforms were laid, the gun carriages put in order, and decayed pickets replaced. On the 5th instant the British naval force, consisting of four large ships, three brigs, and a number of gun and other boats, were descried at reveille beating about seven miles from the fort. Information was immediately given to captain Woolsey of the navy (who was at Oswego village), and to the neighbouring militia. It being doubtful on what side of the river the enemy would attempt to land, and my force (290 effectives) being too small to bear division, I ordered the tents in store to be pitched on the village side, while I occupied the other with my whole force. It is probable that this artifice had its effect, and determined the enemy to attack, where, from appearances, they expected the least opposition. About one o'clock the fleet approached. Fifteen boats, large and crowded with troops, at a given signal moved slowly to the shore. These were preceded by gun boats sent to rake the woods and cover the landing, while the larger vessels opened a fire upon the fort. Captain Boyle and lieutenant Legate (so soon as the debarking boats got within range of our shot) opened upon them a very successful fire from the shore-battery, and compelled them twice to retire. They at length returned to the ships, and the whole stood off from the shore for better anchorage. One of the enemy's boats, which had been deserted, was taken up by us, and some others by the militia. The first mentioned was sixty feet long, carried thirty-six oars and three sails, and could accommodate 150 men. She had received a ball through her bow, and was nearly filled with water.

Piquet guards were stationed at different points, and we lay on our arms during the night.

At dav-break on the 6th, the fleet appeared bearing up under easy sail. The Wolfe, &c. took a position directly against the fort and batteries, and for three hours kept up a heavy fire of grape, &c. Finding that the enemy had effected a landing, I withdrew my small disposable force into the rear of the fort, and with two companies (Romayne's and Melvin's) met their advancing columns, while the other companies engaged the flanks of the enemy. Lieutenant Pearce of the navy, and some seamen, joined in the attack, and fought with their characteristic bravery. We maintained our ground about thirty minutes, and as long as consisted with my further duty of defending the public stores, deposited at the Falls, which no doubt formed the principal object of the expedition on the part of the enemy. Nor was this movement made precipitately. I halted within 400 yards of the fort. Captain Romayne's company formed the rear guard, and, remaining with it, I marched to this place in good order, destroying the bridges in my rear. The enemy landed 600 of De Watteville's regiment, 600 marines, two companies of the Glengary corps, and 350 seamen.

General Drummond and commodore Yeo were the land and naval commanders. They burned the old barracks, and evacuated the fort about three o'clock on the morning of the 7th.

Our loss in killed is six; in wounded 38; and in missing 25. That of the enemy is much greater. Deserters, and citizens of ours taken prisoners and afterwards released, state their killed at 64, and wounded in proportion. Among these are several land and navy officers of merit.

I cannot close this dispatch without speaking of the dead and the living of my detachment.—Lieutenant Blaney, a young man of much promise, was unfortunately killed. His conduct in the action was highly meritorious. Captain Boyle and lieutenant Legate merit my highest approbation, and indeed I want language to express my admiration of their gallant conduct. The subalterns M'Comb, Ansart, Ring, Robb, Earle, M'Clintock, and Newkirk performed well their several parts.

It would be injustice were I not to acknowledge and report the zeal and patriotism evinced by the militia, who arrived at a short notice, and were anxious to be useful.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, Sackett's Harbour, May 12, 1814.

Major-general Brown has the satisfaction to announce to the forces under his command, that the detachment station-

ed at Oswego, under the immediate orders of lieutenant colonel Mitchell, of the third artillery, by their gallant and highly military conduct, in sustaining the fire of the whole British fleet of this lake, for nearly two days, and contending with the vastly superior numbers of the enemy on the land, as long as the interest of the country, or the honour of the profession required, and then effecting their retreat in good order, in the face of this superior force of an enterprising and valiant foe, to the depot of naval stores, which it became their duty to defend, have established for themselves a name in arms, worthy of the gallant nation in whose cause they fight, and highly honourable to the army.

That it may be known to the army, what regular troops were engaged on this occasion, the general deems it proper to state, that there were four companies of the third artillery, under the command of captain Boyle, captain Romayne, captain M'Intire, and captain Pierce, one company of light artillery, under the command of captain Melvin, and a small detachment of sailors, under the command of lieutenant Pierce of the navy, in all less than 300 men, the force of the enemy by land and water, exceeded 3000.

By command,

(Signed) R. JONES.

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Extract of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States ship Superior, Sackett's Harbour, May 16, 1814.

The enemy has paid dearly for the little booty which he obtained at Oswego. From the best information which I can collect, both from deserters and my agents, the enemy lost 70 men killed, and 165 wounded, drowned, and missing—in all, 235; nearly as many as were opposed to them. Captain Mulcaster is certainly mortally wounded, a captain of marines killed, and a number of other officers killed and wounded.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, Montreal, May 12, 1814.

His excellency the governor in chief and commander of the forces, has the highest gratification in announcing to the troops, that he has received a despatch from lieutenant-general Drummond, reporting the result of a most spirited and successful attack on the enemy's fort and position of Os-

wego, which was carried by assault at noon on the 6th instant.

The lieutenant-general reports, that having caused six companies of the regiment de Watteville, and one company of the Glengary light infantry, with a small detachment of artillery, to embark on board the squadron, in addition to the second battalion of royal marines, he accompanied sir James Yeo, in the Prince Regent, and on the evening of the 5th instant anchored off Oswego; but a violent gale of wind driving the squadron off shore, the position was not again recovered till noon on the following day, when the disposition for landing was *instantly* carried into execution, in the following order: the frigates taking a position from whence they could cannonade the fort; and the brigs, schooners, and gun boats, in proportion to their respective draft of water, covered by their fire the several points of debarkation of the troops, which was attended with considerable difficulty, owing to the shoalness of the water—the boats grounding, the troops were in many instances obliged to leap out and wade through the water to their middles to gain the landing; and the enemy having strongly occupied the favourable positions near the shore and woods with which it is surrounded, the disembarkation was attended with some loss, but effected with the utmost promptitude, under the direction of lieutenant-colonel Fischer, led by two new formed flank companies of the Watteville regiment, under captain Berzy; the remaining four companies, and detachment of royal artillery, being held in reserve.

The second battalion of marines under lieutenant-colonel Malcolm, supported by a detachment of 200 seamen, under captain Mulcaster, royal navy, formed a second column to the right. Captain M'Millin's company of Glengary light infantry gained the skirts of the wood to the left, and covered the advance of the columns to the fort;—which was carried in ten minutes from the advance of the troops' landing. The enemy's garrison, consisting of Macomb's third regiment of artillery, 400 strong, and a numerous body of militia, saved themselves by precipitate flight.

Lieutenant-general Drummond speaks in the strongest terms of the cordial, judicious, and able co-operation of sir James Yeo, and the officers and seamen of his squadron, and laments the temporary loss the service has sustained in captain Mulcaster of the royal navy, who is severely wounded. The eminent services of that officer, and of captains O'Conner, Popham, and Collier are particularly noticed.

[Here follow encomiums on the merits of many officers and

volunteers, to whom various parts of duty were assigned.—Among others, lieutenant Hewitt of the marines, who climbed the flag-staff and pulled down the American colours, *which were nailed to it;* and lieutenant Laurie, who led the party which entered the fort.]

It is particularly gratifying to his excellency to have to notice, that, to the high honour of both branches of the service, there was not a single soldier or sailor missing, not a single instance of intoxication, although surrounded with temptation.

The service has lost a brave and meritorious officer in captain Haltaway of the royal marines.

Every object of the expedition was accomplished—the barracks burnt, and the fort dismantled, and all public stores, which were not brought away, destroyed, the troops re-embarked at four o'clock the following morning, and the squadron sailed for Kingston.

The enemy's loss amounts to at least 100 killed and 60 prisoners, the greater part wounded.

[Here follows the detail of killed and wounded: the total of which are—killed, 1 captain (Haltaway), 15 rank and file, and 3 seamen, total 19. Wounded, 3 captains (Ledergrew, Mulcaster, and Popham), 2 lieutenants (May and Griffith), Mr. Richardson, master, 62 rank and file, and seven seamen, total 75. Total killed and wounded 94.]

Ordnance taken and destroyed.

Taken, 3 iron 32-pounders, 4 iron 24-pounders, 1 iron 12-pounder, 1 iron 6-pounder. Destroyed, one heavy 12-pounder, and one heavy 6-pounder.

One schooner and several boats, laden with ordnance, naval, and other stores, were brought away.

Three schooners and other craft destroyed.

EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-General North America.

AFFAIR AT SANDY CREEK.

Extract of a letter from Brigadier-General Gaines, to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Sackett's Harbour, May 31st, 1814.

"I have the honour to transmit herewith major Appling's report of the gallant affair which took place yesterday morning, between a detachment of the first rifle regiment and Oneida Indians, under his command, and a detachment from the British fleet, consisting of sailors and marines, commanded by captain Popham of the royal navy.

"Major Appling had been ordered to co-operate with captain Woolsey, of the navy, in escorting the cannon and naval stores from Oswego, destined for the fleet here, on board of a flotilla of barges, and after having gotten safely into Sandy Creek, 16 miles south-west of this place, they were pursued up the creek, by the enemy's force, which they met, and beat, and took, after an action of ten minutes, without any other loss on our part than one rifleman wounded."

Copy of a letter from major Appling to Brigadier-General Gaines.

Sir, *Sandy Creek, May 30th*, 1814.

Presuming that you have already been made acquainted with the result of the affair of this day, I consider it necessary only to furnish you with the return of the killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the part of the enemy, which is as follows:—prisoners, 27 marines and 106 sailors; wounded, 28 sailors and marines; killed, 13 marines and 1 midshipman, with two post captains, four lieutenants of the navy, prisoners, and two lieutenants of marines dangerously wounded and prisoners. The dead will receive all the honours and attentions due unfortunate soldiers; the wounded remain at this place, waiting the arrival of medical aid from the harbour. The prisoners have been marched into the country, and to-morrow they will proceed for the harbour. The enemy's boats also fell into my hands, consisting of two gunboats, and five barges, some of which carried howitzers. Of 120 men, and a few Indians, my loss does not exceed one man of the rifle corps, wounded.

I cannot sufficiently extol the conduct of the officers who

served under me, who were lieutenants M'Intosh, Calhoun, Macfarland, Armstrong, Smith, and ensign Austin.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) D. APPLING.

Brigadier-general Edmund P. Gaines,
commanding at Sackett's Harbour.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, Sackett's Harbour, 1st June, 1814.

The brigadier-general has the satisfaction to announce to the troops under his command, the defeat and capture of a British force, consisting of 186 marines and sailors, with two gun-boats and five barges, under the command of captain Popham, of the royal navy, by a detachment of 120 riflemen and a few Oneida warriors, under the command of major Appling, of the first United States' rifle regiment.

Major Appling had been detached to protect the cannon and naval stores at Oswego, destined for commodore Chauncey's fleet. They were embarked on board a flotilla of boats, in charge of captain Woolsey of the navy, and had arrived safely in Sandy Creek. They were pursued by the enemy, who was gallantly met by the riflemen, and, after an action of a few minutes, beaten, and taken, without the loss of a man on our part—an Indian and one rifleman only wounded. The Oneida warriors were not in the action until the enemy began to retreat.

The riflemen were most judiciously posted along the bank, a short distance below captain Woolsey's boats, where the creek is narrow and shoal. Most of the men having been taken from the boats, and the enemy, amused, perhaps, with the idea, that even the sight of a British force had been sufficient to appal American riflemen, gave three cheers at the prospect of the rich prize before them; his joy was of short duration, for at this moment the riflemen poured forth their deadly fire, which in about ten minutes terminated in his total defeat, leaving an officer and thirteen men killed, two officers and twenty-eight men wounded (the officers and many of the men dangerously), the residue, consisting of ten officers and 133 men, taken prisoners.

The greatest praise is due to major Appling, for the very judicious manner in which his gallant little corps was posted, as well as for the cool, deliberate valour displayed throughout the action, and his prompt exertions in arresting the tragic hand of his warriors, so soon as the enemy had struck.

Major Appling speaks in the highest terms of the courage and good conduct of his officers and men. The officers were lieutenants M'Intosh, Calhoun, M'Farland, Armstrong, and Smith, and ensign Austin. Captain Harris with his troop of dragoons, and captain Melvin with his two field-pieces, had made a rapid march, and would in a few minutes have been ready to participate in the action, had the enemy been able to make a stand.

(Signed) E. P. GAINES,
Brigadier-general commanding.

Copy of a letter from commodo e Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States ship Superior, Sackett's Harbor, 2d June, 1814.

Sir,

Finding it a most difficult task to transport our heavy guns on by land, I determined to get them to Stony Creek by water, when we should have only about three miles land carriage to transport them to Henderson's harbour, from which we could bring them to this place by water. I directed captain Woolsey to send all the stores except the heavy guns up to North Bay, and to place the guns in boats ready to move up or down the river, but to be ready to start at a moment's notice for Sandy Creek, whenever the coast was clear of the enemy's gun-boats, which hovered about the creek in Mexico Bay. On the evening of the 28th, captain Woolsey started from Oswego with 18 boats, containing all our heavy guns, twelve cables, and a quantity of shot. Major Appling and the rifle corps accompanied the boats with about 130 riflemen. I had also esgaged 130 Indians to traverse the shores for the purpose of protecting the boats if chased on shore, or into any of the creeks. Captain Woolsey proceeded unmolested to Sandy Creek, where he arrived about noon on Sunday the 29th, with one boat missing, containing one cable and two 24 pounders. As soon as I received information of the arrival of the boats at Sandy Creek, the general at my request dispatched two pieces of artillery and captain Harris's company of dragoons. Yesterday morning I ordered captain Smith with about 120 marines to Sandy Creek, and general Gaines very politely offered an additional force of about 300 artillery and infantry, under the command of that excellent officer colonel Mitchell, to the same place; but before this force could reach the creek, the enemy was discovered in chase of our look-out boats, and entered the creek a little after day-light; they landed and reconnoitred the shore—a

part of their force marched up on each side of the creek, while their gun-boats ascended cautiously, occasionally firing into the woods. Major Appling disposed of his force in the most judicious manner, and permitted the enemy to approach within a few yards of his ambuscade, when the riflemen and Indians opened a most destructive fire upon the enemy, which obliged them to surrender in about ten minutes, with the loss of a number killed and wounded, and seven boats taken, three of which were gun-boats, mounting 68, 24, 18, and 12-pounders, with some smaller arms.

The number of officers and men which the enemy entered the creek with, were about 200, but the number killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, I am still ignorant of, as no return has been made to me; among the prisoners, however, are two post captains, four lieutenants, and two lieutenants of the marines.

The conduct of major Appling and the troops under his command, has been highly honourable, and they are entitled to my warm acknowledgments for the zeal and ability with which they have defended the guns and stores for this station.

I have made arrangements for transporting the guns from Sandy Creek by land, which is about 16 miles. I hope to have them all here before the 10th.

I inclose herewith, for your information, captain Woolsey's report of his proceedings.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

Copy of a letter from M. T. Woolsey, to Commodore Chauncey,

Sir, *Sackett's Harbor, 1st June.*

I have already had the honour to inform you of the affair at Sandy Creek on the 30th instant, but, for want of time at that juncture, I had it not in my power to give you the particulars, and as the most of my communications, since measures were adopted for a push from Oswego Falls to Sandy Creek, with the naval stores, have been made in great haste, I avail myself of a leisure moment to make a report in detail of my proceedings since that period. On the 17th, I dispatched Mr. Huginan to Mexico, to hire a number of ox teams, and to engage a quantity of forage, &c. I also sent orders to Oswego Falls to have an additional number of large wheels made, for transporting the guns and cables back across the the portage, and caused reports to be circulated in every di-

rection that I had received your orders to send all the naval stores to Oneida Lake, with all possible expedition. On the morning of the 28th, when these reports were well in circulation, and when (as I have since heard from good authority) they had been faithfully detailed to sir James, I had the honour to receive, per express, your communication of the 27th, vesting in me discretionary powers. I immediately despatched Mr. Dixon in the long gig, to reconnoitre the coast. I went with my officers to the falls, to run the boats down over the rapids. At sun-set we arrived at Oswego with the boats (19 in number), loaded in all with 21 long 32-pounders, ten 24-pounders, three 42-pounders (carronades), and ten cables, besides some light articles, and distributed in the batteaux a guard of about 150 riflemen, under command of major Appling. Mr. Dixon having returned with a report of the coast being clear, we set off at dark, and arrived at Big Salmon River, about sun-rise on the 29th, with the loss of one boat, having on board two 24-pounders and one cable. I cannot account for her having separated from us, as every possible exertion was made to keep the brigade as compact as possible.

At Big Salmon we met the Oneidas, whom I had dispatched the day previous, under the command of lieutenant Hill of the rifle regiment. As soon as they had taken up their line of march along the shore to Big Sandy Creek, I started with all the boats, and arrived at noon at our place of destination, about 2 miles up the creek. In this laborious and hazardous duty, I feel much indebted to major Appling, his officers, and men, for their exertions, having assisted my officers and seamen in rowing the boats without a moment's rest, twelve hours, and about half the time enveloped in darkness and deluged with rain; also to some of the principal inhabitants of the village of Oswego, who volunteered their services as pilots. At 2 A. M. on the 30th, I received your letter of the 29th, 6 P. M., per express, and, agreeably to the order contained therein, sent lieutenant Pierce to look out as far as Stoney Point; about 5 o'clock he returned, having been pursued by a gun-boat and 5 barges. The best possible disposition was made of riflemen and Indians, about half a mile below our boats. About 8 A. M. a cannonading at long shot was commenced by the enemy, and believing (as I did) that no attempt would be made to land with their small force, I ordered lieutenant Pierce to proceed in erecting sheers and making preparations to unload the boats; and, as all the teams had retrogaded in conse-

quence of the cannonading, I sent in pursuit of them to return. About 8 o'clock captain Harris with a squadron of dragoons, and captain Melvin with a company of light artillery, and two 6-pounders, arrived. Captain Harris, the commanding officer, agreed with me, that this reinforcement should halt, as the troops best calculated for a bush-fight were already on the ground where they could act to the greatest advantage, and that the enemy, seeing a large reinforcement arrive, would most probably retreat. About 10, the enemy having landed and pushed up the creek with three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gig; the riflemen, under that excellent officer major Appling, rose from their concealment, and after a smart fire of about 10 minutes, succeeded in capturing all the boats and their crews, without one having escaped. At about 5 P. M., after having buried, with the honours of war, Mr. Hoare (a British midshipman), killed in the action, I was relieved by captain Ridgley, whom you did me the honour to send to Sandy Creek for that purpose. All the prisoners, except the wounded, having been removed, and expecting another attack at night, I remained to assist captain Ridgely in that event; but yesterday morning, seeing nothing in the offing, I availed myself of my relief, and returned to this place. In performing, to the best of my abilities, the duty for which I was ordered to Oswego Falls, I have great satisfaction in acknowledging the unremitted exertions of lieutenant Pierce, sailing-master Vaughan, and midshipman Mackey, Hart, and Caton; also to major Appling, his officers, and men, for their kind assistance in the same duty.

The report of killed, wounded, and prisoners, and also the number and description of the captured boats, has been already remitted by captain Ridgely and myself.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) M. T. WOOLSEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

FURTHER OPERATIONS ON LAKE ONTARIO.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States ship Superior, Sackett's Harbour, June 20, 1814.

Sir,

Knowing that the enemy was contantly receiving naval and military stores at Kingston, by the St. Lawrence, I thought it

might be practicable to surprize and capture a brigade of boats with stores on board, and either destroy or bring them off; for this purpose I directed lieutenant Gregory to take three gigs with only one settee in each boat, and proceed down the St. Lawrence, secrete himself on some of the islands, and watch a favourable opportunity to surprize a brigade of loaded boats, and either bring them off or destroy them, as circumstances would point out.

Lieutenant Gregory left here with his party on the evening of the 15th instant, and proceeded to the "Thousand Islands," where he hauled his boats on shore and concealed them; saw two brigades of boats pass, one up the river with troops, of course too strong for our little party; the other down the river, empty, and not worth taking.

Lieutenant Gregory found the enemy had gun-boats stationed between Kingston and Prescott, within about six miles of each other, and that they had a telegraph and look-out in almost every high island, so that they convey intelligence with great expedition.

Yesterday morning between nine and ten o'clock, lieutenant Gregory finding himself discovered and a gun-boat close to him, he instantly formed the bold design to board her, which he did, and carried her without losing a man; one of the enemy was badly wounded; she proved to be the fine gun-boat Black Snake, or No. 9, and mounted one 18 pounder, and manned with 18 men, chiefly royal marines (a list of which is inclosed) Lieutenant Gregory manned his prize and proceeded up the St. Lawrence, but was soon discovered and pursued by a very large gun-boat mounting two heavy guns, and rowed with upwards of forty oars, which over-hauled him fast; he kept possession of his prize until the enemy threw their shot over him; he then very reluctantly (but I think properly), took all his prisoners out and scuttled the gun-boat, which sunk instantly, and escaped the enemy, although so heavily loaded. Lieutenant Gregory arrived safe this morning with all his prisoners.

Permit me to recommend this gallant young officer to your notice and patronage; he is not surpassed by any of his grade, in zeal, intelligence, and intrepidity. Sailing master Vaughan, and Mr. Dixson, each commanding a gig under lieutenant Gregory, are entitled to my warm acknowledgements for their zeal and activity on all occasions to render service to their country, more particularly on the last expedition, when, from their knowledge of the river, they ren-

dered the most important services by pointing out the proper channels to elude the pursuit of the enemy.

Will you be pleased to direct in what manner the prisoners are to be disposed of?

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States ship Superior,
Sackett's Harbour, 7th July, 1814.

Sir,

I am happy that I have it in my power to detail to you another brilliant achievement of lieutenant Gregory with his brave companions.

I received information some time since that the enemy was building a large schooner at "Presque Isle." I determined upon her destruction, but deferred the execution until she should be nearly ready for launching. Finding the alarm extensive down the St. Lawrence in consequence of taking the gun-boat Black Snake, I thought it a favourable opportunity to attempt something at "Presque Isle." On the 26th ultimo, I directed lieutenant Gregory to take with him Messrs. Vaughan and Dixon; proceed with the two largest gigs to Nicholas Island (within about seven miles of "Presque Isle" harbour), and there conceal his boats, and wait for some transports which I had information were expected to take up provisions and munitions of war, which had been sent up the bay of Quinte for the troops at York and Fort George, but, if these transports did not make their appearance in three or four days, then to proceed to "Presque Isle," and burn the vessel on the stocks, but with positive orders not to injure a private building or any private property. The day after lieutenant Gregory arrived on the coast, he discovered a vessel beating up, but just as he shoved off to board her, a large gun-boat hove in sight a little below him. This boat made a signal to the vessel in the offing, upon which she tacked and stood for the gun-boat. Lieutenant Gregory secreted his boats as well as he could, but was apprehensive that he had been discovered. The gun-boat and her convoy (which was full of troops) stood into Presque Isle. Lieutenant Gregory was determined to ascertain whether he had been discovered; accordingly he sent one of his boats in the next night and took off one of the inhabitants, who informed him that it was known that he was on the coast, and that two expresses had

been sent to Kingston in consequence. He therefore determined upon executing the latter part of his instructions, and made his arrangements accordingly, landed, placed sentinels at the houses to prevent alarm, and set fire to the vessel, which was nearly ready to launch; she was a stout well-built vessel to mount 14 guns, and would probably have been launched in about ten days. A small store-house which contained stores for the vessel was unavoidably burnt, as it was so near the vessel that it took fire from her. Lieutenant Gregory learnt from the inhabitants, that much property had been sent up a few days previous, that a company of the Glengary regiment had been stationed there, but had been sent to York a few days before; another company was on its way from Kingston to replace them. The few militia which had been left to guard the vessel and property, retreated upon the approach of our boats. As soon as the vessel was entirely consumed, lieutenant Gregory re-embarked his men, without having permitted one of them to enter a house; finding the alarm so general he thought prudent to cross the lake immediately; he stopped one day at Oswego, for refreshment, and arrived here last evening, having performed a most difficult service with his usual gallantry and good conduct.

Lieutenant Gregory speaks in the highest terms of commendation of sailing master Vaughan and Mr. Dixon, as well as the men under his command, for their patient endurance of hunger and fatigue, and the zeal with which they performed every part of their duty.

I think, in justice to these brave men, that they ought to be allowed something for the destruction of this vessel; they have, however, every confidence in the justice and liberality of the government, and submit their case most cheerfully to its decision.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, &c.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States ship Superior, off the Ducks, October 1, 1814.

Sir,

On the 28th instant, at day-light, we discovered two of the enemy's ships, standing out of Kingston, under a press of sail. As soon as they discovered us, they hove too. The wind being fresh from the northward and eastward, and fair to leave Kingston, I was impressed with a belief that sir

James had got his large ship ready, and that he was coming out with his whole fleet. I immediately made sail, in order to gain the wind; but as soon as we tacked for them, the enemy's ships filled, made sail on a wind, and soon after tacked from us. The weather being hazy, it soon became so thick a fog, that we could not discover objects more than a hundred yards. I, however, continued to beat to windward, and late in the afternoon it cleared up for a short time, when we discovered the enemy's two ships outside of Nine-Mile Point; but as soon as he discovered that we had neared him considerably, and in a situation to cut him off from Kingston, if he ventured further out, he immediately made all sail, and beat into his anchorage.

As no other part of the enemy's squadron made their appearance, and these two ships from their manœuvres evidently wished to escape us, it struck me, that the enemy had learnt the movements of general Izard, up the lake, and apprehending an attack upon general Drummond's army (which probably also was distressed for provisions), had induced him to put on board these two ships, troops and provisions, and risque them for the relief of his army upon the Niagara frontier; the wind and thick foggy weather also favoured such a movement. I determined to frustrate his designs if possible. Soon after sun-down, I anchored the fleet between the Galooes and Grenadier Island, for the purpose of keeping them together, and put lieutenant Skinner, with an additional number of men, on board of the Lady of the Lake, with orders to anchor between Pigeon and Snake Islands, and, if he discovered any movement of the enemy, to make me a signal with rockets, or guns, of his number, &c. It continued a thick fog during the night—the enemy made no movement, and the next morning, 29th, the weather cleared up, with the wind to the westward—weighed with the fleet, and stood in for Kingston, until we opened the town—sent the Lady of the Lake close in to reconnoitre, and ascertain the state of forwardness of the new ship. Lieutenant Skinner found her hauled off in the stream, and completely rigged, but sails not bent—four other ships and a large schooner lying also in the stream, and apparently ready to sail.

From present appearances, I have no doubt but the enemy will be on the lake, with his whole force, in the course of a week, and I think his first movement will be to attempt to retrieve, at Sackett's Harbour, what he lost at Plattsburg. I hope, however, that he will meet with the same gallant re-

sistance upon this lake, that he experienced on lake Champlain.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, Washington.

From the same to the same.

United States ship Superior,
off the Ducks, 2d October, 1814.

Sir,

Having a very commanding breeze yesterday, I sent the Lady of the Lake into Kingston to reconnoitre. She stood close in with the forts and shipping, keeping just without the range of their shot, and had a fair view. The ships lay in the same positions as on the 29th, and the large ship still without her sails bent—no visible preparation to embark troops. I shall watch them in this position as long as possible, without endangering the safety of the fleet.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE CO-OPERATION OF THE FLEET ON LAKE ONTARIO, WITH THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL BROWN.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States ship Superior, off Kingston, August 10, 1814.

Sir,

Great anxiety of mind, and severe bodily exertions, have at length broken down the best constitution, and subjected me to a violent fever that confined me for eighteen days. This misfortune was no more to be foreseen than prevented, but was particularly severe at the moment it happened, as it induced a delay of five or six days in the sailing of the fleet.

In the early part of July, I expected the fleet would be made ready for sailing by the 10th or 15th; but many of the mechanics were taken sick, and amongst them the blockmakers and blacksmiths, so that the Mohawk could not be furnished with blocks and iron work for her gun and spar decks, before

the 24th or 25th ultimo, when she was reported ready by captain Jones. As considerable anxiety had been manifested by the public to have the fleet on the lake, I should have asked captain Jones to take charge of it and go out, but I was then recovering my health, and was confident I should be able in three or four days to on go board myself. There was an additional reason for submitting to this delay, in the difficulty I found in making the changes of commanders, neither of them being willing to be separated from his officers and men, and a change of crews through the fleet being inadmissible.

In the afternoon of the 31st July, I was taken on board, but it was calm, and I did not sail before the next morning. To satisfy at once whatever expectations the public had been led to entertain of the sufficiency of this squadron to take and maintain the ascendancy on this lake, and at the same time to expose the futility of promises, the fulfilment of which had been rested on our appearance at the head of the lake, I got under way at four o'clock in the morning of the 1st instant, and steered for the mouth of the Niagara. Owing to light winds, I did not arrive off there before the 5th. There we intercepted one of the enemy's brigs, running over from York to Niagara with troops, and ran her on shore about six miles to the westward of fort George. I ordered the Sylph in, to anchor as near to the enemy as she could with safety, and to destroy her. Captain Elliott ran in a very gallant manner to within from three hundred to five hundred yards of her, and was about anchoring when the enemy set fire to her, and she soon after blew up. This vessel was a schooner the last year, and called the Beresford; since they altered her to a brig, they changed her name, and I have not been able to ascertain it. She mounted 14 guns, twelve 24-pound carronades, and two long 9-pounders.

Finding the enemy had two other brigs and a schooner in the Niagara river, I determined to leave a force to watch them, and selected the Jefferson, Sylph, and Oneida for that purpose, and placed the whole under the orders of captain Ridgely. Having looked into York, without discovering any vessel of the enemy, I left Niagara with the remainder of the squadron on the evening of the 7th, and arrived here the 9th. We found one of the enemy's ships in the offing, and chased her into Kingston.

My anxiety to return to this end of the lake was increased by the knowledge I had of the weakness of Sackett's Harbour, and the apprehension that the enemy might receive large reinforcements at Kingston, and, embarking some of the troops

on board his fleet, make a dash at the harbour, and burn it with all my stores during our absence When I left the harbour there were but about 700 regular troops fit for duty. It is true, a few militia had been called in, but little could be expected of them should an attack be made. My apprehension, it seems, was groundless, the enemy having contented himself with annoying in some trifling degree the coasters between Oswego and the harbour in his boats.

I cannot forbear expressing the regret I feel that so much sensation has been excited in the public mind because the squadron did not sail so soon as the wise heads that conduct our newspapers have presumed to think I ought. I need not suggest to one of your experience, that a man of war may appear to the eye of a landsman, perfectly ready for sea, when she is deficient in many of the most essential points of her armament, nor how unworthy I should have proved myself of the high trust reposed in me, had I ventured to sea in the face of an enemy of equal force, without being ready to meet him in one hour after my anchor was weighed.

It ought in justice to be recollected, that the building and equipment of vessels on the Atlantic, are unattended by any of the great difficulties which we have to encounter on this lake: there every department abounds with facilities. A commander makes a requisition, and articles of every description are furnished in twelve hours; but this fleet has been built and fitted in the wilderness, where there are no agents and chandler's shops and founderies, &c. &c. to supply our wants, but every thing is to be created; and yet I shall not decline a comparison of what has been done here, with any thing done on the Atlantic, in the building or equipment of vessels. The frigate Guerriere, for instance, has been building and fitting upwards of twelve months, in the city of Philadelphia, and is not now ready. The President frigate was sent into the navy yard at New York for some partial repairs, a few days after the keel of the Superior was laid; since then two frigates of a large class, and two sloops of war of the largest class, have been built and fitted here, and have sailed before the President is ready for sea, although every article of their armament and rigging has been transported from New York, in despite of obstacles almost insurmountable. I will go farther, sir, for it is due to the unremitted and unsurpassed exertions of those who have served the public under my command, and will challenge the world to produce a parallel instance, in which the same number of vessels of

such dimensions have been built and fitted in the same time, by the same number of workmen.

I confess that I am mortified in not having succeeded in satisfying the expectations of the public, but it would be infinitely more painful, could I find any want of zeal or exertion in my endeavours to serve them, to which I could in any degree impute their disappointment.

I have the honour to be, sir, with the utmost respect, your most obedient and very humble servant.

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board the United States ship Superior, off Kingston, August 10th, 1814.

"I have been duly honoured with your letters of the 19th and 24th July.

"I do assure you, sir, that I have never been under any pledge to meet general Brown at the head of the lake; but on the contrary, when we parted at Sackett's Harbour, I told him distinctly, that I should not visit the head of the lake, unless the enemy's fleet did.

"I can ascribe the intimation of general Brown, that he expected the co-operation of the fleet to no other motive, than a cautious attempt to provide an apology for the public, against any contingent disaster, to which his army might be be exposed.

"But, sir, if any one will take the trouble to examine the topography of the peninsula (the scene of the general's operations), he will discover that this fleet, could be of no more service to general Brown, or his army, than it could to an army in Tennesee.

"General Brown has never been able to penetrate nearer to Lake Ontario, than to Queenstown, and the enemy is in possession of all the intermediate country; so that I could not even communicate with the army, but by a circuitous route of 70 or 80 miles.

"Admitting general Brown could have invested fort George, the only service he could have derived from the fleet, would be our preventing the supplies of the enemy from entering the Niagara river; for the water is so shallow, that the large vessels could not approach within two miles of their works,

"General Brown had therefore two abundantly sufficient reasons for not expecting the co-operation of this fleet; it was not promised to him—and was chimerical in itself.

"My fixed determination has always been to seek a meeting with the enemy, the moment the fleet was ready, and to deprive him of an apology for not meeting me, I have sent four guns on shore from the Superior, to reduce her armament in number to an equality with the Prince Regent's, yielding the advantage of their 68-pounders. The Mohawk mounts two guns less than the Princess Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are equal to the General Pike and Madison. I have detached, on separate service, all the brigs, and am blockading his four ships, with our four ships, in the hope that this may induce him to come out."

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown, to Commodore Chauncey,

Head-Quarters, Queenstown, July 13th, 1814.

My dear sir,

I arrived at this place on the 10th, as I assured you that with the blessing of God I would. All accounts agree that the force of the enemy in Kingston is very light; meet me on the lake shore, north of Fort George, with your fleet, and we will be able, I have no doubt, to settle a plan of operation that will break down the power of the enemy in Upper Canada, and that in the course of a short time. At all events let me hear from you; I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field, and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place. For God's sake let me see you; sir James will not fight, two of his vessels are now in Niagara river.

If you conclude to meet me at the head of the lake, and that immediately, have the goodness to bring the guns and troops that I have ordered from the harbour; at all events, have the politeness to let me know what aid I am to expect from the fleet of Lake Ontario.

There is not a doubt resting in my mind, but that we have between us the command of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months, if there is a prompt and zealous co-operation, and a vigorous application of these means; now is our time, before the enemy can be greatly reinforced.

Yours, truly,

(Signed) JACOB BROWN.

Commodore Chauncey.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey, to Major-General Brown, dated United States ship Superior, off Kingston, August 10th, 1814.

Sir,

Your letter of the 13th ultimo was received by me on a sick bed, hardly able to hear it read, and entirely unfitted to reply to it. I, however, requested general Gaines to acquaint you with my situation, the probable time of the fleet's sailing, and my views of the extent of its co-operation with the army.

From the tenor of your letter, it would appear that you had calculated much upon the co-operation of the fleet. You cannot surely have forgotten the conversation we held on this subject at Sackett's Harbour, previous to your departure for Niagara. I then professed to feel it my duty as well as inclination to afford every assistance in my power to the army, and to co-operate with it whenever it could be done without losing sight of this great object, for the attainment of which this fleet had been created, to wit: the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet; but I then distinctly stated to you, that this was a primary object, and would be first attempted; and that you must not expect the fleet at the head of the lake, unless that of the enemy should induce us to follow him there.

I will not suffer myself to believe that this conversation was misunderstood or has since been forgotten. How then shall I account for the intimation thrown out to the public in your despatch to the secretary of war, that you expected the fleet to co-operate with you? Was it friendly, or just, or honourable, not only to furnish an opening for the public, but thus to assist them, to infer that I had pledged myself to meet you on a particular day, at the head of the lake, for the purpose of co-operation? and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn their resentment from you, who are alone responsible, upon me, who could not by any possibility have prevented or retarded even your discomfiture? You well know, sir, that the fleet could not have rendered you the least service during your late incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queenstown, and the enemy were then in possession of all the country between that place and the shore of Ontario, and that I could not even communicate with you without making a circuit of 70 or 80 miles. I would ask, of what possible use the fleet could have been to you, either in threatening or investing Fort George, when the shallowness

of the water alone would prevent an approach with these ships within two miles of that fort or Niagara? To pretend that the fleet could render the least assistance in your projected capture of Burlington Heights on your route to Kingston, is still more romantic; for it is well known the fleet could not approach within nine miles of those heights.

That you might find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the transportation of provisions and stores for the use of the army, and an agreeable appendage to attend its marches and countermarches, I am ready to believe; but, sir, the secretary of the navy has honoured us with a higher destiny; we are intended to seek and to fight the enemy's fleet. This is the great purpose of the government in creating this fleet, and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of the army.

We have one common object in the annoyance, defeat, and destruction of the enemy, and I shall always cheerfully unite with any military commander in the promotion of that object.

I am, sir, with great consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Major-General Jacob Brown.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to Commodore Chauncey, dated Head Quarters, Buffalo, Sept. 4, 1814.

Sir,

Your letter of the 10th ultimo, after going the rounds, was delivered to me a few days since, on my way to this place.

The exception you take at my letter to the secretary, would be very reasonable and proper, provided the fleet of Lake Ontario was your private property, over which the government had no controul. But as I have been induced to believe that it was the property of the nation, subject to the orders of the government; and as the government led me to believe that the fleet under your command would be upon Lake Ontario, to co-operate with my division of the army the first week in July, I have deemed it fit and proper to let the nation know, that the support I had a right to expect was not afforded me.

I consider my conduct towards yourself and the navy, as not only honourable, but, sir, as being very liberal and friendly, from the date of my report of the battle at Sackett's Harbour to the present hour. The troops under my command

have always been disposed of so as to meet your views to the extent of my power and authority; and as far as was consistent with the rights and the honour of the army.

Your information appears very incorrect as to the situation of the army, previous to the arrival of reinforcements with lieutenant-general Drummond. From the 9th of July to the 24th the whole country was in our power from Fort George to Burlington Heights; and could the army have been supplied with provisions from the depots provided on the shores of Lake Ontario, we should not have doubted our ability (without reinforcements or additional guns) to carry the heights: when we could have returned upon Forts George and Niagara, or advanced upon Kingston (as might have been thought most advisable), with the co-operation of the fleet.

You speak of responsibility. I do not desire you, or any man, to be responsible for me. I have endeavoured to execute the orders given me; success has not attended my endeavours; but I humbly trust in heaven that the honour of the brave men entrusted to my command has been and will be preserved, let what may happen.

It will be very difficult to retire from Fort Erie, pressed as the remains of my gallant little army are, by a superior force of the enemy. But no other alternative will be left us, unless reinforcements speedily arrive. The militia are coming in in very considerable numbers, but it is not yet ascertained how many of them will cross. The secretary has given me to understand, that general Izard would move to the St. Lawrence, with a view of attacking Kingston (should he and you deem that measure advisable). Should you decide otherwise, that general Izard should come with, or send to me a reinforcement of from two to three thousand men.

I have not heard from general Izard, and begin to apprehend that something has occurred, to retard or prevent his movement. I will thank you for any information you can give me on this subject.

I am, sir, with great consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

JACOB BROWN.

Commodore Isaac Chauncey.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT ERIE, AND BATTLE OF CHIPPEWA PLAINS.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Adjutant-General's office, left division, July 2d, 1814.

Major-general Brown has the satisfaction to announce to the troops of his division on this frontier, that he is authorized by the orders of his government to put them in motion against the enemy. The first and second brigades, with the other corps of artillery, will cross the streights before them this night, or as early to-morrow as possible. The necessary instructions have been given to the brigadiers, and by them to the commanding officers of regiments and corps.

Upon entering Canada, the laws of war will govern: men found in arms, or otherwise engaged in the service of the enemy, will be treated as enemies; those behaving peaceably, and following their private occupations, will be treated as friends. Private property in all cases will be held sacred: public property, wherever found, will be seized and disposed of by the commanding general. Our utmost protection will be given to all who actually join, or who evince a desire to join us.

Plundering is prohibited. The major-general does not apprehend any difficulty on this account with the regular army, or with honourable volunteers, who press to the standard of their country, to avenge her wrongs, and to gain a name in arms.—Profligate men, who follow the army for plunder, must not expect that they will escape the vengeance of the gallant spirits who are struggling to exalt the national character. Any plunderer shall be punished with death, who may be found violating this order.

By order of the major-general,

C. K. GARDNER,

Adjutant-general.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated Chippewa Plains, 6th July, 1814.

Sir,

Excuse my silence. I have been much engaged. Fort Erie did not, as I assured you it should not, detain me a single day. At 11 o'clock on the night of the 4th, I arrived at this place with the reserve, general Scott having taken the posi-

tion about noon, with the van. My arrangements for turning and taking in rear the enemy's position east of Chippewa was made, when major-general Riall, suspecting our intention, and adhering to the rule that it is better to give than to receive an attack, came from behind his works about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th, in order of battle. We did not baulk him. Before six o'clock his line was broken and his forces defeated, leaving on the field four hundred killed and wounded. He was closely pressed, and would be utterly ruined, but for the proximity of his works, whither he fled for shelter. The wounded of the enemy and those of our own army must be attended to. They will be removed to Buffalo. This, with my limited means of transportation, will take a day or two, after which I shall advance, not doubting but that the gallant and accomplished troops I lead will break down all opposition between me and Lake Ontario, when, if met by the fleet, all is well—if not, under the favour of heaven, we shall behave in a way to avoid disgrace. My detailed report shall be made in a day or two. I am, with the highest respect, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. Secretary of War.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Adjutant-General's office, left division, Chippewa Plains, 6th July, 1814.

Major-general Brown has the satisfaction to say that the soldiers of the second division, west of the Niagara, merits greater applause than he is able to bestow in general orders—they merit the highest approbation of their country. The conduct of brigadier-general Scott's brigade, which had the opportunity to engage the whole force of the enemy (the greater part it is believed of all within the peninsula), removes, on the day of this battle, the reflection on our country, that its reputation in arms is yet to be established. His brigade consists of battalions of the 9th, the 11th, and the 25th regiments, and a detachment of the 22d. Towson's company of artillery, which was attached to it, gallantly commenced, and, with it, sustained the action.

The volunteers and Indians performed their part—they drove the enemy's Indians and light troops until they met the British army: they merit the general's approbation. In the report of killed and wounded, the names of the wounded officers will be given, in order that they may be rewarded

with that honourable mention which is due to them. By order of major-general Brown.

C. K. GARDNER,
Adjutant-general.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Chippewa Plains, July 7th, 1814.

Dear Sir,

On the 2d instant I issued my orders for crossing the Niagara river, and made the arrangements deemed necessary for securing the garrison of Fort Erie.—On the 3d that post surrendered, at five P. M. Our loss in this affair was four of the 25th regiment, under major Jessup, of brigadier-general Scott's brigade, wounded. I have inclosed a return of the prisoners, of the ordnance, and ordnance stores captured.

To secure my rear I have placed a garrison in this fort, and requested captain Kennedy to station his vessels near the post.

On the morning of the 4th, brigadier-general Scott, with his brigade and a corps of artillery, was ordered to advance towards Chippewa, and be governed by circumstances, taking care to secure a good military position for the night. After some skirmishing with the enemy, he selected this plain with the eye of a soldier; his right resting on the river, and a ravine being in front. At 11 at night I joined him with the reserve under general Ripley, our field and battering train, and corps of artillery under major Hindman. General Porter arrived the next morning with a part of the New-York and Pennsylvania volunteers, and some of the warriors of the Six Nations.

Early in the morning of the 5th, the enemy commenced a petty war upon our pickets, and, as he was indulged, his presumption increased: by noon he shewed himself on the left of our exterior line, and attacked one of our pickets as it was returning to camp.

Captain Treat, who commanded it, retired disgracefully, leaving a wounded man on the ground. Captain Biddle, of the artillery, who was near the scene, impelled by feelings highly honourable to him as a soldier and officer, promptly assumed the command of this picket, led it back to the wounded man, and brought him off the field. I ordered captain Treat, on the spot, to retire from the army, and, as I am anxious that no officer shall remain under my command who can be

suspected of cowardice, I advise that captain Treat and lieutenant ———*, who was also with the picket, be struck from the rolls of the army†.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, agreeably to a plan I had given general Porter, he advanced from the rear of our camp, with the volunteers and Indians (taking the woods, in order to keep out of view of the enemy) with the hope of bringing his pickets and scouting parties between his (Porter's) line of march and our camp. As Porter moved, I ordered the parties advanced in front of our camp to fall back gradually, under the enemy's fire, in order to draw him, if possible, up to our line.—About half past four the advance of general Porter's command met the light parties of the enemy in the woods, upon our extreme left. The enemy were driven, and Porter advancing near to Chippewa, met their whole column in order of battle. From the cloud of dust rising, and the heavy firing, I was led to conclude that the entire force of the enemy was in march, and prepared for action. I immediately ordered general Scott to advance with his brigade and Towson's artillery, and meet them upon the plain in front of our camp. The general did not expect to be gratified so soon with a field engagement. He advanced in the most prompt and officer-like style, and in a few minutes was in close action upon the plain, with a superior force of Bri-

* The name omitted in the letter.

† Immediately after the battle, general Brown issued an order suspending captain Treat from command. Captain Treat demanded a court of inquiry. It was not granted, but a court-martial was ordered at Fort Erie. The left division of the army marched to Sackett's Harbour soon after, and the court was dissolved.

Captain Treat immediately proceeded to Sackett's Harbour, by permission from major-general Izard; and requested another court-martial. Major-general Brown, on the 5th of April, 1815, after the repeated solicitations of captain Treat, issued an order organizing a court, consisting of

Colonel M'Feely, president.

Lieutenant-colonel Smith, major Croker, major Boyle, major M'Ilhenny, major Chane, and captain White, members.

Captain Seymour, supernumerary.

Lieutenant Anderson, of the 13th regiment, judge advocate.

The court met and proceeded on the trial the 6th April, 1815, at Sackett's Harbour. They closed the investigation on the 8th May; when captain Treat was honourably acquitted.

The following is a copy of the decision of the court—

"After mature deliberation on the testimony adduced, the court find the accused, captain Joseph Treat, of the 21st infantry, not guilty of the charge or specification preferred against him, and do honourably acquit him."

The sentence of the court was approved by major-general Brown, and promulgated on the 28th June—at Sackett's Harbour.

tish regular troops. By this time general Porter's command had given way, and fled in every direction, notwithstanding his personal gallantry, and great exertions to stay their flight. The retreat of the volunteers and Indians caused the left flank of general Scott's brigade to be greatly exposed. Captain Harris, with his dragoons, was directed to stop the fugitives, behind the ravine fronting our camp; and I sent colonel Gardner to order general Ripley to advance with the 21st regiment, which formed part of the reserve, pass to the left of our camp, skirt the woods so as to keep out of view, and fall upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This order was promptly obeyed, and the greatest exertions were made by the 21st regiment to gain their position and close with the enemy; but in vain—for such was the zeal and gallantry of the line commanded by general Scott, that its advance upon the enemy was not to be checked. Major Jessup, commanding the left flank battalion, finding himself pressed in front and in flank, and his men falling fast around him—ordered his battalion to "support arms and advance;"—the order was promptly obeyed, amidst the most deadly and destructive fire. He gained a more secure position, and returned upon the enemy so galling a discharge as caused them to retire. By this time their whole line was falling back, and our gallant soldiers pressing upon them as fast as possible. As soon as the enemy had gained the sloping ground descending towards Chippewa, and distant a quarter of a mile, he broke and ran to his works. In this effort he was too successful, and the guns from his batteries opening immediately upon our line, checked in some degree the pursuit. At this moment I resolved to bring up all my ordnance, and force the place by a direct attack, and gave the order accordingly. Major Wood of the corps of engineers, and my aid, captain Austin, rode to the bank of the creek towards the right of their line of works, and examined them. I was induced by their report, the lateness of the hour, and the advice of general Scott and major Wood, to order the forces to retire to camp.

My most difficult duty remains to be performed—I am depressed with the fear of not being able to do justice to my brave companions in arms, and apprehensive, that some who had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and promptly embraced it, will escape my notice.

Brigadier-general Scott is entitled to the highest praises our country can bestow—to him more than any other man am I indebted for the victory of the 5th of July. His brigade has covered itself with glory. Every officer and man

of the 9th, 11th, and 25th regiments did his duty, with a zeal and energy worthy of the American character. When every officer stands so pre-eminently high in the path of duty and honour, it is impossible to discriminate, but I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of saying that major Lavenworth commanded the 9th and 22d, major Jessup the 25th, and major M'Neil the 11th. Colonel Campbell was wounded early in the action, gallantly leading on his regiment.

The family of general Scott were conspicuous in the field; lieutenant Smith of the 6th infantry, major of brigade, and lieutenants Worth and Watts his aids.

From general Ripley and his brigade, I received every assistance that I gave them an opportunity of rendering. I did not order any part of the reserve into action, until general Porter's command had given way, and then general Scott's movements were so rapid and decisive, that general Ripley could not get up in time with the 21st, to the position as directed. The corps of artillery under major Hindman, were not generally in action—this was not their fault—captain Towson's company was the only one that had a full opportunity of distinguishing itself, and it is believed that no company ever embraced an opportunity with more zeal, or more success.

A detachment from the 2d brigade, under the command of lieutenant M'Donald, penetrated the woods with the Indians and volunteers, and for their support. The conduct of M'Donald and his command reflects high honour upon the brigade to which they belong.

The conduct of general Porter has been conspicuously gallant. Every assistance in his power to afford, with the description of force under his command, has been rendered. We could not expect him to contend with the British column of regulars which appeared upon the plains of Chippewa. It was no cause of surprise to me, to see his command retire before this column.

Justice forbids that I should omit to name my own family. They yield to none in honourable zeal, intelligence, and attention to duty. Colonel Gardner, major Jones, and my aids, captains Austin and Spencer, have been as active and as much devoted to the cause, as any officers of the army. Their conduct merits my warmest acknowledgments; of Gardner and Jones I shall have occasion again to speak to you.

Major Camp, deputy quarter-master-general, deserves my particular notice and approbation. By his great exertion I was

enabled to find the means of crossing. Captain Daliba of the ordnance department has rendered every service in his power.

The inclosed return will shew you our loss, and furnish you with the names of the dead and wounded officers. These gallant men must not be forgotten. Our country will remember them, and do them justice.

Respectfully and truly yours,

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Inspector-General's office, Head-Quarters, left division, Chippewa, 9th July, 1814.

Return of the killed, wounded, and prisoners of the enemy in the action of the fifth instant, fought on the plains, within half a mile of Chippewa, between the left division of the United States army, commanded by major-general Brown, and the English forces, under the command of major-general Riall.

Killed, 3 captains, 3 subalterns, and 87 rank and file of the regular troops.—Wounded, 2 captains of the First Royal Scots, 1 lieutenant of the 100th regiment, and 92 rank and file of the Royal Scots, 8th, and 100th regiments.—Prisoners, 1 captain of the Indians, and 9 rank and file of the regulars.—Killed in the woods, of the Indians 87, o the militia and regulars 18.—Indian prisoners, 1 chief and 4 privates.

Recapitulation.—Killed, 3 captains, 3 subalterns, and 192 rank and file.—Wounded and prisoners, 2 captains, 1 subaltern, and 92 rank and file.—Prisoners, 1 captain, and 14 rank and file.—Total, 6 captains, 4 subalterns, and 298 rank and file.

Total of the enemy placed hors de combat, that we have ascertained beyond a doubt, 6 captains, 4 subalterns, and 298 rank and file. Those reported under the head of wounded and prisoners were so severely injured, that it would have been impracticable for them to have escaped. The enemy had the same facilities of carrying their wounded from the field at the commencement of the action as ourselves, and there can be no doubt, from the information that I have received from unquestionable sources, that they carried from the field as many of their wounded as are reported above in the total.

AZ. ORNE,

Assistant Inspector-general.

Major-general Brown.

Report of the killed and wounded of the left division, commanded by Major-General Brown, in the action of the 5th July, 1814, on the plains of Chippewa, Upper Canada.

Head-Quarters, Camp Chippewa, 7th July, 1814.

Artillery.—Killed, 4 privates; wounded severely, 3 corporals, 5 privates; 8 privates slightly.

General Scott's brigade.—9th infantry—killed, 2 musicians, 11 privates—wounded severely, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 2 corporals, 19 privates—slightly, 2 serjeants, 19 privates.—22d infantry attached—killed, 8 privates, wounded severely, 1 captain, 8 privates—slightly, 2 serjeants, 33 privates.—11th infantry—killed, 1 serjeant, 4 corporals, 10 privates—wounded severely, 1 colonel, 1 subaltern, 3 serjeants, 5 corporals, 28 privates—slightly, 3 serjeants, 19 privates.—23d infantry—killed, 1 serjeant, 4 privates—wounded severely, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 5 serjeants, 2 corporals, 37 privates—slightly, 2 serjeants, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 19 privates.

Of General Ripley's Brigade.—21st regiment, none—19th infantry attached—killed, 3 privates—severely wounded, 2 privates—missing, 2.—23d infantry—severely wounded, 1 private.

Of brigadier-general P. B. Porter's command.—Fenton's regiment of Pennsylvania militia—killed, 3 privates, severely wounded, 1 private, slightly, 1 private, missing, 3 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers and privates.—Corps of Indians—killed, 9 privates, severely wounded, 4, slightly, 4, missing, 10.—Grand total—2 serjeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 52 privates killed.—1 colonel, 3 captains, 5 subalterns, 8 serjeants, 11 corporals, 105 privates, severely wounded,—9 serjeants, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 193 privates, slightly wounded,—3 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers and privates missing.—Total, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, 316.—Aggregate, 328.

Names and rank of officers wounded.

Colonel Campbell, 11th infantry, severely; knee-pan fractured.—Captain King, 22d infantry; dangerously, shot wound in the abdomen.—Captain Read, 25th infantry, badly; flesh wound in the thigh.—Captain Harrison 42d, doing duty in the 9th infantry, severely; thigh amputated.—Lieutenant Palmer, adjutant 9th infantry, severely; shot-wound in the shoulder.—Lieutenant Barron, 11th infantry, severely.—Lieutenant De Witt, 25th infantry, severely.—Lieutenant Patchim, 25th infantry, badly; flesh-wound in the thigh.—Lieutenant Brim-

hall, 9th infantry, slightly.—Note—The slightly wounded are fast recovering.

C. K. GARDNER,
Adjutant-general.

Inspector-General's office, Head-Quarters, left division, Camp near Fort Erie, July 3.

Return of the British prisoners of war, who surrendered by capitulation with Fort Erie on the afternoon of the 3d July, 1814, to the left division of the United States army, under the command of Major-General Brown.

8th or King's regiment, 1 major.—Royal artillery, 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, 1 bombardier, and 19 gunners.—100th regiment, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 serjeants, 5 corporals, 3 musicians, 98 privates.

Recapitulation.—8th regiment, 1 major.—Royal artillery, 1 subaltern, 1 corporal, 1 bombardier, 19 gunners.—100th regiment, 1 captain, 3 subalterns, 4 serjeants, 5 corporals, 3 musicians, 98 privates.—Aggregate, 137.

AZ. ORNE,
Assistant Inspector-general.

Major-general Brown.

Extract of a letter from General Brown, of the 17th July, 1814, to the Secretary of War.

"The inclosed reports were made by order. I desired that the distinguished gallantry of the corps and the individuals engaged in the batde of the 5th should be well understood by you and the nation. I have ascertained that the enemy had more regular troops engaged in this action than we had, and that his loss exceeds five hundred men.

I feel myself under great obligations to captain Kennedy, of the navy, for his prompt attention to my communications. He has afforded, and is disposed to afford me, all the assistance that is in his power to render."

Sir, *Queenstown, U. C. July 15th*, 1814.

By the general order of the 13th instant, a methodical and detailed report is called for, designating the names of such persons, whether commissioned officers or others, who, in the action of the 5th, contributed in a particular manner to the successful result of that day.

I am not asked for an account of the dispositions made of

the troops under my command, during the action; I will, therefore, confine myself strictly to the general order.

A severe action has been fought, and a signal victory gained. The general order of the 6th instant attributes that victory to the first brigade of infantry, and captain Towson's company of artillery under my command. It was believed at the time, and has since been clearly ascertained, that of the forces engaged, the enemy were greatly superior in numbers. Under such circumstances, victory could not have been obtained, without a very general participation of all ranks and grades in the event.

I have the satisfaction of being assured by every commanding officer (which is confirmed by my own personal observation), that every man, and of every grade in the action, evinced an ability to meet even a greater shock than that encountered, with like success.

The truth of this observation was most conspicuous in the very crisis of the action. Conduct universally good leaves but little room for discrimination. Accordingly, but few names are reported to me by the several commandants of battalion, as entitled to a select mention (in respect to their gallant comrades), and those cases are noticed principally from accidental circumstances of good or bad fortune. As in the instance of captain Ketchum, of the twenty-fifth infantry, whose good fortune it was to be detached with his company, by order of major Jessup, to attack a much superior force, whilst the battalion was engaged with another body of the enemy. Captain Ketchum gallantly sustained himself in the execution of his orders, till the battalion had cleared its own front, in order to march to his support.

The good conduct of captain Harrison, commanded by major Levensworth, and observed by myself, was of another kind. A cannon ball shattered and carried away a part of his leg. The captain preserved a perfect serenity, under the tortures of his wound, and utterly refused any assistance from the ranks, until the enemy should be beaten. So glorious a display of fortitude had the happiest effect.

Of the three battalions of infantry composing the first brigade, the first consisted of the ninth and a detachment of the twenty-second regiment, under the command of major Levenworth. The second battalion (or the eleventh regiment), was gallantly conducted towards its place, in the order of battle, by colonel Campbell, who, being early wounded, was succeeded by major M'Neil. Major Jessup commanded the

twenty-fifth regiment, or the remaining battalion of the brigade. Of these three excellent officers, it would be difficult to say which was the most meritorious, or most conspicuously engaged. The twenty-fifth regiment having been detached to my left, to turn the enemy's right wing, which rested in a wood, major Jessup was less under my personal observation than the other commanders; but I had every evidence of the able dispositions he made of his corps, as well by the report of my aids, as by the effect he produced on that part of the enemy's line immediately opposed to him; and which contributed very much to the general success of the day. Major Jessup had his horse shot under him.

The other two battalions, with an enlarged interval between them, received the enemy in open plain; that under major Levenworth, parallel to the attack; that under major M'Neil, with its left wing thrown forward to take the enemy in front and flank at the same time. Captain Towson, who commenced the fire before the troops were in the order of battle, immediately afterwards advanced to the front of the extreme right with three pieces of light artillery, and took post on the river. Majors Levenworth and M'Neil made prompt dispositions to receive the charge. The fire of these corps (including the artillery) produced a prodigious effect in the enemy's ranks. That of major M'Niel was the most effective, from the oblique position which his corps judiciously occupied. The enemy's batteries were also admirably served; to the fire of which all the corps were exposed; that of major Levenworth more particularly. This cannonade, however, did not prevent the latter from preserving his corps in the most excellent order, at all times prepared to advance or to fire, to give or to receive the charge.

Captain Towson finally silenced the enemy's most effective battery, by blowing up an ammunition waggon, which produced great confusion. Turning next a heavy discharge of cannister on the enemy's infantry, now nearly in contact with our line, advancing to the charge, the enemy could not long sustain this accumulation of fire; he broke, and fled to his strong works behind the Chippewa. All the corps pursued with promptitude.

To mention them in order of their rank (I know of no other in this case), majors Jessup, Levenworth, and M'Neil, and captain Towson, deserve, in my humble opinion, every thing which conspicuous skill and gallantry can win from a grateful country.

I cannot close this account of meritorious conduct, without mentioning the great services rendered me by those two gallant young soldiers, lieutenants Worth and Watts, my aids.

There was no danger they did not cheerfully encounter, in communicating my orders; and by their zeal and intrepidity, won the admiration, as they had before the esteem, of the whole brigade. They both rendered essential service at critical moments, by assisting the commandants of corps in forming the troops, under circumstances which precluded the voice from being heard.

This conduct has been handsomely acknowledged by the officers of the line, who have joined in requesting that it might be particularly noticed.

My brigade-major, lieutenant Smith, rendered me every assistance which his accidental situation on foot permitted; he is entitled to my thanks.

During the action, major Wood, of the engineers, and captain Harris, of the dragoons, whose troop could not act, came up, and very handsomely tendered their services. The latter had his horse shot under him.

It is proper that I should take this opportunity to mention the case of captain Crooker, of the ninth regiment of infantry, in the affair of the 4th of July, on the same ground on which the action of the 5th was fought.

I have already had the honour to mention this case verbally to the commanding general.

It is due to the gallant individual more particularly concerned, that his conduct should be formally noticed.

My brigade constituted the advance of the army. In descending on the left bank of the Niagara, from Fort Erie, we met an advanced corps of the enemy at Black creek, strongly posted behind that stream. Captain Towson, who was with the advance, obliged the enemy to fall back, who, on retreating, took up the bridge over the creek. Captain Crooker, who flanked out to the left of our march, had crossed this stream some distance above the bridge, and was pursuing the enemy, just as the head of the brigade column arrived at the bridge, which could not be passed until the pioneers had replaced the boards which the enemy had hastily removed. Whilst this operation was going on, captain Crooker, immediately within my view, was suddenly enveloped by a troop of the 19th light dragoons, composing a part of the enemy's rear guard. He fought his way to a house, then near to him, turned upon the dragoons, and put them to flight. Captains Hull

and Harrison, and lieutenant Randolph, with a small party, were at the same time marching to the support of captain Crooker, and arrived just as the enemy took to flight. I have witnessed nothing more gallant in partizan war, than was the conduct of captain Crooker and his company.

I am, sir, respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WILLIAM SCOTT,
General 1st brigade.

C. K. Gardner, Adjutant-general.

Agreeably to general orders, I transmit the following report:

At the commencement of the action of the 5th July, captain Towson's company of artillery, with the first brigade, was solely engaged with the enemy; he maintained his position on the right, and kept up a spirited and destructive fire during the charge of the enemy. Amidst the fire and charge of the enemy, the captain and his subalterns, lieutenants Campbell and Schmuck, and lieutenant Randolph, of the infantry, commanding the reserve of the artillery, behaved with the greatest gallantry, and I am proud to say, tended greatly to check the impetuosity of the enemy.

At an early part of the battle, the captain's piece was thrown out of action by a 24-pound shot from the enemy; yet his zeal and exertions were given with his characteristic spirit to the remaining pieces, and he reports handsomely of the conduct and services of his officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

About the time the enemy commenced their charge, and at the moment they broke, captain Ritchie's company of artillery, and one piece (a 12-pounder) of captain Biddle's company of artillery, under lieutenant Hall, participated in the action. The captains, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, conducted themselves as brave and faithful soldiers, and the whole artillery then on the field, pursued, under the fire of the enemy's batteries, with rapidity, and saw them precipitate themselves within their works. At this period of the action two 18-pounders under captain Williams, and the remainder of captain Biddle's artillery, were brought upon the field, but those officers reluctantly quit the ground without being permitted to open a battery upon the enemy's works.

To particularise, if all had been engaged from first to last, would have been invidious; but, in this case, captain Towson and company deserve particular mention. The captain be-

ing so fortunate as to be ordered in advance with his company of artillery only, had an opportunity of shewing his gallantry, and distinguishing himself, officers, and soldiers above others.

With due respect, yours, &c.

J. HINDMAN,
Major, commanding battalion artillery.

C. K. Gardner, Adjutant-general.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

Chippewa, July 10, 1814.

Brigadier-general Porter congratulates the corps under his command, on the successful operations and brilliant achievements of the American army during the past week. The crossing of the Niagara on the 3d, and the surprise and capture of the fort and garrison of Erie, without the loss of a man, afforded the fullest evidence of the talents of the major-general, and was a certain presage of the success which was to follow.

The action of Chippewa, in which the volunteers took so conspicuous a part, will ever be remembered to the honour of the American arms. It was commenced by about 800 Pennsylvania volunteers and Indian warriors, who met about the same number of British militia and Indians, overthrew and drove them behind the main line of the British army, destroying at least 150, and annihilating, it is believed, this description of the enemy's force.

The British regulars were met by general Scott's brigade, and defeated in the most gallant and masterly style, and the whole of the enemy driven across the Chippewa, when they destroyed the bridges and retired to their strong works. Colonel Fenton's regiment of volunteers again distinguished itself by its steadiness and courage in advancing in column and forming a line with the regular troops on the plain, in face of the enemy's batteries, and under a tremendous cannonade. Our loss, though severe, is very trifling compared with that of the enemy, which was 500. We have, however, to regret the loss of lieut. col. Bull, major Galloway, and captain White, of the Pennsylvania volunteers, whose zeal and gallantry in pursuit led them, with others, directly upon the British regular line: exhausted by fatigue, they were made prisoners. We lost also, two distinguished chiefs of the Onondaga and Oneida tribes, who were killed. The New York volunteers did not arrive until the day after the battle; but they have since

given the fullest evidence of their determination to emulate the example set them by the other part of the corps, by their conduct in forcing a passage over the Chippewa, on the eighth instant, and the readiness with which they volunteered in building a bridge under the fire of the enemy's batteries.

In short, the brigadier is satisfied that the whole corps will continue to distinguish itself by its courage and good conduct, and at the close of the campaign deserve and receive the thanks of their country.

By order of brigadier-general P. B. Porter, commanding volunteers.

D. FRASER,
Lieutenant 15th United States Infantry, and volunteer aid-de-camp.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Deputy Adjutant-general's office,
Kingston, 9th July, 1814.

Lieutenant-general Drummond has received a report from major-general Riall, of the enemy having effected a landing in great force on the Niagara frontier, on Sunday the 3d instant.

Having advanced on the 5th for the purpose of attacking major-general Riall, who had taken post at Chippewa (waiting for reinforcements from York), the major-general most gallantly anticipated the enemy, by attacking him in the afternoon of that day, in the position which he had taken up at Street's Creek.

After an action highly creditable to the gallantry and efforts of the handful of troops engaged, viz. the 100th regiment under lieutenant-colonel the marquis of Tweedale, and one wing of the Royal Scots, under lieutenant-colonel Gordon; major-general Riall withdrew his small force to Chippewa, after having sustained a very severe loss in killed and wounded, including a large proportion of officers.

Lieutenant-colonel the marquis of Tweedale, of the 100th regiment, lieutenant-colonel Gordon, of the Royal Scots, and captain Holland, aid-de-camp to major-general Riall, are among the wounded.

Major-general Riall has been reinforced at Chippewa by the King's regiment from York.

(Signed) J. HARVEY,
Lieutenant-colonel and D. A. G.

GENERAL ORDER.

Adjutant-general's office, Head-Quarters, Montreal, 13th July, 1814.

His excellency the governor in chief and commander of the forces, has received from lieutenant-general Drummond the official report of major-general Riall, of the sortie which took place on the 5th instant from the lines of Chippewa.

His excellency derives a proud consolation in the undaunted gallantry and exemplary discipline displayed by the troops in this unequal contest, in which major-general Riall represents lieutenant-colonel Pearson in command of a detachment of light troops; lieutenant-colonel the marquis of Tweedale, 100th regiment; major Evans, eighth or king's regiment; major Risle, 19th light dragoons, and captain Mackonachie, royal artillery, to have afforded the most able support in the zealous and judicious command of their respective corps; and that the zeal and intelligence evinced by his aid-de-camp captain Holland, captain Elliot, deputy assistant quarter-master-general; lieutenant Fox, royals; acting brigade-major and staff-adjutant Greig, merited his approbation; and that the conduct of lieutenant-colonel Dixon, Lincoln militia, was most exemplary.

His excellency laments the loss of so many valuable officers and men, but this sentiment is greatly aggravated by the disappointment and mortification he has experienced in learning that Fort Erie, entrusted to the charge of major Buck, 8th or king's regiment, was surrendered on the evening of the third instant, by capitulation, without having made an adequate defence.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing.

Royal artillery, 1 rank and file killed, 4 rank and file wounded.

Royal artillery drivers, 1 subaltern wounded.

First or Royal Scots, 1 captain, 4 serjeants, 43 rank and file killed; 1 field officer, 2 captains, 7 subalterns, 4 serjeants, 121 rank and file wounded; 30 rank and file missing.

Eighth or king's regiment, 3 rank and file killed; 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, and 22 rank and file wounded.

One hundredth regiment, 2 subalterns, 3 serjeants, 64 rank and file killed; 1 field-officer, 2 captains, 6 subalterns, 11 serjeants, 114 rank and file wounded; 1 subaltern missing.

Militia, 2 captains, 1 subaltern, 9 rank and file killed; 1 field-officer, 3 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 11 rank and file wounded; 1 serjeant, 14 rank and file missing.

Royal 10th light dragoons; 1 serjeant, 5 rank and file wounded.

Officers killed.

Royal Scots, captain Baily.

100th regiment, lieutenant Gibbons, and ensign Rea.

Militia, captains Rowe and Turney, and lieutenant M'Donnell.

Officers wounded.

General staff, captain Holland, aid-de-camp to major-general Riall, severely, not dangerously.

Royal artillery drivers, lieutenant Jack, slightly.

First or Royal Scots, lieutenant-colonel Gordon, slightly; captains Bird and Wilson, severely, and prisoners; lieutenant W. Campbell, severely; lieutenants Fox, Jackson, and Hendrick, severely, but not dangerously; lieutenant M'Donald, slightly; lieutenants A. Campbell and Connell, severely.

Eighth or king's regiment, lieutenant Boyde.

One hundredth regiment, lieutenant-colonel, the marquis of Tweedale, severely, not dangerously; captain Sherrard, do. do.; captain Sleigh, severely; lieutenants Williams, Lyon, and Valentine; lieutenant Fortune, wounded and missing, supposed prisoner; ensigns Clarke and Johnson, and adjutant Hingston.

Militia, lieutenant-colonel Dickson, slightly; lieutenant Clement, severely; lieutenant Bowan, slightly; ensign Kirkpatrick, dangerously.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

FURTHER OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL BROWN.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Porter to General Brown, dated Queenstown Heights, July 16, 1814.

Sir,

In pursuance of your instructions to me, to move round Fort George, interrupt the enemy's communications with the country, and reconnoitre his works, I marched yesterday morning at reveille, accompanied by that excellent officer major Wood of the engineers, with the whole of my brigade, and two pieces of artillery under captain Ritchie of the regular army, by the way of St. David's and Cross Roads to lake Ontario, where we had an opportunity to examine the

northern face of forts Royal and Niagara, about two miles distant. From the lake I returned to the Cross Roads, moved in upon Fort George, drove the enemy's pickets, and formed the brigade upon the plains, in full view and within a mile of the fort. Lieutenant-colonel Wilcocks with his command, captains Hull, Harding, and Freeman, with their companies of New York volunteers, and captain Flemming, with part of our Indian warriors, advanced, under cover of a tuft of woods, within musket-shot of the fort, and afforded major Wood a fair opportunity to examine the woods.

After remaining an hour and a half, and having accomplished the object of the expedition, I returned slowly around the south side of Fort George, and joined general Ripley on the Niagara, and with his brigade returned to camp at nine in the evening.

The enemy fired but a few shots from his batteries, and, with the exception of two or three small parties that were sent out and immediately driven back by our light troops, kept close within his works, until we were retiring, when several pieces of artillery were sent out of the fort, and a brisk fire commenced on our rear.

We lost not a man killed, and but two (both of colonel Swift's regiment) wounded. Lieutenant Fontaine of the artillery, and one of captain Boughton's officers, had their horses killed under them by cannon shot.

But I have to regret the loss of five men of captain Boughton's fine company of New York cavalry made prisoners. They are victims of your own generous policy of suffering the inhabitants who profess neutrality to remain undisturbed. The safety of my brigade required me to place videttes at the several roads leading from Fort George and crossing my line of march at right angles. Five of them were surprised and taken by a party of 15 or 20 militia, who live on the road, but who had secreted themselves in the woods on our approach, and were advised of all our movements and positions by the women who were thronging around us on our march.—Some of these men I am informed have been in our camp professing friendship.

The conduct of every part of my command was such as not only to meet my approbation, but, considering the description of force, to excite my highest admiration. They performed a march of 30 miles, drove in the enemy's pickets, lay for some time under his batteries, retired in good order, and, in every movement of the day, exhibited exam-

ples of order, fortitude, and gallantry, which would have been honourable to the oldest troops.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. B. PORTER,

Brigadier-general, commanding volunteers.

Major-general Jacob Brown, commanding
2d division United States army.

Copies of letters from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated

Head Quarters, Queenstown, July 22d, 1814.

Dear Sir,

On the 20th, the army moved, and encamped in the rear of Fort George. General Scott, with the van, had some skirmishing before the main body came up, but as the enemy kept close to their works, nothing important occurred. No force was left in our rear; the heights were abandoned to the enemy, and we did hope that the movement would have induced him to re-occupy them, or close in nearer to us, so as to bring on an engagement out of his works. In this we were disappointed. The army returned to-day, and found a body of militia and a few regulars in and about the heights. General Porter pursued them with his command and a few regulars, and was so fortunate as to come up with and capture seven officers and ten privates. They will be sent to Greenbush.

Very respectfully and truly yours,

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Head-Quarters, Chippewa, July 25th, 1814.

Dear Sir,

On the 23d instant, I received a letter by express from general Gaines, advising me, that on the 20th the heavy guns that I had ordered from the harbour, to enable me to operate againts forts George and Niagara, were blockaded in that port, together with the rifle regiment that I had ordered with them. I had ordered these guns and troops in boats, provided the commodore should not deem it prudent or proper to convey them in his fleet, not doubting but that he would have been upon the lake for their protection, and that the enemy would have been driven into port or captured. As general Gaines informed me that the commodore was confined to his bed with a fever, and as he did not know when the

fleet would sail, or when the guns and forces that I had been expecting would even leave Sackett's Harbour, I have thought it proper to change my position, with a view to other objects. You know how greatly I am disappointed, and therefore I will not dwell upon that painful subject. And you can best perceive, how much has been lost by the delay, and the command of Lake Ontario being with the enemy; reliances being placed upon a different state of things. The Indians all left me some time since. It is said that they will return, but this you will perceive depends upon circumstances. The reinforcements ordered on from the west have not arrived.

Yours, respectfully and truly,

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE OF BRIDGEWATER.

Copy of a letter from Captain L. Austin, aid to General Brown, to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Buffalo, 29th July, 1814.

I have the honour of addressing you by desire of general Brown, who is now confined by wounds received in a severe and desperate engagement with the enemy, on the afternoon and night of the 25th instant.

Our army had fallen back to Chippewa. The enemy collecting every regiment from Burlington and York, and meeting with no opposition on Lake Ontario, transported by water to Fort George, troops from Kingston, and even from Prescott, which enabled them to bring against us a force vastly superior, under the command of lieutenant-general Drummond and major-general Riall. They were met by us near the Falls of Niagara, where a most severe conflict ensued. The enemy disputed the ground with resolution, yet were driven from every position they attempted to hold. We stormed his batteries directly in front and took possession of all his artillery. Notwithstanding his immense superiority both in numbers and position, he was completely defeated, and our troops remained on the battle ground without interruption. As, however, both general Brown and general Scott had received severe wounds, almost every chief of battalion disabled, and our men quite exhausted, it was thought prudent to retire to our encampment, which was done in good

order, without any molestation from the enemy, our wounded having first been removed.

Major-general Riall, with the aid-de-camp of lieutenant-general Drummond and about twenty other officers, with 200 privates, are taken prisoners.

The loss on both sides is immense, but no account has yet been returned. The aid and brigade-major of general Scott, are both severely wounded, and captain Spencer, and aid of general Brown, most probably dead, having received two balls through his body. Both generals Brown and Scott are on this side confined by their wounds. General Ripley commands on the other.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

L. AUSTIN,
Aid-de-camp.

Hon. Secretary at War, Washington.

P. S.—General Brown received his wounds at the same instant during a late part of the action, but still continued to keep his horse until exhausted by loss of blood. This probably has rendered his wounds more painful than they would otherwise have been.

General Brown's report of the battle of the 25th July, at the Falls of Niagara.

Sir,

Confined as I was, and have been, since the last engagement with the enemy, I fear that the account I am about to give, may be less full and satisfactory, than under other circumstances it might have been made. I particularly fear that the conduct of the gallant men it was my good fortune to lead, will not be noticed in a way due to their fame, and the honour of our country.

You are already apprised that the army had on the 25th ultimo taken a position at Chippewa. About noon of that day, colonel Swift, who was posted at Lewistown, advised me by express, that the enemy appeared in considerable force in Queenstown, and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near Fort Niagara, and that a number of boats were in view, moving up the streight. Within a few minutes after this intelligence had been received, I was further informed by captain Denmon, of the quarter-master's department, that the enemy was landing at Lewistown, and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in

danger of immediate capture. It is proper here to mention, that having received advices as late as the 20th from general Gaines, that our fleet was then in port, and the commodore sick, we ceased to look for co-operation from that quarter, and determined to disencumber ourselves of baggage, and march directly for Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, I fell back upon Chippewa.

As this arrangement, under the increased force of the enemy, left much at hazard on our own side of the Niagara, and as it appeared by the before-stated information, that the enemy was about to avail himself of it, I conceived that the most effectual method of recalling him from this object, was to put myself in motion towards Queenstown. General Scott, with the first brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither, with orders to report if the enemy appeared, and to call for assistance, if that was necessary. On the general's arrival at the falls, he learned that the enemy was in force directly in his front, a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to give this information, he advanced upon them. By the time the assistant adjutant-general (Jones) had delivered his message, the action began, and before the remaining part of the division had crossed the Chippewa, it had become close and general between the advanced corps. Though general Ripley with the second brigade, major Hindman with the corps of artillery, and general Porter at the head of his command, had respectively pressed forward with ardour; it was not less than an hour before they were brought to sustain general Scott, during which time his command most skilfully and gallantly maintained the conflict.

Upon my arrival I found that the general had passed the wood, and engaged the enemy at Queenstown road, and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments, and Towson's artillery. The 25th had been thrown to the right to be governed by circumstances. Apprehending that these corps were much exhausted, and knowing that they had suffered severely, I determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops, and thus disengage general Scott and hold his brigade in reserve. Orders were accordingly given to general Ripley. The enemy's artillery at this moment occupied a hill which gave him great advantages, and was the key of the whole position. It was supported by a line of infantry.

To secure the victory, it was necessary to carry this artillery, and seize the height. This duty was assigned to colonel Miller, while, to favour its execution, the first regiment, under the command of colonel Nicholas, was directed to menace and amuse the infantry. To my great mortification this regiment, after a discharge or two, gave way, and retreated some distance before it could be rallied, though it is believed the officers of the regiment exerted themselves to shorten this distance. In the mean time, colonel Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried the height and the cannon. General Ripley brought up the 23d (which had also faultered) to his support, and the enemy disappeared from before them. The first regiment was now brought into line on the left of the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, general Porter occupying, with his command, the extreme left. About the time colonel Miller carried the enemy's cannon, the 25th regiment, under major Jessup, was engaged in a more obstinate conflict with all that remained to dispute with us the field of battle. The major, as has been alrealy stated, had been ordered by general Scott at the commencement of the action, to take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank; had captured (by a detachment under captain Ketchum) general Riall and sundry other officers, and showed himself again to his own army in a blaze of fire, which defeated or destroyed a very superior force of the enemy. He was ordered to form on the right of the second regiment. The enemy rallying his forces, and, as is believed, having received reinforcements, now attempted to drive us from our position, and regain his artillery. Our line was unshaken, and the enemy repulsed. Two other attempts, having the same object, had the same issue. General Scott was again engaged in repelling the former of these; and the last I saw of him on the field of battle, he was near the head of his column, and giving to its march a direction that would have placed him on the enemy's right. It was with great pleasure I saw the good order and intrepidity of general Porter's volunteers from the moment of their arrival, but during the last charge of the enemy those qualities were conspicuous. Stimulated by the examples set them by their gallant leader, by major Wood, of the Pennsylvania corps, by colonel Dobbin, of New York, and by their officers generally, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy's line, and made all the prisoners which were taken at this point of the action.

Having been for some time wounded, and being a good

deal exhausted by loss of blood, it became my wish to devolve the command on general Scott, and to retire from the field; but on enquiry, I had the misfortune to learn, that he was disabled by wounds; I therefore kept my post, and had the satisfaction to see the enemy's last effort repulsed. I now consigned the command to general Ripley.

While retiring from the field, I saw and felt that the victory was complete on our part, if proper measures were promptly adopted to secure it. The exhaustion of the men, was, however, such as made some refreshment necessary. They particularly required water. I was myself extremely sensible of the want of this necessary article. I therefore believed it proper that general Ripley and the troops should return to camp, after bringing off the dead, the wounded, and the artillery; and in this I saw no difficulty, as the enemy had entirely ceased to act. Within an hour after my arrival in camp I was informed that general Ripley had returned, without annoyance, and in good order. I now sent for him, and, after giving him my reasons for the measure I was about to adopt, ordered him to put the troops into the best possible condition; to give to them the necessary refreshment; to take with him the pickets and camp guards, and every other description of force; to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared. To this order he made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed. I feel most sensibly how inadequate are my powers, in speaking of the troops, to do justice either to their merits or to my own sense of them. Under abler direction, they might have done more and better.

From the preceding detail, you have new evidence of the distinguished gallantry of generals Scott and Porter, of colonel Miller, and major Jessup.

Of the first brigade, the chief, with his aid de-camp Worth, his major of brigade Smith, and every commander of battalion, were wounded.

The second brigade suffered less; but, as a brigade, their conduct entitled them to the applause of their country. After the enemy's strong position had been carried by the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, the 1st and 23d assumed a new character. They could not again be shaken or dismayed. Major M'Farland of the latter fell nobly at the head of his battalion.

Under the command of general Porter, the militia volunteers of Pennsylvania and New York stood undismayed amidst the hottest fire, and repulsed the veterans opposed to

them. The Canadian volunteers, commanded by colonel Wilson, are reported by general Porter as having merited and received his approbation.

The corps of artillery, commanded by major Hindman, behaved with its usual gallantry. Captain Towson's company, attached to the first brigade, was the first and the last engaged, and during the whole conflict maintained that high character which they had previously won by their skill and their valour. Captains Biddle and Ritchie were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit the field. The latter declared that he never would leave his piece; and, true to his engagement, fell by its side, covered with wounds.

The staff of the army had its peculiar merit and distinction. Colonel Gardner, adjutant-general, though ill, was on horseback, and did all in his power; his assistant, major Jones, was very active and useful. My gallant aids-de-camp, Austin and Spencer, had many and critical duties to perform, in the discharge of which the latter fell. I shall ever think of this young man with pride and regret; regret, that his career was terminated so short; pride, that it has been so noble and digtinguished. The engineers, majors M'Ree and Wood, were greatly distinguished on this day, and their high military talents exerted with great effect; they were much under my eye, and near my person, and to their assistance a great deal is fairly to be ascribed. I most earnestly recommend them, as worthy the highest trust and confidence. The staff of generals Ripley and Porter discovered great zeal and attention to duty. Lieutenant E. B. Randolph, of the 20th regiment, is entitled to notice; his courage was conspicuous.

I inclose a return of our loss; those noted as missing may be generally numbered with the dead. The enemy had but little opportunity of making prisoners.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the left division of the army commanded by major-general Brown, in the action of the afternoon and night of the 25th July, 1814, *at the Falls of Niagara.*

Adjutant-general's office, Fort Erie, 30th July, 1814.

General staff—wounded, 1 major-general, 1 aid-de-camp.

Light dragoons—killed, 1 corporal—wounded, 2 privates.

Artillery—killed, 1 captain, 1 corporal, 8 privates—wound-

ed, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 28 privates—missing, 1 private.

First or brigadier-general Scott's brigade.

Brigade staff—wounded, 1 brigadier-general, 1 aid-de-camp, 1 brigade-major.

9th infantry—killed, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 11 privates—wounded, 1 major, 1 quarter-master, 1 paymaster, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 7 serjeants, 5 corporals, 69 privates—missing, 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant-major, 2 serjeants, 11 privates.

11th infantry—killed, 1 captain, 2 serjeants. 4 corporals, 21 privates—wounded, 1 major, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 serjeant-major, 1 chief musician, 7 serjeants, 3 corporals, 1 musician, 82 privates—missing, 1 subaltern, 2 privates.

22d infantry—killed, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 33 privates—wounded, 1 colonel, 2 captains, 4 subalterns, 9 serjeants, 11 corporals, 1 musician, 62 privates—missing, 3 subalterns, 2 serjeants, 12 privates.

25th infantry—killed, 1 captain, 1 subaltern, 26 privates—wounded, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 1 subaltern, 6 serjeants, 6 corporals, 50 privates—missing, 1 serjeant, 2 corporals, 12 privates.

Second or brigadier-general Ripley's brigade.

1st infantry—killed, 11 privates—wounded, 2 subalterns, 18 privates—missing, 1 corporal, 1 private.

21st infantry—killed, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 11 privates—wounded, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 63 privates—missing, 19 privates.

23d infantry—killed, 1 major, 2 serjeants, 7 privates—wounded, 1 captain, 6 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 43 privates—missing, 3 serjeants, 2 corporals, 22 privates.

Brigadier-general Porter's command.

Brigade staff—1 brigade-major missing.

Canadian volunteers—killed, 1 private—wounded, 2 privates—missing, 8 privates.

Pennsylvania volunteers—killed, 1 adjutant, 1 serjeant, 9 privates—wounded, 1 major, 1 quarter-master, 1 subaltern, 21 privates—missing, 1 captain.

New York volunteers—killed, 1 captain, 1 corporal, 2 privates—wounded, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 9 privates—missing, 1 subaltern.

Grand total.

Killed, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 5 captains, 4 subalterns, 10 serjeants, 10 corporals, 140 privates. Total, 171.

Wounded, 1 major-general, 1 brigadier-general, 2 aids-de-camp, 1 brigade-major, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 majors, 1 adjutant, 3 quarter-masters, 1 paymaster, 7 captains, 32 subalterns, 1 serjeant-major, 1 chief musician, 34 serjeants, 29 corporals, 3 musicians, 449 privates. Total, 572.

Missing, 1 brigade-major, 1 captain, 6 subalterns, 1 serjeant-major, 8 serjeants, 5 corporals, 95 privates. Total, 117.

C. K. GARDNER,
Adjutant-general.

Officers killed.

Major M'Farland, 23d infantry.
Captain Ritchie, corps of artillery.
Captain Hull, 9th infantry.
Captain Kinney, 25th infantry.
Captain Goodrich, 11th infantry.
1st lieutenant Bigelow, 21st infantry.
1st lieutenant Turner, 9th infantry.
2d lieutenant Burghard, 9th infantry.
Ensign Hunter, 25th infantry.
Captain Hooper, New York volunteers.
Adjutant Poe, Pennsylvania volunteers.

Officers wounded.

Major-general Brown, severely wounded through the thigh and in the side.

Captain Spencer, aid to the major-general, through the body, supposed to be mortal.

Artillery—Captain Biddle, slightly, shot wounds in the neck and arm.

2d lieutenant Campbell, badly through the leg.

2d lieutenant Schmuck, severely.

First brigade.

Brigadier-general Scott, severely, shoulder fractured and wound in the side.

Lieutenant J. D. Smith, 6th infantry, brigade-major, badly through the leg.

Lieutenant Worth, 23d infantry, aid-de-camp, severely, grape-shot in the thigh.

9th infantry—major Levenworth, slightly, contusion in the side.

Captain W. L. Foster, slightly, in the shoulder.

Lieutenant and paymaster Fowle, slightly, shot in the foot.

Lieutenant and quarter-master Browning, slightly shot in the face.

2d lieutenant Fisher, severely, shot in the head and wrist.

3d lieutenant Cushman, slightly, in the thigh and shoulder.

Ensign G. Jacobs, severely, shot wound in the knee.

Ensign J. P. Jacobs, slightly in the shoulder.

Ensign Blake, slightly, in the knee.

11th infantry—Major M'Neil, severely, canister shot in the thigh.

Captain Bliss, badly, shot in the leg.

1st lieutenant Hale, slightly, shot in the thigh.

2d lieutenant Cooper, slightly, contusion in the breast.

3d lieutenant Stephenson, slightly in the thigh.

Ensign Bedford, slightly, hurt in the abdomen by a splinter.

Ensign Thompson, (26th, doing duty in the 11th) severely, shot wound in the side.

22d infantry—colonel Brady, severely, shot wound in the side and hip.

Captain Pentland, severely wounded, and a prisoner.

Captain Foulk, severely, shot wound in the side.

1st lieutenant Culberston, severely, shot wound in the leg.

1st lieutenant Ferguson, severely, shot in the hand from a canister.

2d lieutenant Armstrong, dangerously, shot wound in the shoulder.

3d lieutenant Bean, slightly, shot in the foot.

25th infantry—major Jessup, severely, shot wounds in the hand and shoulder.

Lieutenant and adjutant Shayler, severely, shot wounds in the arm and side.

Lieutenant and quarter-master M'Glassi, badly, shot wounds in the shoulder.

3d lieutenant Giafford, severely, shot wounds in the hip.

Second Brigade.

1st infantry—1st lieutenant Vasquez, slightly, shot in the thigh, and bayonet in the leg.

1st lieutenant Bissel, slightly, in the leg.

21st infantry—captain Burbank, severely, shoulder fractured.

1st lieutenant Cilley, severely, thigh fractured.

2d lieutenant Fisk (of the 19th attached), slightly, in the breast.

Ensign Jones, slightly, flesh-wound in the wrist.

Ensign Camp, (2d rifle regiment, serving with the regiment attached) flesh-wound in the ancle.

Ensign Thomas, slightly, contusion in the back.

23d infantry—captain Odell, severely, shot wound in the arm.

1st lieutenant H. Whiting, severely, in the neck.

2d lieutenant Ingersol, slightly, in the foot.

2d lieutenant Tappan, slightly, in the head.

3d lieutenant Abeal, slightly, in the leg.

3d lieutenant Deitereich, slightly, in the arm.

3d lieutenant Lamb, severely, in the leg.

Brigadier-general Porter's command.

New-York volunteers—lieutenant-colonel Dobbin, slightly, shot in the breast.

Lieutenant O'Fling, slightly, spent common shot in the shoulder.

Pennsylvania volunteers—major Wood, severely, musket-shots in the arm and foot, and bruised by his horse being shot and falling on him.

Quarter-master Maclay, severely, musket-shots in the head and twice through the leg.

Lieutenant Dick, severely, shot in the hand.

Brigadier-general Porter was slightly wounded, but declined being reported.

Officers missing.

1st lieutenant Perry 9th infantry—a prisoner.

3d lieutenant Webster, 11th infantry, severely shot in the head, and taken prisoner,

Lieutenants Sturgis, Keps and Davidson, 22d infantry, supposed to be killed.

Volunteers, brigade-major Stanton of New York, taken prisoner.

Captain Roberts, of Pennsylvania, taken prisoner.

Lieutenant Hunt, of New York, supposed to be killed.

Inspector-General's office, Head-Quarters, left division, Fort Erie, August 1, 1814.

Return of the prisoners of the enemy, taken in the action of the 25th ultimo, fought at the Niagara Falls, between the left division of the United States army commanded by major-general Brown, and the English forces, under the command of lieutenant-general Drummond.

Prisoners—1 major-general—1 aid-de-camp—1 captain and 2 subalterns of the 103d regiment—1 captain 89th regiment—1 captain provincial dragoons—2 captains and 2 subalterns of incorporated militia—1 captain of militia—1 lieutenant of royal engineers—3 subalterns of Royal Scots—1 subaltern Glengary corps—quarter-master of 8th or king's regiment—quarter-master of 41st regiment—and 150 rank and file.

Recapitulation.

1 major-general.
1 aid to lieutenant-general Drummond.
6 captains.
11 subalterns.
150 rank and file.

Aggreg. 169

Major-general Riall severely wounded in the arm.

AZ. ORNE,
Assistant inspector-general.

Major-general Brown.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Adjutant-General's office,
Head-Quarters, Montreal, 4th August.

The commander of the forces has the highest satisfaction in promulgating to the troops the district general order, issued by lieutenant-general Drummond, after the action which took place on the 25th of last month, near the falls of Niagara. His excellency is desirous of adding to the meed of praise so deservedly bestowed by the lieutenant-general, on the troops, regulars and militia, who had the good fortune to share in this brilliant achievement, the deep sense he entertains of their services, and of the distinguished skill and energetic exertions of lieutenant-general Drummond, in the measures which have terminated in repelling the invaders from his majesty's territories.

The commander of the forces unites with lieutenant-general Drummond, in sincerely lamenting the great loss which the service has sustained by the severe wound received by major-general Riall, and his subsequent untoward capture. It will be a most pleasing part of the duty of the commander of the forces to bring the meritorious services of the right

division of the army of the Canadas, before the gracious consideration of his royal highness the prince regent.

(Signed) EDWD. BAYNES,
Adjutant-general N. A.

DISTRICT GENERAL ORDER.

Head-Quarters, Falls of Niagara, 26th July, 1814.

Lieutenant-general Drummond offers his sincerest and warmest thanks to the troops and militia engaged yesterday, for their exemplary steadiness, gallantry, and discipline in repulsing all the efforts of a numerous and determined enemy to carry the position of Lundy's Lane, near the Falls of Niagara; their exertions have been crowned with complete success, by the defeat of the enemy, and his retreat to the position of Chippewa, with the loss of two of his guns, and an immense number of killed and wounded, and several hundred prisoners. When all have behaved nobly, it is unnecessary to hold up particular instances of merit in corps or individuals. The lieutenant-general cannot, however, refrain from expressing in the strongest manner his admiration of the gallantry and steadiness of the 89th regiment under lieutenant-colonel Morrison, and major Clifford, who ably and gallantly supplied the lieutenant-colonel's place after he was wounded; 41st light company under captain Glew, and detachment of the 8th, or king's regiment, under captain Campbell; and royals acting with them; also a party of incorporated militia, by whom the brunt of the action was for a considerable time sustained, and whose loss has been very severe. To the advance under lieutenant-colonel Pearson, consisting of the Glengary light infantry, under lieutenant-colonel Battersby; a small party of the 104th, under lieutenant-colonel Drummond; the incorporated militia under lieutenant-colonel Robinson, and detachments from the first, second, fourth, and fifth Lincoln militia, and second York, under lieutenant-colonel Pary, 103d, the lieutenant-general offers his warmest thanks They are also due to the troops which arrived under colonel Scott, during the action, viz. the First, or Royal Scots, under lieutenant-colonel Gordon, 8th or king's, under major Evans; 103d regiment under colonel Scott, flank company 104th, with the Norfolk, Oxford, Kent, and Essex rangers, and Middlesex, under lieutenant-colonel Hamilton.

The admirable steadiness and good conduct of the 19th light dragoons under major Lisle, and of the detachment of royal artillery under captain Maclachlan, are entitled to particular praise; the latter officer having been badly wounded,

the command of the artillery devolved to captain Mackonochie, with whose gallantry and exertions lieutenant-general Drummond was highly pleased. Serjeant Austin, who directed the fire of the congreve rockets, deserves very great credit.—To the officers of the general and of his personal staff, to captain Holland, aid-de-camp to major-general Riall, lieutenant-general Drummond feels himself greatly indebted for the assistance they afforded him.

He has to lament being deprived (by a wound early in the action) of the services of major-general Riall, who was most unfortunately made prisoner, while returning from the field, by a party of the enemy's cavalry, who had a momentary possession of the road. Lieutenant-general Drummond has also to regret the wounds which have deprived the corps of the services of lieutenant-colonel Morrison, 80th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel Robertson, of the incorporated militia. In the fall of lieutenant Moorsom, of the 104th regiment, serving as deputy assistant adjutant-general, the service has lost a gallant, intelligent, and meritorious young officer.

The lieutenant-general and president has great pleasure in dismissing to their homes the whole of the sedentary militia, who have so handsomely come forward on the occasion, confident that on any future emergency their loyalty will be again equally conspicuous. He will perform a grateful duty in representing to his majesty's government, the zeal, bravery, and alacrity with which the militia have co-operated with his majesty's troops.

(Signed) J. HARVEY,
Lieutenant-colonel and deputy adjutant general.

NAMES OF OFFICERS KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING.

Officers killed.

General staff—lieutenant Moorsom, 104th regiment, deputy assistant adjutant-general.

1st, or Royal Scots—lieutenant Hemphill.

89th regiment, second battalion—captain Spunner and lieutenant Lathum.

Incorporated militia—ensign Campbell.

Officers wounded.

General staff—lieutenant-general Drummond, severely, not dangerously; major-general Riall, do. and prisoner; lieute-

nant-colonel Pearson, slightly; lieutenant Le Breton, severely.

Royal artillery—captain Maclachlan, dangerously.

1st, or Royal Scots—captain Brereton, slightly; lieutenant Haswell, severely, not dangerously; lieutenant D. Fraser, do. do. missing.

1st battalion 8th, or king's—lieutenant Noel and ensign Swayne, slightly; ensign M'Donald, severely.

89th regiment—lieutenant-colonel Morrison, lieutenants Sanderson, Steel, Pierce, Taylor, Lloyd, and Miles, severely, not dangerously; lieutenant Redman, and adjutant Hopper, slightly; lieutenant Grey and ensign Sanders, dangerously.

103d regiment—lieutenant Langhorne, slightly.

Glengary light infantry—lieutenant R. Kerr, slightly.

Incorporated militia—lieutenant-colonel Robinson, dangerously; captain Fraser, severely; captain Washburn, slightly; captain M'Donald, severely, left arm amputated; lieutenant M'Dougall, mortally; lieutenant Ratan and ensign M'Donald, severely; lieutenant Hamilton, slightly.

Second Lincoln militia—adjutant Thompson, slightly.

Fourth do. do.—captain H. Nellis and ensign Kennedy, slightly.

Fifth do. do.—major Hatt, severely.

Second York militia—major Simons, severely; captain M'Kay, slightly; captain Rockman, lieutenants Orrfield and Smith, severely.

Officers missing.

Royal engineers—lieutenant Yale.

1st, or Royal Scots—lieutenants Clyne and Lamont, supposed to be prisoners.

8th, or king's regiment—quarter-master Kirman.

4th Lincoln militia—captain H. Nellis and quarter-master Bell.

Officers prisoners.

General staff—captain Loring, aid-de-camp to general Drummond.

89th regiment,—captain Gore.

103d regiment—captain Brown; lieutenant Montgomery, and wounded; ensign Lynai.

Glengary light infantry—ensign Robin.

Incorporated militia—captain Mac Lean, ensign Wharf, and quarter-master Thompson.

Provincial light dragoons—captain Merritt.

Total—including officers.

Killed, - - - -	84
Wounded - - -	559
Missing, - - - -	193
Prisoners, - - -	41
Grand total, - -	878

In consequence of the great use made by the enemy of buck-shot, many of the wounds have proved slight.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general.

ATTACK UPON BUFFALO.

Extracts of letters from Brigadier-General Gaines, to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, Upper Canada, August 7, 1814.

"I arrived at this post on the fourth instant, and assumed the command—the army is in good spirits, and more healthy than I could have expected.

"The British army under lieutenant-general Drummond is strongly posted opposite to Black Rock, two miles east of this fort; a skirt of thick wood separates us.

"I yesterday endeavoured to draw him out, to see him and try his strength—for this purpose I sent the rifle corps through the intervening woods with orders to amuse the enemy's light troops, until his strong columns should get in motion, and then to retire slowly to the plain on this side the woods, where I had a strong line posted in readiness to receive the enemy; our riflemen met and drove the enemy's light troops into their lines, where they remained, although the riflemen kept the woods near two hours, and until they were ordered in. They returned without being able to draw any part of the enemy's force after them.

"Major Morgan reports that his officers and men acted with their usual gallantry. The enemy left 11 dead and three prisoners in our hands, and I am informed by two persons just from the British camp, that their loss was much more considerable—among their killed were five Indians. We lost five killed and some three or four wounded.

"General Drummond's force, from the best information we are able to collect from deserters and others, amounts to

upwards of 4000, principally regulars; De Watteville's regiment has joined since the battle of the 25th ultimo, together with two or three companies of the Glengary corps—making a total joined since the 25th, of about 1200."

"*August* 11, 1814, 9 *P. M.*

"The enemy's position remains unchanged; they have constructed two batteries with two embrasures each, and have erected a wooden breastwork 1200 to 1400 yards in our rear. In examining their works yesterday, captain Birdsel, of the fourth rifle regiment, with a detachment of the first and his company, amounting in the whole to 160 men, beat in two of their strong pickets with a loss on their part of ten killed—captain Birdsel had one killed and three wounded.

"General Drummond was much disappointed and chagrined at the failure of the enterprise of the third instant, against Buffalo—our riflemen having opposed and beaten them. Colonel Tucker, it seems, has been publicly reprimanded in general orders."

Report of Major Morgan.

Sir, *Fort Erie, August 5*, 1814.

Having been stationed with the first battalion of the first regiment of riflemen at Black Rock, on the second instant, I observed the British army moving up the river on the opposite shore, and suspected they might make a feint on Fort Erie, with an intention of a real attack on the Buffalo side. I immediately moved and took a position on the upper side of Conjocta creek, and that night threw up a battery of some logs, which I found on the ground, and had the bridge torn away.

About 2 o'clock the next morning, my pickets from below gave me information of the landing of nine boats full of troops, half a mile below. I immediately got my men (240 in number) to their quarters, and patiently waited their approach. At a quarter past four they advanced upon us, and commenced the attack; sending a party before to repair the bridge, under the cover of their fire. When they had got at good rifle distance, I opened a heavy fire on them, which laid a number of them on the ground, and compelled them to retire. They then formed in the skirts of the wood, and kept up the fight at long shot, continually reinforcing from the Canada shore, until they had 23 boat loads, and then attempted to flank us, by sending a large body up the creek to ford it,

when I detached lieutenants Ryan, Smith, and Armstrong, with about 60 men, to oppose their left wing, where they were again repulsed with considerable loss—after which they appeared disposed to give up their object, and retreated by throwing six boat loads of troops on Squaw Island, which enfiladed the creek, and prevented me from harrassing their rear. Their superior numbers enabled them to take their killed and wounded off the field, which we plainly saw, and observed they suffered severely. We found some of their dead thrown into the river, and covered with logs and stones, and some on the field. We also collected a number of muskets and accoutrements, with clothing that appeared to have been torn to bind their wounds. We took six prisoners, who stated the British force opposed to us, to consist of from 12 to 1500 men, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Tucker, of the 41st regiment. They also state that their object was to re-capture general Riall, with the other British prisoners, and destroy the public stores deposited at Buffalo. The action continued about two hours and a half. I am happy to state they were completely foiled in their attempts. Our loss is trifling compared with theirs—we had two killed and eight wounded. I am sorry to inform you that captain Hamilton, lieutenants Wadsworth and M'Intosh, are among the latter. Their gallantry in exposing themselves to encourage their men, I think entitles them to the notice of their country. My whole command behaved in a manner that merited my warmest approbation; and, in justice to them, I cannot avoid mentioning the names of the officers, which are as follows:—captain Hamilton, lieutenants Wadsworth, Ryan, Calhoun, M'Intosh, Arnold, Shortridge, M'Farland, Tipton, Armstrong, Smith, Cobbs, Davidson, and Austin, with ensign Page.

If, sir, you believe we have done our duty, we shall feel highly gratified.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant;

L. MORGAN,
Major, first rifle regiment.

Major-general Brown.

Recapitulation of our killed and wounded.

	Capt.	Sub.	Rank and file.
Wounded,	1	2	5
Killed,			2
	1	2	7
Aggregate			10

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE STORMING OF FORT ERIE.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, Upper Canada, August 15, 1814, 7 *A. M.*

Dear Sir,

My heart is gladdened with gratitude to heaven and joy to my country, to have it in my power to inform you that the gallant army under my command has this morning beaten the enemy commanded by lieutenant-general Drummond, after a severe conflict of near three hours, commencing at two o'clock, A. M. They attacked us on each flank, got possession of the salient bastion of the old Fort Erie, which was regained at the point of the bayonet, with a dreadful slaughter.

The enemy's loss in killed and prisoners is about 600—near 300 killed. Our loss is considerable, but I think not one tenth as great as that of the enemy. I will not detain the express to give you the particulars. I am preparing my force to follow up the blow.

With great respect and esteem, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES,
Brigadier-general, commanding.

Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Copies of letters from Brigadier-General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, Upper Canada, August 23, 1814.

Sir,

Loss of sleep and constant exposure to the weather in its various changes, gave me some days ago a violent cold, which has put it out of my power to do any thing more than the state of the service here rendered absolutely indispensable. Hence my apology for delaying until this day my report of the battle of the 15th instant.

General Drummond is quietly engaged in collecting his reinforcements. His camp appears to be fortified. I attempted to look at it a few days past, and it cost me a fine young officer, lieutenant Yates of the fourth rifle regiment, killed, and lieutenant Kearsley of that excellent corps, with lieutenant Childs of the ninth, wounded, with the loss of some two or three privates killed, and five or six wounded. The loss of the enemy I was unable to ascertain. He would not leave his defences, and I did not think fit to leave mine at all exposed,

Several deserters say that the sixth and 82d regiments arrived last night. Their colonel, Scott, is dead; about 20 deserters from the De Watteville regiment, and some few from other corps, concur in the report that the loss in killed, wounded, and missing, on the 15th, was upwards of a thousand.

Your obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES,

Brigadier-general, commanding.

General Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Head-Quarters, left wing, second division,

Sir, *Fort Erie, Upper Canada, August* , 1814.

I have the honour to communicate, for the information of the department of war, the particulars of the battle fought at this place on the 15th instant, between the left wing of the second division of the northern army, under my command, and the British forces in the peninsula of Upper Canada, commanded by lieutenant-general Drummond, which terminated in a signal victory in favour of the United American arms.

Our position on the margin of the lake at the entrance of the Niagara river, being nearly a horizontal plain, 12 or 15 feet above the surface of the water, possessing few natural advantages, had been strengthened in front by temporary parapet breast-works, entrenchments, and abattis, with two batteries and six field-pieces. The small unfinished Fort Erie, with a 24, 18, and 12-pounder, forms the north-east, and the Douglass battery, with an 18 and 6-pounder near the edge of the lake, the south-east angle of our right.—The left is defended by a redoubt battery, with six field-pieces, just thrown up on a small ridge. Our rear was left open to the lake, bordered by a rocky shore of easy ascent. The battery on the left was defended by captain Towson; Fort Erie by captain Williams, with major Trimble's command of the 19th infantry; the batteries on the front by captains Biddle and Fanning; the whole of the artillery commanded by major Hindman. Parts of the 11th, 9th, and 22d infantry (of the late veteran brigade of major-general Scott), were posted on the right under the command of lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall. General Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 21st and 23d, defended the left; general Porter's brigade of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, with our distinguished riflemen, occupied the centre.

I have heretofore omitted stating to you, that during the 13th and 14th, the enemy had kept up a brisk cannonade, which was sharply returned from our batteries, without any considerable loss on our part. At 6 P. M. one of their shells lodged in a small magazine in Fort Erie, which was fortunately almost empty. It blew up with an explosion more awful in appearance than injurious in its effects, as it did not disable a man or derange a gun. It occasioned but a momentary cessation of the thunders of the artillery on both sides; it was followed by a loud and joyous shout by the British army, which was instantly returned on our part, and captain Williams, amidst the smoke of the explosion, renewed the contest by an animated roar of his heavy cannon.

From the supposed loss of our ammunition, and the consequent depression such an event was likely to produce upon the minds of our men, I felt persuaded that this explosion would lead the enemy to assault, and made my arrangements accordingly. The annexed paper, No. 1, is a copy of lieutenant-general Drummond's order and plan of attack.

The night was dark and the early part of it raining, but the faithful sentinel slept not—one-third of the troops were up at their posts. At half past two o'clock the right column of the enemy approached, and though enveloped in darkness black as his designs and principles†, was distinctly heard on our left, and promptly marked by our musketry under major Wood, and cannon under captain Towson. Being mounted at the moment, I repaired to the point of attack, where the sheet of fire rolling from Towson's battery, and the musketry of the left wing of the 25th infantry under major Wood, enabled me to see the enemy's column of about 1500 men approaching on that point; his advance was not checked until it had approached within ten feet of our infantry. A line of loose brush representing an abattis only intervened; a column of the enemy attempted to pass round the abattis through the water where it was nearly breast deep. Apprehending that this point would be carried, I ordered a detachment of riflemen and infantry to its support, but having met with the gallant commander major Wood, was assured by him that he could defend his position without reinforcements. At this moment the enemy were repulsed, but instantly renewed the charge, and were again repulsed. My attention was now called to the right, where our batteries and lines were soon light-

† I several times heard, and many of our officers heard, orders given "to give the damned Yankee rascals no quarter."

ed by a most brilliant fire of cannon and musketry; it announced the approach of the centre and left columns of the enemy, under colonels Drummond and Scott; the latter was received by the veteran ninth, under the command of captain Foster, and captains Boughton and Harding's companies of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, aided by a six-pounder judiciously posted by major M'Kee, chief engineer, who was most active and useful at this point—they were repulsed. That of the centre, led by colonel Drummond, was not long kept in check; it approached at once every assailable point of the fort, and with scaling ladders ascended the parapet, but was repulsed with dreadful carnage. The assault was twice repeated, and as often checked, but the enemy having moved round in the ditch, covered by darkness added to the heavy cloud of smoke which had rolled from our cannon and musketry, enveloping surrounding objects, repeated the charge, re-ascended the ladders; their pikes, bayonets, and spears fell upon our gallant artillerists. The gallant spirits of our favourite captain Williams and lieutenants M'Donough and Watmough, with their brave men, were overcome. The two former and several of their men received deadly wounds. Our bastion was lost. Lieutenant M'Donough being severely wounded, demanded quarter. It was refused by colonel Drummond. The lieutenant then seized a handspike, and nobly defended himself until he was shot down with a pistol by the monster who had refused him quarter, who often reiterated the order—"give the damned Yankees no quarter." This officer, whose bravery, if it had been seasoned with virtue, would have entitled him to the admiration of every soldier—this hardened murderer soon met his fate. He was shot through the breast by of the regiment, while repeating the order to "give no quarter."

The battle now raged with increased fury on the right, but on the left the enemy was repulsed and put to flight. Thence and from the centre I ordered reinforcements. They were promptly sent by brigadier-general Ripley, and brigadier-general Porter. Captain Fanning, of the corps of artillery, kept up a spirited and destructive fire with his field-pieces on the enemy attempting to approach the fort. Major Hindman's gallant efforts, aided by major Trimble, having failed to drive the enemy from the bastion with the remaining artillerists and infantry in the fort, captain Birdsall of fourth rifle regiment, with a detachment of riflemen, gallantly rushed in through the gateway to their assistance, and with some infantry charged the enemy; but was repulsed, and the captain

severely wounded. A detachment from the 11th, 19th, and 22d infantry, under captain Foster of the 11th, were introduced over the interior bastion, for the purpose of charging the enemy. Major Hall, assistant inspector-general, very handsomely tendered his services to lead the charge. The charge was gallantly made by captain Foster and major Hall, but owing to the narrowness of the passage up to the bastion, admitting only two or three men a-breast, it failed. It was often repeated, and as often checked. The enemy's force in the bastion was, however, much cut to pieces and diminished by our artillery and small arms. At this moment every operation was arrested by the explosion of some cartridges deposited in the end of the stone building adjoining the contested bastion. The explosion was tremendous—it was decisive: the bastion was restored. At this moment captain Biddle was ordered to have a field-piece posted so as to enfilade the exterior plain and salient glacis. The captain, though not recovered from a severe contusion in the shoulder, received from one of the enemy's shells, promptly took his position, and served his field-piece with vivacity and effect. Captain Fanning's battery likewise played upon them at this time with great effect. The enemy were in a few moments entirely defeated, taken, or put to flight, leaving on the field 221 killed, 174 wounded, and 186 prisoners, including 14 officers killed and seven wounded and prisoners. A large portion are so severely wounded, that they cannot survive; the slightly wounded, it is presumed, were carried off.

To brigadier-general Ripley much credit is due, for the judicious disposition of the left wing previous to the action, and for the steady disciplined courage manifested by him and his immediate command, and for the promptness with which he complied with my orders for reinforcement during the action. Brigadier-general Porter, commanding the New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, manifested a degree of vigilance and judgment in his preparatory arrangements, as well as military skill and courage in action, which proves him to be worthy of the confidence of his country and the brave volunteers who fought under him. Of the volunteers, captains Boughton and Harding, with their detachments, posted on the right and attached to the line, commanded by captain E. Foster of the veteran ninth infantry, handsomely contributed to the repulse of the left column of the enemy under colonel Scott.

The judicious preparations and steady conduct of lieute-

nant-colonel Aspinwall, commanding the first brigade, merit approbation.

To major M'Kee, chief engineer, the greatest credit is due for the excellent arrangement and skilful execution of his plans for fortifying and defending the right, and for his correct and seasonable suggestions to regain the bastion. Major Wood, of the engineers, also greatly contributed to the previous measures of defence. He had accepted the command of a regiment of infantry (the 21st), for which he has often proved himself well qualified, but never so conspicuously as on this occasion.

Towson's battery emitted a constant sheet of fire. Wood's small arms lighted up the space, and repulsed five terrible charges made between the battery and the lake. Brigadier-general Ripley speaks in high terms of the officers and men engaged, particularly captains Marston and Ropes; lieutenants Riddle (of the 15th, doing duty with the 21st) and Hall; ensigns Benn, Jones, Cummings, and Thomas of the 21st, and Keally and Green of the 19th.

Major Hindman, and the whole of the artillery under the command of that excellent officer, displayed a degree of gallantry and good conduct not to be surpassed. The particular situation of captain Towson, and the much-lamented captain Williams and lieutenant M'Donough, and that of lieutenant Watmough, as already described, with their respective commands, rendered them most conspicuous. The courage and good conduct of lieutenant Zantzinger and lieutenant Chiles, is spoken of in the highest terms by major Hindman and captain Towson, as also that of serjeant-major Denhon. Captains Biddle and Fanning, on the centre and right of their entrenchments, threw their shot to the right, left, and front, and annoyed the Indians and light troops of the enemy approaching from the woods. Lieutenant Fontaine, in his zeal to meet the enemy, was unfortunately wounded and made prisoner. Lieutenant Bird was active and useful, and in fact every individual of the corps did their duty.

The detachment of Scott's gallant brigade, consisting of parts of the 9th, 11th, and 22d infantry, did its duty in a manner worthy the high reputation the brigade had acquired at Chippewa and at the falls of the Niagara. The 9th, under the command of captain Edmund Foster, was actively engaged against the left of the enemy, and with the aid of lieutenant Douglass's corps of bombardiers, commanding the water battery, and of that of the volunteers, under captains Bough-

ton and Harding, effected their repulse. The good conduct of lieutenants Childs, Cushman, and Foot, and ensign Blake, deserves commendation.

The officers killed are captain Williams and lieutenant M'Donough of the artillery; wounded, lieutenant Watmough of the artillery; ensign Cisna 19th; lieutenant Bushnell 21st; lieutenants Brown and Belknap 23d; and captain Birdsall, 4th rifle regiment, all severely.

Lieutenant Fontaine of the artillery, who was taken prisoner, writes from the British camp, that he fortunately fell into the hands of the Indians, who, after taking his money, treated him kindly. It would seem, then, that these savages had not joined in the resolution to give no quarter.

To major Jones, assistant adjutant-general, and major Hall, assistant inspector-general; captain Harris, of the dragoons, volunteer aid-de-camp; lieutenant Belton, aid-de-camp, much credit is due for their constant vigilance and strict attention to every duty previous to the action, and the steady courage, zeal, and activity which they manifested during the action.

The surgeons, Drs. Fuller, 23d, Troubridge, 21st, with their mates; doctors Gale, of the 23d, and Everitt and Allen, of the 21st, deserve the warmest approbation, for their indefatigable exertions and humane attention to the wounded of our army, as well as to the prisoners who fell into their hands.

I have the honour to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES,
Brigadier-general, commanding.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War, Washington.

Report of the killed, wounded, and prisoners, taken at the battle of Erie, Upper Canada, August 15, 1814.

Killed, left on the field, 222—wounded, left on the field, 174—prisoners, 186—grand total 582.

Two hundred supposed to be killed on the left flank near Snake Hill (in the water), and permitted to float down the Niagara. The number on the right flank near the woods could not be ascertained.

Given at the inspector-general's office, Fort Erie, Upper Canada.

NATHANIEL N. HALL,
Assistant inspector-general.

Brigadier-general E. P. Gaines, &c.

Official report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the left division of the United States army, commanded by brigadier-general Gaines, in the action of the 15th August, 1814, at Fort Erie, Upper Canada.

Adjutant-general's Office, Fort Erie, Aug. 14th, 1814.

Corps of bombardiers.

Killed, 1 private.

Artillery.

Killed, 1 captain, 1 subaltern, 2 privates—wounded severely, 1 lieutenant, 3 privates—slightly, 6 privates—missing, 1 lieutenant, 3 privates.

1st brigade.

9th regiment—slightly wounded, 1 private.

11th regiment—killed, 3 privates—wounded dangerously, 1 serjeant, 1 private—severely, 4 privates—slightly, 4 privates—missing, 1 private.

19th regiment—killed, 5 privates—wounded dangerously, 1 subaltern—severely, 1 serjeant, 4 privates—slightly, 1 corporal, 8 privates*.

22d regiment—killed, 2 privates—wounded severely, 5 privates.

2d brigade.

21st regiment—killed, 2 privates—wounded severely, 1 subaltern, 3 privates—slightly, 3 privates—missing, 3 privates.

23d regiment—wounded severely, 2 subalterns, 1 private—slightly, 3 privates—missing, 2 privates.

1st and 4th rifle corps.

Wounded severely, 1 captain, 1 private—missing, 1 private.

Grand total—1 captain, 1 subaltern, 15 privates, killed.
1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 1 private, dangerously wounded.
1 captain, 4 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 21 privates, severely wounded.
1 corporal, 25 privates, slightly wounded.
1 lieutenant, 10 privates, missing.

Names of officers.

Artillery—captain Williams, and lieutenant M'Donough, killed, defending the bastion.

* This regiment was stationed in the fort.

Lieutenant Watmough, wounded severely.

Lieutenant Fountain, missing, thrown from the bastion.

Infantry--19th regiment, ensign Cissua, dangerously, in defence of the fort.

19th regiment—lieutenant Bushnell, severely, do.

23d regiment—lieutenant Brown, do. do.

Do. lieutenant Belknap, do. in defending the picket guard which he commanded.

4th rifle regiment—captain Birdsal, accidentally wounded, whilst defending the fort, by one of his own soldiers.

Report of the killed and wounded of the left division of the United States army, commanded by brigadier-general Gaines, during the cannonading and bombardment, commencing at sun-rise on the morning of the 13th instant, and continuing without intermission till 8 o'clock, P. M., recommenced on the 14th at day-light, with increased warmth, and ending one hour before the commencement of the action at Erie, on the morning of the 15th.

Adjutant-general's office, August 15th, 1814.

Corps of artillery.

Wounded severely, 2 privates--slightly, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 3 privates.

11th regiment--wounded severely, 2 serjeants, 2 privates; slightly, 3 privates.

19th regiment--wounded severely, 1 subaltern.

21st regiment—killed, 4 privates--wounded severely, 3 privates—slightly, 2 privates.

22d regiment—killed, 1 serjeant—wounded severely, 2 corporals, 2 privates--slightly, 3 privates.

23d regiment—killed, 1 private—wounded severely, 1 private.

Rifle regiments, 1st and 4th.

Killed, 1 corporal, 2 privates—wounded severely, 3 privates—slightly, 1 private.

Grand total—1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 7 privates, killed.

1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 2 corporals, 14 privates, severely wounded.

1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 12 privates, slightly wounded.

Officers wounded.

Artillery--captain Biddle, lieutenant Zantzinger, adjutant-lieutenant Watmough.

Infantry—lieutenant Patterson, 19th regiment.

Killed—George Carryl, 25th infantry, orderly to general Gaines.

ROGER JONES,
Assistant adjutant-general.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Gaines to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Erie, Upper Canada, August 26, 1814.

Sir,

In my report of the battle of the 15th instant, I inadvertently omitted the names of captain Chunn of the 19th, and lieutenants Bowman and Larned of the 21st, and lieutenant Jewitt of the 11th infantry, as also my brigade-major, lieutenant Gleason; each of whom bore a conspicuous part in the action, and whom I beg leave to recommend to your notice. Lieutenants Bowman and Larned commanded companies in the 21st, which so gallantly beat the enemy's right column. Captain Chunn, with his company, was doing duty with the same regiment. I also omitted mentioning that part of this regiment pursued the enemy's right upwards of a mile, and took nearly 100 prisoners—his left was likewise pursued, and more than an hundred prisoners taken beyond our works. These facts prove that the affair was not merely a defence of our position, or a mere repulse of the enemy, as I find it called by some. As regards myself, I am satisfied with the result, and am not disposed to make any difficulty about the name by which the affair may be called; but it is due to the brave men I have the honour to command, that I should say, that the affair was to the enemy a sore beating and a defeat, and it was to us a handsome victory.

Our position is growing stronger every day by the exertions of majors M'Rea and Wood, and the officers and men generally. We keep up a smart cannonade. One of the enemy's pickets yesterday approached nearer to ours than usual. Major Brooks, officer of the day, added 100 men to our picket, attacked and drove them in with considerable loss; the major brought in about 30 muskets. In this affair, however, we have to lament the loss of another gallant officer, captain Wattles, of the 23d; our loss was otherwise inconsiderable.

I have the honour to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES,
Brigadier-general, commanding.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Report of General Ripley.

Brigadier-general Gaines—Sir,

I take the liberty of reporting to you the course of operations on the left flank of the camp, during the action of the 15th instant.

From indications satisfactory to me, I was persuaded very early of the enemy's design of attacking us in our position. Before any alarm, I caused my brigade to occupy their alarm-posts. On the first fire of the picket, captain Towson opened his artillery upon them from Fort Williams, in a style which does him infinite credit; it was continued with very great effect upon the enemy during the whole action.

The enemy advanced with fixed bayonets, and attempted to enter our works between the fort and water. They brought ladders for the purpose of scaling, and in order to prevent their troops from resorting to any other course excepting the bayonet, had caused all the flints to be taken from their muskets. The column that approached in this direction consisted of and amounting in number to at least 1500 men—and according to the representation of prisoners they were 2000 strong. The companies posted at the point of the works which they attempted to escalade, were captain Ross's, captain Marston's, lieutenant Bowman's, and lieutenant Larned's, of the 21st regiment, not exceeding 250 men, under command of major Wood, of the engineer corps. On the enemy's approach they opened their musketry upon them in a manner the most powerful. Fort Williams and this little band emitted one broad unin· rrupted sheet of light—the enemy were repulsed. They rallied, came on a second time to the charge, and a party waded round our line by the lake, and came in on the flank—but a reserve of two companies, posted in the commencement of the action to support this point, marched up and fired upon the party—they were all killed or taken. Five times in this manner did the enemy advance to the charge—five times were their columns beaten back in the utmost confusion by a force one-sixth of their numbers; till at length, finding the contest unavailing, they retired. At this point we made 147 prisoners.

During the contest in this quarter, the lines of the whole left wing were perfectly lined, in addition to the reserves; and I found myself able to detach three companies of the 23d regiment from the left, to reinforce the troops at Fort Erie, viz. captain Wattles's, lieutenant Cantine's, and lieutenant Brown's companies—and one of the 17th, under captain Chunn. They were in the fort during the time of the

explosion, and their conduct is highly spoken of by major Brooke, their commanding officer. Indeed, from the high state to which that regiment has been brought by major Brooke, I am convinced that no troops will behave better.

In submitting to your view the conduct of the troops under my command on this occasion, I find every thing to applaud, and nothing to reprehend. The utmost coolness and subordination was manifested both by the 21st and 23d regiments. To major Wood I feel particularly indebted. This officer's merits are so well known, that approbation can scarcely add to his reputation. He has the merit, with his Spartan band, in connexion with captain Towson's artillery, of defeating a vaunting foe of six times his force. Major Brooke did every thing in his power; and it affords me pleasure at all times to call the attention of the general commanding to this amiable and accomplished officer.

The officers commanding companies immediately engaged, have my highest commendations—their conduct was most judicious and gallant. I cannot refrain from adverting to the manner in which captain Towson's artillery was served—I have never seen it equalled. This officer has so often distinguished himself, that to say simply that he is in action, is a volume of eulogium—the army, only to be informed he is there, by a spontaneous assent, are at once satisfied that he has performed well his part. I have no idea that there is an artillery officer in any service superior to him in the knowledge and performance of his duty.

The officers I have mentioned as commanding companies of the 21st and 23d regiments, are particularly commended by their commanding officers. Captain Marston, a most valuable officer, commanded a first line of three companies opposed to the enemy's column. Captain Ropes commanded the companies of reserve. Major Wood reports in the highest terms of the good conduct of the subalterns. Lieutenant Riddle of the 15th, attached to the 21st, and Hall, and ensign Bean, Jones, Cumming, and Thomas of the 19th; as being extremely active, and performing their duties with alacrity.

The manner in which lieutenant Belknap, of the 23d, retired with his picket guard from before the enemy's column, excites my particular commendation. He gave orders to fire three times as he was retreating to camp, himself bringing up the rear. In this gallant manner, he kept the light advance of the enemy in check, for a distance of two or three hundred yards. I have to regret, that when entering our lines

after his troops, the enemy pushed so close upon him that he received a severe wound from a bayonet.

Lieutenants Bushnel and Cissney, of the 19th, whilst gallantly engaged with the enemy at Fort Erie, were both severely, if not mortally wounded. Their conduct merits the warmest approbation.

Permit me to recommend to your notice, the good conduct of my staff, lieutenant Kirby, of the corps of artillery, my aid-de-camp, and lieutenant Holding, acting brigade-major; their activity and zeal was entirely to my satisfaction.

I close this long report, with stating to you in the highest terms of approbation, the skilfulness exhibited by doctor Fuller, surgeon of the 23d, and doctors Trowbridge, surgeon of the 21st infantry, with their mates, doctor Gale, of the 23d, and doctors Everett and Allen, of the 21st, their active, humane, and judicious treatment of the wounded, both of the enemy and of our own, together with their steady and constant attention to the duties of their station, must have attracted your personal observation, and I am confident, will receive your approbation.

I have the honour to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed) EL. W. RIPLEY,

Brigadier-general, commanding 2d brigade.

Fort Erie, Upper Canada, August 17th, 1814.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Adjutant-general's office, Fort Erie, September 2d, 1814.

Major-general Brown resumes the command of the troops on the Niagara frontier.

The major-general recurs with proud satisfaction to the conduct of his division, since the opening of the campaign. It was opened in the defence of the munitions of war destined for the navy, which were embarked at Oswego, when the enemy was in force on the lake, landed at Sandy creek, and transported to Sackett's Harbour. Oswego displays the discipline and prowess of a single battalion of artillery, led by colonel Mitchell; and Sandy Creek gives name to the gallant achievement of the 1st riflemen under lieutenant-colonel Appling.

The bravery alone, of American soldiers, has often shown them superior to their British adversaries; but on the plains of Chippewa, bravery and discipline both rise pre-eminent, and triumph over the enemy's best troops, led on in the ablest manner. There the brigade of major-general Scott, fought

British veterans, battalion against battalion, and the smallest in numbers conquered. Victory crowned the American arms.

At the Falls of Niagara, our brave soldiers met a severer trial; they rose superior to the test, and proved their intrepidity equal to any exigence. They engaged the whole force of the enemy, and again conquered a larger than their own. The victory was ours; the trophies of victory only were not accomplished. The enemy had relinquished the contest and the field to our superiority.

The glorious defeat of an important expedition of the enemy, on our own shore, is again accomplished by the first rifle regiment, on its arrival at this frontier, under the late distinguished major Morgan.

Another trial was left for the brave spirits who compose the American force in Canada. An endurance of fatigue was shown with unexampled cheerfulness, on the works around their camp at Fort Erie, and a new test of military prowess was called for, to complete the glorious character of the division. They were called to receive the attack of heavy columns of the enemy, on their lines of entrenchment, and the signal manner in which they acquitted themselves, as well as the vigilance of their brave and finished commander brigadier-general Gaines, is established by the brilliant victory acquired on the 15th of August. The discomfiture of the forces under lieutenant-general Drummond, was attended with a disparity of loss, unexampled in the record of battles.

By order of major-general Brown.

C. K. GARDNER,
Adjutant-general.

GENERAL ORDER.

Head-Quarters, Montreal, August 25th, 1814.

In promulgating to the troops an extract from a district general order issued by lieutenant-general Drummond to the right division of this army, in consequence of the capture of two of the enemy's schooners, co-operating in the defence of the enemy's position at Fort Erie, the commander of the forces avails himself of the opportunity it presents, to acknowledge the high sense he entertains of the valuable services rendered to the right division by captain Dobbs of the royal navy, and the officers and seamen of the vessels placed under command for that purpose, by commodore sir James Yeo.

This event, so ably planned and so gallantly executed, was followed by a general attack of the enemy's forts and entrenchments.

Lieutenant-general Drummond reports, that the spirit with which it was undertaken enabled our troops to surmount every obstacle. Fort Erie and the entrenchments were entered, the guns turned on the barrack block-house (the enemy's last refuge), when unfortunately a most violent explosion occurred on the battery: in its effect destroying and disabling many a valuable officer and soldier, and caused so considerable a consternation, as to induce the remaining troops to abandon the works, and all those advantages which they had gained by their determined conduct, and precipitately to retire to our first approaches.

From other causes almost inseparable from night operations, carried on in a close and difficult country, the right column failed in the object it had to accomplish.

With deep regret the commander of the forces records the loss his majesty's service has sustained on this occasion.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the right division, in the assault of Fort Erie, on the 15th August, 1814.

Killed—1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 51 rank and file.

Wounded—1 major, 9 captains, 11 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 master, 20 serjeants, 3 drummers, 262 rank and file.

Missing—2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 midshipman, 41 serjeants, 3 drummers, 486 rank and file.

Total—1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 12 captains, 15 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 master, 1 midshipman, 62 serjeants, 7 drummers, 799 rank and file.

Officers killed—1st or Royal Scots, captain Torrens; 8th or King's regiment, lieutenant Noel; 103d regiment, colonel Scott; 104th regiment, lieutenant-colonel Drummond.

Officers wounded—royal navy, captain Dobbs and lieutenant Stevenson, slightly; Mr. Harris, master, severely.

1st Royal Scots, captain Rowan, severely; lieutenant Vaughan, slightly.

8th or King's, lieutenant Young, slightly.

41st regiment, flank companies, captains Glew and Bullock, severely; lieutenant Hailes, slightly; ensign Townshend, severely.

89th regiment, captain Barney, acting assistant engineer, severely.

100th regiment, lieutenant Murray, wounded and prisoner; volunteer Fraser, severely.

103d regiment, major Smelt, and captain Gardner, severely; captain Colclough, and lieutenant Charlton, severely and pri-

soner; lieutenant Fallon, severely; lieutenant Cappage, jun. dangerously; lieutenant Meagher, slightly; lieutenants Burrows, Hazen, and ensign Nash, severely.

104th Flank companies, captain Leonard and lieutenant M'Laughlin, severely.

Officers missing—General staff, captain Elliott, deputy-assistant quarter-master general.

Royal navy, Mr. Hyde, midshipman.

41st flank company, lieutenant Gardner, and ensign Hall.

103d regiment, captain Irwin, lieutenant Kaye, ensign Huoy, lieutenant and adjutant Pettet.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF THE OHIO AND SOMERS, ON LAKE ERIE.

Copy of a letter from lieutenant Conkling to captain Kennedy, dated Fort George, Upper Canada, August 16th, 1814.

Sir,

With extreme regret I have to make known to you the circumstances attending the capture of the Ohio and Somers. On the night of the 12th, between the hours of 10 and 12, the boats were seen a short distance a-head of the Somers, and were hailed from that vessel—they answered "provision boats," which deceived the officers of the deck, as our army boats had been in the habit of passing and repassing through the night, and enabled them to drift athwart his hawser and cut his cables, at the same time pouring in a heavy fire before he discovered who they were. Instantaneously they were along side of me, and notwithstanding my exertions, aided by Mr. M'Cally, acting sailing-master (who was soon disabled), I was unable to repulse them but for a moment. I maintained the quarter-deck until my sword fell, in consequence of a shot in the shoulder, and all on deck either wounded or surrounded by bayonets. As their force was an overwhelming one, I thought farther resistance vain, and gave up the vessel, with the satisfaction of having performed my duty, and defended my vessel to the last.

List of killed and wounded.

Ohio.

Killed—John Fifehill, boatswain's mate, shot through the body.

Wounded—Reuben Wright, shot through the arm.

Sailing-master M'Cally, shot through the thigh, and bayonetted through the foot.

Serjeant Eastman, of the 11th regiment of the army, wounded in the neck by a musket ball.

—— Granger, 11th regiment, wounded in the arm.

—— Weath, 11th do. do. do.

—— Whillers, 21st do. wounded, cut in the arm.

Somers.

Wounded—Samuel Taylor, shot in the arm and cut in the head.

Charles Ordean, cut in the shoulder; also one of the Ohio's marines, whose name the serjeant cannot find, now in the hospital, badly wounded.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded is much more considerable; amongst the killed is the commanding officer of the Netley (lying here), captain Ratliff; he fell in attempting to come over my quarters. Notwithstanding the number of muskets and pistols which were fired, and the bustle inseparable from enterprizes of this kind, neither the Fort or the Porcupine attempted to fire as we drifted past them, nor did we receive a shot until past Black Rock, though they might have destroyed us with ease.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. M. CONKLING.

P. S. We expect to be sent to Montreal, and perhaps to Quebec directly.

Edward P. Kennedy, Esq., commanding United States' naval force on Lake Erie.

Extract from Morning District General Order.

Head-Quarters, camp before Fort Erie, 13th August, 1814.

Lieutenant-general Drummond congratulates the army on the brilliant achievements executed last night by captain Dobbs of the royal navy, and a party of seamen and marines, who in the most gallant style boarded, and after a short struggle carried, two of the enemy's armed schooners anchored close to Fort Erie. Accident alone prevented the capture of the third schooner. Those captured are the Somers and Porcupine; the former mounts two long 12-pounders; the latter one long 12. They were commanded by lieutenants, and had on board 35 men each. The lieutenant-general laments to find that lieutenant Radcliffe, commander of

his majesty's schooner Netly, has fallen on this occasion; he was killed in the act of boarding. He will be buried at 12 o'clock, with such marks of respect as circumstances will permit; besides Mr. Radcliffe, our loss has been only one seaman killed and four wounded. The enemy's loss is one seaman killed—3 officers and four seamen wounded. The whole enterprise reflects the highest credit on the ability and spirit of captain Dobbs and the gallant party under his command.

J. HARVEY,
Lieutenant-colonel, deputy adjutant-general.

CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN ON THE NIAGARA, INCLUDING THE SORTIE FROM FORT ERIE.

GENERAL ORDER.

Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, 6th September, 1814.

The brigadier-general commanding has received the report of major Matteson, of the New York volunteers, on whom devolved the command of the party, engaged in the affair of the gallant colonel Wilcocks.

With sincere pleasure, the brigadier-general congratulates the army that the steadiness and valour which have marked the conduct of this division, during the whole campaign, were again most singularly manifested by the volunteers and regulars engaged on this occasion.

A party not exceeding 100 volunteers (the enemy being of treble numbers) drove the enemy to his works, with comparatively a small loss, and made him suffer severely. Previous to this a detachment of forty men from the twenty-first, under ensign Thomas, had successfully skirmished with the enemy.

The conduct of major Matteson on this occasion excites the highest approbation of the brigadier-general, his coolness, courage and prudence, and the good conduct of his troops, were again conspicuously manifested. The New York volunteers have, on this occasion, as well as every other that has occurred during the whole campaign, reflected honour on the state of which they are members. Captain Hale of the eleventh infantry commanding piquet No. 2, and ensign Thomas commanding the regulars, conducted in a manner to the perfect satisfaction of the brigadier-general. The loss

on our side, with the exception of the gallant Wilcocks, and lieutenant Rosevelt, is trifling; but on the side of the enemy, it was severe in the extreme; various deserters report, that they had four officers and nearly 100 either killed or wounded; so great a disparity evinces, in the strongest light, the difference between the coolness of troops, such as ours, in a just and honourable career, and of the enemy's thousands, who fight for objects which they care not for, and in a cause which they deprecate.

Major Matteson speaks in the highest terms of the courage and good conduct of captains Hull, Harding, Knap, and Satterly, who volunteered to command a company; and lieutenants Hathaway, Jones, and ensign Wickwire; he also expresses his highest opinion of the correct, brave, and soldier-like conduct of brigade-major Dobbin, quarter-master Green, and adjutant Gilbert.

Lieutenant-colonel Wilcocks, whose services and bravery have excited the warmest interest of the army in his favour, and lieutenant Rosevelt, of the New York volunteers, have added other names to the gallant heroes, who, during this unexampled campaign, have gloriously died on the field of honour. Colonel Wilcocks, at the instant he was mortally wounded, was charging and repulsing an infinitely superior force under the enemy's battery; the command devolving on major Matteson, he succeeded in driving the enemy to their works, and retired in good order to camp.

By command of brigadier-general Ripley.

R. JONES,
Assistant adjutant-general.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, September 18th, 1814.

Sir,

I have the satisfaction to announce to you a brilliant achievement yesterday effected by the forces under my command. A sortie was made upon the enemy's batteries. These were carried—we blew up his principal work, destroyed his battering pieces, and captured 400 prisoners. The enemy resisted our assault with firmness, but suffered greatly. His total loss cannot be less than 800 men.

In such a business we could not but expect to lose many valuable lives; they were offered up a voluntary sacrifice to the safety and honour of this army and the nation.

I will forward to you the particulars of this splendid affair,

with a return of the killed and wounded, in the course of a few days.

Very respectfully, your humble servant,

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable Secretary of War.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Camp Fort Erie, September 29, 1814.

Sir,

In my letter of the 18th instant, I briefly informed you of the fortunate issue of the sortie which took place the day preceding. But it is due to the gallant officers and men, to whose bravery we are indebted for our success on this occasion, that I should give you a more circumstantial and detailed account of this affair.

The enemy's camp I had ascertained to be situated in a field, surrounded by woods, nearly two miles distant from their batteries and entrenchments, the object of which was to keep that part of their force which was not upon duty, out of the range of our fire from Fort Erie and Black Rock. Their infantry was formed into three brigades, estimated at twelve or fifteen hundred men each. One of these brigades, with a detail from their artillery, was stationed at their works (these being about 500 yards from old Fort Erie, and the right of our line). We had already suffered much from the fire of two of their batteries, and were aware that a third was about to open upon us. Under these circumstances, I resolved to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle the brigade upon duty before those in reserve could be brought into action.

On the morning of the 17th, the infantry and riflemen, regulars and militia, were ordered to be paraded and put in readiness to march precisely at twelve o'clock. General Porter with the volunteers, colonel Gibson with the riflemen, and major Brooks with the twenty-third and first infantry, and a few dragoons acting as infantry, were ordered to move from the extreme left of our position upon the enemy's right, by a passage opened through the woods for the occasion. General Miller was directed to station his command in the ravine which lies between Fort Erie and the enemy's batteries, by passing them by detachment through the skirts of the wood—and the twenty-first infantry under general Ripley was posted as a corps of reserve between the new bas-

tions of Fort Erie; all under cover, and out of the view of the enemy.

About twenty minutes before three P. M. I found the left columns, under the command of general Porter, which were destined to turn the enemy's right, within a few rods of the British entrenchments. They were ordered to advance and commence the action. Passing down the ravine, I judged from the report of musketry that the action had commenced on our left; I now hastened to general Miller, and directed him to seize the moment and pierce the enemy's entrenchments between batteries No. 2 and 3. My orders were promptly and ably executed. Within 30 minutes after the first gun was fired, batteries No. 3 and 2, the enemy's line of entrenchments, and his two block-houses, were in our possession.

Soon after, battery No. 1 was abandoned by the British. The guns in each were spiked by us or otherwise destroyed, and the magazine of No. 3 was blown up.

A few minutes before the explosion, I had ordered up the reserve under general Ripley. As he passed me at the head of his column, I desired him, as he would be the senior in advance, to ascertain as near as possible the situation of the troops in general, and to have a care that not more was hazarded than the occasion required: that, the object of the sortie effected, the troops would retire in good order, &c. General Ripley passed rapidly on—soon after, I became alarmed for general Miller, and sent an order for the twenty-first to hasten to his support towards battery No. 1. Colonel Upham received the order, and advanced to the aid of general Miller. General Ripley had inclined to the left, where major Brooks' command was engaged, with a view of making some necessary enquiries of that officer, and in the act of doing so was unfortunately wounded. By this time the object of the sortie was accomplished beyond my most sanguine expectations. General Miller had consequently ordered the troops on the right to fall back—observing this movement, I sent my staff along the line to call in the other corps. Within a few minutes they retired from the ravine, and from thence to camp.

Thus one thousand regulars and an equal portion of militia, in one hour of close action blasted the hopes of the enemy, destroyed the fruits of fifty days labour, and diminished his effective force 1000 men at least. I am at a loss how to express my satisfaction at the gallant conduct of the officers and men of this division, whose valour has shone superior to

every trial. General Porter in his official report herein inclosed, has very properly noticed those patriotic citizens who have done so much honour to themselves, by freely and voluntarily tendering their services at a dangerous and critical period.

As the scene of action was in a wood, in advance of the position I had chosen for directing the whole, the several reports of commandants of corps must guide me in noticing individuals.

General Miller mentions lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall, lieutenant-colonel Beedle, major Trimble, captain Hall, captain Ingersoll, lieutenant Crawford, lieutenant Lee, and particularly ensign O'Fling, as entitled to distinction.

Lieutenant-colonel M'Donald, upon whom the command of the rifle corps devolved on the fall of the brave and generous Gibson, names adjutant Shortridge of the first, and Ballard of the fourth regiment, as deserving the highest applause for their promptness and gallantry in communicating orders. Of the other corps, he reports generally, that the bravery and good conduct of all was so conspicuous as to render it impossible to discriminate.

Major Brooks, to whom much credit is due for the distinguished manner in which he executed the orders he received, speaks in high terms of lieutenants Goodell, Ingersoll, Livington, and ensign Brant, and O'Fling of the twenty-third—particularly of the latter. Also of captain Simms, lieutenants Bissel, Shore, and Brinot, of the first infantry, and lieutenant Watts of the dragoons.

Lieutenant-colonel Upham, who took command of the reserve after general Ripley was disabled, bestows great praise upon major Chambers of the fourth regiment of riflemen, attached to the twenty-first infantry, as also upon captain Bradford and lieutenant Holding of that regiment.

My staff, colonel Snelling, colonel Gardner, major Jones, and my aids-de-camp, major Austin and lieutenant Armstrong, were, as usual, zealous, intelligent, and active—they performed every duty required of them to my entire satisfaction.

Major Hall, assistant inspector-general led a battalion of militia, and conducted with skill and gallantry. Lieutenant Kirby, aid de-camp to general Ripley, was extremely active and useful during the time he was in action.

Lieutenants Fraser and Riddle were in general Porter's staff; their bravery was conspicuous, and no officers of their grade were more useful.

The corps of artillery, commanded by major Hindman, which has been so eminently distinguished throughout this campaign had no opportunity of taking a part in the sortie. The twenty-fifth infantry under colonel Jessup was stationed in Fort Erie to hold the key of our position.

Colonel Brady, on whose firmness and good conduct every reliance could be placed, was on command at Buffalo with the remains of the twenty-second infantry. Lieutenant-colonel M'Bee and lieutenant-colonel Wood of the corps of engineers, having rendered to this army services the most important, I must seize the opportunity of again mentioning them particularly. On every trying occasion I have reaped much benefit from their sound and excellent advice. No two officers of their grade could have contributed more to the safety and honour of this army. Wood, brave, generous, and enterprising, died as he had lived, without a feeling but for the honour of his country, and the glory of her arms. His name and example will live to guide the soldier in the path of duty so long as true heroism is held in estimation. M'Bee lives to enjoy the approbation of every virtuous and generous mind, and to receive the reward due to his services and high military talents.

It is proper here to notice, that although but one-third of the enemy's force was on duty when his works were carried, the whole were brought into action while we were employed in destroying his cannon. We secured prisoners from seven of his regiments, and know that the sixth and thirty-second suffered severely in killed and wounded, yet these regiments were not upon duty.

Lieutenant-general Drummond broke up his camp during the night of the twenty-first, and retired to his entrenchments behind the Chippewa. A party of our men came up with the rear of his army at Frenchman's Creek; the enemy destroyed part of their stores by setting fire to the buildings from which they were employed in conveying them. We found in and about their camp a considerable quantity of cannon-ball, and upwards of one hundred stand of arms.

I send you inclosed herein a return of our loss. The return of prisoners inclosed does not include the stragglers that came in after the action.

I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,

JACOB RROWN.

Honourable Secretary of War.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the left division of the army at Fort Erie, commanded by Major-General Brown, in the sortie against the enemy's batteries, on the 7th September, 1814.

Total of regulars.

Killed—1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 captains, 5 serjeants, 7 corporals, 44 privates.

Wounded—1 brigadier-general, 1 brigade-major, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 2 captains, 11 subalterns, 1 principal musician, 12 serjeants, 11 corporals, 94 privates.

Missing—1 adjutant, 1 serjeant, 4 corporals, 1 musician, 36 privates.

Total of militia, &c.

Killed—1 brigadier-general, 1 captain, 3 subalterns, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 12 privates.

Wounded—1 major-general, 2 aids-de-camp, 1 brigade-major, 2 captains, 2 subalterns, 4 serjeants, 3 corporals, 65 privates.

Missing—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 1 quarter-master, 2 captains, 4 subalterns, 9 serjeants, 13 corporals, 6 musicians, 136 privates.

Grand Total.

Killed—1 brigadier-general, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 captains, 3 subalterns, 6 serjeants, 8 corporals, 56 privates.

Wounded—1 major-general, 1 brigadier-general, 2 aids-de-camp, 2 brigade-majors, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 4 captains, 13 subalterns, 1 principal musician, 16 serjeants, 14 corporals, 159 privates.

Missing—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 2 captains, 4 subalterns, 10 serjeants, 17 corporals, 7 musicians, 172 privates.

Aggregate—officers, 45; non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates 466; total, 511.

Names and ranks of officers.

Killed.

Lieutenant-colonel E. D. Wood, captain and brevet lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

Captain L. Bradford, 21st infantry.

Captain H. Hale, 11th do.

Captain L. G. A. Armistead, first riflemen.

Wounded—staff—brigadier-general Ripley, second brigade, dangerously, shot through the neck.

First-lieutenant Crawford, 11th infantry, brigade-major, first brigade, slightly, shot in the arm.

Ninth infantry—lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall, severely, left arm amputated.

Captain Ingersoll, slightly, in the head.

First lieutenant E. Childs, severely, bayonet wound through the thigh.

Eleventh infantry—first lieutenant W. F. Hale, dangerously, shot in the body.

Second lieutenant J. Clark, severely, in the body.

Third lieutenant Stevenson, severely, through the thigh.

Third lieutenant Davis, dangerously, through the body.

Ninteenth infantry—major Trimble, dangerously, shot through the body.

Ensign Neely, slightly, shot in the thigh.

Twenty-first infantry—ensign Cummings, severely, in the arm.

Twenty-third infantry—first lieutenant Brown, slightly, in the arm.

Ensign O'Fling, mortally, since dead.

First riflemen—captain Ramsey, severely, in the groin.

Third lieutenant Cobb, severely, in the body.

Fourth riflemen—colonel James Gibson, mortally, died the 18th instant.

First lieutenant Gantt, severe wounds in the arm and side.

Missing—first lieutenant Ballard, adjutant, fourth riflemen, prisoner.

Of the militia.

Killed—Brigadier-general Davis, of volunteer brigade.

Captain Buel, of lieutenant-colonel Crosby's regiment.

Lieutenant Brown, of lieutenant-colonel M'Burney's regiment.

Lieutenant W. Belknap, of lieutenant-colonel Fleming's regiment.

Ensign Blakesly, of lieutenant-colonel M'Burney's regiment.

Wounded—Staff—major-general P. B. Porter, sword-wound in the hand.

First lieutenant Fraser, 13th infantry, brigade-major, severely in the leg.

First lieutenant Riddle, 15th infantry, acting aid-de-camp, slight contusion.

Captain Bigger, New York volunteers, acting aid, severely, through the breast and shoulder.

Lieutenant-colonel Dobbin's regiment—captain Knapp, in the hip.

Lieutenant Bailey, in the side.

Lieutenant-colonel M'Burney's regiment—captain Hale, wounded and prisoner.

Lieutenant-colonel Hopkins' regiment—lieutenant Gillet, through the thigh.

Missing.

Lieutenant-colonel W. L. Churchill,
Major E. Wilson,
Quarter-master O. Wilcox,
Captain Crouch,
Captain Case,
Lieutenant Case,
Ensign Chambers,
Ensign Clark,
Ensign Church,
} Prisoners.

C. K. GARDNER,
Adjutant-general.

Return of prisoners taken in the sortie from Fort Erie on the 17th day of September, 1814.

Regiment of De Watteville—2 majors, 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 assistant surgeon, 4 staff-serjeants, 7 serjeants, 7 corporals, 1 drummer, and 204 privates—total, 232.

Royal artillery—9 privates—total, 9.

First regiment of Royal Scots—2 serjeants, 16 privates—total, 18.

Sixth regiment—1 serjeant, 9 privates—total, 10.

Eighth, or king's regiment—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 8 serjeants, 9 corporals, 66 privates—total, 86.

Eighty-second regiment—9 privates—total, 9.

Eighty-ninth regiment—1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 19 privates—total, 21.

Grand total—2 majors, 4 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 assistant-surgeon, 4 staff-serjeants, 19 serjeants, 17 corporals, 1 drummer, 332 privates.

Aggregate—385.

J. SNELLING,
Inspector-general.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated

Head-Quarters, Camp Fort Erie, October 1*st*, 1814.

Sir,

Looking over my official account of the action of the 17th ultimo, I find that the names of the regiments which composed general Miller's command have not been given. As I believe it even more important to distinguish corps than individuals, I am anxious to correct this mistake. General Miller on that day commanded the remains of the 9th and 11th infantry, and a detachment of the 19th. Of three field officers, who were attached to them, two were severely wounded; lieutenant-colonel Aspinwall of the 9th, gallantly leading his men to the attack upon the enemy's entrenchments; and major Trimble of the 19th, who was shot within their works, conducting with great skill and bravery. A detachment of the 17th regiment was attached to the 21st.

Very respecfully, your most obedient servant,

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Porter to Major-General Brown.

Sir, *Fort Erie, September* 22*d*, 1814.

In executing the duty you have imposed on me, of reporting the conduct of the officers and men composing the left column, which you was pleased to place under my command, in the sortie of the 17th instant, the pleasure I derive in representing to you the admirable conduct of the whole, is deeply chastened by sorrow for the loss of many brave and distinguished men.

Being obliged, from the nature of the ground, to act on foot, it was impossible that my own personal observation should reach to every officer. Some part of this report must therefore rest upon the information of others.

It is the business of this communication to speak of the conduct of individuals; yet you will permit me to premise, although well known to yourself already, that the object of the left column was to penetrate, by a circuitous route, between the enemy's batteries, where one-third of his force was always kept on duty, and his main camp, and that it was subdivided into three divisions; the advance of 200 riflemen, and a few Indians, commanded by colonel Gibson, and two columns moving parallel to, and thirty yards distant from

each other. The right column was commanded by lieutenant-colonel Wood, headed by 400 infantry, under major Brook, of the 23d, and followed by 500 volunteers and militia, being parts of lieutenant-colonel Dobbins's, M'Burney's, and Fleming's regiments, and was intended to attack the batteries. The left column of 500 militia was commanded by brigadier-general Davis, and comprised the commands of lieutenant-colonels, Hopkins, Churchhill, and Crosby, and was intended to hold check any reinforcements from the enemy's camp; or both columns (circumstances requiring it, which frequently happened) to co-operate in the same object.

After carrying by storm, in the handsomest style, a strong block-house, in rear of the third battery, making its garrison prisoners, destroying the three 24-pounders and their carriages in the third battery, and blowing up the enemy's magazine, and after co-operating with general Miller in taking the second battery, the gallant leaders of the three divisions all fell nearly at the same time; colonel Gibson, at the second battery, and general Davis and lieutenant-colonel Wood, in an assault upon the first.

Brigadier-general Davis, although a militia officer of little experience, conducted on this occasion with all the coolness and bravery of a veteran, and fell while advancing upon the enemy's entrenchments. His loss as a citizen, as well as a soldier, will be severely felt in the patriotic county of Genesee. Colonel Gibson fully sustained the high military reputation, which he had before so justly acquired. You know how exalted an opinion I have always entertained of lieutenant-colonel Wood of the engineers. His conduct, on this day, was, what it uniformly has been, on every similar occasion, an exhibition of military skill, acute judgment, and heroic valour. Of the other regular officers, lieutenant-colonel M'Donald and major Brook, senior in command, will report to you in relation to their respective divisions. Permit me, however, to say of these two officers, that, much as was left to them by the fall of their distinguished leaders, they were able to sustain their parts in the most admirable manner, and they richly deserve the notice of the government.

Of the militia, I regret that the limits of a report will not permit me even to name all of those, who on this occasion established claims to the gratitude of their fellow citizens; much less to particularize individual merit. Lieutenant-colonels Hopkins, M'Burney, Churchill, and Crosby, and majors Lee, Marcle, Wilson, Lawrence, Burr, Dunham, Kellogg, and Ganson, are entitled to the highest praise for

their gallant conduct, their steady and persevering exertions. Lieutenant-colonel Dobbin being prevented by severe indisposition from taking the field, major Hall, assistant inspector-general, volunteered his services to join major Lee in the command of the volunteer regiment; and major Lee and every other officer speaks in the highest terms of the gallant and good conduct of this young officer.

Captain Fleming, who commanded the Indians, was, as he always is, in the front of the battle. There is not a more intrepid soldier in the army. I should be ungrateful, were I to omit the names of captains Knapp and Hull of the volunteers, and captain Parker, and lieutenant Chatfield of the militia, by whose intrepidity I was, during the action, extricated from the most unpleasant situation. Captains Richardson, Buel, and Kennedy, lieutenants Parkhust and Brown, and adjutants Dobbin, Bates, and Robinson, particularly distinguished themselves. The patriotic conduct of captain Elliott with 20 young gentlemen who volunteered from Batavia, and of major Hubbard with 14 men exempted by age from military duty, should not be omitted. They were conspicuous during the action.

You will excuse me if I shall seem partial, in speaking of my own family, consisting of my brigade-major Frazer, my volunteer aid-de-camp Riddle (both 1st lieutenants in the 15th infantry), captain Bigger of the Canadian volunteers, Messrs. Williams and Delapierre, volunteer aids for the day, all of whom, except Mr. Williams, were wounded.

Lieutenants Frazer and Riddle were engaged for most of the preceding day with fatigue parties, cutting roads for the advance of the column through the swamp, and falling timber to the rear, and within 150 yards of the enemy's right; which service they executed with so much address as to avoid discovery; and on the succeeding day they conducted the two columns to the attack. Frazer was severely wounded by a musket-ball, whilst spiking a gun on the second battery. Riddle, after the first battery was carried, descended into the enemy's magazine, and after securing (with the assistance of quarter-master Greene, of the volunteers, whose good conduct deserves much praise) a quantity of fixed ammunition, blew up the magazine, and suffered severely by the explosion. I must solicit, through you, sir, the attention of the general government to these meritorious young men. Captain Bigger is an excellent officer, and rendered me much assistance, but was dangerously wounded. The other young gentlemen are citizens, and deserve much credit for their

activity, and for having voluntarily encountered danger. My aid-de-camp, major Dox, was confined at Buffalo by sickness.

On the whole, sir, I can say of the regular troops attached to the left column, and of the veteran volunteers of lieutenant-colonel Dobbin's regiment, that every man did his duty, and their conduct on this occasion reflects a new lustre on their former brilliant achievements. To the militia, the compliment is justly due, and I could pay them no greater one, than to say, that they were not surpassed by the heroes of Chippewa and Niagara in steadiness and bravery.

The studied intricacy of the enemy's defences, consisting not only of the breast-work connecting their batteries, but of successive lines of entrenchments for a hundred yards in the rear, covering the batteries and enfilading each other, and the whole obstructed by abattis, brush, and felled timber, was calculated to produce confusion among the assailants, and led to several contests at the point of the bayonet. But by our double columns any temporary irregularity in the one was always corrected by the other. Our success would probably have been more complete, but for the rain which unfortunately set in soon after we commenced our march, which rendered the fire of many of our muskets useless, and by obscuring the sun, led to several unlucky mistakes. As an instance of this, a body of 50 prisoners who had surrendered, were ordered to the fort in charge of a subaltern and 14 volunteers; the officer mistaking the direction, conducted them towards the British camp in the route by which we had advanced, and they were retaken with the whole of the guard, excepting the officer and one man who fought their way back. Several of our stragglers were made prisoners by the same mistake. But, sir, notwithstanding these accidents, we have reason to rejoice at our signal success in inflicting a vastly disproportionable injury on the enemy, and in wholly defeating all his plans of operation against this army.

I have the honour to be, with very great respect, your obedient servant,

P. B. PORTER,

Brig.-gen., commanding volunteers and militia.

Major-general Brown, commanding, &c.

DISTRICT GENERAL ORDER.

Head-Quarters, camp before Fort Erie, 18th September.

Lieutenant-general Drummond, having received the reports of the general officer in the immediate direction of the

troops engaged yesterday, begs to offer his best acknowledgments for their very gallant conduct in repulsing the attack made by the enemy on our batteries, with his whole force, represented to consist of not less than five thousand men, including militia. The brilliant style in which the battery No. 2 was recovered, and the enemy driven beyond our entrenchments by seven companies of the 82d regiment, under major Proctor, and three companies of the 6th regiment detached under major Taylor, excited lieutenant-general Drummond's admiration, and entitled those troops to his particular thanks. On the right the enemy's advance was checked by the 1st battalion of the Royal Scots, supported by the 89th, under the direction of lieutenant-colonel Gordon of the royals; and in the centre he was driven back by the Glengary light infantry, under lieutenant-colonel Battersby, and directed by lieutenant-colonel Pearson, inspecting field officer. To these troops the lieutenant-general's best thanks are due, as also to the remainder of the reserve under lieutenant-colonel Campbell, consisting of the remaining companies of the 6th regiment, the flank companies of the 41st, and the incorporated militia, which supported the troops engaged.

The lieutenant-general deeply laments the unfortunate circumstances of weather which enabled the enemy to approach unperceived close to the right of the position, and to capture a considerable number of the regiment De Watteville, stationed at the point. The severe loss in killed and wounded which the 8th or King's and De Watteville's regiment have suffered, affords incontestible proof that No. 2 battery was not gained without a vigorous resistance; it is equally obvious that the block-house on the right was well defended by the party of the king's regiment stationed in it.

Lieutenant-general Drummond feels greatly indebted to major-general De Watteville for his judicious arrangement; and he also desires to offer his thanks to the respective commanding officers of brigades and corps, and the officers and men of the royal artillery and engineers, for their exertions. To major-general Stovin, who joined the army a short time before the attack, the lieutenant-general is indebted for his assistance, and also to the officers of the general of his personal staff.

Lieutenant-general Drummond greatly regrets the wounds which have deprived the army for the present of the services of colonel Fisher, lieutenant-colonels Pearson and Gordon.

Lieutenant-colonels Fisher, Pearson, and Gordon, have

permission to proceed to the rear for the recovery of their wounds.

(Signed) J. HARVEY,
Lieutenant-colonel, deputy adjutant-general.

GENERAL ORDER.

Head-Quarters, Montreal, 29th September, 1814.

His excellency the commander of the forces having received the official report of lieutenant-general Drummond, of an affair which took place at Fort Erie, on the 17th instant. in which very superior numbers of the enemy were repulsed with loss, entirely coincides with the lieutenant-general in the just tribute of praise he bestows on the intrepid valour and determined discipline evinced by the troops under his command, as detailed in the district general order of the 18th instant, which his excellency is pleased to order to be published for the general information of the troops under his command.

(Signed) EDW. BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters of the Northern Army,
Camp near Fort Erie, October 23d, 1814.

The indisposition of brigadier-general Bissell has prevented, till this morning, his report of the handsome affair which took place on the 19th, between a detachment of his brigade and a superior force of the enemy.

The object of the expedition entrusted to the brigadier, was the seizure of some provisions intended for the British troops. He marched from Black Creek on the morning of the 18th, with parts of the fifth, 14th, 15th, and 16th infantry, a small party of dragoons, and a company of riflemen, the whole about 900 men.—After driving before them a picket, of which they made the commanding officer prisoner, they encamped for the night, throwing beyond Lyon's Creek some light infantry companies, under captain Dorman, fifth, and lieutenant Horrel, 16th infantry, and the riflemen under captain Irvine; a picket on the Chippewa road, commanded by lieutenant Gassaway, was attacked by two companies Glengary light infantry, which were beaten back with loss. On the morning of the 19th, the detachment was attacked by a select corps of the enemy, not less than 1200 strong. The light infantry under captain Dorman, and Irvine's riflemen, sustained the whole fire of the enemy for

fifteen minutes, during which time the fifth and 14th were formed—the fifth was ordered to turn the enemy's right flank, while the 14th charged them in front. This was executed in the most gallant manner by colonel Pinckney of the fifth, and major Barnard of the 14th, who greatly distinguished himself by the officer-like style in which he conducted his battalion. The enemy were compelled to a precipitate retreat, and hid themselves once more behind their fortifications.

Brigadier-general Bissell particularly mentions the skill and intrepidity of colonel Snelling, inspector-general, colonel Pinckney, commanding the fifth regiment, major Barnard, 14th infantry, major Barker, 45th infantry, acting with the fifth, captain Dorman, captain Allison (whose horse was shot under him), and brigade-major lieutenant Prestman, of the fifth. Lieutenant Anspaugh, of dragoons, was conspicuous by his alertness in communicating the brigadier-general's orders during the action. It is with the highest satisfaction, that the commanding general tenders to the brave officers and troops of the second brigade of the right division, his thanks for their good conduct on this occasion. The firmness of the 15th and 16th regiments commanded by colonel Pierce, and who were posted as a reserve, proved, that had the resistance of the enemy afforded them an opportunity of going into action, they would have emulated the valour of the commanders of the fifth and 14th. A number of prisoners were taken, among whom was a picket of dragoons with their horses; a large quantity of grain also fell into our hands. The brigadier, after completing the orders he had received, and burying the few of our brave soldiers who fell in the action, and the dead of the enemy, which were left on the ground by the latter, returned to Black Creek. To the cool and intrepid conduct of brigadier-general Bissell, the general offers the praise he has so justly entitled himself to.

By order of major-general Izard.

C. K. GARDNER,

Adjutant-general, northern army.

Sir, *Camp, Frenchman's Creek, October* 22, 1814.

I have the honour to report, that in obedience to your orders of the 18th instant, I proceeded with about 900 men of my brigade, a company of riflemen under captain Irvine, and a small party of dragoons under lieutenant Anspaugh, by very bad roads and creeks, the bridges over which were broken down, to Cook's mills, on Lyon's Creek, a branch of the

Chippewa, and encamped for the night: near that place the enemy had stationed a militia picket of twenty men, commanded by a captain, who made their escape on our approach, the captain excepted, who was taken. Their picket of regulars found at this place was driven in, and I threw across at that place (the only one at which it was practicable) the two elite companies under captain Dorman, fifth, and lieutenant Horrel, 16th infantry, and the riflemen under captain Irvine; our advanced picket on the Chippewa road, commanded by lieutenant Gassaway, was attacked in the night by two companies of the Glengary light infantry, who were beaten off with the loss of one man only. On the morning of the 19th, we were attacked by the enemy in force; from the best information amounting to more than 1200 men, composed of the 82d and 87th regiments of foot, detachments of the 100th, 104th, the Glengary light infantry, a few dragoons, and rocketteers, and one piece of artillery; the whole commanded by the marquis of Tweedale, colonel of the 100th.

The light corps under captain Dorman, and Irvine's riflemen, sustained the whole fire of the enemy for about fifteen minutes, with the greatest gallantry, until the other troops were formed and brought to their support.

The fifth regiment under colonel Pinckney, aided by major Baker of the 45th attached to that regiment, was ordered to skirt the woods and turn the enemy's right flank, and if possible to cut off the piece of artillery.

Major Bernard with the 14th was ordered at the same time to form in front, advance to support the light troops and charge the artillery: the 15th regiment under Major Grindage, and 16th under colonel Pierce, were ordered to act as circumstances might require.

The well-directed fire of the elite corps, riflemen, and gallant charge of the 14th, soon compelled the enemy to give ground, and on discovering that his right flank was turned by the intrepid move of the fifth under colonel Pinckney, he retreated in the utmost confusion, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners; we pursued to a ravine some distance from the scene where the action commenced; not knowing the ground, I did not think proper to push them further; but soon after reconnoitred the country, and discovered they had retreated to their strong hold at the mouth of the river, about seven miles distance.

To the officers and men engaged, great credit is due for their zeal and intrepidity, and to those who had not an op-

portunity to come into action, for the promptitude with which they obeyed our orders. All did their duty—but the handsome manner in which major Bernard brought his regiment into action, and the gallant conduct of the elite, under captain Dorman, deserve particular notice. I am much indebted to that distinguished officer colonel Snelling, inspector-general, for his able services through the action, and much praise is due to my aid, captain Allison (whose horse was shot under him), and brigade major Prestman, for their intrepid and useful services in every situation. Lieutenant Anspaugh, of the dragoons, rendered me much service in communicating my orders. It is justly due, and I must be permitted to add, that every officer and private behaved with that skill and gallantry, which will do honour to the American arms. We found in the mills at that place, about 150 or 200 bushels of wheat, belonging to the enemy, which I ordered to be destroyed. The enemy having retreated to his batteries on the Chippewa, in obedience to your orders, I returned, leaving the causeways, bridges, &c. entire. I annex for your information, a return of killed and wounded.

I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed) D. BISSELL,
Brigadier-general.

Major-general George Izard, commanding northern army.

N. B. Acute nervous attacks must be my apology for the delay and imperfections of this report.

D. B.

Report of the killed and wounded of the second brigade, under the command of brigadier-general Bissell, in the affair of the 19th October, 1814.

Fifth regiment—killed, 5 privates; wounded, 1 captain, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 1 corporal, 9 privates—total, 19.

Fourteenth regiment—killed, 1 serjeant, 6 privates; wounded, 1 subaltern, 2 corporals, 16 privates—total, 26.

Twelfth regiment—wounded, 1 private—total, 1.

Sixteenth regiment—wounded, 1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 6 privates, 1 prisoner—total, 10.

Riflemen—wounded, 1 subaltern, 2 corporals, 8 privates—total, 11.

Grand total—killed, wounded, and missing, 67.

Names of the officers wounded.

Fifth regiment—captain Bell, ensign Whitehead, severely.

Fourteenth regiment—lieutenant Becket, severely.
Sixteenth regiment—lieutenant Thomas, slightly.
Riflemen—lieutenant Spurr, severely.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Brown to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Erie, September 20, 1814.

Sir,

Among the officers lost to this army in the battle of Niagara Falls, was my aid-de-camp, captain Ambrose Spencer, who, being mortally wounded, was left in the hands of the enemy. By flags from the British army, I was shortly afterwards assured of his convalescence, and an offer was made me by lieutenant-general Drummond to exchange him for his own aid, captain Loring, then a prisoner of war with us. However singular this proposition appeared, as captain Loring was not wounded, nor had received the slightest injury, I was willing to comply with it on captain Spencer's account; but as I knew his wounds were severe, I first sent to ascertain the fact of his being then living. My messenger, with a flag, was detained, nor even once permitted to see captain Spencer, though in his immediate vicinity. The evidence I wished to acquire failed, but my regard for captain Spencer would not permit me longer to delay, and I informed general Drummond that his aid should be exchanged even for the body of mine. This offer was, no doubt, gladly accepted, and the corpse of captain Spencer sent to the American shore.

Indignant, as I am, at this ungenerous procedure, I yet hold myself bound in honour to lieutenant-general Drummond to return captain Loring; and must, therefore, earnestly solicit of you his immediate release. He can return to lieutenant-general Drummond by the way of Montreal.

Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

JACOB BROWN.

Honourable James Monroe, secretary of war.

Copy of a letter from General Brown to General Drummond, August 2d, 1814.

Sir,

A letter said to be dictated by you, but signed by lieutenant-colonel Harvey has been laid before me. As it was proposed to change your aid for mine, I desired first to ascertain if my aid yet lived. But as it appears my flag sent direct from the American shore, for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, has been detained, I wave the objection that induced my

mind at the time the proposal was received. Send me the body of my aid captain Spencer, by his brother, if he is dead, and your aid captain Loring shall be returned to you. If captain Spencer is not dead, any attention that you will cause to be paid to him, will be gratefully acknowledged; but I do not desire to have him removed until it can be done with safety, as his life is dear to me. Of this, however, I am willing his brother should be the judge; and you can pass him by the front, the flank or the rear of your army, as may by you be deemed most prudent and proper. The favour I ask is, that Mr. Spencer may be so far indulged as to be allowed to see his brother, and if dead to collect his effects.

Very respectfully your humble servant,

(Signed) JACOB BROWN,
Major-general.

Lieutenant-general Drummond.

Copy of the reply of General Drummond.

British Head-Quarters, camp before Erie, August 5th.

Sir,

I am extremely sorry to acquaint you, that it has just been reported to me that captain Spencer died this forenoon. He had the melancholy satisfaction of having had his brother with him for some time previous to his death.

Mr. Spencer with the corpse of captain Spencer shall be sent over to Schlosser, when I shall expect the fulfilment on your part of your promise to send back captain Loring.

I have the honour to be, sir, with respectful consideration, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) GORDON DRUMMOND,
Lieutenant-general.

His excellency major-general Brown, U. S. army.

GENERAL ORDER.

Adjutant-General's office, Montreal, December 1st, 1814.

In reviewing the operations of the campaign on the Niagara frontier, under the immediate direction of lieutenant-general Drummond, from its commencement to its close, the commander of the forces is called on most highly to commend and notice, the spirit of enterprize with which every opportunity to annoy or repulse the enemy, has been seized, and the avidity with which they were followed up, as far as was prudent.

His excellency has marked with admiration the patient, but

determined endurance of harassing fatigue, aggravated by circumstances of particular privation, being exposed without shelter to an almost incessant deluge, which left not the tired soldier a single spot of dry ground to rest his wearied limbs; but it is more particularly in the close of the campaign, that the sterling qualities of the British soldier were conspicuously displayed. In the approaching prospect of a general action, all hardships and past sufferings were forgotten; the superior force of the enemy despised, and confident in the result which tried courage and discipline must command, the threatened attack was invited with that intrepid undaunted countenance, that the enemy shrunk from and retired to his own shore, sacrificing the arduous labours of many months, and bringing the campaign to a conclusion highly honourable to the right division.

Thus the enemy's annual attempt to invade the Upper Province, has once more recoiled on him with increased dishonour in proportion to his means. By the command of both lakes, Ontario and Erie, the American government was enabled to concentrate on the Niagara frontier the whole of its disposable force for the purpose of insuring success to its schemes of subjugation.

The horde of mounted Kentuckians under general M'Arthur, did not make its appearance until the enemy were retiring from Fort Erie to their own shore. It was checked in its attempt to pass the Grand River, by a detachment of the 103d regiment, and a band of Indian warriors, and its retreat has been followed by a detachment of the 19th light dragoons, conducted by an officer of the quarter-master-general's department. Its course is marked by wanton plunder, devastation, and indiscriminate pillage. It is to be lamented that the rapid movement of the marauders has screened them from the punishment due to a course of lawless conduct equally repugnant to the dictates of humanity and the usages of war.

It will prove a most grateful duty to the commander of the forces to bring to the notice of his royal highness the prince regent, the able support he has experienced in the talents and exertions of lieutenant-general Drummond, and in transmitting the reports of that officer, which record in detail the most honourable testimony of the ready assistance he has received from the generals, and other officers and troops serving with the right division, particularly the cordial co-operation, and the gallant and most useful exertions of captain Dobbs of the royal navy, and the officers and seamen

placed under his command, as well as other remarkable instances of zeal and bravery which have been displayed by corps and individuals, and have attracted the applause of the lieutenant-general.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

GENERAL ORDER.

Adjutant-General's office, Montreal, 6th December, 1814.

The commander of the forces has received instructions from the right honourable the earl of Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, to announce to the troops serving under his command, the gracious intention of his royal highness the prince regent, after the cessation of hostilities in consequence of a definitive treaty of peace, to grant to a certain portion of each regiment, to which number those who have families are to be first reckoned, and who are desirous of settling in the Canadas, grants of lands, not exceeding one hundred acres to each person, in eligible situations, and that those whose families are in Europe will be sent to join them in this country at the expense of the public.

His royal highness has been further graciously pleased to signify his munificent intention to continue for a period the issue of rations, and moreover to supply implements of husbandry, either gratis or at a reduced price, as the circumstances and necessities of the settlers may require.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

EXPEDITION OF GENERAL M'ARTHUR.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General M'Arthur, to the Secretary of War, dated Head Quarters, eighth military district, Detroit, 18th November, 1814.

Sir,

I have the satisfaction to report to you the safe return of the mounted troops to this place on the 17th instant.

In a former communication, I had the honour to inform you, that the mounted volunteers were marched in this direction in consequence of the regular troops having been withdrawn, and the apprehensions that were entertained for

the safety of this territory, of which I was advised by his excellency governor Cass.

The militia detached from Kentucky and Ohio having arrived, they were assigned for the immediate protection of this place; it was then deemed expedient, from the ardour and species of the force, that the mounted volunteers should be actively employed in the territory of the enemy, with a view to destroy their resources, and ultimately paralize any efforts which might be made against this place during the winter.

The valuable mills at the head of Lake Ontario, and in the vicinity of Grand River, furnished large supplies to the army in the peninsula; their destruction was desirable. To that effect the mounted troops, consisting of six hundred volunteers, fifty United States rangers, and seventy Indians, were put in motion on the 22d of October, to pursue the route along the western shore of Lake St. Clair, and pass into the enemy's territory near the mouth of that river.

The real object of the expedition was masked by the general impression, that it was destined against the Indian towns at Saguina. To favour that idea, boats were prepared for the reception of artillery, to be conveyed through Lake St. Clair, up that river into Lake Huron, and to co-operate with the mounted troops in the attack. The boats were, however, employed in the transportation of the troops and horses across the river St. Clair and Bear Creek, which empties into Beldoon River. This movement was absolutely necessary to secure that secrecy to the expedition which could alone render it successful. All military movements in this direction are rapidly communicated to the enemy from Sandwich and this place; it was therefore deemed improper to pass the troops across this river, but to proceed over the river St. Clair, down to the Scotch settlement on the Beldoon, up Bear Creek about 30 miles, and across to the Moravian towns, a few miles above the lower settlement on the Thames, where the detachment arrived on the 30th of October.

We were very fortunate at this place in taking a serjeant in the British service, who was proceeding to Burlington, with the information that the detachment had passed into the enemy's territory. The capture of this serjeant at the commencement of the "Long Woods," between the Moravian towns and Delaware, enabled us to reach the latter place undiscovered. On our approach, the rangers were detached to move across the Thames below the settlement, pass in the rear of it and guard the different roads leading into the inte-

rior, whilst the troops were engaged in swimming their horses and transporting their baggage on rafts.

We were thus enabled to arrive at the town of Oxford, one hundred and fifty miles distant from Detroit, before the inhabitants knew that a force was approaching. They were promised protection to their persons and property, upon condition that they remained peaceably at their respective homes; otherwise, they were assured that their property should be destroyed.

However, notwithstanding this injunction, and the sacred obligations of a previous parole, two of the inhabitants escaped to Burford with the intelligence of our arrival. Their property, consisting of two dwelling-houses, two barns, and one shop, were instantly consumed.

On the succeeding day, the fifth instant, the detachment proceeded to Burford, where we were informed that the militia had been embodied about ten days previously to our arrival, in consequence of reports received from Sandwich, that an expedition was expected to move from Detroit against Burlington.

A few hours before our arrival, the enemy retreated from Burford to Malcolm's mills, ten miles distant, on the road leading from Dover to Burlington, where they were joined by the militia from Long Point.

It was my intention to cross Grand River as soon as possible, without regarding the militia collected at Malcolm's mills, and attack Burlington. To my great mortification, upon our arrival at the river, we found it high and rapid from the late excessive rains, and learned that general Brown had re-crossed the Niagara, leaving only a strong garrison in Fort Erie. No means were presented of even passing the river in rafts, and had it been effected, upon our return, the militia, contemptible as they were, might have been encouraged to attack when a rapid river divided us. Major Muir, with about fifty Indians and fifty militia, was preparing to contest the passage. A battery was also erecting as was understood for three pieces of artillery, distant twelve miles on the road from Burlington.

These considerations presented serious objections to any attempts to pass the river; it was also due to the past sufferings and the future safety of the gallant detachment under my command, that a direction should be given to its movements, calculated to afford compensation for the former and secure the latter.

It was therefore determined upon to attack and defeat or

disperse the militia at Malcolm's mills, move down the Long Point road through the Grand River settlement, destroy the valuable mills in that quarter, and then return to our territory, either by a movement across Grand River at the mouth to Fort Erie, or along Talbot's street to the Thames.

To that effect, a detachment was directed to remain and engage the attention of the enemy, whilst the principal force should be withdrawn and marched to Malcolm's mills. We found the enemy, consisting of four or five hundred militia, and a few Indians, fortified on commanding ground beyond a creek, deep and difficult of passage, except at a bridge immediately in front of their works, which had been destroyed. Arrangements were made for a joint attack on the front and rear. The Ohio troops, with the advance-guard and Indians, were accordingly thrown across the creek under cover of a thick wood, to approach the enemy in rear, whilst the Kentucky troops were to attack in front as soon as the attention of the enemy was engaged by the attack in the rear. The enemy would have been completely surprised and captured, had not an unfortunate yell by our Indians announced the approach of the detachment destined to attack their rear; they were, however, defeated and dispersed, with the loss in the skirmishes on that day of one captain and seventeen privates killed, nine privates wounded, and three captains, five subalterns, and one hundred and three privates made prisoners; whilst our loss was only one killed and six wounded. Early on the 7th instant the enemy were pursued on the road to Dover, many made prisoners, and five valuable mills destroyed.

Apprehensive that the troops could not be supplied on the route to Fort Erie, and that difficulties would occur in the passage of Grand River, together with the uncertainty which existed as to the position of our army below, I was induced on the 8th instant to commence my return to this place by the way of Talbot street and the Thames; which was happily effected on the 17th instant.

In this excursion, the resources of the enemy have been essentially impaired, and the destruction of the valuable mills in the vicinity of Grand River, employed in the support of the army in the peninsula, together with the consumption of the forage and provisions necessary for the troops, has added to the barrier heretofore interposed by an extensive and swampy frontier, against any attempts which may be made this winter in the direction of Detroit.

With the exception of nine thousand rations, and eight hundred bushels of forage, the detachment subsisted entirely on the enemy. Of private property no more was destroyed than was absolutely necessary for the support of the troops, for which regular payments or receipts were given. It is, however, much to be regretted, that there were some partial abuses, produced by the unfortunate examples presented by the Indians, whose customs in war impel them to plunder after victory; but for this blemish there was some excuse in their correct and gallant conduct before and during battle. It is also gratifying to know, that they were forgetful of the atrocious deeds committed by the Indians in the service of the enemy; neither the innocent or disarmed have been massacred or molested.

The honourable deportment of the chiefs Lewis, Wolfe, and Civil John, was truly animating to all the troops.

It was essential to the progress of the expedition that the horses of individuals should be taken to supply the place of those that were disabled and lost on the march—in all cases receipts were given.

The Michigan militia were invited to accompany us on the expedition; not more than twenty accepted it—of those, six deserted near Delaware, and the remainder were permitted to return on the next day. Lieutenant Rutland, of captain Audrain's company of rangers from Detroit, was distinguished for zeal and intrepidity.

The patriotic volunteers under my command have just claims on the gratitude of their country, when it is recollected that they tendered their services with no other assurance than the approbation which always attends disinterested sacrifices; that they have performed much severe duty at an inclement season, through an extensive and swampy district, frequently intersected with deep and rapid rivers; that they have penetrated two hundred miles into the enemy's territory, destroyed two hundred stand of arms, together with five of their most valuable mills; parolled or dispersed the greater portion of the efficient militia of that part of Upper Canada west of Grand River, and the whole detachment has returned in safety to this place with the exception of one killed.

The ardour which the troops always evinced when they expected to meet the enemy was not more conspicuous or praiseworthy than the cheerfulness with which they conformed to the rules of military propriety. The officers and privates of the detachment, with a very few exceptions, merited my warmest approbation.

I was much indebted to the zeal and intelligence displayed on all occasions by major Dudley, commanding the Kentucky battalion, and was ably assisted by the zeal and assiduity of doctor Turner of the seventeenth infantry—captain Bradford of the ninteenth infantry—my brigade-major, already distinguished at Fort Meigs and Tehoopcaw, is entitled to my sincere thanks for his exertions under every difficulty, and I have the support of the troops in assuring you, sir, that to the military talents, activity, and intelligence of major Todd, who acted as my adjutant-general, much of the fortunate progress and issue of the expedition is attributable; and I cheerfully embrace this occasion to acknowledge the important services which he has at all times rendered me whilst in command of the district. His various merits justly entitle him to the notice of the government.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. M'ARTHUR,
Brigadier-general, U. S. army, commanding.

Hon. James Monroe, secretary of war, Washington.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, 8th Military District,
Detroit, November 18th, 1814.

The commanding general congratulates the gallant volunteers under his command, upon their safe return, and the fortunate issue to the expedition. He acknowledges with equal pride and pleasure the meritorious conduct of the troops, so conspicuously displayed in their patriotism in the first instance, in their patience under every difficulty, and in the enthusiasm which pervaded all ranks, when they expected to meet the enemy.

Circumstances beyond military controul, and in their nature calculated to reflect on the fidelity of the citizens, on both sides of this river, rendered a movement around Lake St. Clair absolutely necessary to the success of the expedition. This necessity exposed the troops to many difficulties and hardships, in wading frequently along the shores of the lake; in the passage of several deep and rapid rivers, sometimes without boats, and on all occasions encountering swamps. They have the consolation, however, to know, that they have performed a route of more than four hundred miles, one hundred and eighty of which is a wilderness, and a considerable part of that distance too without any road.—The detachment consisting of not more than seven hundred

and twenty effectives, penetrated two hundred miles into the enemy's territory; destroyed upwards of two hundred stand of arms, defeated and dispersed four or five hundred of their militia, encamped in a strong position, with a loss on their part, in the skirmishes of the 6th instant, at Grand River, and Malcolm's mills, of 1 captain and 17 privates killed, and 9 privates wounded, and 3 captains, 5 subalterns, and 103 privates made prisoners during the action and on the retreat, whilst our loss was only 1 killed and 6 wounded. 165 militia were paroled.

As the best evidence of the secrecy and rapidity of the expedition, the detachment was enabled, in despite of treason and stratagem, to enter the town of Oxford, one hundred and forty miles in the enemy's country, before the inhabitants were apprized that a force was approaching. The resources of the enemy have been essentially affected by the fact, that the detachment subsisted entirely upon them; this circumstance, together with the destruction of the five valuable mills in the vicinity of Grand River, which were employed in the support of the army in the peninsula, will present obstacles to any attempts during the winter against this place. These important objects have been effected, and the detachment has returned in complete safety, with the exception of one killed.

The health of the troops was also unexampled; and the unexpected rise in Grand River alone prevented a visit to Burlington Heights, the head-quarters of the province, distant only 25 miles.

The ardour and firmness manifested by the troops whenever they expected to meet the enemy, was not more conspicuous than the cheerfulness with which they obeyed orders, whilst the difficulties they encountered can only be known to those who participated in them. In representing the merits of the gallant corps, and the assistance afforded by each in their respective stations, particular credit is due to that zealous and intelligent officer, major Dudley, and his staff, especially to the activity of adjutant Berry: the good conduct of captains Simpson, Moore, M'Clenny, and Lancaster; lieutenants Caldwell and M'Clain; ensigns Clark and Whitaker, and serjeants Fry and Sopes, all of the Kentucky battalion. Particular notice is also due to the activity of adjutant Wood and Dr. Chapez, of the Ohio battalion; to captain Murray of the Ohio cavalry, captain Campbell, and lieutenant Ellis of the Ohio battalion. The general regrets that captain Dewitt of that corps, in the skirmish at Malcolm's mills, did not ani-

mate his command by his example; and that quarter-master Crouch of the Kentucky battalion possessed no other military qualification than zeal.

The exertions of quarter-master Conner were duly appreciated by the detachment previously to its passage over the river St. Clair, and upon his return to this place, that department was afterwards well conducted by acting quarter-master Reed. Dr. Turner, of the 17th infantry, rendered many important services, and much is due to the activity, zeal, and intelligence displayed by captain Bradford of the 19th infantry, brigade major, already distinguished for his gallantry in the north, as well as the south Lieutenant Rayburn and serjeant Martin of the United States rangers, supported the character which that corps has established for bravery and enterprize. The honourable deportment of the Indian chiefs Lewis, Wolfe, and Civil John, and interpreter Anthony Shane, was truly animating to all the troops.

The mounted troops will be mustered with all practicable despatch, discharged and returned to the interior by companies.

The commanding general returns his most unfeigned thanks to the volunteers under his command, and in taking leave of troops, so much deserving his confidence, begs them to be assured that he will never cease to cherish a lively recollection of their services, with a hope that they may return in safety to their respective homes, to enjoy the society of their families, and the just gratitude of their country.

By command.

C. S. TODD,
Acting adjutant-general.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON, AND OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON IN THE CHESAPEAKE, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THAT EVENT.

Extract of a letter from Joshua Barney, Esq. commanding the United States Flotilla in the Chesapeake, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Patuxent, June 3d, 1814.

On the 1st instant at 6 A. M. we got under way from this place. At 9 the galley and look-out boat signaled the enemy, a brig and schooner below us, the wind light from the northward and inclined to calm; we gave chase, sails and oars, and

came up with them very fast. On approaching, I found that they were two schooners, one a full rigged, showing nine ports on a side. They made signals and fired guns: when off St. Jerome's we discovered a large ship under way, and that she had despatched a number of barges to the assistance of the schooners. Unfortunately at this time the wind shifted to south-west and squally, which brought the ship to windward of us and under a press of sail, steering for Point-Look-Out, of course could cut off from the Potomac. I then made the signal for Patuxent, and was followed by a 74, three schooners, and several barges, with a fresh wind, squally and rain (bad for my boats). At 4 A. M. we doubled round Cedar Point in the mouth of the river, the barges in all sail, as the wind had hauled to the westward, and rowed up under the weather shore. The Scorpion worked in very well, but the gun-boats being in the rear, particularly gun-boat 137 (with provisions), the enemy's force very little astern, finding I must lose No. 137 or risk an engagement, I brought the Scorpion and gun-boat No. 138 to anchor: sent men on board 137 to row and tow her in, the tide and wind being against us. Signaled my barges to return and join me; immediately at this moment No. 138 and myself opened a fire on the large schooner, who was leading in with a number of barges; she immediately bore up and got her boats ahead to tow her off, my barges rowed down upon her and the other schooners, and gave them a number of shot at long distance. We then gave up the chase, got under way with the Scorpion and gun-boats, and returned into port with all the flotilla. During the firing the enemy advanced a barge which threw rockets; but as they cannot be directed with any certainty, they did no execution; but I find they can be thrown further than we can our shot, and conclude from this essay this will be their mode of warfare against the flotilla. The 74 is now anchored off the mouth of this river, the large schooner with her, the barges play about all day, the other schooners have gone down the bay, I presume for more force, in which case some attempt may probably be made to attack us. We lay about three miles up the river (in sight), I shall observe their motions and act accordingly. I now regret not having furnaces for hot shot. In a day or two I expect the enemy will make their arrangements, and if the troops that are in this neighbourhood were ordered to this place, I conceive a good use might be made of them.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy, dated June 4th, 1814.

Sir,

The bearer of the inclosed, on his way to Leonardtown, met major Stuart, with three hundred men of the 36th, marching to Cedar Point; the major has been with me.

The enemy the same as yesterday, except the return of a schooner from below, the weather thick, and blowing so that I cannot well discover their movements. The major sends off an officer with letters to the secretary of war, by whom this goes.

I am just informed that the enemy landed last evening at Cedar Point, carried off several negroes and considerable stock, from a plantation belonging to Mr. Sewall.

Respectfully, yours,

JOSHUA BARNEY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from Commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Patuxent, St. Leonard's Creek, June 9th, 1814.

"Since mine of the 3d and 4th instant the enemy has been reinforced with a razee and a sloop of war brig; I then moved up to the mouth of this creek. At 5 A. M. yesterday, we perceived one ship, a brig, two schooners, and 15 barges coming up the Patuxent, the wind at east; I got the flotilla under way and moved up the creek, about two miles, and moored in line, abreast, across the channel, and prepared for action. At 8 A. M. the enemy's barges came up the creek, a rocket barge was advanced upon us, we fired several shot to try the distance, which fell short.

I got my barges (13 in number), under way, leaving the Scorpion and gun-boats at anchor, and rowed down upon them, when they precipitately fled from their position behind a point, and sailed and rowed off with all their means.

We pursued them until near the shipping, fired several shot among them, when we returned to our moorings. In the afternoon they came up again; again they threw rockets, and were again pursued out of the creek. The militia under colonel Taney are on the alert. I am this moment informed the ship &c. have entered the mouth of the creek."

Extract of a letter from Joshua Barney, Esq. commanding the United States Flotilla in the Chesapeake, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated St. Leonard's Creek, June 13, 1814.

I had the honour of addressing you on the 11th instant, giving a short detail of our action with the enemy on the 10th. By information, they suffered much. The large schooner was nearly destroyed, having several shot through her at the water's edge; her deck torn up, gun dismounted, and mainmast nearly cut off about half way up, and rendered unserviceable. She was otherwise much cut; they ran her ashore to prevent her sinking. The commodore's boat was cut in two; a shot went through the rocket boat; one of the small schooners carrying two thirty-two-pounders had a shot which raked her from aft forward; the boats generally suffered, but I have not ascertained what loss they sustained in men.

Yesterday a gentleman of this county by the name of Parron, who lives at the mouth of the creek, came up, and said that himself and brother had been taken and carried on board. That he had been landed from the commodore, to inform the inhabitants that if they remained at home quietly, they should not be molested, but if on landing he found their houses deserted he would burn them all, as he had done the house of a Mr. Patterson, and the barn of Mr. Skinner (our purser). Saturday and yesterday the enemy were employed on the Patuxent River, in landing on the banks to plunder stock, &c.; it was on Saturday evening they burnt the property of Mr. Patterson and Skinner. Mr. Parron informs me that commodore Barrie of the Dragon always commanded, and is much disappointed at his defeats, for that he had wrote to admiral Cockburn, that if the admiral would send him a frigate and brig he would most assuredly destroy the flotilla. The frigate is the Acasta, the brig the Jasseur. They left only 200 men, and one small boat on board the Dragon, at the mouth of the Patuxent, so that there must have been in the affair on Friday upwards of 800 men, they came with a band of music playing.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Sunday, 26th June, 1814—10 *A. M.*

Sir,

This morning at 4 A. M. a combined attack of the artillery, marine corps, and flotilla was made upon the enemy's two frigates at the mouth of the creek. After two hours engagement they got under way and made sail down the river.

They are now warping round Point Patience, and I am moving up the Patuxent with my flotilla. My loss is acting-midshipman Asquith, killed, and ten others killed and wounded.

Mr. Blake, the bearer of this, was a volunteer in my barge. He will give you every other information. With respect, &c.

JOSHUA BARNEY.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Copy of a letter from Colonel Wadsworth to the Secretary of War, dated Camp near St. Leonard's, June 26.

Sir,

We decided on attacking the enemy this morning at day-break; after one and a half or two hours cannonading he thought proper to retreat down the river, and commodore Barney has taken advantage of his absence to pass his flotilla up the Patuxent. I was constrained to precipitate the attack before I was fully prepared, from the circumstance of all the enemy's small vessels having left the river. The ground I was obliged to occupy for a battery consisted of a high bluff point, having the Patuxent on the right and St. Leonard's creek on the left, with which the communication was over a flat piece of ground, subject to be enfiladed from the Patuxent, and the hill on which the guns were to be placed liable to a reverse fire from the same quarter; therefore, in case of an attack, the enemy might have rendered our situation very uncomfortable, by stationing a small vessel so as to command the low ground I speak of.

We committed a great many blunders during the action, or our success would probably have been more complete. I forbear to enter into minute particulars, lest I should cast an indirect censure on some officers, perhaps undeserved, for I must acknowledge I was so much engaged at the battery as to have but an indistinct knowledge of what passed elsewhere. But the fact is, the infantry and light artillery decided upon retreating without my orders, before they had lost a single man killed or wounded; and at the time too when the enemy were manœuvring to the rear of our position with their barges. The consequence of this movement was very disadvantageous; the men at the guns perceiving the infantry retreating, and the enemy getting into the rear, their numbers began sensibly to diminish, and I was pretty soon left with only men enough to work one gun, which I was necessitated to turn

to the rear for the sake of keeping the barges in check. Finally, the few men that remained were so exhausted with fatigue, we found it impracticable to fire any more, and the limbers and horses which had been ordered down the hill, having disappeared and gone, I know not where, I found myself under the painful necessity of spiking the guns to prevent their being made use of by the enemy, should he get possession of them.

I must, in justice to the infantry, acknowledge they did not take to flight, but quitted the ground in perfect order; after a while I was able to halt them and bring them back. In the mean time the enemy were getting under way and retiring down the river. From the precipitancy of his retreat, I infer he must have suffered considerably. From some untoward circumstances I had it not in my power to observe the effect of each shot we fired, otherwise I think his destruction would have been complete.

Commodore Barney furnished me with twenty excellent men from his flotilla to work the guns. By some mismanagement in loading with a hot shot, one poor fellow had his arms blown off, which is the only material accident we sustained. One of the enemy's rockets passed through an ammunition-box, which had been injudiciously placed, and exploded it, which did some damage. An ammunition cart near it was covered with the fire, but fortunately did not explode. Some other trifling accidents were sustained.

We commenced in the night an epaulment to cover our guns; but the work progressed so little, from the shortness of time, I did not think it best to occupy it. We retreated our guns so as barely to allow the muzzles to peep over the hill. This brought us on descending ground, in a ploughed cornfield. The recoil of the gun downward every time it was fired gave us excessive labour to bring it up to its position. In other respects it answered admirably. The enemy found it impossible to hit either the guns or men. Every shot aimed by them either fell short and struck the bank, or flew clear over. Towards the close of the firing, the enemy adopted the method of using small charges of powder, which just threw his shot over the hill, probably firing from his carronades—but the effect was not more decisive.

To prevent the enemy taking alarm in the night from our movements, we were necessitated to halt our ammunition waggons and carts above a quarter of a mile from the battery, and pass all the stores, even the bricks of which our fur-

nace was constructed, that distance by hand. This fatigued the men excessively. I felt certain, if the enemy should open upon us even a random fire, it would be impossible to get any thing done for the confusion it would create.

I ought to mention that the situation in which the infantry and light artillery were placed, was a trying one for new-raised troops. Most of the shot which missed the battery fell among them. I had anticipated that disadvantage, but it was unavoidable. It was indispensable to have them covered by some rising ground from the waters of the Patuxent, and the position chosen was the only one compatible with that view, and the design I had in posting them to protect the rear of our battery.

The battalion of the thirty-eighth regiment joined us but last evening, after a hard day's march, and were immediately marched to the ground. Some of their men were completely exhausted, and the whole excessively fatigued and half famished.

Commodore Barney's flotilla was at hand, ready to open upon the enemy the moment a favourable opportunity should offer. He commenced firing soon after us, and drew off that of the enemy for a while. I have not seen him since the action, but understand he lost several men killed and wounded.

I hope, on the whole, taking into consideration our not being fully prepared, the excessive fatigue the men had undergone, and that we have attained the object in view, which was the release of commodore Barney's flotilla, the affair will not reflect dishonour on our troops.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DECIUS WADSWORTH.

General John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Abstract of reports from Rear-Admiral Cockburn to Vice-Admiral Cochrane.

June 1st, 1814.

The rear-admiral incloses a letter from captain Ross, of his majesty's ship Albion, dated off Tangier Sound, the 29th of May, giving an account of his having with the boats of that ship, and the Dragon, proceeded into the river Pungoteak, in Virginia, for the purpose of destroying any batteries or capturing any vessels that he might find there. There were no vessels in the river: but a party of seamen and marines were landed to attack a battery, which they took possession of, after a smart firing, notwithstanding the mili-

tia which collected on the occasion, and re-embarked after destroying the work, barracks, and guard-houses, and bringing away a six-pounder gun with its carriage.

June 22d.

The rear-admiral transmits four letters from captain Barrie, of his majesty's ship Dragon, dated between the 1st and 19th of June, reporting his proceedings while despatched by rear-admiral Cockburn, against the flotilla fitted out at Baltimore, under the orders of commodore Barney.

On the first of June, captain Barrie, with the St. Lawrence schooner, and the boats of the Albion and Dragon, fell in with the flotilla standing down the Chesapeake, and retreated before it towards the Dragon, then at anchor off Smith's Point. This ship having got under way, captain Barrie wore with the schooner and boats, but the flotilla made off and escaped into the Patuxent river. The Dragon being obliged to come again to an anchor, and the boats not being strong enough to attack the flotilla, captain Barrie endeavoured to induce the enemy to separate his force, by detaching two boats to cut off a schooner under Cove Point, but the Americans suffered this vessel to be burnt in the face of the flotilla, without attempting to save her.

On the 8th the flotilla retreated higher up the Patuxent, and captain Barrie being joined on the following day by the Loire and Jaseur brig, he proceeded up the river with them, the St. Lawrence schooner, and the boats of the Albion and Dragon. The enemy retreated into St. Leonard's creek, into which they could only be pursued by the boats, which were too inferior in force to allow of any attack being made by them alone; captain Barrie endeavoured, however, to provoke the enemy by rockets and carronades from the boats, to come down within reach of the ship's guns. The flotilla was at one time so much galled by these attacks, that it quitted its position, and chased the boats, and after a slight skirmish with the smaller vessels it returned precipitately to its original position. With a view to force the flotilla to quit this station, detachments of seamen and marines were landed on both sides of the river, and the enemy's militia (though assembled to the number of three to five hundred) retreating before them into the woods, the marines destroyed two tobacco stores, and several houses, which formed military posts. On the 15th the Narcissus joined, and captain Barrie determined to proceed up the river with twelve boats, having in them one hundred and eighty marines, and thirty of the black colonial corps; they proceeded to Benedict, whence a party

of regulars fled at the approach, leaving behind several muskets, and part of their camp equipage, with a six-pounder, which was spiked; a store of tobacco was also found there; captain Barrie advanced from thence towards Marlborough, and although only eighteen miles from Washington, took possession of the place, the militia and inhabitants flying in the woods. A schooner was loaded with tobacco, and the boats plentifully supplied with stock, after which having burnt tobacco stores, containing two thousand five hundred hogsheads, the detachment re-embarked. The enemy collected three hundred and sixty regulars and some militia on some cliffs which the boats had to pass; but some marines being landed, traversed the skirts of the heights, and re-embarked without molestation; and the enemy did not show himself till the boats were out of gun-shot. Captain Barrie commends, in high terms, the conduct of all the officers and men, seamen and marines, under his orders, as well as that of the colonial corps, composed of armed blacks; and rear-admiral Cockburn takes the opportunity of expressing his high sense of the personal exertions and able conduct displayed by captain Barrie.

June 25th.

The rear-admiral transmits a report from lieutenant Urmston, first of the Albion, of a successful attack made by the boats of the squadron, under the lieutenant's direction, on a post established by the enemy at Chissene-sick, on the main land, abreast of Watt's island. The detachment landed, notwithstanding a fire of grape and musketry, drove the enemy from the post, and destroyed the guard-houses, &c. bringing away a six-pounder, the only gun of the enemy at that place. Great gallantry was displayed by all employed on this occasion.

July 6th.

The rear-admiral incloses two reports addressed to him by captains Brown and Nourse, of the Loire and Severn: the former, dated the 27th of June, states that the enemy having established a battery on the banks of the Patuxent which opened on the Loire and Narcissus, he had judged it proper to move the two ships lower down the river, when the flotilla under commodore Barney moved out of St. Leonard's creek and ran higher up the Patuxent, with the exception of one row-boat, which returned to the creek apparently damaged by the fire of the frigates. The latter from captain Nourse, dated the 7th of July, reports his joining the ships in the Patuxent; and having moved them up beyond St. Leonard's

creek, he sent captain Brown with the marines of the ships up the creek, by whom two of the enemy's gun-boats that were found drawn up and scuttled, were with other vessels burnt, and a large tobacco store destroyed.

July 19*th.*

The rear-admiral states that having been joined by a battalion of marines, he proceeded up the Potomac with a view to attack Leonard's town, the capital of St. Mary's county, where the 36th regiment was stationed. The marines were landed under major Lewis, whilst the boats pulled up in front of the town; but on discovering the British, the enemy's armed force quitted the place, and suffered them to take quiet possession of it. A quantity of stores belonging to the 36th regiment, and a number of arms of different descriptions, were found here and destroyed; a quantity of tobacco, flour, provisions, and other articles, were brought away in the boats and in a schooner lying off the town. Not a musket being fired, nor an armed enemy seen, the town was accordingly spared.

July 21*st.*

The rear-admiral reports, that the enemy having collected some Virginia militia at a place called Nominy ferry, in Virginia, a considerable way up Nominy river, he proceeded thither with their boats and marines (the latter commanded by captain Robyns, during the illness of major Lewis). The enemy's position was on a very commanding eminence, projecting into the water; but some marines being landed on its flank, and soon getting up the craggy side of the mountain, while the main body landed at the ferry, the enemy fell back, and though pursued several miles till the approach of night, escaped with the loss of a few prisoners. They had withdrawn their field artillery, and hid it in the woods; fearing that if they kept it to use against the British, they would not be able to retreat with it quick enough to save it from capture. After taking on board all the tobacco, and other stores found in the place, with a quantity of cattle, and destroying all the store-houses and buildings, the rear-admiral re-embarked; and dropping down to another point of the Nominy, he observed some movements on shore, upon which he again landed with marines. The enemy fired a volley at them, but on the advance of the marines, fled into the woods. Every thing in the neighbourhood was therefore also destroyed or brought off; and after visiting the country in several other directions, covering the escape of the negroes who were anxious to join him, he quitted the river, and returned to the ships with one

hundred and thirty-five refugee negroes, two captured schooners, a large quantity of tobacco, dry-goods, and cattle, and a few prisoners.

July 24th.

The rear-admiral gives an account of his having gone up St. Clement's creek, St. Mary's county, with the boats and marines, to examine the country. The militia showed themselves occasionally, but always retreated when pursued; and the boats returned to the ships without any casualty, having captured four schooners and destroyed one. The inhabitants having remained peaceably in their houses, the rear-admiral did not suffer any injury to be done to them excepting at one farm, from which two musket-shots were fired at the admiral's gig, and where the property was therefore destroyed.

July 31st.

The rear-admiral reports, that having on the 26th proceeded to the head of the Machodick river, in Virginia, where he burnt six schooners, whilst the marines marched without opposition over the country on the banks of that river, and there not remaining any other place on the Virginia or St. Mary's side of his last anchorage that he had not visited, he, on the 28th, caused the ships to move above Blackstone's Island, and on the 29th proceeded with the boats and marines up the Wicomico river; he landed at Hamburgh and Chaptico, from which latter place he shipped a considerable quantity of tobacco and visited several houses in different parts of the country, the owners of which living quietly with their families, and seeming to consider themselves and their neighbourhood at his disposal, he caused no farther inconvenience to them, than obliging them to furnish supplies of cattle and stock for the use of his forces.

August 4th.

The rear-admiral states, that on the 2d the squadron dropped down the Potomac, near the entrance of the Yocomoco river, which he entered the following day with the boats and marines, and landed with the latter. The enemy had here collected in great force, and made more resistance than usual; but the ardour and determination of the rear-admiral's gallant little band carried all before them: and after forcing the enemy to give way, they followed him ten miles up the country, captured a field-piece, and burnt several houses which had been converted into depots for militia, arms, &c. Learning afterwards that general Hungerford, had rallied his men at Kinsale, the rear-admiral proceeded thither; and though the enemy's position was extremely strong, he had only time

to give the British an ineffectual volley, before they gained the height, when he again retired with precipitation, and did not re-appear. The stores found at Kinsale were then shipped without molestation; and having burnt the store-houses and other places, with two old schooners, and destroyed two batteries, the rear-admiral re-embarked, bringing away five prize schooners and a large quantity of tobacco, flour, &c. a field-piece, and a few prisoners. The American general, Taylor, was wounded and unhorsed, and escaped only through the thickness of the wood and bushes, into which he ran. The British had three men killed, and as many wounded. The conduct of the officers and men on this occasion calls for the rear-admiral's particular commendation; with five hundred men they penetrated ten miles into the enemy's country, and skirmished back surrounded by woods, in the face of the whole collected militia of Virginia, under generals Hungerford and Taylor; and after this long march carried the heights of Kinsale in the most gallant manner.

August 8th.

The rear-admiral states, that Coan river, a few miles from Yocomoco, being the only inlet on the Virginia side of the Potomac that he had not visited, he proceeded on the 7th to attack it with the boats and marines: after a tolerably quick fire on the boats, the enemy went off precipitately with the guns: the battery was destroyed, and the river ascended, in which three schooners were captured, and some tobacco brought off.

August 13th.

The rear-admiral gives an account of his having, on the 12th, proceeded up St. Mary's creek, and landed in various parts of the country about that extensive inlet, but without seeing a single armed person, though militia had formerly been stationed at St. Mary's factory for defence; the inhabitants of the state appearing to consider it wiser to submit than to attempt opposition.

August 15th.

The rear-admiral reports his having again on that day landed within St. Mary's creek, but found on the different parts of the country, the same quiet and submissive conduct on the part of the inhabitants, as in the places visited on the 12th.—Throughout the whole of these operations, rear-admiral Cockburn repeats the highest encomiums on all the officers and men of the ships and marines under his orders. Although from the nature of the country, and the excessive heat of the climate, these services must have been more ha-

rassing, they were carried on with greater cheerfulness and perseverance.

The captains of his majesty's ships, on all occasions, volunteered, to accompany the rear-admiral. To lieutenant-colonel Malcolm and major Lewis of the royal marines, he expresses his obligations, as well as to the other officers of that corps. The conduct of the men was also deserving of the greatest praise; and though the re-embarkations frequently took place in the night, yet during the whole of the operations neither a sailor nor a marine was reported missing.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Winder to the Secretary of War, dated Baltimore, August 27, 1815.

Sir,

When the enemy arrived at the mouth of the Potomac, of all the militia which I had been authorised to assemble, there were but about 1700 in the field, from 13 to 1400 under general Stansbury near this place, and about 250 at Bladensburg, under lieutenant-colonel Kramer; the slow progress of draft, and the imperfect organization, with the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to have procured more.

The militia of this state, and of the contiguous parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, were called on en masse, but the former militia law of Pennsylvania had expired the 1st of June or July, and the one adopted in its place is not to take effect in organising the militia before October. No aid therefore has been received from that state.

After all the force that could be put at my disposal in that short time, and making such dispositions as I deemed best calculated to present the most respectable force at whatever point the enemy might strike, I was enabled by the most active and harassing movement of the troops to interpose before the enemy at Bladensburg about 5000 men, including 350 regulars and commodore Barney's command. Much the largest portion of this force arrived on the ground when the enemy were in sight, and were disposed of to support in the best manner the position which general Stansbury had taken. They had barely reached the ground before the action commenced, which was about one o'clock, P. M., of the 24th instant, and continued about an hour. The contest was not as obstinately maintained as could have been desired, but was by parts of the troops sustained with great spirit and with prodigious effect, and had the whole of our force been equally

firm, I am induced to believe the enemy would have been repulsed, notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which we fought. The artillery from Baltimore, supported by major Pinkney's rifle battalion, and a part of captain Doughty's from the navy yard, were in advance to command the pass of the bridge at Bladensburg, and played upon the enemy, as I have since learned, with very destructive effect. But the rifle troops were obliged after some time to retire, and of course the artillery. Superior numbers however rushed upon them and made their retreat necessary, not. however, without great loss on the part of the enemy. Major Pinkney received a severe wound in his right arm after he had retired to the left flank of Stansbury's brigade. The right and centre of Stansbury's brigade, consisting of lieutenant-colonels Ragan and Shuter's regiments, generally gave way very soon afterwards, with the exception of about 40, rallied by colonel Ragan, after having lost his horse, and the whole or a part of captain Shower's company, both of whom general Stansbury represents to have made, even thus deserted, a gallant stand.

The fall which lieutenant-colonel Ragan received from his horse, together with his great efforts to sustain his position, rendered him unable to follow the retreat; we have therefore to lament that this gallant and excellent officer has been taken prisoner; he has however been paroled, and I met him here recovering from the bruises occasioned by his fall. The loss of his services at this moment is serious.

The 5th Baltimore regiment under lieutenant-colonel Sterrett, being the left of brigadier-general Stansbury's brigade, still, however, stood their ground, and except for a moment when part of them recoiled a few steps, remained firm, and stood until ordered to retreat, with a view to prevent them from being outflanked.

The reserve under brigadier-general Smith of the district of Columbia, with the militia of the city and Georgetown, with the regulars and some detachments of Maryland militia, flanked on their right by commodore Barney and his brave fellows, and lieutenant-colonel Beal, still were to the right on the hill, and maintained the contest for some time with great effect.

It is not with me to report the conduct of commodore Barney and his command, nor can I speak from observation, being too remote, but the concurrent testimony of all that did observe them, the highest justice for their brave resistance and the destructive effect they produced on the enemy. Commodore Barney, after having lost his horse, took post near

one of his guns, and there unfortunately received a severe wound in the thigh, and he also fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain Miller, of the marines, was wounded in the arm, fighting bravely. From the best intelligence, there remains but little doubt that the enemy lost at least four hundred killed and wounded, and of these a very unusual portion killed.

Our loss cannot, I think, be estimated at more than from thirty to forty killed, and fifty to sixty wounded.

They took altogether about 120 prisoners.

You will readily understand that it is impossible for me to speak minutely of the merit or demerit of particular troops so little known to me from their recent and hasty assemblage. My subsequent movement for the purpose of preserving as much of my force as possible, gaining reinforcements, and protecting this place, you already know.

I am, with very great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. WINDER,

Brig.-gen. 10th military district.

Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

N. B. We have to lament, that captain Sterrett, of the 5th Baltimore regiment, has also been wounded, but is doing well. Other officers, no doubt, deserve notice, but I am as yet unable to particularize.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Barney to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Farm, at Elkridge, August 29th, 1814.

Sir,

This is the first moment I have had it in my power to make a report of the proceedings of the forces under my command since I had the honour of seeing you on Tuesday, the 23d instant, at the camp at the "Old Fields." On the afternoon of that day we were informed that the enemy was advancing upon us. Our army was put into order of battle, and our positions taken; my forces were on the right, flanked by the two battalions of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth regiments, where we remained some hours. The enemy did not, however, make his appearance. A little before sun-set general Winder came to me and recommended that the heavy artillery should be withdrawn, with the exception of one twelve-pounder to cover the retreat. We took up the line of march, and in the night entered Washington by the Eastern Branch bridge. I marched my men, &c. to the marine barracks, and took up quarters for the night. About two o'clock, general Winder came to my quarters, and we made some arrange-

ments. In the morning I received a note from general Winder, and waited upon him. He requested me to take command and place my artillery to defend the passage of the bridge on the eastern Branch, as the enemy was approaching the city in that direction. I immediately put my guns in position, leaving the marines and the rest of my men at the barracks, to wait further orders. I was in this situation when I had the honour to meet you with the president and heads of departments, when it was determined I should draw off my guns and men, and proceed towards Bladensburg, which was immediately put into execution. On our way I was informed the enemy was within a mile of Bladensburg: we hurried on, though the day was very hot, and my men much crippled from the severe marches we had experienced the preceding days. I preceded the men, and when I arrived at the line which separates the district from Maryland, the battle began. I sent an officer back to hasten on my men—they came up in a trot. We took our position on the rising ground, put the pieces in battery, posted the marines under captain Miller, and flotilla men, who were to act as infantry under their own officers, on my right, to support the pieces, and waited the approach of the enemy. During this period the engagement continued—the enemy advancing, and our army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road in force and in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt; I reserved our fire; in a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an eighteen-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward, but all who made the attempt were destroyed. The enemy then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right. He was there met by three twelve-pounders, the marines under captain Miller, and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred posted on a height on my right, from whom I expected much support from their fine situation. The enemy from this period never appeared in force in front of us. He however pushed forward his sharpshooters, one of whom shot my horse from under me, which fell dead between two of my guns. The enemy, who had been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour, now began to outflank us on the right. Our guns were turned that way; he pushed up the hill with about two or three hundred men towards the corps of Americans stationed as above described,

who, to my great mortification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two and retiring.

In this situation we had the whole army of the enemy to contend with; our ammunition was expended, and unfortunately the drivers of my ammunition waggons had gone off in the general panic. At this time I received a severe wound in my thigh. Captain Miller was wounded, sailing-master Warner killed, acting sailing-master Martin killed, and sailing-master Martin wounded, but to the honour of my officers and men, as fast as their companions and mess-mates fell at the guns, they were instantly replaced from those acting as infantry. Finding the enemy now completely in our rear, and no means of defence, I gave orders to my officers to retire. Three of my officers assisted me to get off a short distance, but the great loss of blood occasioned such a weakness that I was compelled to lie down. I requested my officers to leave me, which they obstinately refused, but upon being ordered they obeyed—one only remained. In a short time I observed a British soldier and had him called, and directed him to seek an officer—in a few minutes an officer came, who, on learning who I was, brought general Ross and admiral Cockburn to me. These officers behaved to me with the most marked attention, respect, and politeness, had a surgeon brought and my wounds dressed immediately. After a few minutes conversation the general informed me (after paying me a handsome compliment) that I was paroled and at liberty to proceed to Washington or Bladensburg, as was also Mr. Huffington who had remained with me, offering me every assistance in his power, giving orders for a litter to be brought, in which I was carried to Bladensburg. Captain Wainwright, first captain to admiral Cochrane, remained with me, and behaved to me as if I was a brother.

During the stay of the enemy at Bladensburg I received the most polite attention from the officers both of the navy and army.

My wound is deep, but I flatter myself not dangerous—the ball is not yet extracted. I fondly hope a few weeks will restore me to health, and that an exchange will take place that I may resume my command, or any other that you and the president may honour me with.

Yours, respectfully,

JOSHUA BARNEY.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Extracts of a letter from Commodore Tingey, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Navy Yard, Washington, 27th August, 1814.

Sir,

After receiving your orders of the 24th, directing the public shipping, stores, &c. at this establishment to be destroyed, in case of the success of the enemy over our army—no time was lost in making the necessary arrangements for firing the whole, and preparing boats for departing from the yard, as you had suggested.

About four P. M. I received a message by an officer from the secretary of war, with information that he "could protect me no longer." Soon after this, I was informed that the conflagration of the Eastern Branch bridge had commenced—and, in a few minutes, the explosion announced the blowing up of that part, near the "draw," as had been arranged in the morning.

The intended fate of the navy yard had before been publicly announced to the neighbours, in order that they might take every possible precaution for the safety of themselves, families, and property.

Immediately several individuals came in succession, endeavouring to prevail on me to deviate from my instructions —which they were invariably informed was unavailing, unless they could bring me your instructions in writing, countermanding those previously given.

A deputation also of the most respectable women came on the same errand—when I found myself painfully necessitated to inform them that any farther importunities would cause the matches to be instantly applied to the trains—with assurance, however, that if left at peace, I would delay the execution of the orders as long as I could feel the least shadow of justification. Captain Creighton's arrival at the yard, with the men who had been with him at the bridge (probably about five o'clock) would have justified me in instant operation—but he also was strenuous in the desire to obviate the intended destruction; and volunteered to ride out, and gain me positive information as to the position of the enemy, under the hope that our army might have rallied and repulsed them. I was myself indeed desirous of delay, for the reason that the wind was then blowing fresh from the S. S. W., which would most probably have caused the destruction of all the private property north and east of the yard, in its neighbourhood, being of opinion also, that the close of the evening would bring with it a calm, in which happily we

were not disappointed. Other gentlemen, well mounted, volunteered, as captain Creighton had done, to go out and bring me positive intelligence of the enemy's situation, if possible to obtain it.

The evening came, and I waited with much anxiety the return of captain Creighton, having almost continual information, that the enemy were in the neighbourhood of the marine barracks—at the Capitol Hill—and that their advance was near Georgetown; I therefore determined to wait only until half past eight o'clock, to commence the execution of my orders, becoming apprehensive that captain Creighton had, from his long stay, fallen into the hands of the enemy. During this delay, I ordered a few marines, and other persons who were then near me, to go off in one of the small gallies, which was done, and that boat is saved. Colonel Wharton had been furnished with a light boat, with which he left the yard, probably between seven and eight o'clock.

At twenty minutes past eight, captain Creighton returned; he was extremely averse to the destruction of the property, but having informed him that your orders to me were imperative; the proper disposition of the boats being made, the matches were applied, and in a few moments the whole was in a state of irretrieveable conflagration.

When about leaving the wharf, I observed the fire had also commenced at the works at Greenleaf's point, and in the way out of the Branch, we observed the capitol on fire.

It had been my intention not to leave the vicinity of the yard, with my boat, during the night, but having captain Creighton and other gentlemen with me, she was too much encumbered and over-laden to render that determination proper. We therefore proceeded to Alexandria, in the vicinity of which I rested till the morning of the 25th, when we left Alexandria at half past seven o'clock, and proceeded again to the yard, where I landed unmolested about a quarter before nine.

The schooner Lynx had laid alongside the burning wharf, still unhurt; hoping, therefore, to save her, we hauled her to the quarter of the hulk of the New-York, which had also escaped the rages of the flames.

The detail issuing store of the navy store keeper, had remained safe from the fire during the night, which the enemy (being in force in the yard) about eight o'clock set fire to and it was speedily consumed. It appeared they had left the yard about half an hour when we arrived.

From the number and movements of the enemy, it would

have appeared rash temerity to have attempted returning again that day—though my inclination strongly urged it: therefore reconnoitering their motions, as well as could be effected at a convenient distance in the gig, until evening, I again proceeded to Alexandria for the night.

Yesterday morning the 26th, it was impossible to form (from the various and contradictory reports at Alexandria) any sort of probable conjecture either of the proceedings and situation of our army, or that of the enemy. Determining therefore to have a positive knowledge of some part thereof, from occular demonstration, I again embarked in the gig, proceeding with due caution to the yard, where I learned with chagrin devastation and pillage had commenced; and found also to my surprize that the old gun-boat, which had been loaded with provisions, and had grounded in endeavouring to get out of the Branch, on the evening of the 24th, was nearly discharged of her cargo, by a number of our people, without connexion with each other.

Having landed in the yard, I soon ascertained that the enemy had left the city, excepting only a serjeant's guard, for the security of the sick and wounded. Finding it impracticable to stop the scene of plunder that had commenced, I determined instantly on repossessing the yard, with all the force at my command; repairing, therefore, immediately to Alexandria, lieutenant Haraden, the ordinary men, and the few marines there, were ordered directly up, following myself, and got full possession again at evening.

I am now collecting the scattered, purloined provisions, ready for your orders, presuming they will now become very scarce indeed—the quantity saved you shall be informed of when known to me.

The Lynx is safe, except her foremast being carried away in the storm of the 25th, about four P. M. We have also another of the gun-boats, with about 100 barrels of powder; and one of the large yard-cutters, nearly full with the filled cylinders for our different guns previously mounted—the powder of those, however, is probably much wetted by the storm.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

T. TINGEY.

Honourable Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Copies of despatches from Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, K. B. to John Wilson Croker, Esq.

Sir, *Tonnant, in the Patuxent, September* 2, 1814.

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of my lords commissioners of the admiralty, of the proceedings of his majesty's combined forces since my arrival within the capes of Virginia; and I beg leave to offer my congratulations to their lordships upon the successful termination of an expedition, in which the whole of the enemy's flotilla under commodore Barney has been captured or destroyed; his army, though greatly superior in number, and strongly posted with cannon, defeated at Bladensburg; the city of Washington taken; the capitol, with all the public buildings, military arsenals, dock-yard, and the rest of their naval establishment, together with a vast quantity of naval and military stores, a frigate of the largest class ready to launch, and a sloop of war afloat, either blown up or reduced to ashes.

Such a series of successes in the centre of an enemy's country, surrounded by a numerous population, could not be acquired without loss, and we have to lament the fall of some valuable officers and men; but considering the difficulties the forces had to contend with, the heat of the climate, and their coming into action at the end of a long march, our casualties are astonishingly few.

My letter of the 11th August will have acquainted their lordships of my waiting in the Chesapeake for the arrival of rear-admiral Malcolm, with the expedition from Bermuda.

The rear-admiral joined me on the 17th, and as I had information from rear-admiral Cockburn, whom I found in the Potomac, that commodore Barney, with the Baltimore flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of the Patuxent, this afforded a pretext for ascending that river to attack him near its source, above Pig Point, while the ultimate destination of the combined force was Washington, should it be found that the attempt might be made with any prospect of success. To give their lordships a more correct idea of the place of attack, I send a sketch of the country, upon which the movements of the army and navy are pourtrayed; by it their lordships will observe that the best approach to Washington is by Port Tobacco upon the Potomac, and Benedict upon the Patuxent; from both of which are direct and good roads to that city, and their distances nearly alike; the roads from Benedict divide nearly five miles inland; the one by Piscataway

and Bladensburg, the other following the course of the river, although at some distance from it, owing to the creeks that run up the country; this last passes through the town of Nottingham and Marlborough to Bladensburg, at which town the river called the Eastern Branch, that bounds Washington to the eastward, is fordable, and the distance is about five miles. There are two bridges over this river at the city; but it was not to be expected that the enemy would leave them accessible to an invading army.

Previously to my entering the Patuxent, I detached captain Gordon, of his majesty's ship Seahorse, with the ships and bombs named in the margin, in the Potomac, to bombard fort Washington (which is situated on the left bank of that river, about ten or twelve miles below the city), with a view of destroying that fort, and opening a free communication above, as well as to cover the retreat of the army, should its return by the Bladensburg road be found too hazardous, from the accession of strength the enemy might obtain from Baltimore; it was also reasonable to expect, that the militia from the country to the northward and westward would flock in, so soon as it should be known that the capital was threatened.

Captain sir Peter Parker, in the Menelaus, with some small vessels, was sent up the Chesapeake above Baltimore, to divert the attention of the enemy in that quarter, and I proceeded with the remainder of the naval force and the troops, up this river, and landed the army upon the 19th and 20th, at Benedict.

So soon as the necessary provisions and stores could be assembled and arranged, major-general Ross, with his army, moved towards Nottingham, while our flotilla, consisting of the armed launches, pinnaces, barges, and other boats of the fleet, under the command of rear-admiral Cockburn, passed up the river, being instructed to keep upon the right flank of the army, for the double purpose of supplying it with provisions, and, if necessary, to pass it over to the left bank of the river, into Calvert county, which secured a safe retreat to the ships, should it be judged necessary.

The army reached Nottingham upon the 21st, and on the following day arrived at Marlborough; the flotilla continued advancing towards the station of commodore Barney, about three miles above Pig Point, who although much superior in force to that sent against him, did not wait an attack, but, at the appearance of our boats, set fire to his flotilla, and the whole of his vessels, excepting one, were blown up.

For the particulars of this well executed service, I must refer their lordships to rear-admiral Cockburn's report No. 1, who, on the same evening, conveyed to me an account of his success, and intimation from major-general Ross, of his intention to proceed to the city of Washington, considering, from the information he had received, that it might be assailed, if done with alacrity, and in consequence had determined to march that evening upon Bladensburg. The remaining boats of the fleet were immediately employed in conveying up the river supplies of provisions for the forces, upon their return to Nottingham, agreeably to an arrangement made by the rear-admiral, who proceeded on in company with the army.

The report No. 2, of rear-admiral Cockburn's, will inform their lordships of the brilliant success of the forces, after their departure from Marlborough, when they returned upon the 26th, and having reached Benedict upon the 29th, the expedition was embarked in good order.

On combined services, such as we have been engaged in, it gives me the greatest pleasure to find myself united with so able and experienced an officer as major-general Ross, in whom are blended those qualities so essential to promote success, where co-operation between the two services become necessary; and I have much satisfaction in noticing the unanimity that prevailed between the army and navy, as I have also in stating to their lordships that major-general Ross has expressed his full approbation of the conduct of the officers, seamen, and marines, acting with the army.

I have before had occasion to speak of the unremitting zeal and exertions of rear-admiral Cockburn during the time he commanded in the Chesapeake under my orders: the interest and ability which he has manifested throughout this late arduous service, justly entitle him to my best thanks, and to the acknowledgments of my lords commissioners of the admiralty.

Rear-admiral Malcolm, upon every occasion, and particularly in his arrangement for the speedy re-embarkation of the troops, rendered me essential assistance, and to him, as well as to rear-admiral Codrington, captain of the fleet, I am indebted for the alacrity and order with which the laborious duties in the conveying of supplies to the army were conducted.

For the conduct of the captains and officers of the squadron employed in the flotilla, and with the army, I must beg leave to refer their lordships to the reports of rear-admiral Cock-

burn, and to call their favourable consideration to those whom the rear-admiral has had occasion particularly to notice. While employed immediately under my eye, I had every reason to be perfectly satisfied with their zealous emulation, as well as that of every seaman and marine, to promote the service in which they were engaged.

Captain Wainwright, of his majesty's ship Tonnant, will have the honour to deliver this despatch to you, and as he was actually employed both with the flotilla and with the army in the whole of their proceedings, I beg leave to refer their lordships to him for any farther particulars.

I have not yet received any returns from the ships employed in the Potomac, the winds having been unfavourable to their coming down; but, by the information I gain from the country-people, they have completely succeeded in the capture and destruction of fort Washington, which has been blown up.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ALEX. COCHRANE,
Vice-admiral and commander in chief.

John Wilson Croker, Esq.

On board the Resolution tender, off Mount Calvert.
Monday-night, 22d August, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, that after parting from you at Benedict on the evening of the 20th instant, I proceeded up the Patuxent with the boats and tenders, the marines of the ships being embarked in them, under the command of captain Robyns (the senior officer of that corps in the fleet), and the marine artillery, under captain Harrison, in their two tenders; the Severn and Hebrus frigates, and the Manly sloop, being directed to follow us up the river as far as might prove practicable.

The boats and tenders I placed in three divisions; the first under the immediate command of captains Sullivan (the senior commander employed on the occasion) and Badcock; the second, under captains Money and Somerville; the third, under captain Ramsay;—the whole under the superintendance and immediate management of captain Wainwright of the Tonnant, lieutenant James Scott (first of the Albion) attending as my aid-de-camp.

I endeavoured to keep with the boats and tenders as nearly as possible abreast of the army under major-general Ross, that I might communicate with him as occasion offered, according to the plan previou[illegible] arranged; and about mid-day yesterday I accordingly anchored at the ferry-house opposite

Lower Marlborough, where I met the general; and where the army halted for some hours, after which he marched for Nottingham, and I proceeded on for the same place with the boats. On our approaching that town a few shots were exchanged between the leading boats and some of the enemy's cavalry; but the appearance of our army advancing caused them to retire with precipitation. Captains Nourse and Palmer, of the Severn and Hebrus, joined me this day with their boats, having found it impracticable to get their ships higher than Benedict.

The major-general remained with the army at Nottingham, and the boats and tenders continued anchored off it during the night: and soon after day-light this morning, the whole moved again forward, but the wind blowing during the morning down the river, and the channel being excessively narrow, and the advance of our tenders consequently slow, I judged it advisable to push on with the boats, only leaving the tenders to follow as they could.

On approaching Pig Point (where the enemy's flotilla was said to be), I landed the marines under captain Robyns on the left bank of the river, and directed him to march round and attack, on the land-side, the town situated on the point, to draw from us the attention of such troops as might be there for its defence, and the defence of the flotilla; I then proceeded on with the boats, and, as we opened the reach above Pig Point, I plainly discovered commodore Barney's broad pendant in the head-most vessel, a large sloop, and the remainder of the flotilla extending in a long line astern of her. Our boats now advanced towards them as rapidly as possible; but, on nearing them, we observed the sloop bearing the broad pendant to be on fire, and she very soon afterwards blew up. I now saw clearly that they were all abandoned, and on fire, with trains to their magazines; and out of the seventeen vessels which composed this formidable and so much vaunted flotilla, sixteen were in quick succession blown to atoms, and the seventeenth (in which the fire had not taken) we captured. The commodore's sloop was a large armed vessel; the others were gun-boats, all having a long gun in the bow, and a carronade in the stern; the calibre of the guns and number of the crew of each differed in proportion to the size of the boat, varying from 32-pounders and 60 men to 18-pounders and 40 men. I found here lying above the flotilla, under its protection, 13 merchant schooners, some of which not being worth bringing away I caused to be burnt; such as were in good condition I directed to be moved to Pig

Point. Whilst employed in taking these vessels, a few shot were fired at us by some of the men of the flotilla from the bushes on the shore near us; but lieutenant Scott, whom I had landed for that purpose, soon got hold of them and made them prisoners. Some horsemen likewise showed themselves on the neighbouring heights, but a rocket or two dispersed them; and captain Robyns, who had got possession of Pig Point without resistance, now spreading his men through the country, the enemy retreated to a distance, and left us in quiet possession of the town, the neighbourhood, and the prizes.

A large quantity of tobacco having been found in the town at Pig Point, I have left captain Robyns, with the marines, and captain Nourse, with two divisions of the boats, to hold the place and ship the tobacco into the prizes, and I have moved back with the third division to this point, to enable me to confer on our future operations with the major-general, who has been good enough to send his aid-de-camp to inform me of his safe arrival, with the army under his command, at Upper Marlborough.

In congratulating you, sir, which I do most sincerely, on the complete destruction of this flotilla of the enemy, which has lately occupied so much of our attention, I must beg to be permitted to assure you, that the cheerful and indefatigable exertions on this occasion, of captains Wainwright, Nourse, and Palmer, and of captain Sullivan, the commanders, officers, and men, in the boats you have placed under my orders, most justly entitle them to my warmest acknowledgments, and my earnest recommendation to your favourable notice.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) G. COCKBURN,
Rear-admiral.

The honourable sir A. Cochrane, K. B.

His Majesty's ship Manly, off Nottingham.

Sir, *Patuxent, August* 27.

I have the honour to inform you that, agreeably to the intentions I notified to you in my letter of the 22d instant, I proceeded by land on the morning of the 23d to Upper Marlborough, to meet and confer with major-general Ross as to our further operations against the enemy, and were not long in agreeing on the propriety of making an immediate attempt on the city of Washington.

In conformity therefore with the wishes of the general, I instantly sent orders for our marine and naval forces at Pig Point, to be forthwith moved over to Mount Calvert, and

for the marines, marine artillery, and a portion of the seamen to be there landed, and with the utmost possible expedition to join the army, which I also readily agreed to accompany.

The major-general then made his dispositions, and arranged that captain Robyns, with the marines of the ships, should retain possession of Upper Marlborough, and that the marine artillery and seamen should follow the army to the ground it was to occupy for the night. The army then moved on, and bivouacked before dark, about five miles nearer Washington.

In the night, captain Palmer of the Hebrus, and captain Money of the Trave, joined us with the seamen and with the marine artillery, under captain Harrison; captain Wainwright of the Tonnant, had accompanied me the day before, as had also lieutenant James Scott (acting first lieutenant) of the Albion.

At daylight in the morning of the 24th, the major-general again put the army in motion, directing his march upon Bladensburg, on reaching which place, with the advanced brigade, the enemy was discovered drawn up in force on a rising ground beyond the town; and by the fire he soon opened upon us as we entered the place, gave us to understand he was well protected with artillery. General Ross, however, did not hesitate immediately advancing to attack him, although our troops were almost exhausted with the fatigue of the march they had just made, and but a small proportion of our little army had yet got up; this dashing measure, was, however, I am happy to add, crowned with the success it merited; for, in spite of the galling fire of the enemy, our troops advanced steadily on both his flanks and in his front; and as soon as they arrived on even ground with him, he fled in every direction, leaving behind him ten pieces of cannon, and a considerable number of killed and wounded, amongst the latter commodore Barney and several other officers; some other prisoners were also taken, though not many, owing to the swiftness with which the enemy went off, and the fatigues our army had previously undergone.

It would, sir, be deemed presumption in me to attempt to give you particular details respecting the nature of this battle; I shall, therefore, only remark, generally, that the enemy 8000 strong, on ground he had chosen as best adapted for him to defend, where he had time to erect his batteries, and concert all his measures, was dislodged as soon as reached, and a victory gained over him by a division of the British army, not amounting to more than 1500 men, headed by our gallant general, whose brilliant achievement of this day it is

beyond my power to do justice to, and indeed no possible comment could enhance.

The seamen, with the guns, were, to their great mortification, with the rear division during this short but decisive action; those, however, attached to the rocket brigade, were in the battle, and I remarked with much pleasure the precision with which the rockets were thrown by them, under the direction of first lieutenant Lawrence, of the marine artillery; Mr. Jeremiah M'Daniel, master's mate of the Tonnant, a very fine young man, who was attached to this party, being severely wounded, I beg permission to recommend him to your favourable consideration. The company of marines I have on so many occasions had cause to mention to you, commanded by first lieutenant Stephens, was also in the action, as were the colonial marines under the temporary command of captain Reed, of the sixth West-India regiment, (these companies being attached to the light brigade), and they respectively behaved with their accustomed zeal and bravery. None other of the naval department were fortunate enough to arrive up in time, to take their share in this battle, excepting captain Palmer, of the Hebrus, with his aid-de-camp, Mr. Arthur Wakefield, midshipman of that ship, and lieutenant James Scott, first of the Albion, who acted as my aid-de-camp, and remained with me during the whole time.

The contest being completely ended, and the enemy having retired from the field, the general gave the army about two hours rest, when he again moved forward on Washington; it was however dark before we reached the city, and on the general, myself, and some officers advancing a short way past the first houses of the town, without being accompanied by the troops, the enemy opened upon us a heavy fire of musketry, from the capitol and two other houses; these were therefore almost immediately stormed by our people, taken possession of, and set on fire, after which the town submitted without further resistance.

The enemy himself, on our entering the town, set fire to the navy yard (filled with naval stores), a frigate of the largest class, almost ready for launching, and a sloop of war lying off it, as he also did to the fort which protected the sea approach to Washington.

On taking possession of the city, we also set fire to the president's palace, the treasury, and the war office; and in the morning captain Wainwright went with a party to see that the destruction in the navy yard was complete; when he destroyed whatever stores and buildings had escaped the flames

of the preceding night; a large quantity of ammunition and ordnance stores were likewise destroyed by us in the arsenal, as were about 200 pieces of artillery of different calibres, as well as a vast quantity of small arms. Two rope-walks, of a very extensive nature, full of tar-rope, &c. situated at a considerable distance from the yard, were likewise set fire to and consumed; in short, sir, I do not believe a vestige of public property, or a store of any kind, which could be converted to the use of the government, escaped destruction; the bridges across the Eastern Branch and the Potomac were likewise destroyed.

This general destruction being completed during the day of the 25th, we marched again at nine that night on our return, by Bladensburg, to Upper Marlborough.

We arrived yesterday evening at the latter without molestation of any sort, indeed without a single musket having been fired, and this morning we moved on to this place, where I have found his majesty's sloop Manly, the tenders, and the boats, and I have hoisted my flag pro tem. in the former. The troops will probably march to-morrow, or next day at farthest, to Benedict for re-embarkation, and the flotilla will of course join you at the same time.

In closing, sir, my statement to you, of the arduous and highly important operations of this week, I have a most pleasing duty to perform, in assuring you of the good conduct of the officers and men who have been serving under me. I have been particularly indebted, whilst on this service, to captain Wainwright of the Tonnant, for the assistance he has invariably afforded me; and to captains Palmer and Money, for their exertions during the march to and from Washington. To captain Nourse, who has commanded the flotilla during my absence, my acknowledgments are most justly due, as well as to captains Sullivan, Badcock, Somerville, Ramsay, and Bruce, who have acted in it under him.

Lieutenant James Scott, now first lieutenant of the Albion, has on this occasion rendered me essential services, and, as I have had reason so often of late to mention to you the gallant and meritorious conduct of this officer, I trust you will permit me to seize this opportunity of recommending him to your favourable notice and consideration.

Captain Robyns (the senior officer of the marines on board the fleet), who has had, during these operations, the marines of the ships under his orders, has executed ably and zealously the several services with which he has been entrusted,

and is entitled to my best acknowledgments accordingly, as is also captain Harrison of the marine artillery, who, with the officers and men attached to him, accompanied the army to and from Washington.

Mr. Dobie, surgeon of the Melpomene, volunteered his professional services on this occasion, and rendered much assistance to the wounded on the field of battle, as well as to many of the men taken ill on the line of march.

One colonial marine killed, one master's-mate, two serjeants, and three colonial marines wounded, are the casualties sustained by the naval department; a general list of the killed and wounded of the whole army will of course accompany the report of the major-general.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) G. COCKBURN,
Rear-admiral.

Vice-admiral the honourable sir A. Cochrane, K. B. &c.

From the London Gazette Extraordinary.

Colonial Department, Downing-street, September 27th, 1814.

Captain Smith, assistant adjutant-general to the troops under the command of general Ross, arrived this morning with a despatch from that officer, addressed to earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, of which the following is a copy.

Tonnant, in the Patuxent, August 30th, 1814.

My lord,

I have the honour to communicate to your lordship, that on the night of the 24th instant, after defeating the army of the United States on that day, the troops under my command entered and took possession of the city of Washington.

It was determined between sir Alexander Cochrane and myself, to disembark the army at the village of Benedict, on the right bank of the Patuxent, with the intention of co-operating with rear-admiral Cockburn, in an attack upon a flotilla of the enemy's gun-boats under the command of commodore Barney. On the 20th instant, the army commenced its march, having landed the previous day without opposition: on the 21st it reached Nottingham, and on the 22d moved on to Upper Marlborough, a few miles distant from Pig Point on the Patuxent, where admiral Cockburn fell in with and defeated the flotilla, taking and destroying the whole. Having advanced to within sixteen miles of Washington, and as-

certaining the force of the enemy to be such as might authorize an attempt at carrying his capital, I determined to make it, and accordingly put the troops in movement on the evening of the 23d. A corps of about 1300 men appeared to oppose us, but retired after firing a few shots. On the 24th, the troops resumed their march, and reached Bladensburg, a village situated on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac, about five miles from Washington.

On the opposite side of that river, the enemy was discovered strongly posted on very commanding heights, formed in lines, his advance occupying a fortified house, which, with artillery, covered the bridge over the Eastern Branch, across which the British troops had to pass. A broad and straight road leading from the bridge to Washington, ran through the enemy's position, which was carefully defended by artillery and riflemen.

The disposition for an attack being made, it was commenced with so much impetuosity by the light brigade, consisting of the 85th light infantry and the light infantry companies of the army, under the command of colonel Thornton, that the fortified house was shortly carried, the enemy retiring to the higher grounds.

In support of the light brigade, I ordered up a brigade under the command of colonel Brooke, who, with the 44th regiment, attacked the enemy's left, the 4th regiment pressing his right with such effect as to cause him to abandon his guns. His first line giving way, was driven on the second, which, yielding to the irresistible attack of the bayonet, and the well-directed discharge of rockets, got into confusion and fled, leaving the British masters of the field. The rapid flight of the enemy, and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being taken, more particularly as the troops had during the day undergone considerable fatigue.

The enemy's army, amounting to eight or nine thousand men, with three or four hundred cavalry, was under the command of general Winder, being formed of troops drawn from Baltimore and Pennsylvania. His artillery, ten pieces of which fell into our hands, was commanded by commodore Barney, who was wounded and taken prisoner. The artillery I directed to be destroyed.

Having halted the army for a short time, I determined to march upon Washington, and reached that city at 8 o'clock that night Judging it of consequence to complete the destruction of the public buildings with the least possible delay[1]

so that the army might retire without loss of time, the following buildings were set fire to and consumed; the capitol, including the senate-house and house of representatives; the arsenal, the dock-yard, treasury, war-office, president's palace, rope-walk, and the great bridge across the Potomac: in the dock-yard, a frigate nearly ready to be launched, and sloop of war, were consumed. The two bridges leading to Washington over the Eastern Branch had been destroyed by the enemy, who apprehended an attack from that quarter. The object of the expedition having been accomplished, I determined, before any greater force of the enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of the 25th. On the evening of the 29th we reached Benedict, and re-embarked the following day. In the performance of the operation I have detailed, it is with the utmost satisfaction I observe to your lordship, that cheerfulness in undergoing fatigue, and anxiety for the accomplishment of the object, were conspicuous in all ranks.

To sir Alexander Cochrane my thanks are due, for his ready compliance with every wish connected with the welfare of the troops, and the success of the expedition.

To rear-admiral Cockburn, who suggested the attack upon Washington, and who accompanied the army, I confess the greatest obligation for his cordial co-operation and advice.

Colonel Thornton, who led the attack, is entitled to every praise for the noble example he set, which was so well followed by lieutenant-colonel Wood and the 85th light infantry, and by major Jones, of the 4th foot, with the light companies attached to the light brigade. I have to express my approbation of the spirited conduct of colonel Brooke, and of his brigade; the 44th regiment, which he led, distinguished itself under the command of lieutenant-colonel Mullens; the gallantry of the 4th foot, under the command of major Faunce, being equally conspicuous.

The exertions of captain Mitchell, of the royal artillery, in bringing the guns into action, were unremitting: to him, and to the detachment under his command, including captain Deacon's rocket brigade, and the marine rocket corps, I feel every obligation. Captain Lempriere, of the royal artillery, mounted a small detachment of the artillery drivers, which proved of great utility.

The assistance afforded by captain Blanchard, of the royal engineers, in the duties of his department, was of great advantage. To the zealous exertions of captains Wainwright, Pal-

mer, and Money, of the royal navy, and to those of the officers and seamen who landed with them, the service is highly indebted; the latter, captain Money, had charge of the seamen attached to the marine artillery. To captain M'Dougal, of the 85th foot, who acted as my aid-de-camp, captain Falls, and to the officers of my staff, I feel much indebted.

I must beg leave to call your lordship's attention to the zeal and indefatigable exertions of lieutenant Evans, acting deputy quarter-master-general. The intelligence displayed by that officer in circumstances of considerable difficulty, induces me to hope he will meet with some distinguished mark of approbation. I have reason to be satisfied with the arrangements of assistant-commissary-general Lawrence.

An attack upon an enemy so strongly posted, could not be effected without loss. I have to lament that the wounds received by colonel Thornton, and the other officers and soldiers left at Bladensburg, were such as prevented their removal. As many of the wounded as could be brought off were removed, the others being left with medical care and attendants. The arrangements made by the staff surgeon, Baxter, for their accommodation have been as satisfactory as circumstances would admit of. The agent for British prisoners of war, very fortunately residing at Bladensburg, I have recommended the wounded officers and men to his particular attention, and trust to his being able to effect their exchange when sufficiently recovered.

Captain Smith, assistant-adjutant-general to the troops, who will have the honour to deliver this despatch, I beg leave to recommend to your lordship's protection, as an officer of much merit and great promise, and capable of affording any further information that may be requisite.

Sanguine in hoping for the approbation of his royal highness the prince regent, and of his majesty's government, as to the conduct of the troops under my command, I have, &c.

(Signed) ROB. ROSS,
Major-general.

I beg leave to inclose herewith a return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the action of the 24th instant, together with a statement of the ordnance, ammunition, and ordnance stores, taken from the enemy between the 16th and 25th August; and likewise sketches of the scene of action and of the line of march.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the troops under the command of major-general Ross, in the action with the enemy, on the 24th August, 1814, on the heights above Bladensburg.

Washington, August 25th, 1814.

General staff—4 horses killed.

Royal artillery—4 horses killed; 6 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded.

Royal marine artillery—1 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, wounded.

Royal sappers and miners—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, killed.

Fourth regiment—1 lieutenant, 2 serjeants, 21 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 5 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 6 serjeants, 50 rank and file, wounded.

Twenty-first regiment—2 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 11 rank and file, wounded.

Fourteenth regiment—1 serjeant, 13 rank and file, killed; 35 rank and file, wounded.

Second battalion royal marines—5 rank and file, killed.

Eighty-fifth light infantry—1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 12 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 8 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 51 rank and file, wounded.

Colonial company—1 rank and file, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded.

Sixth West India regiment—1 serjeant, wounded.

Total—1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 5 serjeants, 56 rank and file, 10 horses, killed; 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 1 captain, 14 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 10 serjeants, 155 rank and file, 8 horses, wounded.

Names of officers killed and wounded.

Killed.

Ninety-fifth light infantry—captain D. S. Hamilton, lieutenant G. P. R. Codd.

Fourth or king's own—lieutenant Thomas Woodward.

Wounded.

Eighty-fifth light infantry—colonel William Thornton, severely (left at Bladensburg); lieutenant-colonel William Wood, severely (left at Bladensburg); major George Brown, severely (left at Bladensburg).

Twenty-first fusileers—captain R. Remsie, severely (not dangerously).

Fourth regiment—lieutenant E. P. Hopkins, severely; lieutenant J. K. Mackenzie, slightly; lieutenant J. Stavely,

severely (left at Bladensburg); lieutenant P. Boulby, and lieutenant F. Field, slightly.

Twenty-first fusileers—lieutenant J. Grace, slightly.

Eighty-fifth regiment—lieutenant William Williams, and lieutenant J. Burrel, severely; lieutenant F. Maunsell, slightly; lieutenant G. F. G. O'Conner. and lieutenant F. Gascoyne, severely; lieutenant G. R. Gleig, slightly; lieutenant —— Crouchly, severely.

Fourth regiment—ensign J. Buchanan, severely (left at Bladensburg); ensign William Reddock, severely.

(Signed) H. G. SMITH,
Deputy assistant-adjutant-general.

Return of ordnance, ammunition, and ordnance stores, taken from the enemy by the army under the command of Major-General Robert Ross, between the 19th and 25th of August, 1814.

August 19th.

1 twenty-four-pounder carronade.

August 22d.

1 six-pounder field-gun, with carriage complete.

156 stand of arms with cartouches, &c.

August 24th, at Bladensburg.

2 eighteen-pounders, 5 twelve-pounders, 3 six-pounders, with field carriages.

A quantity of ammunition for the above.

220 stand of arms.

August 25th, at Washington.

Brass—6 eighteen-pounders, mounted on traversing platforms; 5 twelve-pounders, 4 twelve-pounders, 1 five and half-inch howitzer, 1 five and half-inch mortar.

Iron—26 thirty-two-pounders, 36 twenty-four-pounders, 36 eighteen-pounders; 27 twelve-pounders, 2 eighteen-pounders, mounted on platforms; 19 twelve-pounders, on ship carriages; 3 thirteen-inch mortars, 2 eight-inch howitzers, 1 forty-two-pounder gun, 5 thirty-two-pounder carronades, 5 eighteen-pounder carronades, 13 twelve-pounder guns, 2 nine-pounder guns, 2 six-pounder guns.

Total amount of cannon taken—206.

500 barrels of powder.

100,000 rounds of musket-ball cartridge.

40 barrels of fine grained powder.

A large quantity of ammunition of different natures made up.

The navy-yard and arsenal having been set on fire by the

enemy before they retired, an immense quantity of stores of every description was destroyed, of which no account could be taken; seven or eight very heavy explosions during the night denoted that there had been large magazines of powder.

(Signed) F. G. J. WILLIAMS,
Lieutenant royal artillery, acting quarter-master.
J. MITCHELL,
Captain, commanding artillery.

N. B. The remains of near 20,000 stand of arms were discovered, which had been destroyed by the enemy.

Surrender of Alexandria.

In Council, September 7, 1814.

Present—Thomas Herbert, president, John Gird, Andrew Fleming, Henry Nicholson, J. B. Patton, John Cohagen, James Millan, John Hunter, Reuben Johnston, R. I. Taylor, William Veitch, Anthony Rhodes.

The following narrative of the occupation of this town by the enemy, and of the circumstances connected with that unfortunate transaction, having been submitted to council and duly considered and examined, the council do unanimously concur therein, and it is thereupon ordered, that it be published in both of the papers printed in this town.

THOMAS HERBERT,
President.

At a meeting of the committee of vigilance, this 7th of September, 1814.

Present—Charles Simms, mayor; Joseph Dean, Mathew Robinson, Jonah Thompson, William Herbert, Thomas Vowell, Edmund I. Lee.

The following narrative of the occupation of the town of Alexandria by the British squadron, was submitted to the committee, who, upon examining the same, unanimously concur in it.

CHARLES SIMMS,
Chairman.

Thomas Vowell, Secretary.

A respect for the opinions of others, and a due regard for the character of the citizens of Alexandria, have induced the municipal authorities of the town to exhibit to the public a faithful narrative of the occupation of Alexandria by the Bri-

tish squadron under the command of captain Gordon, together with the causes which led to that distressing event.

To those who are unacquainted with the situation and condition of Alexandria in regard to its means of defence, it will be proper to state, that it is situate in the district of Columbia, upon the west bank of the river Potomac, about six miles below the city of Washington; the depth of water admitting large frigates to come to the very wharves of the town.

It is totally destitute of fortifications of any kind, and its protection against invasion by water depended entirely upon a fort about six miles below the town, commonly known by the name of Fort Warburton, which was exclusively under the controul of the government of the United States.

About the month of July last, it was announced that general Winder was appointed to the command of the tenth military district of the United States, comprehending the district of Columbia and a portion of the adjoining states of Virginia and Maryland, including the city of Baltimore.

In consequence of reports that the enemy contemplated an attack upon the city of Washington, the municipal authority of Alexandria thought it advisable to appoint a committee of vigilance for the purpose of procuring information of the approaches of the enemy, and obtaining assistance and advice as to the measures which it might be proper to pursue for protection and defence. As soon as this committee was appointed, they caused representations to be made to general Winder of the defenceless condition of the town, and earnestly entreated that some measures should be taken for its protection. General Winder was called on, because it had been distinctly understood that the secretary of war would receive our communications through this channel only. From general Winder every assurance was made that could have been wished, that every thing in his power should be done for the protection of the town. His means however were very inconsiderable—he had no money to expend in fortifications, or even in the erection of batteries; and unless some defence of this sort could be obtained, the town would be exposed to the mercy of the enemy, if he should approach by water and should succeed in passing the fort. The committee of vigilance was duly impressed with the necessity of providing some adequate defence against an attack by water, and some of its members, under the authority of the committee, had repeated interviews with general Winder on this subject; in one of them, the president of the United States

was present, and he was distinctly given to understand, that unless there was provided an adequate defence for the town, it would be at the mercy of the enemy, and would be compelled to make the best terms in its power. These representations and requests produced no other effect then the repetition of the assurance of an earnest desire on the part of general Winder to afford every assistance in his power.

On the 19th of August, a levy en masse was made of the militia of the town and county of Alexandria, and on the 20th and 21st, they were ordered to cross the Potomac, and stationed between Piscataway and Fort Warburton. They took with them all the artillery which had been mounted at the expense of the corporation, except two twelve-pounders, which were left without ammunition, and nearly all the arms belonging to the town. They left no men but the exempts from age and other causes, and a few who had not reported themselves or had found substitutes; and it is not believed that, after their departure, one hundred effective armed men could have been mustered in the town. The two iron twelve-pounders remained until the 25th, when, Alexandria being open to the enemy, then in full possession of Washington, they were removed at some distance from the town, by orders received from general Young.

On the night of the 24th, the Alexandria militia were ordered to recross the Potomac: they did so, and were marched through town without halting, to the country, and without giving information to the authorities or inhabitants of the place of their destination, and on the evening of the 27th, when the fleet approached, the municipal authorities of the town knew not where they were. It has since appeared that they were then stationed about nineteen miles from the town, by the orders of general Winder. It is here proper to state that general Winder, on the morning of the 24th, informed the committee of vigilance, who waited on him, that he could send no part of the forces with him to Alexandria; but that he had ordered general Young to cross over to Alexandria, if practicable, if not, to fall down the river. The committee of vigilance, on receiving this information, sent boats over to the Maryland shore sufficient in number to bring over the whole of general Young's force at once; but when the boats reached him, he had received orders from the secretary of war to retain his position, as general Young in a communication to the mayor stated.

The committee of vigilance, despairing of obtaining any assistance from the general government, and having infor-

mation of the rapid approach of the enemy towards the capital by land, and that their squadron was approaching Alexandria by water, deemed it their duty to recommend to the common council a resolution to the following effect:

"That in case the British vessels should pass the fort, or their forces approach the town by land, and there should be no sufficient force on our part to oppose them, with any reasonable prospect of success, they should appoint a committee to carry a flag to the officer commanding the enemy's force about to attack the town, and to procure the best terms for the safety of persons, houses, and property in their power."

This recommendation was made on the day of the battle at Bladensburg, and on the same day was unanimously adopted by the common council.

The battle of Bladensburg having terminated in the defeat of our troops, and general Winder having been obliged to retreat from the capital towards Montgomery court-house, about fifteen miles to the west of it, the city of Washington was left in the entire possession of the enemy. The citizens of Alexandria saw nothing to impede the march of the British to their town—saw nothing to restrain them from committing the most brutal outrages upon the female portion of society, having neither arms nor men to make defence with; the president of the United States and the heads of the departments were absent, and it was not known where they were to be found; no military commander or officer of the general government was present to direct or advise.

In this state of things it was considered by the common council as their duty to send a flag to the British commander, to know what treatment might be expected from him in case his troops should approach Alexandria, and should succeed in obtaining possession of the town. Admiral Cockburn, to whom the communication was made, assured the very respectable gentlemen who bore the flag, that private property of all description should be respected; that it was probable that fresh provisions and some flour might be wanted, but that whatever they did take should be paid for.

While these things were going on in the city of Washington, the British squadron had been gradually ascending the Potomac, and on the 27th of August, three days after the battle at Bladensburg, it reached fort Warburton. No change had taken place in relation to the means of the defence of the town of Alexandria. Upon the fort did the safety of Alexandria now entirely depend. The citizens looked with great anxiety to this point for protection. But, to their great

surprise and mortification, and without the concurrence or wish of the municipal authority of the town or of any member of it, the fort was abandoned and the magazine blown up by the United States' garrison on the evening of the 27th, without firing a single gun.

This relinquishment of the fort decided the fate of Alexandria. Nothing was left to oppose the progress of the squadron, and on the morning of the 28th it passed the ruins of the fort on its way to town; their barges had sounded a considerable distance above. About ten o'clock of the morning of the 28th, after the squadron was above the fort, the committee appointed by the council to bear the flag to the enemy in case they should pass the fort, set out upon their mission, and proceeded to the ship commanded by captain Gordon. They requested to know what his intentions were in regard to the town of Alexandria. They were informed by captain Gordon that he would communicate his terms when he came opposite the town. But he assured them, that, in the mean time, if the squadron was not molested by the inhabitants, the persons, houses, and furniture of the citizens should not be injured. One of the gentlemen who attended the flag was the mayor. Upon his return from the squadron, he was informed that a small detachment of cavalry from the army of general Hungerford had been in town, probably for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy; that it had remained but a short time. Upon inquiry it was understood that the army of general Hungerford was at that time about sixteen miles from Alexandria, on its march to that place, having followed the British squadron along the shores of Potomac a great part of its way up. The force of general Hungerford was composed of infantry and cavalry, with two or three small pieces of artillery, not calculated to afford any protection to the town.

The municipal authority of the town had received no advices of the approach of this army; and after the return of the flag, it was too late to enter into any arrangements with general Hungerford for defence—he was too distant to afford relief.

The squadron having suspended its approach to the town, did not reach it until the evening of this day. On the morning of the next day, to wit, the 29th of August, it arranged itself along the town, so as to command it from one extremity to the other. The force consisted of two frigates, to wit, the Seahorse, rating 38 guns, and Euryalus, rating 36 guns, two rocket-ships, of 18 guns each, two bomb-ships, of

8 guns each, and a schooner of 2 guns, which were but a few hundred yards from the wharves, and the houses so situated that they might have been laid in ashes in a few minutes. About ten o'clock in the morning of the 29th, captain Gordon sent to the mayor the following terms:

His Majesty's Ship Seahorse, off Alexandria, the 29th day of August, 1814.

Gentlemen,

In consequence of a deputation yesterday received from the city of Alexandria, requesting favourable terms for the safety of their city, the undermentioned are the only conditions in my power to offer.

The town of Alexandria (with the exception of public works) shall not be destroyed, unless hostilities are commenced on the part of the Americans; nor shall the inhabitants be molested in any manner whatever, or their dwelling-houses entered, if the following articles are complied with.

1*st article.* All naval and ordnance stores (public and private) must be immediately delivered up.

2*d article.* Possession will be immediately taken of all the shipping, and their furniture must be sent on board by the owners without delay.

3*d article.* The vessels that have been sunk must be delivered up in the state they were in on the 19th of August, the day of the squadron passing the Kettle Bottoms.

4*th article.* Merchandise of every description must be instantly delivered up; and, to prevent any irregularities that might be committed in its embarkation, the merchants have it in their option, to load the vessels generally employed for that purpose, when they will be towed off by us.

5*th article.* All merchandise that has been removed from Alexandria since the 19th instant, is to be included in the above articles.

6*th article.* Refreshments of every description to be supplied the ships and paid for at the market price, by bills on the British government.

7*th article.* Officers will be appointed to see that the articles Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, are strictly complied with, and any deviation or non-compliance on the part of the inhabitants of Alexandria will render this treaty null and void.

I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant, JAMES A. GORDON,

Captain of his majesty's ship Seahorse, and senior officer of his majesty's ships before Alexandria.

To the council of the town of Alexandria.

Upon the mayor's receiving them he sent for the members of the committee of vigilance. These terms were borne by one of the officers of captain Gordon's frigate, who stated but one hour was allowed him to wait for a reply to them. Upon their being read by the mayor and the committee, it was observed to the officer by the mayor and one of the committee, that it would be impossible that the common council could accede to several of them; that the municipal authority of the town had no power to recal the merchandise that had been sent out subsequent to the 19th of August. The reply of the officer was, in that case it could not be expected.

He was further informed that it would not be in the power of the common council to compel the citizens to assist in getting up the sunken vessels. The officer answered that their sailors would then do it. He was required to explain what was intended by the term merchandise, as used in the 4th article. He answered that it was intended to embrace that species of merchandise only which was intended for exportation, such as tobacco, flour, cotton, bale-goods, &c.

The mayor and one of the committee requested to know whether the commodore intended to require a delivery of any more of the merchandise than he could take away with him. He answered it would not be required. This explanation was afterwards recognized by captain Gordon. With these verbal explanations the preceding terms were submitted to the common council. It will be here proper to remark, that when these terms were proposed and submitted to the common council, general Hungerford had not arrived with his army, nor did it reach the suburbs of the town until the night of that day.—The town was still without any means of defence, and it was evident that no defence could avail, but that species of force which would be calculated to drive the ships from their mooring. No communication had been received from the officers of the general government, and the town appeared to be abandoned to its fate. Under these circumstances the common council could have no hesitation as to the course to be pursued. The citizens of the town of all descriptions, with an immense value of property were entirely in the power of the enemy, whose naval commander, according to the proclamation of the president of the United States, dated on the first of September, has declared his "purpose to be, to employ the force under his direction in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable." A similar declaration had been made by captain Gordon to the committee who

bore the flag. Against the attack of such an enemy was the town of Alexandria without any means of defence whatever. The people of the town were at his mercy, and compelled to yield to such terms as the "victor" might prescribe. If the members of the municipal authority and citizens of the town had given loose to the feelings of indignation which the occasion had excited, and had sacrificed the town, and had exposed their wives and daughters to the wanton insults of an unrestrained enemy, they would have betrayed their trusts and have deplored the consequences.

The common council therefore were obliged to yield submission to the terms as explained, and did thereupon pass and publish the following resolution:

"*Resolved*, That the common council of Alexandria, in assenting to the conditions offered by the commander of the British squadron now off the town, has acted from the impulse of irresistible necessity, and solely from the regard to the welfare of the town. That it considers the assent by it given as only formal, inasmuch as the enemy already had it in their power to enforce a compliance with the demand by a seizure of the property required from us; and believing the safety of the persons of the inhabitants, of their dwellings, and of such property as is not comprehended within the requisition, to depend entirely upon the observance of the terms of it, the common council recommends to the inhabitants an acquiescence: at the same time it does expressly disclaim the power of doing any act on its part to enforce compliance; its authority in this particular being limited to recommendation only."

In the execution of the terms imposed by the enemy it is proper to state that the verbal explanations made by the officer to the mayor were generally adhered to. No merchandise was required to be brought back to the town; no assistance was required of or offered by the citizens in getting up the sunken vessels. The depredations of the enemy, with a few exceptions, were confined to flour, cotton, and tobacco, which they carried off in some of the vessels then at the town; only one vessel was burnt; no private dwelling was visited or entered in a rude or hostile manner, nor were citizens personally exposed to insult.

The loss sustained from the enemy it is believed will not exceed the following:--three ships, three brigs, several bay and river craft, the number of which has not been ascertained; all of which were carried away, and one ship burnt. The quantity of flour carried away it is believed will not exceed

sixteen thousand barrels—about one thousand hogsheads tobacco; one hundred and fifty bales of cotton; and of wine, sugar, and other articles, not more than five thousand dollars worth.

His Majesty's Ship Tonnant Chesapeake,

Sir, *September 12th*, 1814.

In my despatch of the 2d instant, recounting the success of our expedition against Washington, I acquainted you, for the information of my lords commissioners of the admiralty, that the winds had been unfavourable for the return of the ships which had been detached up the Potomac, under captain J. A. Gordon, of the Seahorse, to co-operate against the capitol; but that I had heard of their having accomplished the destruction of Fort Washington. I have now the honour not only to confirm this report, but to transmit, for their lordships' information, a copy of captain Gordon's detail of his proceedings, in which his further success has exceeded my most sanguine expectations; having forced the populous city of Alexandria to capitulate, and having brought down the river in triumph, though a series of obstacles and determined opposition, a fleet of 21 enemy's vessels. The difficulties which presented themselves to these ships in ascending the river, impeded by shoals and contrary winds, and the increased obstacles which the enemy had prepared against their return, with a confident hope of obstructing their descent, were only to be overcome by the most indefatigable exertions.

I trust, therefore, that the resolution and gallantry displayed by every one employed upon this service, which deserve my warmest applause, will be further honoured by the approbation of their lordships.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEX. COCHRANE,
Vice-admiral, commander in chief.

Sir, *Seahorse, Chesapeake, September 9th*, 1814.

In obedience to your orders, I proceeded into the river Potomac, with the ships named in the margin*, on the 17th of last month; but from being without pilots to assist us through that difficult part of the river called the Kettle Bottoms, and from contrary winds, we were unable to reach Fort Washington until the evening of the 27th; nor was

* Seahorse, Euryalus, Devastation, Ætna, Meteor, Erebus, Anna Maria despatch boat.

this effected but by the severest labour. I believe each of the ships was not less than 20 different times aground, and each time we were obliged to haul off by main strength, and we were employed warping for five whole successive days, with the exception of a few hours, a distance of more than fifty miles.

The bomb-ships were placed on the evening of the 27th, and immediately began the bombardment of the fort, it being my intention to attack it with the frigates at daylight the following morning. On the bursting of the first shell, the garrison were observed to retreat; but supposing some concealed design, I directed the fire to be continued. At eight o'clock, however, my doubts were removed by the explosion of the powder magazine, which destroyed the inner buildings, and at daylight on the 28th we took possession. Besides the principal fort, which contained two 52-pounders, two 32-pounders, and eight 24-pounders, there was a battery on the beach of five 18-pounders, a martello tower, with two 12-pounders and loop holes for musketry, and a battery in the rear of two 12 and six 6-pound field-pieces. The whole of these guns were already spiked by the enemy, and their complete destruction, with their carriages also, was effected by the seamen and marines sent on that service, in less than two hours. The populous city of Alexandria thus lost its only defence; and, having buoyed the channel, I deemed it better to postpone giving any answer to a proposal made to me for its capitulation until the following morning, when I was enabled to place the shipping in such a position as would insure assent to the terms I had decided to enforce.

To this measure I attribute their ready acquiescence, as it removed that doubt of my determination to proceed, which had been raised in the minds of the inhabitants, by our army having retired from Washington; this part of our proceedings will be further explained by the accompanying documents.

The honourable lieutenant Gordon, of this ship, was sent on the evening of the 28th, to prevent the escape of any of the vessels comprised in the capitulation, and the whole of those which were seaworthy, amounting to 21 in number, were fitted and loaded by the 31st.

Captain Baker, of the Fairy, bringing your orders of the 26th, having fought his way up the river past a battery of five guns, and a large military force, confirmed the rumours, which had already reached me, of strong measures having been taken to oppose our return, and I therefore quitted Al-

exandria without waiting to destroy those remaining stores which we had not the means of bringing away,

Contrary winds again occasioned us the laborious task of warping the ships down the river, in which a day's delay took place, owing to the Devastation grounding. The enemy took advantage of this circumstance to attempt her destruction, by three fire-vessels, attended by five boats; but their object was defeated by the promptitude and gallantry of captain Alexander, who pushed off with his own boats, and being followed by those of the other ships, chased the boats of the enemy up to the town of Alexandria. The cool and steady conduct of Mr. John Moore, midshipman of the Seahorse, in towing the nearest fire-vessel on shore whilst the others were removed from the power of doing mischief by the smaller boats of the Devastation, entitles him to my highest commendation.

The Meteor and the Fairy, assisted by the Anna Maria despatch boat, belonging to the Euryalus, with a howitzer, had greatly impeded the progress of the enemy in their works; notwithstanding which, they were enabled to increase their battery to eleven guns, with a furnace for heating shot. On the third, the wind coming to the N. W. the Etna and the Erebus succeeded in getting down to their assistance, and the whole of us, with the prizes, were assembled there on the fourth, except the Devastation, which, in spite of our utmost exertion in warping her, still remained five miles higher up the river. This was the moment when the enemy made his greatest efforts to effect our destruction.

The Erebus being judiciously placed by captain Bartholomew, in admirable position for harassing the workmen employed in the trenches, was attacked by three field-pieces which did her considerable d mage before they were beaten off. And another attempt being made to destroy the Devastation with fire-vessels, I sent the boats under captain Baker to her assistance; nothing could exceed the alacrity with which captain Baker went on this service; to which I attribute the immediate retreat of the boats and fire-vessels. His loss, however, was considerable, owing to their having sought refuge under some guns in a narrow creek, thickly wooded, from which it was impossible for him to dislodge them.

On the 5th, at noon, the wind coming fair, and all my arrangements being made, the Seahorse and Eurvalus anchored within short musket-shot of the batteries, while the whole of the prizes passed betwixt us and the shoal; the bombs, the

Fairy, and Erebus, firing as they passed, and afterwards anchoring in a favourable position for facilitating, by means of their force, the further removal of the frigates. At three, P. M., having completely silenced the enemy's fire, the Seahorse and Euryalus cut their cables, and the whole of us proceeded to the next position taken up by the troops, where they had two batteries, mounting from fourteen to eighteen guns, on a range of cliffs of about a mile extent, under which we were of necessity obliged to pass very close. I did not intend to make the attack that evening, but the Erebus grounding within range, we were necessarily called into action. On this occasion the fire of the Fairy had the most decisive effect, as well as that of the Erebus, while the bombs threw their shells with excellent precision, and the guns of the batteries thereby completely silenced by about eight o'clock.

At daylight on the 6th I made signal to weigh—and so satisfied were the whole of the parties opposed to us of their opposition being ineffectual, that they allowed us to pass without further molestation. I cannot close this detail of operations, comprising a period of twenty-three days, without begging leave to call your attention to the singular exertion of those whom I had the honour to command, by which our success was effected. Our hammocks were down only two nights during the whole time; the many laborious duties which we had to perform were executed with cheerfulness, which I shall ever remember with pride, and which will insure I hope, to the whole of the detachments, your favourable estimation of their extraordinary zeal and abilities.

To captain Napier I owe more obligations than I have words to express. The Euryalus lost her bowsprit, the head of her foremast, and the heads of all her topmasts, in a tornado which she encountered on the 25th, just as her sails were clued up, whilst we were passing the flats of Maryland point, and yet after twelve hours work on her refittal she was again under way and advancing up the river. Captain Napier speaks highly of the conduct of lieutenant Thomas Herbert, on this as well as on every other of the many trying occasions which called his abilities into action. His exertions were also particularly conspicuous in the prizes, many of which, already sunk by the enemy, were weighed, masted, hove down, caulked, rigged, and loaded by our little squadron, during the three days which we remained at Alexandria.

It is difficult to distinguish amongst officers who had a greater share of duty than often falls to the lot of any, and

which each performed with the greatest credit to his professional character. I cannot omit to recommend to your notice the meritorious conduct of captains Alexander, Bartholomew, Baker, and Kenah, the latter of whom led us through many of the difficulties of the navigation; and particularly to captain Roberts of the Meteor, who, besides undergoing the fatigues of the day, employed the night in coming the distance of ten miles to communicate and consult with me upon our further operations preparatory to our passing the batteries.

So universally good was the conduct of all the officers, seamen, and marines of the detachment, I cannot particularize with justice to them; but I owe it to the long tried experience I have had of Mr. Henry King, first lieutenant of the Seahorse, to point out to you, that such was his eagerness to take the part to which his abilities would have directed him on this occasion, that he even came out of a sick bed to command at his quarters, whilst the ship was passing the batteries*; nor can I ever forget how materially the service is indebted to Mr. A. Loubain the master, for both finding and buoying the channel of a navigation, which no ship of similar draft of water had ever before passed with their guns and stores on board, and which according to a report of a seaman now in the ship, was not accomplished by the President American frigate, even after taking her guns out, under a period of 42 days.

Inclosed is a list of killed and wounded, and also of the vessels captured.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES A. GORDON,
Captain

To sir Alexander Cochrane, commander in chief, &c.

Return of killed and wounded on board his majesty's ships employed in the Potomac river between September 1 *and* 5, 1814.

Total—7 killed; 35 wounded.

(Signed) JAMES A. GORDON,
Captain.

* The first two guns, pointed by lieutenant King, disabled each a gun of the enemy.

Copy of a letter from Captain Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Washington, September 7, 1814.

Sir,

Agreeable to your orders of the 31st ultimo, I proceeded with the detachment of sailors and marines under my command to the White House, on the west bank of the Potomac, there to erect batteries and attempt the destruction of the enemy's ships on their passage down the river. Captain Creighton, lieutenant Clack, and several other navy officers, as well as Mr. Augustus Monroe, Mr. Ferdinand Fairfax, and several other citizens and officers of the militia and volunteer companies, hearing of my destination, volunteered their services on the occasion, and ably supported me through the arduous and fatiguing enterprise. By preceding my men, I arrived in company with the honourable secretary of state, and generals Hungerford and Young, on the evening of the first instant at the spot fixed on, where I found a few militia belonging to general Hungerford's army, clearing away the trees to make room for mounting our cannon, which had not yet arrived, but which had been seen on their way down, consisting of three long eighteens and two twelves. Generals Hungerford and Young had received orders to co-operate with me, to detach men on my requisition, and make such disposition of their forces as would effectually protect me in the rear, in the event of the enemy's landing; the positions they were to occupy were also allotted to them by mutual agreement, when the enemy should attempt to pass, as it was believed that, concealed by the thick woods on the high bank, they would be enabled to clear the enemy's decks with their musketry, and in a great measure divert his fire from our battery. At the moment of my arrival, one of the enemy's vessels of war, a brig of eighteen guns, was seen coming up. General Hungerford and his men took their position in the woods; and two small four-pounders that instant arriving, I caused them to be planted on the edge of the bank, and on the enemy arriving abreast of us we opened a brisk fire on him; having a fine breeze he was enabled to pass us, but could fire only one broadside as he crossed the fire of our field-pieces and musketry; the militia continued following him up along the bank and greatly annoyed him by their well-directed fire. In this affair we had only one man wounded, and we believed our elevated position rendered breast-works useless, as it was remarked that none but the enemy's grape passed over us, his round shot went into the bank below. No men could have shown more zeal on the occasion than those com-

posing the army, and if they committed any errors which gave rise to confusion, they proceeded from an over desire to injure the enemy. Of the conduct of the sailors and marines, I deem it unnecessary to say any thing;—their conduct on all such occasions has ever been uniform. The evening of our arrival two eighteen-pounders reached our position, and next morning one of the enemy's bomb-ships and two barges, one carrying a long two-and-thirty, the other a mortar, commenced their operations upon us, the first throwing shells in front, beyond the reach of our shot; the other flanking us on our right; several shells fell near and burst over our battery, and although the firing lasted all day, without intermission, it had no other effect than to accustom the militia to the danger. In the afternoon I took an eighteen-pounder to a more advanced point, about a mile distant, and commenced a fire on the bomb-ship, which did so much execution as to draw on me the fire of all their vessels, including a schooner and an eighteen gun brig which had dropped down that day. On the third, the enemy was reinforced from above by another bomb-ship and a sloop of war fitted up as a rocket-ship. The latter anchoring within reach of our battery, we were enabled to play on her with great effect, and compelled her to change her position. All this day and the succeeding night the enemy kept up a brisk fire on us of shot, shells, and rockets. In the course of the day their prizes from Alexandria anchored above them, and out of the reach of our cannon. The work of our battery went on; five light field-pieces, from four to six-pounders, arrived and were planted, and we had every hope of soon receiving some long thirty-two-pounders from Washington; we built a furnace for hot shot, and time only appeared necessary to make ourselves formidable. The whole of the fourth and fifth, an incessant fire was kept up by the enemy night and day. He had once attempted landing at night, it is supposed with an intention of spiking the guns of our battery, but was repulsed by the picket guard. My former plan of annoying him by advancing guns was adapted to better effect than before. The rocket-ship lying close in shore, was much cut up by a twelve-pounder and two sixes carried to a point; scarcely a shot missed his hull, and for one hour we drew to this point the fire of all the enemy's force. The cool indifference of my sailors to the danger to which they were exposed was very remarkable, and the intrepidity of captain Griffith, of the Alexandria artillery, his officers and men, merit the highest eulogiums. They fought their six-pounders until their ammunition was expended, and coolly

retired with their guns, when ordered to do so, under a shower of the enemy's shot.

We now, as if by mutual consent, ceased all hostilities. Some thirty-two-pounders arrived. Carpenters were employed to make carriages. Two mortars, a large quantity of ammunition, and an abundance of shot and shells reached us; two barges were equipped, and every thing promised that we should speedily be put in a proper state for annoying the enemy. In the evening two frigates anchored alone above us, making his whole force,

	Guns.
Two frigates, carrying	96
Three bomb-ships,	30
One sloop of war fitted as a rocket-ship,	26
One brig,	18
One schooner,	1
Two barges,	2
Total,	173

The guns mounted in the battery were three eighteen-pounders, two twelve-pounders, six nine-pounders, and two fours. My two mortars were without carriages, as were all my thirty-two's; for notwithstanding every effort was made by the government at Washington to have them made there, and by myself on the spot, they could not be completed in time.

On the morning of the sixth the enemy shewed a disposition to move. I advised general Hungerford of the same, and prepared to meet them with hot shot. About twelve o'clock the two frigates got under way, with a fair wind and tide, and stood down for us. The rocket-sloop, bomb-vessels, brig, schooner, and prizes following in succession, the gun-boats endeavouring to flank us on our right. I immediately despatched an officer to general Hungerford, to request him to take the position agreed upon in the woods on the heights; but from the distance of his camp and the quick approach of the enemy, he was unable to march before the firing commenced, and, after that period, it was almost impossible, as I have understood, from the vast quantities of shot, shells, and rockets which were showered over the hills and fell among his troops.

As the enemy approached, a well-directed fire was kept up from the battery with hot and cold shot, and my brave officers and men stood the broadsides of the ships with unparal-

leled firmness. I anxiously expected the militia would open their fire of musketry, but was disappointed; the cause was not explained until after the firing ceased. Finding that the whole of the enemy's fire was directed at my force, and that in a few minutes all his force would be brought to bear on me, and (entertaining no hopes of preventing his passing) as some of my men had already been killed and wounded, I determined not to make an useless sacrifice; and when the enemy was on the point of anchoring abreast the battery, after sustaining his fire one hour and a quarter, I directed the officers and men to retire behind a hill on our left, and be in readiness to charge the enemy, if he should land to spike our guns. The two frigates anchored abreast, the bombs, sloops, and smaller vessels passed outside them, all pouring into the battery and neighbouring woods a tremenduous fire of every description of missive. In the woods on the left, a company of riflemen from Jefferson county, Virginia, under captain George W. Humphreys, greatly distinguished themselves by a well-directed fire on the enemy's decks, as did a company of militia under the command of captain Gena, who was posted by me on the right. The first lost one man killed, and one serjeant and four privates wounded; the latter, two privates killed. The company of artillery which so much distinguished itself on a former occasion, behaved with no less gallantry to-day; and it affords me much pleasure to observe, that the militia who came under my immediate notice, and were attached to my command, voluntarily or otherwise, conducted themselves in a manner which reflects on them and their country the highest honour. Many before the battle requested to be posted near me; and there was no instance where one offered to retire until I gave the order to retire—and it was not necessary to repeat the order to rally. Captain Grayson of the marines is a brave and zealous officer—he had volunteered to come with his detachment under me at Baltimore. Those veterans who so much distinguished themselves under their gallant though unfortunate commander at Bladensburg, were all willing to try another battle—they have been again unsuccessful, but no less courageous: two of them have fallen.

Captain Spencer of the United States' artillery, late second in command at Fort Washington, and now in command of the officers and men stationed there, were attached to my command b the war department—they have given the most unquestionable proof that it was not want of courage on their part which caused the destruction of that fort. Captain Spen-

cer, his officers and men merit the attention of their country, and have incurred my esteem—three of them were killed. The remnant of the crew of the Essex behaved as usual. Lieutenant Barnwell received on this day his third wound. Doctor Hoffman was also wounded in the head. To particularise the good conduct of each individual placed under my orders would swell too much the bulk of this letter. Several lieutenants and midshipmen of the navy, as well as many young gentlemen of the neighbourhood, volunteered to serve under my order and near my person—they all conducted themselves with great courage, and made themselves of great utility before and during the battle, and I shall take an opportunity of making you more particularly acquainted with their names and merits. After the bombs, gun-vessels, and prizes had all passed, the frigate proceeded down and anchored abreast Indian Head, where a constant firing was kept up until after sunset; but I am fearful with little success on our part.

The number we have had killed and wounded on this occasion I cannot ascertain exactly. I am induced to believe, however, it does not exceed thirty, and when we consider the constant fire which has been kept up by the enemy for the four days preceding their passage by the fort, we should esteem ourselves very fortunate. His damage can never be known by us. Some of his ships were much crippled, and I should suppose his loss considerable.

I have understood, that in order to bring their guns to bear on our battery, they cut away the upper part of their ports, and took the inner trucks from their gun-carriages. When they had passed down, I sent a torpedo after them—it was heard to explode about nine at night, but I have not learnt the effect it produced.

I have the honour to be, with much respect, your obedient and humble servant,

D. PORTER.

Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Washington, September 9th.

The inclosed note was sent to me by colonel Parker, and I beg that you will publish it along with my report.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

D. PORTER.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

The note inclosed.

The very moment information was received by colonel Green and myself of the enemy's intention to come down, the regiments were paraded, mine being in front, and commenced their march. Fearing that unless the ground was previously marked out, there would be some difficulty in forming in the midst of so heavy a fire, I rode forward myself; went to the ground on the right of the battery which was to have been my station, found it occupied by some riflemen, &c.; then went to the left, ordered captain Janway's company to take their position, and waited myself for the regiment to come up. After some time the fire becoming excessively heavy, I found that the sailors and marines were retreating from the fort, and seeing commodore Porter among the last, I ran to him and asked if he had ordered it. He replied that he found it impossible to maintain the fort longer against so disproportioned a force.

I could myself proceed very little farther, and found it not only more dangerous to retreat than remain, but quite impossible to rejoin the troops, who had, as I understand, continued to advance within 300 yards of the battery, until general Hungerford ordered a retreat.

The 11th regiment was a second time ordered to advance obliquely to the right to cover the battery, and did so advance until they came within view of the shipping, and were again retreated.

The brigade of general Young were in colonel Green's and my rear.

R. E. PARKER,
Lieutenant-colonel, commanding 11*th regiment.*

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Hungerford to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Camp at the White House, September 6th, 1814.

Sir,

Yesterday evening about two o'clock the enemy's squadron discontinued the bombardment which had been kept up, wiih little intermission, for three days, weighed anchor, and stood down the river, commencing a heavy fire on the battery, and across the neck of land through which the militia were compelled to march to its assistance. The rifle companies under captains Humphries, Tebbs, and Fields were immediately ordered down to the battery, which orders were promptly obeyed. I followed with colonel Parker's regiment, and two detachments under colonels Green and Renno, leav-

ing instructions with general Young to take a position between us and a creek, which made up some distance behind, so as to prevent the enemy from falling on our rear, and to co-operate with us, if necessary, at the battery. When I had proceeded with the advance to a point within three or four hundred yards of the river, the troops were halted until I could obtain accurate information of the precise situation of the enemy. About this time commodore Porter, as I understood, finding our little battery insufficient to impede the progress of the vessels, after having long gallantly defended it, and considering a longer contention with such a superiority of metal a wanton sacrifice of blood, ordered the battery to be evacuated and his men to retire, which they did. The two largest of the enemy's vessels then anchored, one just above, and the other below the battery, and commenced a most galling cross fire of round shot, grape, canister, &c. The troops which had been previously ordered to shelter themselves from the fire of the enemy, it having become extremely severe, were immediately formed and marched back to a place of comparative security. We had scarcely retired when information was brought that the enemy discovered a disposition to land, and aid was necessary to prevent their spiking our cannon. I again moved down with the troops under my command, colonel Dangerfield, with his regiment, being sent on before, and had proceeded to a valley within about fifty yards of the battery, when general Young and myself, who were following with the residue of the troops, were met by commodore Porter within three or four hundred yards of the river. He thought that it was unnecessary to expose the whole army, and advised that 200 men, which he thought sufficient for the purpose, should be sent down to protect the battery. All the troops were then ordered back, the detail made and sent down under the command of colonel Green, major Banks following with 200 men to aid them, if necessary.

Permit me to say that it was impossible for men to have conducted themselves with more intrepidity than the militia on this occasion. Notwithstanding the dreadful cross fire of every species of missive, by the enemy, to which they were exposed, without a possibility of returning the fire (the most trying of all situations), not a man under my command offered to move until an order to that effect was given; and then it was done slowly and in order. I beg leave also to mention the promptitude and alacrity with which the second order to march through a tremendous discharge of large shot

and grape for the distance of about a mile, was immediately obeyed. Captain George W. Humphries, with his rifle company, was stationed just above the battery, and is entitled to the highest commendation for the courage and activity with which he fought. Captain Griffith, of Alexandria, was under the immediate direction of commodore Porter, who spoke of him in the highest terms of approbation. Captain Janey, of Essex, was near the battery at the time of the action, with a fatigue party of fifty or sixty men, and deserves to be particularly mentioned. Our whole loss was eleven killed, and seventeen or eighteen wounded.

I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN P. HUNGERFORD,
Brigadier-general.

The hon. James Monroe, Secretary of War.

Copy of a letter from Captain Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Georgetown, September 9th, 1814.

Sir,

The battery under my direction at the Indian Head was of too small a calibre to make much impression on the enemy, as they descended the Potomac on the 5th instant. A single eighteen-pounder, which arrived only thirty minutes before the firing began, ill supplied with ammunition, was the only gun that could be of much service.

The field-pieces (six-pounders) under the direction of that excellent officer major Peter, of the Georgetown, and captain Birch, of the Washington volunteers, and captain Lewis, of general Steward's brigade, kept up a very spirited fire. These officers, together with captains Stull and Davidson, and their brave men, behaved in the handsomest manner, and rendered all the assistance their limited means afforded.

The ammunition of the eighteen-pounder, and of several of the sixes, being expended, and the fire of the enemy from two frigates, two sloops of war, two bombs, one rocket-ship, and several smaller vessels, being very heavy, it was thought advisable by general Stewart, major Peter, and myself, to retire a short distance in the rear. This was done in good order, after sustaining their fire for more than an hour. General Stewart and colonel Beall were much exposed during the whole time of the cannonading. It would be presumption in me to speak in commendation of those veterans.—I cannot, however, avoid expressing my admiration of their conduct. The few seamen (of the Guerriere) under the immediate command of lieutenant Read, of the Java, exhibited their

usual bravery. Indeed, in the whole of this affair, every officer and man did his duty. Major Stewart of the 36th regiment of infantry was constantly with and rendered all the assistance in his power.

The advantageous situation we occupied prevented the enemy from doing us much injury. Only one man was wounded.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. PERRY.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Baltimore, September 9, 1814.

Sir,

In pursuance of your instructions, I have to inform you, that on the third instant, I proceeded down the Potomac with three small fire vessels under the protection of four barges or cutters, manned with about sixty seamen, armed with muskets, destined against two of the enemy's frigates, and a bomb-ship which lay about two and a half miles below Alexandria.

At nine, A. M., in advance of the fire-vessels in my gig, finding no colours displayed at Alexandria, but a Swedish ensign on board a schooner—being near the wharves, I hailed and ordered the American flag to be hoisted; after seeing the flag hoisted, I directed the fire-vessels (which were conducted by lieutenant Newcomb, lieutenant Forrest, and sailing-master Ramage) to proceed on to the objects of attack, and I have no doubt, would have succeeded in destroying two at least of the enemy's ships, had not the wind failed them some time before, and particularly after they had reached the uppermost ship, within the range of musket shot. At this time perceiving the whole of the enemy's barges in motion, I directed lieutenant Newcomb, who commanded the van vessel, after giving her a proper direction, to set fire to her—and after Mr. Ramage came up gave him the same orders; the vessel under charge of lieutenant Forrest was fired by the pilot without orders, some distance above the others.

Of the enemy's boats, some were employed in towing off the fire-vessels, and the rest in pursuit of our four cutters, my own gig, and a small boat with three oars without a rudder; they did not, however, venture to come within musket shot, although their force and numbers were more than treble ours,

but continued at a distance, firing their great guns for thirty or thirty-five minutes, and then retired to their ships again.

On the 4th instant I had another fire-vessel prepared, but it being calm, I ordered lieutenant Newcomb and the four cutters, to proceed with one of the remaining lighters of the yard, having an 18-pounder in her, to attack the bomb-ship, which, in the anxiety of the enemy to get below the temporary forts erected by my gallant associates, captains Porter and Perry, had been left exposed to attack. At sunset, just as I was about to give orders to attack the bomb, I discovered one of the enemy's frigates behind the point forming the entrance of Washington's reach, which necessarily obliged me to relinquish this determination, and gave orders to proceed across to the Virginia shore, to haul up the boats and place the lighter in a situation to be defended against the enemy's barges.

Having reconnoitered the enemy, on returning to the lighter at 9, P. M., I seized a man under suspicious circumstances, on the beach, near to a small boat, about a mile above the enemy's uppermost ship, that again induced me to change my position to the opposite side of the river, where, after getting the cutters hauled up, placing the lighter in an advantageous position, and my musket-men upon the top of a cliff overlooking the river, I was, at 11, P. M., attacked by all the enemy's barges, but which, by the cool intrepidity of lieutenant Newcomb, having charge of the lighter, assisted by lieutenant Forrest, sailing-master Ramage, master's mate Stockton, and midshipman Whitlock, and 45 seamen with muskets, the enemy was not only repulsed, but in less than 20 minutes thrown into the utmost confusion, and driven back to his ships, and I have sufficient reason to believe with great loss, although the only injury sustained on our part was one man wounded on board the lighter.

The enemy thus repulsed, and no prospect of doing him further injury in this way, as his rearmost ship was not more than a mile distant, I had the lighter shifted further up, and at 7, A. M., a fire-vessel brought down for the purpose of assailing him in conjunction with the battery at the White House, under the command of captain Porter, but in this I was again disappointed, as that excellent officer, after using every possible exertion, was not able in so short a time as had been afforded him, to erect a work sufficiently strong to check the enemy any length of time; otherwise, I conceived I should have found no difficulty in effecting his destruction.

At the time the enemy silenced the battery, the fire-ship,

under full sail, was about a mile above his uppermost vessel, when I found myself under the necessity of ordering her to be set on fire, and at the same time our boats to retire, to prevent their being taken possession of by his numerous barges.

Although I did not succeed in the destruction of any of the enemy's vessels, I am nevertheless convinced, that the expedition was in many points of view attended with good effect, consequently I feel it a duty to recommend to your notice the officers and seamen engaged in the same; as, in two of the fire-vessels, lieutenant Newcomb and sailing-master Ramage manifested so much zeal, as to continue on board, steering them, until they were enveloped in the flames, and obliged to jump overboard to avoid sharing the fate of the vessels themselves. I am also indebted to the exertions of lieutenant Forrest, who volunteered his services, and although very much indisposed at the time, afforded all the assistance in his power.

Permit me at the same time to recommend to your attention Mr. Stockton, master's mate, who not only rendered me essential service as acting aid-de-camp, but in every other situation manifested a zeal and intrepidity not to be shaken: also midshipman Whitlock, whose conduct in every part of the service I highly approve. Mr. Thomas Herbert, a young gentleman of Alexandria, and Mr. Porry, pilot, who volunteered their services, also deserve well of their country.

The conduct of the seamen, for energy and patriotism, was not even excelled by that of their officers.

At the time I took possession of Alexandria, there were 1500 pounds of fresh beef lying on the wharves ready to be delivered o the boats of the enemy's ships, which were then only two and a half or three miles below the town, and I mention this to shew the state that place was in at the time.

In justice to major Kemper, commanding a detachment of the militia of general Hungerford's brigade, it is but proper I mention, that on taking possession of Alexandria he immediately marched his detachment to my assistance, and which at once secured the town against any force the enemy could send back.

The quantity of flour the enemy was enabled to take from Alexandria, I found on inquiry to be not more than between 14 and 16,000 barrels.

As respects the manner of my reception by the citizens of Alexandria, when I landed and took possession of that

place I shall inform you hereafter in a separate communication.

With great repect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant, JOHN RODGERS.

The Hon. W. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to Captain Dyson, dated 29th August, 1814.

Sir,

I send captain Manigault with orders to receive your written or verbal report of the causes under which you left the post committed to your charge. In this you will state the orders under which you acted, and from whom received.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

J. ARMSTRONG.

Captain Dyson, corps of Artillery.

Camp at Macon's Island, August 29th, 1814.

Sir,

I had the honour to receive your communication of the 29th instant. The orders received from brigadier-general Winder through major Hite, verbally, on the 24th instant, were, in case I was oppressed by, or heard of, an enemy in my rear, to spike our guns and make my escape over the river. The enemy approached by water on the 27th, and we had learnt on that day through several channels, that the enemy had been reinforced at Benedict, 6000 strong, and that they were on their march to co-operate with the fleet, in addition to the force which left the city. Under all these circumstances, the officers under my command were consulted, and agreed it was best to abandon the fort and effect a retreat. The force under my command was thought not equal to a defence of the place.

I have the honour to be, with great consideration, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL F. DYSON,
Captain corps of artillery.

The Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War, Washington.

Copy of a letter from Colonel Philip Reed, of twenty-fifth regiment of Maryland Militia, to Brigadier-General Benjamin Chambers.

Sir, *Camp at Belle Air, 3d September*, 1814.

I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to seize from incessant labour, to inform you that about half-past 11

o'clock, on the night of the 30th ultimo, I received information, that the barges of the enemy, then lying off Waltham's farm, were moving in shore. I concluded their object was to land, and burn the houses, &c. at Waltham's, and made the necessary arrangements to meet him, and to be prepared for an opportunity which I sought for several days, to strike the enemy. During our march to the point threatened, it was discovered that the blow was aimed at our camp. Orders were immediately given to the quarter-master to remove the camp and baggage, and to the troops to countermarch, pass the road by the right of our camp, and form on the rising ground about three hundred paces in its rear—the right towards Caulk's house, and the left resting on the road—the artillery in the centre, supported by the infantry on the right and left.

I directed captain Wickes and his second lieutenant Beck, with a part of the rifle company, to be formed so as to cover the road by which the enemy marched, and with this section I determined to post myself, leaving the line to be formed under the direction of major Wickes and captain Chambers. The head of the enemy's column soon presented itself, and received the fire of our advanced party at seventy paces distance, and being pressed by numbers vastly superior, I repaired to my post in the line, having ordered the riflemen to return and form on the right of the line. The fire now became general along the whole line, and was sustained by our troops with the most determined valour. The enemy pressed our front; foiled in this, he threw himself on our left flank, which was occupied by captain Chambers's company—here, too, his efforts were equally unavailing. His fire had nearly ceased, when I was informed, that in some parts of our line the cartridges were entirely expended, nor did any of the boxes contain more than a very few rounds (although each man had brought about twenty into the field); the artillery cartridges were entirely expended. Under these circumstances, I ordered the line to fall back to a convenient spot, where a part of the line was fortified—when the few remaining cartridges were distributed among a part of the line, which was again brought into the field, where it remained for a considerable time, the night preventing a pursuit. The artillery and infantry, for whom there were no cartridges, were ordered to this place. The enemy having made every effort in his power, although apprised of our having fallen back, manifested no dis-

position to follow us up, but retreated about the time our ammunition was exhausted.

When it is recollected that very few of our officers or men had ever heard the whistling of a ball, that the force of the enemy (as the most accurate information enables us to estimate) was double ours, that it was commanded by sir Peter Parker of the Menelaus, one of the most distinguished officers in the British navy, and composed (as their officers admitted in a subsequent conversation) of as fine men as could be selected from the British service—I feel justified in the assertion, that the gallantry of the officers and men on this occasion could not be excelled by any troops. The officers and men performed their duty. It is, however, but an act of justice to notice those officers who seemed to display more than a common degree of gallantry. Major Wickes and captain Chambers were conspicuous—captain Wickes and lieutenant Beck of the rifle corps, lieutenant Eunick and ensign Skirvin of captain Chambers's company, exerted themselves; as did captain Hynson and his ensign Grant—captain Ussleton (of the brigade artillery) and his lieutenants Reed and Brown—lieutenant Tilghman, who commanded the guns of the volunteer artillery in the absence of captain Hands (who is in ill health and from home), was conspicuous for his gallantry—his ensign Thomas also manifested much firmness. I am indebted to captain Wilson of the cavalry, who was with me, for his exertions; and also to adjutant Hynson, who displayed much zeal and firmness throughout. To Dr. Blake, Dr. Gordon, and to Isaac Spencer, esq. who were accidentally in camp, I am indebted for reconnoitering the enemy on his advance.

You will be surprised, sir, when I inform you, that in an engagement of so long continuance, in an open field, where the moon shone brilliantly on the rising ground occupied by our troops, while the shade of the neighbouring woods, under the protection of which the enemy fought, gave us but an indistinct view of any thing but the flash of his guns—that under all the disparity of numbers against us, and the advantage of a regular discipline on the side of the enemy, we had not one man killed, and only one serjeant, one corporal, and one private wounded, and those slightly. The enemy left one midshipman and eight men dead on the field, and nine wounded, six of whom died in the course of a few hours. Sir Peter Parker was amongst the slain—he was mortally wounded with a buck-shot, and died before he reached

the barges, to which he was conveyed by his men. The enemy's force, consisting of marines and musketeers, was in part armed with boarding pikes, swords, and pistols, no doubt intended for our tents, as orders had been given by sir Peter not to fire. Many of these arms, with rockets, muskets, &c. have fallen into our hands, found by the picket guard under ensign Skirvin, which was posted on the battle ground for the remainder of the night. Nothing but the want of ammunition saved the enemy from destruction.

Attached are the names of the wounded—and as an act of justice to those concerned, I inclose you a list of the names of every officer and soldier engaged in the affair. Certain information from the enemy assures us that his total loss in killed and wounded was 42 or 43, including two wounded lieutenants.

Names of the wounded.

Captain Chambers's company—John Magnos, serjeant, slightly, in the thigh; Philip Crane, corporal, a ball between the tendons and the bone of the thigh near the knee.

Captain Henry Page's company—John Glanvill, private, in the arm.

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

PHILIP REED,
Lieutenant-colonel, commanding.

Brigadier-General Benjamin Chambers,
sixth brigade, Maryland militia.

Admiralty Office, September 27.
[*Transmitted by Vice-Admiral Cochrane.*]

His Majesty's Ship Menelaus, off Pool's Island,
Sir, *Chesapeake, September* 1, 1814.

With grief the deepest it becomes my duty to communicate the death of sir Peter Parker, bart. late commander of his majesty's ship Menelaus, and the occurrences attending an attack on the enemy's troops, on the night of the 20th ultimo, encamped at Bellair. The previous and accompanying letters of sir Peter Parker, will, I presume, fully point out the respect the enemy on all occasions evinced at the approach of our arms, retreating at every attack, though possessing a superiority of numbers of five to one; an intelligent black man gave us the information of 200 militia being encamped behind a wood, distant half a mile from the beach,

and described their situation, so as to give us the strongest hopes of cutting off and securing the largest part as our prisoners, destroying the camp, field-pieces, &c., and possessing also certain information that one man out of every five had been levied as a requisition on the eastern shore, for the purpose of being sent over for the protection of Baltimore, who were only prevented crossing the bay by the activity and vigilance of the tender and ship's boats. One hundred and four bayonets, with twenty pikes, were landed at eleven o'clock at night, under the immediate direction of captain sir Peter Parker, bart., the first division headed by myself, and the second division by lieutenant Pearce. On arriving at the ground we discovered the enemy had shifted his position, as we were then informed, the distance of a a mile farther; having taken the look-out picket immediately on our landing, we were in assurance our motions had not been discovered, and with the deepest silence followed on for the camp. After a march of between four and five miles in the country, we found the enemy posted on a plain, surrounded by woods, with the camp in the rear: they were drawn up in line, and perfectly ready to receive us; a single moment was not to be lost; by a smart fire and instant charge we commenced the attack, forced them from their position, putting them before us in full retreat to the rear of their artillery; where they again made a stand, showing a disposition to outflank us on the right; a movement was instantly made by lieutenant Pearce's division to force them from that quarter, and it was at this time, while animating his men in the most heroic manner that sir Peter Parker received his mortal wound, which obliged him to quit the field, and he expired in a few minutes. Lieutenant Pearce, with his division, soon routed the enemy, while that under my command gained and passed the camp. One of the field pieces was momentarily in our possession, but obliged to quit it from superior numbers.

The marines, under lieutenants Baynton and Post, formed our centre, and never was bravery more conspicuous. Find it impossible to close on the enemy, from the rapidity of their retreat, having pursued them upwards of a mile. I deemed it prudent to retire towards the beach, which was effected in the best possible order; taking with us from the field 25 of our wounded—the whole we could find, the enemy not even attempting to regain the ground they had lost; from three prisoners (cavalry) taken by us, we learned their force amounted to 500 militia, a troop of horse, and five pieces of

artillery, and since, by flags of truce, I am led to believe their number much greater.

Repelling a force of such magnitude with so small a body as we opposed to them, will I trust speak for itself; and although our loss has been severe, I hope the lustre acquired to our arms will compensate for it. Permit me, sir, to offer to your notice the conduct of Mr. James Stepford Hore, master's mate of this ship, who on this, as well as other trying occasions, evinced the greatest zeal and gallantry. In justice to sub-lieutenant Johnson, commanding the Jane tender, I must beg to notice the handsome manner in which he has at all times volunteered his services.

Herewith I beg leave to inclose you a list of the killed, wounded, and missing in this affair.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HEN. CREASE,
Acting Commander.

Total—14 killed; 27 wounded.

CORRESPONDENCE OF ADMIRAL COCHRANE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT CONSEQUENT THEREON.

Copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Cochrane to Mr. Monroe. His Britannic Majesty's Ship, the Tonnant, in the Patuxent river, 18th August, 1814.

Sir,

Having been called upon by the governor-general of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton destruction committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty, conformably with the nature of the governor-general's application, to issue to the naval force under my command, an order to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast, as may be found assailable.

I had hoped that this contest would have terminated, without my being obliged to resort to severities which are contrary to the usage of civilized warfare, and as it has been with extreme reluctance and concern that I have found myself compelled to adopt this system of devastation, I shall be equally gratified if the conduct of the executive of the United States will authorise my staying such proceedings,

by making reparation to the suffering inhabitants of Upper Canada: thereby manifesting, that if the destructive measures pursued by their army were ever sanctioned, they will no longer be permitted by the government.

I have the honour to be, sir, with much consideration, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) ALEX. COCHRANE,

Vice-admiral and commander in chief of his Britannic Majesty's ships and vessels upon the North American station.

The honourable James Monroe, Secretary of state, &c. &c. &c. Washington.

Copy of a letter from Mr. Monroe to Sir Alexander Cochrane, Vice-Admiral, &c. &c.

Department of State, September 6th, 1814.

Sir,

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 18th of August, stating, that having been called on by the governor-general of the Canadas, to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton desolation committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become your duty, conformably with the nature of the governor-general's application, to issue to the naval force under your command, an order to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable.

It is seen with the greatest surprise, that this system of devastation which has been practised by the British forces, so manifestly contrary to the usage of civilized warfare, is placed by you on the ground of retaliation. No sooner were the United States compelled to resort to war againt Great Britain, than they resolved to wage it in a manner most consonant to the principles of humanity, and to those friendly relations which it was desirable to preserve between the two nations, after the restoration of peace. They perceived, however, with the deepest regret, that a spirit alike just and humane was neither cherished nor acted on by your government. Such an assertion would not be hazarded, if it was not supported by facts, the proof of which has perhaps already carried the same conviction to other nations that it has to the people of these states. Without dwelling on the deplorable cruelties committed by the savages in the British ranks, and in British pay, on American prisoners at the river Raisin, which to this day have never been disavowed or

atoned, I refer, as more immediately connected with the subject of your letter, to the wanton desolation that was committed at Havre-de-Grace, and at Georgetown, early in the spring of 1813. These villages were burnt and ravaged by the naval forces of Great Britain, to the ruin of their unarmed inhabitants, who saw with astonishment that they derived no protection to their property from the laws of war. During the same season, scenes of invasion and pillage, carried on under the same authority, were witnessed all along the waters of the Chesapeake, to an extent inflicting the most serious private distress, and under circumstances that justified the suspicion, that revenge and cupidity, rather than the manly motives that should dictate the hostility of a high-minded foe, led to their perpetration. The late destruction of the houses of the government in this city is another act which comes necessarily into view. In the wars of modern Europe, no examples of the kind, even among nations the most hostile to to each other, can be traced. In the course of ten years past, the capitals of the principal powers of the continent of Europe have been conquered, and occupied alternately by the victorious armies of each other, and no instance of such wanton and unjustifiable destruction has been seen. We must go back to distant and barbarous ages, to find a parallel for the acts of which I complain.

Although these acts of desolation invited, if they did not impose on the government the necessity of retaliation, yet in no instance has it been authorised. The burning of the village of Newark, in Upper Canada, posterior to the early outrages above enumerated, was not executed on that principle. The village of Newark adjoined Fort George, and its destruction was justified by the officer who ordered it, on the ground that it became necessary in the military operations there. The act, however, was disavowed by the government. The burning which took place at Long Point was unauthorised by the government, and the conduct of the officer subjected to the investigation of a military tribunal. For the burning at St. David's, committed by stragglers, the officer who commanded in that quarter was dismissed without a trial, for not preventing it.

I am commanded by the president distinctly to state, that it as little comports with any orders which have been issued to the military and naval commanders of the United States, as it does with the established and known humanity of the American nation, to pursue a system which it appears you have adopted. This government owes it to itself, to the prin-

ciples which it has ever held sacred, to disavow, as justly chargeable to it, any such wanton, cruel, and unjustifiable warfare.

Whatever unauthorised irregularities may have been committed by any of its troops, it would have been ready, acting upon these principles of sacred and eternal obligation, to disavow, and, as far as practicable, to repair. But in the plan of desolating warfare which your letter so explicitly makes known, and which is attempted to be excused on a plea so utterly groundless, the president perceives a spirit of deep-rooted hostility, which, without the evidence of such facts, he could not have believed existed, or would have been carried to such an extremity.

For the reparation of injuries of whatever nature they may be, not sanctioned by the law of nations, which the military or naval force of either power may have committed against the other, this government will always be ready to enter into reciprocal arrangements. It is presumed that your government will neither expect nor propose any which are not reciprocal.

Should your government adhere to a system of desolation, so contrary to the views and practice of the United States, so revolting to humanity, and repugnant to the sentiment and usages of the civilized world, whilst it will be seen with the deepest regret, it must and will be met with a determination and constancy becoming a free people, contending in a just cause for their essential rights, and their dearest interests.

I have the honour to be, with great consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) JAMES MONROE.

Vice-Admiral sir Alexander Cochrane, commander in chief of H. B. M. ships and vessels, &c.

Vice-Admiral Cochrane to the Secretary of State.

His Britannic Majesty's Ship Tonnant, in the Chesapeake, September 19, 1814.

Sir,

I had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th instant, in reply to one which I addressed you from the Patuxent.

As I have no authority from my government to enter upon any kind of discussion relative to the points contained in your letter, I have only to regret that there does not appear to be any hope that I shall be authorised to recal my general order; which has been further sanctioned by a subsequent request from lieutenant-general sir George Prevost.

A copy of your letter will this day be forwarded by me

to England, and until I receive instructions from my government the measures which I have adopted must be persisted in; unless remuneration be made to the inhabitants of the Canadas for the injuries they have sustained from the outrages committed by the troops of the United States.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEX. COCHRANE,
Vice-Admiral and Commander in Chief, &c.

Honourable James Monroe, Secretary of State.

By the President of the United States of America.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas the enemy by a sudden incursion have succeeded in invading the capital of the nation, defended by troops at the moment less numerous than their own, and almost entirely of the militia: during their possession of which, though for a single day only, they wantonly destroyed the public edifices having no relation in their structure to operations of war, nor used at the time for military annoyance; some of these edifices being also costly monuments of taste and of the arts, and others depositories of the public archives, not only precious to the nation as the memorials of its origin and its early transactions, but interesting to all nations, as contributions to the general stock of historical instruction and political science:

And whereas advantage has been taken of the loss of a fort, more immediately guarding the neighbouring town of Alexandria, to place the town within the range of a naval force, too long and too much in the habit of abusing its superiority wherever it can be applied, to require, as the alternative of a general conflagration, an undisturbed plunder of private property, which has been executed in a manner peculiarly distressing to the inhabitants, who had inconsiderately cast themselves upon the justice and generosity of the victor.

And whereas it now appears, by a direct communication from the British commander on the American station, to be his avowed purpose to employ the force under his direction "in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be assailable;" adding to this declaration the insulting pretext that it is in retaliation for a wanton destruction committed by the United States in Upper Canada, when it is notorious that no destruction has been committed, which, notwithstanding the multiplied outrages previously

committed by the enemy, was not unauthorised, and promptly shown to be so; and that the United States have been as constant in their endeavours to reclaim the enemy from such outrages, by the contrast of their own example, as they have been ready to terminate, on reasonable conditions, the war itself:

And whereas these proceedings and declared purposes, which exhibit a deliberate disregard of the principles of humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare, and which must give to the existing war a character of extended devastation and barbarism, at the very moment of negociations for peace, invited by the enemy himself, leave no prospect of safety to any thing within the reach of his predatory and incendiary operations, but in a manly and universal determination to chastise and expel the invader:

Now, therefore, I, James Madison, president of the United States, do issue this my proclamation, exhorting all the good people thereof, to unite their hearts and hands in giving effect to the ample means possessed for that purpose. I enjoin it on all officers, civil and military, to exert themselves in executing the duties with which they are respectively charged. And, more especially, I require the officers commanding the respective military districts, to be vigilant and alert in providing for the defence thereof; for the more effectual accomplishment of which, they are authorised to call to the defence of exposed and threatened places portions of the militia most convenient thereto, whether they be or be not parts of the quotas detached for the service of the United States under requisitions of the general government.

On an occasion which appeals so forcibly to the proud feelings and patriotic devotion of the American people, none will forget what they owe to themselves; what they owe to their country, and the high destinies which await it; what to the glory acquired by their fathers, in establishing the independence which is now to be maintained by their sons, with the augmented strength and resources with which time and Heaven have blessed them.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed to these presents.

Done at the city of Washington, the first day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and of the independence of the United States the thirty-ninth.

JAMES MADISON.

By the President, JAMES MONROE, *Secretary of State.*

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE ATTACK UPON BALTIMORE.

Copies of letters from Major-General Samuel Smith, to the acting Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Baltimore, 15th September, 1814.

Sir,

I have been so incessantly occupied, that it has been impossible for me to convey to you the information respecting the enemy, which it would have been proper for you to have received from me. A detailed statement will be forwarded as soon as it can be made out; in the mean time, I have the pleasure to inform you, that the enemy embarked their rear-guard about one o'clock; and that their ships, a few excepted, are out of the river; their destination unknown.

I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL SMITH,
Major-general, commanding.

Colonel James Monroe, acting Secretary at War.

Head-Quarters, Baltimore, September 19, 1814.

Sir,

In compliance with the promise contained in my letter of the 15th instant; I have now the honour of stating, that the enemy landed between seven and 8,000 men on Monday the twelfth instant, at North Point, fourteen miles distant from this town. Anticipating this debarkation, general Stricker had been detached on Sunday evening with a portion of his brigade on the North Point road. Major Randal, of the Baltimore county militia, having under his command a light corps of riflemen and musketry taken from general Stansbury's brigade, and the Pennsylvania volunteers, was detached to the mouth of Bear Creek, with orders to co-operate with general Stricker, and to check any landing which the enemy might attempt in that quarter. On Monday, brigadier-general Stricker took a good position at the junction of the two roads leading from this place to North Point, having his right flanked by Bear Creek, and his left by a marsh. He here awaited the approach of the enemy, having sent on an advanced corps under the command of major Heath of the fifth regiment. This advance was met by that of the enemy, and after some skirmishing it returned to the line, the main body of the enemy being at a short distance in the rear of their advance. Between two and three o'clock the enemy's whole force came up and commenced the battle by some discharges

of rockets, which were succeeded by the cannon from both sides, and soon after the action became general along the line. General Stricker gallantly maintained his ground against a great superiority of numbers during the space of an hour and twenty minutes, when the regiment on his left (the 51st) giving way, he was under the necessity of retiring to the ground in his rear, where he had stationed one regiment as a reserve. He here formed his brigade; but the enemy not thinking it advisable to pursue, he, in compliance with previous arrangements, fell back and took post on the left of my entrenchments, and a half mile in advance of them.

In this affair the citizen soldiers of Baltimore, with the exception of the 51st regiment, have maintained the reputation they so deservedly acquired at Bladensburg, and their brave and skilful leader has confirmed the confidence which we had all so justly placed in him. I take the liberty of referring you to his letter for the more particular mention of the individuals who, new to warfare, have shown the coolness and valour of veterans; and who, by their conduct on this occasion, have given their country and their city an assurance of what may be expected from them when their services are again required. I cannot dismiss the subject without expressing the heart-felt satisfaction I experience in thus bearing testimony to the good conduct of my fellow townsmen. About the time general Stricker had taken the ground just mentioned, he was joined by brigadier-general Winder, who had been stationed on the west side of the city, but was now ordered to march with general Douglass's brigade of Virginia militia, and the United States dragoons under captain Bird, and take post on the left of general Stricker. During these movements, the brigades of generals Stansbury and Foreman, the seamen and marines under commodore Rodgers, the Pennsylvania volunteers under colonels Cobean and Findley; the Baltimore artillery under colonel Harris, and the marine artillery under captain Stiles, manned the trenches and the batteries—all prepared to receive the enemy. We remained in this situation during the night.

On Tuesday the enemy appeared in front of my entrenchments at the distance of two miles, on the Philadelphia road, from whence he had a full view of our position. He manœuvred during the morning towards our left, as if with the intention of making a circuitous march and coming down on the Harford or York roads. Generals Winder and Stricker were ordered to adapt their movements to those of the enemy, so as to baffle this supposed intention. They ex-

ecuted this order with great skill and judgment, by taking an advantageous position, stretching from my left across the country, when the enemy was likely to approach the quarter he seemed to threaten. This movement induced the enemy to concentrate his forces (between one and two o'clock) in my front, pushing his advance to within a mile of us, driving in our videttes, and shewing an intention of attacking us that evening. I immediately drew generals Winder and Stricker nearer to the left of my entrenchments and to the right of the enemy, with the intention of their falling on his right or rear, should he attack me; or, if he declined it, of attacking him in the morning. To this movement, and to the strength of my defences, which the enemy had the fairest opportunity of observing, I am induced to attribute his retreat, which was commenced at half past one o'clock on Wednesday morning. In this he was so favoured by the extreme darkness and a continued rain, that we did not discover it until daylight. I consented to general Winder's pursuing with the Virginia brigade and the United States dragoons; at the same time major Randal was despatched with his light corps in pursuit on the enemy's right, whilst the whole of the militia cavalry was put in motion for the same object. All the troops were, however, so worn out with continued watching, and with being under arms during three days and nights, exposed the greater part of the time to very inclement weather, that it was found impracticable to do any thing more than pick up a few stragglers. The enemy commenced his embarkation that evening, and completed it the next day at one o'clock. It would have been impossible, even had our troops been in a condition to act offensively, to have cut off any part of the enemy's rear guard during the embarkation, as the point where it was effected was defended from our approach by a line of defences extending from Back river to Humphrey's creek on the Patapsco, thrown up by ourselves previous to their arrival.

I have now the pleasure of calling your attention to the brave commander of Fort M'Henry, major Armistead, and to the operations confined to that quarter. The enemy made his approach by water at the same time that his army was advancing on the land, and commenced a discharge of bombs and rockets at the fort as he got within range of it. The situation of major Armistead was peculiarly trying—the enemy having taken his position at such a distance as to render offensive operations on the part of the fort entirely fruitless, whilst their bombs and rockets were every moment fall-

ing in and about it—the officers and men being at the same time entirely exposed. The vessels, however had the temerity to approach somewhat nearer—they were as soon compelled to withdraw. During the night, whilst the enemy on land was retreating, and whilst the bombardment was the most severe, two or three rocket vessels and barges succeeded in getting up the Ferry Branch; but they were soon compelled to retire, by the forts in that quarter, commanded by lieutenant Newcomb of the navy and lieutenant Webster of the flotilla. These forts also destroyed one of the barges with all on board. The barges and battery at the Lazaretto, under the command of lieutenant Rutter, of the flotilla, kept up a brisk, and, it is believed, a successful fire during the hottest period of the bombardment. Major Armistead being seriously ill in consequence of his continued exposure to the weather, has rendered it impossible for him to send in his report. It is not, therefore, in my power to do justice to those gallant individuals who partook with him the danger of a tremendous bombardment, without the ability of retorting, and without that security, which in more regular fortifications is provided for such occasions. The loss in the fort, is, I understand, about 27 killed and wounded—amongst the former, I have to lament the fall of lieutenants Clagget and Clemm, who were both estimable citizens and useful officers.

From general Stricker's brigade, the return of killed and wounded has not yet come in. It is supposed, however, to amount to about 150—among the former, this city has to regret the loss of its representative in the state legislature, James Lowry Donaldson, esqr., adjutant of the 27th regiment. This gentleman will ever be remembered by his constituents for his zeal and talents, and by his corps for his bravery and military knowledge.

I cannot conclude this report without informing you of the great aid I have derived from commodore Rodgers. He was ever present and ever ready to afford his useful council, and to render his important services. His presence, with that of his gallant officers and seamen, gave confidence to every one.

The enemy's loss in his attempt on Baltimore amounts, as near as we can ascertain it, to between six and seven hundred, killed, wounded, and missing. General Ross was certainly killed.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

S. SMITH,

Major-general, commanding.

Colonel James Monroe, acting Secretary at War.

Copy of a letter from General Stricker to Major-General Smith, dated Head-Quarters, 3d Brigade, Baltimore, September 15, 1814.

Major-general S. Smith,—Sir,

I have the honour to report to you, that in obedience to your orders, I marched from Baltimore on Sunday the 11th instant, with part of my brigade, as the advanced corps of the army under your command. My force consisted of 550 of the 5th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Sterrett; 620 of the 6th under lieutenant-colonel M'Donald; 500 of the 27th under lieutenant-colonel Long; 450 of the 39th under lieutenant-colonel Fowler; 700 of the 51st under lieutenant-colonel Amey; 150 riflemen under captain Dyer; 140 cavalry under lieutenant-colonel Biays; and the Union Artillery of 75 men, with six four-pounders, under captain Montgomery, making an aggregate of 3185 effective men. I moved towards North Point by the main road, and at eight o'clock, P. M., reached the meeting-house near the head of Bear creek, seven miles from this city. Here the brigade halted, with the exception of the cavalry, who were pushed forward to Gorsuch's farm, three miles in advance, and the riflemen, who took post near the blacksmith's shop, two miles in advance of our encampment. At seven o'clock, on the 13th, I received information from the advanced videttes that the enemy were making preparations to land under cover of their gun-vessels, which lay off the staff of North Point, within the mouth of Patapsco river. I immediately ordered back my baggage under a strong guard, moved forward the the 5th and 27th regiments, and my artillery, to the head of Long log lane (so called), resting the 5th with its right on the head of a branch of Bear creek, and its left on the main North Point road, while the 27th was posted on the opposite side of the road, in line with the 5th, its left extending towards a branch of Back river. The artillery I posted directly at the head of the lane, in the interval between the 5th and 27th. The 39th occupied a ground 300 yards in the rear of the 27th, and the 51st the same distance in the rear of the 5th, extending each parallel to the front line. The 6th regiment was thrown back to a position a short distance this side of Cook's tavern, and half a mile in the rear of the second line. My orders were, that the 5th and 27th should receive the enemy, and, if necessary, fall back through the 51st and 39th, and form on the right of the 6th, or reserve regiment. The riflemen were ordered to the skirts of a thick low pine wood, beyond the blacksmith's shop, with a large sedge field

in front, that as the cavalry were still in advance, who would inform of the enemy's approach, they might take advantage of the covering of the wood, and annoy his advance.

I soon learned that the enemy's advance party was moving rapidly up the main road, and as the cavalry continually announced their progress, I flattered myself that the riflemen would soon proclaim, by a galling fire, their still nearer approach. Imagine my chagrin, when I perceived the whole rifle corps falling back upon my main position, having too credulously listened to the groundless information that the enemy were landing on Back river to cut them off. My hopes of early annoyance to the enemy being thus frustrated, I threw the riflemen on the right flank of my front line, thereby, with the addition of a few cavalry, well securing that flank. My videttes soon brought information that the enemy in small force was enjoying himself at Gorsuch's farm. Insulted at the idea of a small marauding party thus daringly provoking chastisement, several of my officers volunteered their corps to dislodge it. Captains Levering's and Howard's companies from the 5th, about 150 in number, under major Heath of that regiment; captain Aisquith's, and a few other riflemen, in all about 70; one four-pounder with 10 men, under lieutenant Stiles, and the cavalry, were immediately pushed forward to punish the insolence of the enemy's advance, or, if his main body appeared, to give evidence of my wish for a general engagement. The latter purpose was soon answered; this small volunteer corps had proceeded scarcely half a mile before the main body of the enemy showed itself, which was immediately attacked. The infantry and riflemen maintained a fire of some minutes, and retired with some loss in killed and wounded; the cavalry and artillery, owing to the disadvantageous grounds, not being able to support them. In this skirmish major Heath's horse was killed under him.

At half past two o'clock the enemy commenced throwing rockets across my left flank, which seemed harmless, and had no other effect than to prepare my line for the sound of the artillery, which soon commenced by us on the enemy's right column then pushing across towards my left, and returned by their six-pounders and a howitzer upon my left and centre. The cannonading was brisk for some minutes, when I ordered my fire to cease, until the enemy should get within close range of canister. Seeing that my left flank was the main object of the enemy, I brought up the 39th into line on the left of the 27th, and detached two pieces of artillery to the left of the 39th; still more securely to protect my left

flank, colonel Amey of the 51st was ordered to form his regiment at right angles with my line, resting his right near the left of the 39th. This order being badly executed created for a moment some confusion in that quarter, but was soon rectified by the efforts of my aid-de-camp and brigade majors, who corrected the error of colonel Amey, and posted the 51st in its ordered position.

The enemy's right column displayed and advanced upon the 39th and 27th. The 51st, unmindful of my object to use its fire in protection of my left flank in case an attempt should be made to turn it, totally forgetful of the honour of the brigade, and regardless of its own reputation, delivered one random fire and retreated precipitately, and in such confusion, as to render every effort of mine to rally them ineffective. Some disorder was occasioned in the second battalion of the 39th, by the flight of the 51st, and a few gave way. The fire now became general from left to right; my artillery in the centre poured forth an incessant volley of canister upon the enemy's left column, who were endeavouring to gain the cover of a small log-house, about fifty yards in front of the 5th, which, however, precaution had been taken to fire, so soon as captain Sadtler's yagers from the 5th (who were originally posted therein) should be compelled to leave it. The enemy's line advanced about 10 minutes before three o'clock, with a severe fire, which was well returned by the artillery, the whole 27th, the 5th, except the three companies of captains Levering, Howard, and Sadtlers, which were too much exhausted by the advanced skirmish of the two former, and the ordered retreat of the latter, to resume their position in line; and from the first battalion of the 39th, who maintained its ground in despite of the disgraceful example set by the intended support on the left.

The fire was incessant till about 15 minutes before four o'clock, when, finding that my line, now 1400 strong, was insufficient to withstand the superior numbers of the enemy, and my left flank being exposed by the desertion of the 51st, I was constrained to order a movement back to the reserve regiment, under colonel M'Donald, which was well posted to receive the retired line, which mostly rallied well. On forming with the 6th, the fatigued state of the regiments and corps which had retired, and the probability that my right flank might be turned by a quick movement of the enemy in that direction, induced me, after proper deliberation, to fall back to Worthington's mill; which I was the more persuaded

to, by my desire to have the 6th regiment (whose officers and men were eager to share the dangers of their brother soldiers) perfect and in good order to receive the enemy on his nearer approach to the city. All retired as I could wish, and were ready to act as circumstances might require. In this situation you found the brigade on the morning of the 13th, somewhat fatigued, but with increased confidence in ourselves, and renewing our preparations for the annoyance of the enemy, alone, if deemed proper, or in conjunction with any other force.

I have thought it due to the merits of my brigade, to detail thus fully their whole movement, and I feel a pride in the belief that the stand made on Monday, in no small degree tended to check the temerity of a foe daring to invade a country like ours, and designing the destruction of our city, in whose defence some of the best blood of the country has already been spilt, and for whose safety and protection the citizen-soldiers of the third brigade are ready to suffer every privation, and meet every danger. Should report be true, (and I doubt not the fact) that the enemy's commanding officer, major-general Ross, was killed in this action, and the enemy suffered in proportion to his superior numbers, I shall feel still more the valuable consequences of our fight.

The conduct of many company officers and privates, was such as I calculated on; that of most of my field-officers also merits my particular notice. Major Richard K. Heath of the 5th, who led on the advanced party to bring on the action, behaved as became an officer; the facts of his horse being killed under him, in the first skirmish, his second being badly wounded, and himself receiving a contusion on the head, by a musket-ball in the general action, are ample proofs of his bravery and exposure in discharge of his duty. Lieutenant-colonel Sterrett, and major Barry of the 5th, gained my highest approbation, and they unite with all in praise of captain Spangler and his company of volunteers from York (Pennsylvania), then attached to their command; also of adjutant Cheston, who is slightly wounded. Lieutenant-colonel Long of the 27th, and his field and company officers, did well; this whole regiment were unsurpassed in bravery, resolution, and enthusiasm. My brigade has to bewail the loss of adjutant James Lowry Donaldson, who fell in the hottest of the fight, bravely discharging the duties of his commission. Lieutenant-colonel Fowler and major Steiger of the 39th, did their duty in every respect; they speak highly of the volunteer companies of captain Quantril, from Hagers-

town, and captain Metzgar from Hanover, Pennsylvania. Captain Quantril is wounded. Captain John Montgomery, commanding my artillery, gained for himself and his company lasting honour. Captain Aisquith, and his company of riflemen, merit my thanks. Ensign Wilmot, commanding the company of United Volunteers of the 5th, and many of his men, distinguished themselves.

To brigade-majors Calhoun and Frailey, I am under great obligations for the prompt and zealous performance of their duty. To my aid-de-camp, major George P. Stevenson, too much praise cannot be given; his industry in every arrangement before the fight, and in animating the whole line, was conspicuous; his zeal and courage are of the most ardent kind, the sprightliness of his manners, in the most trying scenes, had the happiest effect upon all to whom he had to communicate my orders; and the precision with which he delivered my commands, could be exceeded only by the coolness with which he always saw them executed. He was animated, brave, and useful. Major William B. Barney, and adjutant Lemuel Taylor, of the cavalry, who, having no opportunity of distinction in their regiment, owing to the grounds, did me great service, the former in aiding captain Montgomery, the latter in conveying my orders through the whole. Mr. Robert Goodloe Harper deserves my thanks. He visited me just before the action; accompanied the advanced party, and aided me much throughout. The brave soldiers under my command have suffered many privations, and I recognize among our killed and wounded many valuable men; of which I will make a report in a few days.

I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,

JOHN STRICKER,

Brigadier-General, commanding 3d brigade M. M.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New-Castle, September 13, 1814.

Sir,

From the time of my arrival at Baltimore until my departure, the various duties I had to perform, and the different situations in which I was placed, must plead my apology for not furnishing a report of the services of the naval force employed there under my command at an earlier period; and more particularly as my situation, a large portion of the time, was such as to deny me the use of pen, ink, or paper.

The advance and retreat of the enemy you have been made acquainted with from other sources, and it now only remains

for me to make known to you the dispositions made of, and the services rendered by the force under my command, and which I feel a pleasure in doing, as the conduct of all was such as to merit my entire approbation.

In the general distribution of the forces employed in the defence of Baltimore, with the concurrence of the commanding general, I stationed lieutenant Gamble, first of the Guerriere, with about 100 seamen, in command of a seven-gun battery, on the line between the roads leading from Philadelphia and Sparrow's Point.

Sailing-master De La Rouch, of the Erie, and midshipman Field, of the Guerriere, with twenty seamen, in command of a two-gun battery, fronting the road leading from Sparrow's Point.

Sailing-master Ramage, of the Guerriere, with twenty seamen, in command of a five-gun battery, to the right of the Sparrow's Point road.

And midshipman Salter, with twelve seamen, in command of a one-gun battery a little to the right of Mr. Ramage.

Lieutenant Kuhn, with the detachment of marines belonging to the Guerriere, was posted in the entrenchment between the batteries occupied by lieutenant Gamble and sailing-master Ramage.

Lieutenant Newcomb, third of the Guerriere, with eighty seamen, occupied Fort Covington, on the Ferry Branch, a little below Spring Gardens.

Sailing-master Webster, of the flotilla, with fifty seamen of that corps, occupied a six-gun battery, on the Ferry Branch, known by the name of Babcock.

Lieutenant Frazier, of the flotilla, with forty-five seamen of the same corps, occupied a three gun battery near the Lazaretto.

And lieutenant Rutter, the senior officer of the flotilla, in command of all the barges, which were moored at the entrance of the passage between the Lazaretto and Fort M'Henry, in the left wing of the water battery, at which was stationed sailing-master Redman and fifty-four men of the flotilla.

To the officers, seamen, and marines of the Guerriere, considering the privations they experienced, and the cheerfulness and zeal with which they encountered every obstacle, every acknowledgment is due, and it would be as impossible for me to say too much in their praise, as it would be unworthy of the station I hold, not to mention that their discipline and

good conduct is owing in a pre-eminent degree to the indefatigable attention and exertions of that highly estimable officer lieutenant Gamble.

The enemy's repulsion from the Ferry Branch on the night of the 13th instant, after he had passed Fort M'Henry with his barges and some light vessels, was owing to the warm reception he met from Forts Covington and Babcock, commanded by lieutenant Newcomb and sailing-master Webster, who with all under their command performed the duty assigned them to admiration.

To lieutenant Frazier commanding the three-gun battery at the Lazaretto, great praise is due for the constant and animated fire with which he at times assailed the enemy during the whole bombardment, although placed in a very exposed situation to rockets and shells.

Great praise is justly due to lieutenant Rutter for his prompt execution of my orders, as well as the zeal and coolness with which he performed all the duties of his station, although continually exposed for near 24 hours to the enemy's rockets and shells.

Similar praise is due to the officers and men, in the several barges of the flotilla which were immediately under his command, who, without regard to the enemy's rockets and shells, maintained their position with firmness in the passage between Fort M'Henry and the Lazaretto.

Sailing-master Rodman, stationed in the water-battery of Fort-M'Henry, with sixty seamen of the flotilla, did his duty in a manner worthy of the service to which he belongs.

To master's-mate Stockton, my aid, I am greatly indebted for the zeal and promptitude with which he conveyed my orders from post to post, and wherever I had occasion to communicate, although in some instances he had to pass through showers of shells and rockets.

To Mr. Allen (brother of the late gallant captain Allen of the navy), who acted as my aid and remained near my person, I am much indebted for the essential assistance he rendered in the capacity of secretary, and conveying my orders wherever I found the same necessary.

It now becomes a duty to notice the services of that gallant and meritorious officer, captain Spence of the navy, by whose exertions, assisted by lieutenant Rutter with the barges, the entrance into the bason was so obstructed in the enemy's presence, and that too in a very short time, as to bid defiance to his ships, had he attempted to force that passage. In fine, owing to the emergency of the service, although no definite command could be assigned captain Spence, his services

were nevertheless of the first order, and where danger was expected there he was to be found, animating with his presence, and encouraging by his conduct, all to do their duty. On my leaving Baltimore, commodore Perry being absent, the command of the naval forces devolved on this excellent officer.

That justly distinguished officer, commodore Perry, I am sorry to say, was so indisposed and worn out with the fatigue he had experienced on the Potomac, and having arrived at Baltimore but a short time before the bombardment commenced, excluded his taking an active command; at the moment, however, when the enemy threatened to attack our lines, I found he was with us, and ready to render every assistance in his power. In a word, every officer, seaman, and marine, belonging as well to the navy as to the flotilla, performed his duty in a manner worthy of the corps to which he belonged.

I feel a delicacy in attempting to express an opinion of the conduct of any other corps than those particularly placed under my command by the navy department, and the more so, as my object is to avoid every cause of being thought presuming. I must in justice, however, be permitted to say that the conduct of colonel Stephen Stone, commanding the first regiment of Maryland militia, which was formed in column in my rear, for the defence of the lines, and whom I considered attached to my command by order of the commanding general, conducted in a manner not only to give me satisfaction, but the most incontestible proof, that that corps would have done its duty, had the enemy attempted to force the entrenchment in its vicinity.

Much praise is also due to major Randall, commanding a battalion of Pennsylvania riflemen, who was also placed under my command, and whom I despatched with my aid, Mr. Stockton, to dislodge a party of men in the enemy's boats, which it was supposed intended landing near the Lazaretto to take possession of our little three-gun battery. Mr. Stockton on his return reported to me in very high terms the zeal and gallantry displayed by the major and his corps on the occasion. Indeed it is but justice to say that I have the best reason to believe, that all the corps stationed in entrenchments, so far as came under my immediate observation, would have performed their respective duties in a manner honourable to themselves and to their country.

With great respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant, JOHN RODGERS.

The honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

py of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Armistead to the Secretary of War, dated Fort M'Henry, September 24th, 1814.

A severe indisposition, the effect of great fatigue and exsure, has prevented me heretofore from presenting you ith an account of the attack upon this post. On the night of turday the 10th instant the British fleet, consisting of ships the line, heavy frigates, and bomb-vessels, amounting in e whole to 30 sail, appeared at the mouth of the river Patapo, with every indication of an attempt on the city of Baltiore. My own force consisted of one company of United ates artillery, under captain Evans, and two companies of a-fencibles, under captains Bunbury and Addison. Of ese three companies, 35 men were unfortunately on the ck list, and unfit for duty. I had been furnished with two mpanies of volunteer artillery from the city of Baltimore, nder captain Berry and lieutenant-commandant Pennington. To these I must add another fine company of volunteer tillerists, under judge Nicholson, who had proffered their rvices to aid in the defence of this post whenever an attack ight be apprehended; and also a detachment from commore Barney's flotilla under lieutenant Redman. Brigadierneral Winder had also furnished me with about 600 intry, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Stewart nd major Lane, consisting of detachments from the 12th, 4th, 36th, and 38th regiments of United States troops—the tal amounting to about 1000 effective men.

On Monday morning very early, it was perceived that the nemy was landing troops on the east side of the Patapsco, istant about ten miles. During that day and the ensuing ight, he had brought sixteen ships (including five bombips), within about two miles and a half of this fort. I had ranged my force as follows:—The regular artillerists uner captain Evans, and the volunteers under captain Nichlon, manned the bastions in the Star Fort. Captains Bunby's, Addison's, Rodman's, Berry's, and lieutenant-comandant Pennington's command, were stationed on the lowr works; and the infantry, under lieutenant-colonel Stewart nd major Lane, were in the outer ditch, to meet the eneny at his landing should he attempt one.

On Tuesday morning about sunrise, the enemy commenced he attack from his five bomb-vessels, at the distance of about wo miles, when finding that his shells reached us, he anchord, and kept up an incessant and well directed bombardment.

We immediately opened our batteries, and kept up a brisk fire from our guns and mortars, but unfortunately our shot and shells all fell considerably short of him. This was to me a most distressing circumstance; as it left us exposed to a constant and tremendous shower of shells, without the most remote possibility of doing him the slightest injury. It affords me the highest gratification to state, that although we were left thus exposed, and thus inactive, not a man shrunk from the conflict.

About two o'clock, P. M., one of the 24-pounders on the south-west bastion, under the immediate command of captain Nicholson, was dismounted by a shell, the explosion from which killed his second lieutenant, and wounded several of his men; the bustle necessarily produced in removing the wounded, and remounting the gun, probably induced the enemy to suspect that we were in a state of confusion, as he brought in three of his bomb-ships to what I believed to be good striking distance. I immediately ordered a fire to be opened, which was obeyed with alacrity through the whole garrison, and in half an hour those intruders again sheltered themselves by withdrawing beyond our reach. We gave three cheers, and again ceased firing. The enemy continued throwing shells, with one or two slight intermissions, till one o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, when it was discovered that he had availed himself of the darkness of the night, and had thrown a considerable force above to our right; they had approached very near to Fort Covington, when they began to throw rockets; intended, I presume, to give them an opportunity of examining the shores—as I have since understood they had detached 1250 picked men, with scaling ladders, for the purpose of storming this fort. We once more had an opportunity of opening our batteries, and kept up a continued blaze for nearly two hours, which had the effect again to drive them off.

In justice to lieutenant Newcomb, of the United States navy, who commanded at Fort Covington with a detachment of sailors, and lieutenant Webster of the flotilla, who commanded the six-gun battery near the fort, I ought to state, that during this time they kept up an animated, and I believe a very destructive fire, to which I am persuaded we are much indebted in repulsing the enemy. One of his sunken barges has since been found with two dead men in it—others have been seen floating in the river. The only means we had of directing our guns, was by the blaze of their rock-

, and and the flashes of their guns. Had they ventured to same situation in the day time, not a man would have es-ed.

The bombardment continued on the part of the enemy un-seven o'clock on Wednesday morning, when it ceased; l about nine, their ships got under way, and stood down river. During the bombardment, which lasted 25 hours th two slight intermissions), from the best calculation I make, from 15 to 1800 shells were thrown by the enemy. few of these fell short. A large portion burst over us, owing their fragments amongst us, and threatening de-uction. Many passed over, and about four hundred fell hin the works.—Two of the public buildings are materi-injured—the others but slightly. I am happy to inform (wonderful as it may appear) that our loss amounts only four men killed and 24 wounded. The latter will reco-. Among the killed, I have to lament the loss of lieute-t Clagget, and serjeant Clemm, both of captain Nicholson's unteers; two men whose fate is to be deplored, not only their personal bravery, but for their high standing, amia-demeanour, and spotless integrity in private life. Lieute-t Russel, of the company under lieutenant Pennington, re-ved, early in the attack, a severe contusion in the heel; withstanding which he remained at his post during the ole bombardment.

Were I to name any individuals who signalized themselves, would be doing injustice to others. Suffice it to say, that ry officer and soldier under my command did their duty ny entire satisfaction.

I have the honour to remain, respectfully, your obedient vant,

G. ARMISTEAD,
Major U. S. A.

nourable James Monroe, Secretary of War.

DIVISION ORDERS.

Division Head-Quarters, New Church street, September 15th, 1814.

Brigadier-general Winder congratulates the troops of his mmand upon the suspension of the severe duty to which y have been exposed for the last four days.

The garrison of Fort M'Henry, under the command of jor Armistead, are entitled to, and receive the warmest

acknowledgments and praise from the brigadier-general, for their steady, firm, and intrepid deportment during an almost incessant bombardment for twenty-four hours, during which time they were exposed to an incessant shower of shells.

The militia artillery of the third brigade, under captains Nicholson and Berry, and lieutenant Pennington, vied with the regulars in a firmness and composure which would have honoured veterans, and prove that they were worthy to co-operate with the regular artillery, infantry, and sea-fencibles, in defence of that important post. Major Armistead receives also the warmest acknowledgments of the general commanding, for his able, vigilant, and exact arrangements before and during this period of arduous duty, as well as for the uniform zeal, vigour, and ability he has discovered in his preparations for the defence of the post immediately committed to his charge, as for the prompt and efficacious manner in which he has complied, under great and perplexing difficulties, with demands from all quarters for ammunition.

Lieutenant-colonel Stewart and major Lane, neither of whom were required to expose themselves in this dangerous post, will please accept the brigadier-general's warmest acknowledgments for the handsome and gallant manner in which they volunteered to take command of the regular infantry; who, with their officers and men, have evinced the most resolute and steady intrepidity in the midst of imminent and long-continued danger.

The squadron of United States light dragoons under captain Bird, have proved, by the indefatigable and bold manner in which they have constantly kept upon the very lines of the enemy under the fire of his guards, and the regular and exact intelligence which they have constantly given of his situation, that they want nothing but an opportunity to signalise themselves. The bold and intrepid charges which serjeant Keller, of captain Bird's company, made upon the rear guard of the retreating enemy, with but three dragoons, in which he dispersed a guard of 18 fusileers, taking six of them prisoners in despite of their fire and that of a four-pounder within half canister distance, which made three discharges at him, deserves the highest approbation; and the skill and dexterity with which he accomplished this bold achievement proves he will be competent to a more considerable command, to which the justice of his government will no doubt advance him.

Brigadier-general Douglass, with his entire brigade of Virginia militia, have evinced, during four days of the most active and arduous duties, under the severest privations of

nd refreshment, in constant exposure to the unusual
ıency of the weather for the season, a patience, obedi-
and alacrity for the most dangerous duties, which can-
surpassed; and the prompt and eager pursuit in which
yesterday engaged, after the retreating enemy, in the
of heavy and constant rain, after such a series of suf-
and fatigue, is the best evidence which can be given
ıe patriotism which so promptly led them to the field
ence of their country, was bottomed upon a courage
dangers and difficulties cannot subdue.

utenant-colonel Griffin Taylor, with his regiment also
rginia militia, who was left in charge of the defences
t on the Ferry Branch, has proved by his judicious ar-
ments, and the zealous manner in which he was sup-
l by his men and officers, that he only wanted an occa-
to prove himself and them the worthy co-adjutors of
countrymen.

e enemy has retired from our city, and it is to be hoped
such circumstances as will deter him from again at-
ing it. Those gallant Virginians will have the consola-
of believing they have essentially contributed to its
.

e enemy, however, has at present only taken refuge in
ips—he still remains in our vicinity, and may, and pro-
will, return, if he knows there is the least relaxation
ilance or readiness. The commanding officers of corps
etachments will therefore exert themselves with unre-
ıg diligence to repair the great damages of the late fa-
and exposure; to refresh their troops and hold them in
ness for moving at a moment's warning.

By order.

ROBERT G. HITE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-Quarters, Baltimore, September 19, 1814.

e enemy having been compelled to retire from before
ity, the major-general commanding takes pleasure in
atulating the troops under his command, upon a relaxa-
of those severe duties to which they were for some days
sarily exposed. The readiness to which they submitted
ivations of every kind, was as gratifying to him as the
ty with which they flew to arms for the protection of the
He feels a particular pleasure in imparting to every of-

ficer and soldier his warm acknowledgments for the zeal they displayed in marching to meet the enemy, whose object by his own declaration is known to be devastation and ruin to every assailable point on the seaboard. It is with peculiar satisfaction the commanding general seizes this opportunity of acknowledging the very great assistance he has received from the counsel and active exertions of commodore Rodgers. His exertions, and those of his brave officers and seamen, have contributed in a very eminent degree to the safety of the city, and should be remembered with lively emotions of gratitude by every citizen.

The successful defence of Fort M'Henry by major Armistead of the United States army, having under his command (besides his own corps) three companies of colonel Harris's regiment of artillery, commanded by captains Berry and Nicholson, and lieutenant Pennington—and part of the 36th and 38th regiment United States infantry, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Stewart, is beyond all praise. Their gallantry and intrepidity enabled them to defend the fort against every effort of the enemy, and there is no doubt that this intrepid officer will be rewarded by the government. The voluntary services of major Lane, of the 14th regiment United States infantry, were highly useful, and duly appreciated by major Armistead. Lieutenant Newcomb of the navy, who commanded Fort Covington, and lieutenant Webster of the flotilla, the city battery, performed their respective duties to the entire satisfaction of the commanding general.

To brigadier-general Winder he tenders his thanks for his aid, co-operation, and prompt pursuit of the enemy. To brigadier-general Douglass, with his brigade, and to colonel Taylor, with his regiment of Virginia militia, called into service for the defence of Washington, the commanding general also makes a tender of his acknowledgments. They have sustained privations with patience, and submitted to a soldier's life with a temper that does them credit. To the officers much praise is due for the discipline they have introduced, for their attention to their men, and prompt obedience to orders.

To brigadier-general Stricker and the third brigade of Maryland militia, every praise is due; the city being threatened, it became the duty of the citizens to be foremost in its defence. He claimed the honour, and the brave officers and men under his command hailed with delight, the opportunity of meeting the enemy's attack: he met the enemy and engaged him, and when compelled by superior numbers to retreat, he effected it in order, and rallied on his reserve, and from thence re-

d to the ground which had been assigned him near the
s. The particulars of the action, and the just praise due
ach officer, are given by the brigadier-general in his re-
t. He reports the 27th regiment under colonel Long as
ing in a particular manner distinguished itself—he gives
praise to the fifth, under colonel Sterett, and 39th under
nel Fowler. He reports that his reserve under colonel
Donald merited his approbation, and that the artillery un-
captain Montgomery highly distinguished itself. He ap-
ds in terms which are flattering, the conduct of major
kney's battalion of riflemen, the command of which on
occasion having devolved on captain Dyer. He mentions
honourable terms the bravery and good conduct of major
ath of the fifth, who had two horses shot under him, and
captains Spangler and Metzgar commanding companies
m Pennsylvania, and of captain Quantril with a company
m Hagerstown.

The Pennsylvania volunteers, without commissions, repair-
to the post of danger, chose officers and organized them-
ves into regiments, performed all the duties of soldiers,
l have recommended themselves in a particular manner
he attention of the commanding general. Much praise is
due to generals Stansbury and Forman. Their men came
principally en masse, and when assembled were to be or-
ized, armed, equipped, and disciplined. All this has been
cted through their indefatigable exertions. To these gen-
men the commanding general tenders his sincere thanks.
e enthusiasm shown by their men on the approach of the
emy, gave a full assurance that reliance might be placed
them.

The light corps under major Randall performed in a man-
highly honourable the services assigned it, and the ma-
's conduct evinced a firmness, bravery, and talent for a
litary life.

The excellent discipline and order of the artillery under
onel Harris, and marine artillery under captain Stiles, af-
ds a certainty of their good conduct. The regularity which
evails in those corps does them honour, and affords an ex-
lent example to others. Fatiguing as were the duties im-
sed on the United States cavalry, under captain Bird, and
militia cavalry, under lieutenant-colonels Moore, Biays,
eet, and Tilghman, and captain Lee, they were performed
th an alacrity and promptness highly honourable to the of-
ers and men. To captain Thompson of the flying artillery,
d his company, the commanding general tenders his thanks

for their unremitting personal attention as his guard, their readiness in carrying orders, and the various separate duties assigned them—and to major Barney and captain Thompson, with their corps of observation, for the correct information received from them.

The guns at the lazaretto were well served by lieutenant Rutter of the flotilla, whose conduct in the discharge of that, as well as the highly important duty of advanced night-guards to the fort, has met the entire approbation of the commanding general. To the committee of vigilance and safety he feels himself under particular obligations to acknowledge the many advantages he derived from their exertion in providing the means necessary for defence.

Such was the determined zeal evinced on the part of every brigade and corps under his command, that the commanding general is impressed with a full conviction, that had the enemy made his attack, it would have terminated in his discomfiture and defeat.

By order of major-general S. Smith.

WILLIAM BATES,
Assistant adjutant-general, D. M. M.

Admiralty Office, October 17.

Captain Crofton, acting Captain of his majesty's ship the Royal Oak, arrived this morning at this office with despatches from Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane, K. B. addressed to John Wilson Croker, Esq., of which the following are copies:—

His Majesty's Ship Tonnant, Chesapeake, September 17.

Sir,

I request that you will be pleased to inform my lords commissioners of the admiralty, that the approaching equinoctial new moon rendering it unsafe to proceed immediately out of the Chesapeake with the combined expedition, to act upon the plans which had been concerted previous to the departure of the Iphigenia; major-general Ross and myself resolved to occupy the intermediate time to advantage, by making a demonstration on the city of Baltimore, which might be converted into a real attack, should circumstances appear to justify it; and as our arrangements were soon made, I proceeded up this river, and anchored off the mouth of the Patapsco, on the 11th instant, where the frigates and smaller vessels entered at a convenient distance for landing the troops.

At an early hour next morning, the disembarkation of the

army was effected without opposition, having attached to it a brigade of 600 seamen under captain Edward Crofton (late of the Leopard); the second battalion of marines of the squadron, and the colonial black marines. Rear-admiral Cockburn accompanied the general, to advise and arrange as might be deemed necessary for our combined efforts.

So soon as the army moved forward, I hoisted my flag in the Surprise, and with the remainder of the frigates, bombs, sloops, and the rocket-ships, passed farther up the river, to render what co-operation could be found practicable.

While the bomb-vessels were working up, in order that we might open our fire upon the enemy's fort at daybreak next morning, an account was brought to me, that general Ross, when reconnoitering the enemy, had received a mortal wound by a musket-ball, which closed his glorious career before he could be brought off to the ship.

It is a tribute due to the memory of this gallant and respected officer, to pause in my relation, while I lament the loss his majesty's service and the army of which he was one of the brightest ornaments, have sustained by his death. —The unanimity, the zeal which he manifested on every occasion, while I had the honour of serving with him, gave life and ease to the most arduous undertakings.—Too heedless of his personal security when in the field, his devotion to the care and honour of his army has caused the termination of his valuable life. The major-general has left a wife and family, for whom I am confident his grateful country will provide.

The skirmish which had deprived the army of its brave general was a prelude to a most decisive victory over the flower of the enemy's troops. Colonel Brook, on whom the command devolved, having pushed forward our force to within five miles of Baltimore, where the enemy, about six or 7000, had taken up an advanced position, strengthened by field-pieces, and where he had disposed himself, apparently with the intention of making a determined resistance, fell upon the enemy with such impetuosity that he was obliged soon to give way and fly in every direction, leaving on the field of battle a considerable number of killed and wounded, and two pieces of cannon.

For the particulars of this brilliant affair, I beg leave to refer their lordships to rear-admiral Cockburn's despatch, transmitted herewith.

At day-break the next morning, the bombs having their stations within shell range, supported by the Surprise, with

the other frigates and sloops, opened their fire upon the fort that protected the entrance of the harbour, and I had now an opportunity of observing the strength and the preparations of the enemy.

The approach to the town on the land side was defended by commanding heights, upon which was constructed a chain of redoubts connected by a breast-work, with a ditch in front, an extensive train of artillery, and show of force that was reported to be from 15 to 20,000 men.

The entrance by sea, within which the town is retired nearly three miles, was entirely obscured by a barrier of vessels sunk at the mouth of the harbour, defended inside by gun-boats, flanked on the right by a strong and regular fortification, and on the left by a battery of several heavy guns.

These preparations rendering it impracticable to afford any essential co-operation by sea, I considered that an attack on the enemy's strong position by the army only, with such disparity of force, though confident of success, might risk a greater loss than the possession of the town would compensate for, while holding in view the ulterior operations of this force in the contemplation of his majesty's government; and, therefore, as the primary object of our movement had been already fully accomplished, I communicated my observations to colonel Brook, who coinciding with me in opinion, it was mutually agreed that we should withdraw.

The following morning the army began leisurely to retire; and so salutary was the effect produced on the enemy by the defeat he had experienced, that notwithstanding every opportunity was offered for his repeating the conflict, with an infinite superiority, our troops re-embarked without molestation, the ships of war dropped down as the army retired.

The result of this demonstration has been the defeat of the army of the enemy, the destruction, by themselves, of a quantity of shipping, the burning of an extensive rope-walk, and other public erections, the causing of them to remove their property from the city, and above all, the collecting and harassing of his armed inhabitants from the surrounding country; producing a total stagnation of their commerce; and heaping upon them considerable expenses, at the same time effectually drawing off their attention and support from other important quarters.

It has been the source of the greatest gratification to me, the continuation of that unanimity existing between the two services, which I have before noticed to their lordships: and I have reason to assure them, that the command of the army

has fallen upon a most zealous and able officer in colonel Brook, who has followed up the system of cordiality that had been so beneficially adopted by his much-lamented chief.

Rear-admiral Cockburn, to whom I had confided that part of the naval service which was connected with the army, evinced his usual zeal and ability, and executed his important trust to my entire satisfaction.

Rear-admiral Malcolm, who regulated the collection, debarkation, and re-embarkation of the troops, and the supplies they required, has merited my best thanks for his indefatigable exertions; and I have to express my acknowledgments for the counsel and assistance afforded us in all our operations, I have received from rear-admiral Codrington, the captain of the fleet.

The captains of the squadron who were employed in the various duties afloat, were all emulous to promote the service in which they were engaged, and, with the officers acting under them, are entitled to my fullest approbation.

I beg leave to call the attention of their lordships to the report rear-admiral Cockburn has made of the meritorious and gallant conduct of the naval brigade; as well as the accompanying letter from colonel Brook, expressing his obligations to captain Edward Crofton, who commanded; and captains T. B. Sullivan, Rowland, Money, and Robert Ramsay, who had charge of divisions; and I have to recommend these officers, together with those who are particularly noticed by the rear-admiral, to their lordships' favourable consideration.

Captain Robyns of the royal marines, who commanded the marines of the squadron on this occasion, and in the operations against Washington, being severely wounded, I beg leave to bring him to their lordships recollection, as having been frequently noticed for his gallant conduct during the services on the Chesapeake, and to recommend him, with lieutenant Sampson Marshall, of the Diadem, who is dangerously wounded, to their lordships' favour and protection.

First lieutenant John Lawrence, of the royal marine artillery, who commanded the rocket brigade, has again rendered essential service, and is highly spoken of by colonel Brook.

Captain Edward Crofton, who will have the honour of delivering this despatch, is competent to explain any further particulars; and I beg leave to recommend him to their

lordships' protection, as a most zealous and intelligent officer.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEXANDER COCHRANE,
Vice-Admiral, and Commander in Chief.

To John Wilson Croker, &c.

Colonial Department.

Downing street, October 17.

Captain Macdougall arrived early this morning with a despatch addressed to earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, by colonel Brook, of which the following is a copy:—

On board his Majesty's Ship Tonnant,
Chesapeake, September 17, 1814.

My Lord,—

I have the honour to inform your lordship, that the division of troops under the command of major-general Ross effected a disembarkation on the morning of the twelfth of September, near North Point, on the left point of the Patapsco River, distant from Baltimore about thirteen miles, with a view of pushing a reconnoissance, in co-operation with the naval forces, to that town; and acting thereon as the enemy's strength and positions might be found to dictate.

The approach on this side to Baltimore lies through a small peninsula formed by the Patapsco and Back Rivers, and generally from two to three miles broad, while it narrows in some places to less than half a mile.

Three miles from North Point the enemy had entrenched himself quite across this neck of land, towards which (the disembarkation having been completed at an early hour) the troops advanced.

The enemy was actively employed in the completion of this work, deepening the ditch, and strengthening its front by a low abattis, both which, however, he precipitately abandoned on the approach of our skirmishes, leaving in our hands some few dragoons, being part of his rear guard.

About two miles beyond this post our advance became engaged, the country was here closely wooded, and the enemy's riflemen were enabled to conceal themselves. At this moment the gallant general Ross received a wound in his breast, which proved mortal. He only survived to recommend a young and unprovided family to the protection of his king and country.

Thus fell at an early age one of the brightest ornaments of his profession; one who, whether at the head of a regiment, a brigade, or corps, had alike displayed the talents of command; who was not less beloved in his private, than enthusiastically admired in his public character; and whose only fault, if it may be deemed so, was an excess of gallantry, enterprise, and devotion to the service.

If ever it were permitted to a soldier to lament those who fall in battle, we may indeed in this instance claim that melancholy privilege.

Thus it is, that the honour of addressing your lordship, and the command of this army have devolved upon me; duties, which, under any other circumstances, might have been embraced as the most enviable gifts of fortune; and here I venture to solicit, through your lordship, his royal highness the prince regent's consideration to the circumstances of my succeeding, during operations of so much moment, to an officer of such high rank and established merit.

Our advance continuing to press forward, the enemy's light troops were pushed to within five miles of Baltimore, where a corps of about six thousand men, six pieces of artillery, and some hundred cavalry were discovered posted under cover of a wood, drawn up in a very dense order, and lining a strong paling, which crossed the main road nearly at right angles. The creeks and inlets of the Patapsco and Back Rivers, which approach each other at this point, will in some measure account for the contracted nature of the enemy's position.

I immediately ordered the necessary dispositions for a general attack. The light brigade, under the command of major Jones of the fourth, consisting of the eighty-fifth light infantry under major Gubbins, and the light companies of the army under major Pringle, of the twenty-first, covered the whole of the front, driving in the enemy's skirmishers with great loss on his main army. The fourth regiment under major Faunce, by a detour through some hollow ways, gained, unperceived, a lodgment close upon the enemy's left. The remainder of the right brigade, under the command of the honourable lieutenant-colonel Mullins, consisting of the forty-fourth regiment, under major Johnson, the marines of the fleet under captain Robyns, and a detachment of seamen under captain Money, of the Taave, formed line along the enemy's front, while the left brigade under colonel Paterson, consisting of the twenty-first regiment, commanded by major Whitaker, the second battalion of marines, by lieutenant-co-

lonel Malcolm, and a detachment of marines, by major Lewis, remained in columns on the road, with orders to deploy to his left, and press the enemy's right the moment the ground became sufficiently open to admit of that movement.

In this order, the signal being given, the whole of the troops advanced rapidly to the charge. In less than fifteen minutes, the enemy's forces being utterly broken and dispersed, fled in every direction over the country, leaving on the field two pieces of cannon, with a considerable number of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The enemy lost in this short but brilliant affair from five to six hundred in killed and wounded; while at the most moderate computation, he is at least one thousand hors de combat. The fifth regiment of militia, in particular, has been represented as nearly annihilated.

The day being now far advanced, and the troops (as is always the case on the first march after disembarkation) much fatigued, we halted for the night on the ground of which the enemy had been dispossessed. Here I received a communication from vice-admiral the honourable sir Alexander Cochrane, informing me that the frigates, bomb-ships, and flotilla of the fleet, would on the ensuing morning take their stations as previously proposed.

At day-break on the thirteenth, the army again advanced, and at 10 o'clock I occupied a favourable position eastward of Baltimore, distant about a mile and a half, and from whence I could reconnoitre at my leisure the defences of that town.

Baltimore is completely surrounded by strong but detached hills, on which the enemy had constructed a chain of pallisaded redoubts, connected by a small breast-work: I have, however, reason to think that the defence to the northward and westward of the place were in a very unfinished state. Chinkapin hill, which lay in front of our position, completely commands the town; this was the strongest part of the line, and here the enemy seemed most apprehensive of attack. These works were defended, according to the best information which we could obtain, by about fifteen thousand men, with a large train of artillery.

Judging it perfectly feasible, with the description of forces under my command, I made arrangements for a night attack, during which the superiority of the enemy's artillery would not be so much felt, and captain Macdougall, the bearer of these despatches, will have the honour to point out to your lordship those particular points of the line which I had proposed to act on.

During the evening, however, I received a communication from the commander in chief of the naval forces, by which I was informed, that in consequence of the entrance of the harbour being closed up by vessels sunk for that purpose by the enemy, a naval co-operation against the town and camp was found impracticable.

Under these circumstances, and keeping in view your lordships' instructions, it was agreed between the vice-admiral and myself, that the capture of the town would not have been a sufficient equivalent to the loss which might probably be sustained in storming the heights.

Having formed this resolution, after compelling the enemy to sink upwards of twenty vessels in different parts of the harbour, causing the citizens to remove almost the whole of their property to the places of more security inland, obliging the government to concentrate all the military force of the surrounding states, harassing the militia, and forcing them to collect from many remote districts, causing the enemy to burn a valuable rope-walk, with other public buildings, in order to clear the glacis in front of their redoubts, besides having beaten and routed them in a general action, I retired on the fourteenth, three miles from the position which I had occupied, where I halted during some hours.

This tardy movement was partly caused by an expectation that the enemy might possibly be induced to move out of the entrenchments and follow us; but he profited by the lesson which he had received on the twelfth, and towards the evening I retired the troops about three miles and a half further, where I took up my ground for the night.

Having ascertained, at a late hour on the morning of the fifteenth, that the enemy had no disposition to quit his entrenchments, I moved down and re-embarked the army at North Point, not leaving a man behind, and carrying with me 200 prisoners, being persons of the best families in the city, and which number might have been very considerably increased, was not the fatigue of the troops an object principally to be avoided.

I have now to remark to your lordship, that nothing could surpass the zeal, unanimity and ardour displayed by every description of force, whether naval, military, or marine, during the whole of these operations.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ARTHUR BROOK,
Colonel, commanding.

[Here follows a number of uninteresting paragraphs of thanks to various officers.]

Return of the killed and wounded in action with the enemy, near Baltimore, on the 12th of September, 1814.

One general staff, 1 subaltern, 2 serjeants, 35 rank and file, killed; 7 captains, 4 subalterns, 11 serjeants, 229 rank and file, wounded.

His Majesty's Ship Severn, in the Patapsco, 15th September, 1814.

Sir,

In furtherance of the instructions I had the honour to receive from you on the 11th instant, I landed at daylight of the 12th with major-general Ross and the force under his command, at a place the general and myself had previously fixed upon, near to North Point, at the entrance of the Patapsco, and, in conformity with his wishes, I determined on remaining on shore, and accompanying the army to render him every assistance within my power during the contemplated movements and operations; therefore, so soon as our landing was completed, I directed captain Nourse, of this ship, to advance up the Patapsco with the frigates, sloops, and bomb-ships, to bombard the fort, and threaten the water approach to Baltimore, and I moved on with the army and seamen (under captain Edward Crofton) attached to it, on the direct road leading to the abovementioned town.

We had advanced about five miles (without other occurrence than taking prisoners a few light horsemen), when the general and myself, being with the advanced guards, observed a division of the enemy posted at a turning of the road, extending into a wood on our left; a sharp fire was almost immediately opened upon us from it, and as quickly returned with considerable effect by our advanced guard, which pressing steadily forward, soon obliged the enemy to run off with the utmost precipitation, leaving behind him several men killed and wounded; but it is with the most heartfelt sorrow I have to add, that in this short and desultory skirmish, my gallant and highly valued friend, the major-general, received a musket-ball through his arm into his breast, which proved fatal to him on his way to the water-side for re-embarkation.

Our country, sir, has lost in him one of its best and bravest soldiers, and those who knew him, as I did, a friend most honoured and beloved; and I trust, sir, that I may be forgiven for considering it a sacred duty I owe to him to men-

tion here, that whilst his wounds were binding up, and we were placing him on the bearer which was to carry him off the field, he assured me the wounds he had received in the performance of his duty to his country caused him not a pang; but he felt alone, anxiety for a wife and family dearer to him than his life, whom, in the event of the fatal termination he foresaw, he recommended to the protection and notice of his majesty's government, and the country.

Colonel Brook, on whom the command of the army now devolved, having come up, and the body of our troops having closed with the advance, the whole proceeded forward about two miles further, where we observed the enemy in force drawn up before us (apparently about six or seven thousand strong); on perceiving our army, he filed off into a large and extensive wood on his right, from which he commenced a cannonade on us from his field-pieces, and drew up his men behind a thick paling, where he appeared determined to make his stand. Our field-guns answered his with evident advantage, and so soon as colonel Brook had made the necessary dispositions, the attack was ordered, and executed in the highest style possible. The enemy opened his musketry on us from his whole line; immediately we approached within reach of it, and kept up his fire till we reached and entered the wood, when he gave way in every direction, and was chased by us a considerable distance with great slaughter, abandoning his post of the meeting-house, situated in this wood, and leaving all his wounded and two of his field-guns in our possession.

An advance of this description against superior numbers of an enemy so strongly posted, could not be effected without loss. I have the honour to inclose a return of what has been suffered by those of the naval department, acting with the army on this occasion; and it is, sir, with the greatest pride and pleasure I report to you, that the brigade of seamen with small arms, commanded by captain Edward Crofton, assisted by captains Sullivan, Money, and Ramsey (the three senior commanders with the fleet), who commanded divisions under him, behaved with a gallantry and steadiness which would have done honour to the oldest troops, and which attracted the admiration of the army. The seamen under Mr. Jackson, master's mate of the Tonnant, attached to the rocket brigade, commanded by the first lieutenant Lawrence, of the marines, behaved also with equal skill and bravery. The marines landed from the ships under the command of captain

Robyns, the senior officer of that corps, belonging to the fleet, behaved with their usual gallantry.

Although, sir, in making to you my report of this action, I know it is right I should confine myself to mentioning only the conduct of those belonging to the naval department, yet I may be excused for venturing further to state to you generally the high admiration with which I viewed the conduct of the whole army, and the ability and gallantry with which it was managed and headed by its brave colonel, which insured to it the success it met with.

The night being fast approaching and the troops much fatigued, colonel Brook determined on remaining for the night on the field of battle, and on the morning of the 13th, leaving a small guard at the meeting-house to collect and protect the wounded, we again moved forward towards Baltimore, on approaching which it was found to be defended by extremely strong works on every side, and immediately in front of us by an extensive hill, on which was an entrenched camp, and great quantities of artillery, and the information we collected, added to what we observed, gave us to believe there were at least within their works from 15 to 20,000 men. Colonel Brook lost no time in reconnoitering these defences, after which he made his arrangement for storming, during the ensuing night, with his gallant little army, the entrenched camp in our front, notwithstanding all the difficulties which it presented. The subsequent communications which we opened with you, however, induced him to relinquish again the idea, and therefore yesterday morning the army retired leisurely to the meeting-house, where it halted for some hours to make the necessary arrangements respecting the wounded and the prisoners taken on the 12th, which being completed, it made a further short movement in the evening towards the place where it had disembarked, and where it arrived this morning for re-embarkation, without suffering the slightest molestation from the enemy, who, in spite of his superiority of numbers, did not even venture to look at us during this slow and deliberate retreat.

As you, sir, were in person with the advanced frigates, sloops, and bomb-vessels, and as, from the road the army took, I did not see them after quitting the beach, it would be superfluous for me to make any report to you respecting them. I have now, therefore, only to assure you of my entire satisfaction and approbation of the conduct of every officer and man employed under me, during the operations above detail-

ed, and to express to you how particularly I consider myself indebted to captain Edward Crofton (acting captain of the Royal Oak), for the gallantry, ability, and zeal with which he led on the brigade of seamen in the action of the 12th, and executed all the other services with which he has been intrusted since our landing; to captain White (acting captain of the Albion), who attended me as my aid-de-camp the whole time, and rendered me every possible assistance; to captains Sullivan, Money, and Ramsay, who commanded divisions of the brigade of seamen; to lieutenant James Scott of the Albion, whom I have had such frequent cause to mention to you on former occasions, and who in the battle of the 12th commanded a division of seamen, and behaved most gallantly, occasionally also acting as an extra aid-de-camp to myself; captain Robyns, who commanded the marines of the fleet, and who was severely wounded during the engagement, I also beg to recommend to your favourable notice and consideration, as well as lieutenant G. C. Urmston, of the Albion, whom I placed in command of the smaller boats, to endeavour to keep up a communication between the army and navy, which he effected with great perseverance, and thereby rendered us most essential service. In short, sir, every individual seemed animated with equal anxiety to distinguish himself by good conduct on this occasion, and I trust therefore the whole will be deemed worthy of your approbation.

Captain Nourse, of the Severn, was good enough to receive my flag for this service; he rendered me great assistance in getting the ships to the different stations within the river, and when the storming of the fortified hill was contemplated, he hastened to my assistance, with a reinforcement of seamen and marines; and I should consider myself wanting in candour and justice did I not particularly point out, sir, to you, the high opinion I entertained of the enterprise and ability of this valuable officer, not only for his conduct on this occasion, but on the very many others, on which I have employed him, since with me in the Chesapeake.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. COCKBURN,
Rear-admiral.

Vice-admiral the honourable sir A. Cochrane,
K. B. commander in chief, &c.

On board his Majesty's Ship, Tonnant,
Dear Sir, *September* 15, 1814.

I beg leave to be allowed to state to you, how much I feel indebted to captain Crofton, commanding the brigade of sailors from his majesty's ships under your command, as also to captains Sullivan, Money, and Ramsay, for their very great exertions in performing every formation made by his majesty's troops; having seen myself those officers expose themselves in the hottest of the enemy's fire, to keep their men in line of march with the disciplined troops. The obedient and steady conduct of the sailors, believe me, sir, excited the admiration of every individual of the army, as well as my greatest gratitude.

Believe me to be, dear sir, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR BROOK,
Colonel, commanding.

Vice-admiral the honourable sir A. Cochrane,
K. B. commander in chief, &c.

Killed and wounded belonging to the Navy, disembarked with the army under Major-General Ross, September 12, 1814.

Total killed—1 petty officer, 3 seamen, 3 marines.

Total wounded—1 officer, 6 petty officers, 22 seamen, 15 marines.

(Signed) G. COCKBURN,
Rear-admiral.

Sir, *Tonnant, in the Chesapeake, September* 22.

I transmit to you herewith, returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the demonstration on Baltimore, between the 12th and 1 th instan .

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. COCHRANE,
Vice-admiral and commander in chief.

J. W. Croker, Esq.

Killed, wounded, and missing of the Naval brigade commanded by Captain Edward Crofton of his Majesty's Ship Royal Oak, and serving with the army on shore, under Major-General Ross, on the 12th September, 1814.

Total killed, wounded, and missing—6 killed, 32 wounded, 1 missing.

Killed and wounded of the marine brigade commanded by Captain Robyns, Royal marines, of his Majesty's Ship Tonnant, and serving in the army under Major-General Ross, 12th September, 1814.

Total—1 killed; 16 wounded.

AFFAIR AT OTTER CREEK.

Extract of a letter from Thomas M'Donough, Esq. commanding United States force on Lake Champlain, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Vergennes, 14th May, 1814.

"I have the honour to inform you that an engagement between our battery at the mouth of Otter Creek, and eight of the enemy's galleys, with a bomb-vessel, has just terminated by the retreat of the enemy, who, it is supposed, came with an intention of blockading us.

"The battery, commanded by captain Thornton of the artillery, who was gallantly assisted by lieutenant Cassin of the navy, received but little injury, although a number of shells were thrown, and many lodged in the parapet.

"Colonel Davis was advantageously posted to receive the enemy, in the event of his landing, which we had reason to expect, as his new brig, with several other gallies and four sloops, were within two and a half miles of the point on which the battery stands, during the action, which lasted an hour and a half, when they all stood off, and were seen passing Burlington for the northward. Every exertion was made to get the vessels down to the mouth of the creek, which, however, we could not effect until the enemy had withdrawn. Our whole force is at the creek's mouth, with the exception of the schooner, and she will be down also in the course of four or five days."

Extract of a letter from Captain Thomas Macdonough, commanding the United States Naval forces on Lake Champlain, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Vergennes, May 18th, 1814.

"I omitted stating in my letter of the 14th, that the enemy had two fine row-boats shot adrift from their gallies in the action with the battery, which, in their precipitate retreat, were left, and picked up by us.

"I have since learned, that in other parts of the lake, they are much cut up by the militia. Two of their gallies, in passing up a small river on the New York side, had nearly all their men killed and wounded."

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE SIEGE OF PLATTSBURGH AND CAPTURE OF THE BRITISH FLEET ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Macomb to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Plattsburgh, September 15th, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate, for the information of the war department, the particulars of the advance of the enemy into the territory of the United States, the circumstances attending the siege of Plattsburgh, and the defence of the posts entrusted to my charge.

The governor-general of the Canadas, sir George Prevost, having collected all the disposable force in Lower Canada, with a view of conquering the country as far as Crown Point and Ticonderoga, entered the territories of the United States on the 1st of the month, and occupied the village of Champlain; there avowed his intentions, and issued orders and proclamations tending to dissuade the people from their allegiance, and inviting them to furnish his army with provisions. He immediately began to impress the waggons and teams in the vicinity, and loaded them with his heavy baggage and stores. From this I was persuaded he intended to attack this place. I had but just returned from the lines, where I had commanded a fine brigade, which was broken up to form the division under major-general Izard, ordered to the westward. Being senior officer, he left me in command; and except the four companies of the sixth regiment, I had not an organized battalion among those remaining. The garrison was composed of convalescents and recruits of the new regiments—all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.

To create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men in completing the works, I divided them into detachments, and placed them near the several forts; declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own work, and bound to defend it to the last extremity.

The enemy advanced cautiously and by short marches, and our soldiers worked day and night; so that by the time he made his appearance before the place, we were prepared to receive him.

General Izard named the principal work Fort Moreau,

and, to remind the troops of the actions of their brave countrymen, I called the redoubt on the right Fort Brown; and that on the left Fort Scott. Besides these three works we have two block-houses strongly fortified.

Finding, on examining the returns of the garrison, that our force did not exceed fifteen hundred effective men for duty, and well informed that the enemy had as many thousands, I called on general Mooers, of the New York militia, and arranged with him plans for bringing forth the militia, en masse. The inhabitants of the village fled with their families and effects, except a few worthy citizens and some boys, who formed themselves into a party, received rifles, and were exceedingly useful. By the fourth of the month general Mooers collected about 700 militia, and advanced seven miles on the Beckmantown road, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced: also to obstruct the roads with fallen trees, and to break up the bridges.

On the lake road to Dead creek bridge, I posted 200 men under captain Sproul of the 13th regiment, with orders to abattis the woods, to place obstructions in the road, and to fortify himself; to this party I added two field-pieces. In advance of this position, was lieutenant-colonel Appling with 110 riflemen, watching the movements of the enemy, and procuring intelligence. It was ascertained, that before daylight on the 6th, the enemy would advance in two columns on the two roads before mentioned, dividing at Sampson's, a little below Chazy village. The column on the Beckmantown road proceeded most rapidly; the militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and, except a few brave men, fell back most precipitately in the greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flankers and advanced patroles. The night previous I ordered major Wool to advance with a detachment of 250 men to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Also captain Leonard of the light artillery was directed to proceed with two pieces to be on the ground before day, yet he did not make his appearance until eight o'clock, when the enemy had approached within two miles of the village. With his conduct, therefore, I am not well pleased. Major Wool, with his party, disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed upon to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their general and staff officers; although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could

not possibly cut them off. The state dragoons of New York wear red coats, and they being on the heights to watch the enemy, gave constant alarm to the militia, who mistook them for the enemy, and feared his getting in their rear. Finding the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburgh, I despatched my aid-de-camp, lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to inform lieutenant Appling that I wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column debouching from the woods. Here he poured in a destructive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with major Wool. The field-pieces did considerable execution among the enemy's columns. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column. Finding that every road was full of troops crowding on us on all sides, I ordered the field-pieces to retire across the bridge and form a battery for its protection, and to cover the retreat of the infantry, which was accordingly done, and the parties of Appling and Wool, as well as that of Sproul, retired alternately, keeping up a brisk fire until they got under cover of the works The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the bridge, and kept up a constant firing from the windows and balconies, and annoyed us much. I ordered them to be driven out with hot shot, which soon put the houses in flames, and obliged these sharp-shooters to retire. The whole day, until it was too late to see, the enemy's light troops endeavoured to drive our guards from the bridge, but they suffered dearly for their perseverance. An attempt was also made to cross the upper bridge, where the militia handsomely drove them back.

The column which marched by the lake road was much impeded by the obstructions, and the removal of the bridge at Dead Creek, and, as it passed the creek and beach, the gallies kept up a lively and galling fire.

Our troops being now on the south side of the Saranac, I directed the planks to be taken off the bridges and piled up in the form of breast-works to cover our parties intended for disputing the passage, which afterwards enabled us to hold the bridges against very superior numbers.

From the 7th to the 11th, the enemy was employed in getting on his battering train, and erecting his batteries and approaches, and constantly skirmishing at the bridges and fords. By this time the militia of New York, and the volun-

teers of Vermont were pouring in from all quarters. I advised general Mooers to keep his force along the Saranac to prevent the enemy's crossing the river, and to send a strong body in his rear to harass him day and night, and keep him in continual alarm.

The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day, and the volunteers of Vermont were exceedingly serviceable. Our regular troops, notwithstanding the skirmishing and repeated endeavours of the enemy to cross the river, kept at their work day and night, strengthening the defences, and evinced a determination to hold out to the last extremity.

It was reported that the enemy only waited the arrival of his flotilla to make a general attack. About eight in the evening of the 11th, as was expected, the flotilla appeared in sight round Cumberland Head, and at nine bore down and engaged our flotilla at anchor in the bay off the town. At the same instant the batteries were opened on us, and continued throwing bomb-shells, sharpnells, balls, and congreve rockets until sunset, when the bombardment ceased, every battery of the enemy being silenced by the superiority of our fire. The naval engagement lasted but two hours in full view of both armies. Three efforts were made by the enemy to pass the river at the commencement of the connonade and bombardment, with a view of assaulting the works, and had prepared for that purpose an immense number of scaling ladders. One attempt to cross was made at the village bridge, and another at the upper bridge, and a third at a ford about three miles from the works. At the two first he was repulsed by the regulars, at the ford by the brave volunteers and militia, where he suffered severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners; a considerable body having crossed the stream, but were either killed, taken, or driven back. The woods at this place were very favourable to the operations of the militia. A whole company of the 76th regiment was here destroyed, the three lieutenants and twenty-seven men taken prisoners, the captain and the rest killed.

I cannot forego the pleasure of here stating the gallant conduct of captain M'Glassin, of the 15th regiment, who was ordered to ford the river, and attack a party constructing a battery on the right of the enemy's line, within 500 yards of Fort Brown, which he handsomely executed at midnight, with 50 men; drove off the working party, consisting of 150, and defeated a covering party of the same number, killing 1 officer and 6 men in the charge, and wounding many.

At dusk the enemy withdrew his artillery from the batte-

ries, and raised the siege, and at 9, under cover of the night, sent off in a great hurry all the baggage he could find transport for, and all his artillery. At 2 the next morning the whole army precipitately retreated, leaving the sick and wounded to our generosity, and the governor left a note with a surgeon, requesting the humane attention of the commanding general.

Vast quantities of provisions were left behind and destroyed, also an immense quantity of bomb-shells, cannon-balls, grape-shot, ammunition, flints, &c. &c. entrenching tools of all sorts, also tents and marquees. A great deal has been concealed in the ponds and creeks, and buried in the ground, and a vast quantity carried off by the inhabitants. Such was the precipitance of his retreat, that he arrived at Chazy, a distance of eight miles, before we discovered he had gone. The light troops, volunteers, and militia pursued immediately on learning of his flight; and some of the mounted men made prisoners five dragoons of the 19th regiment, and several others of the rear guard. A continual fall of rain and a violent storm prevented further pursuit. Upwards of three hundred deserters have come in, and many are hourly arriving.

We have buried the British officers of the army and navy with the honours of war, and shown every attention and kindness to those who have fallen into our hands.

The conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of my command, during this trying occasion, cannot be represented in too high terms, and I feel it my duty to recommend to the particular notice of government, lieutenant-colonel Appling of the first rifle corps; major Wool of the 29th; major Totten of the corps of engineers; captain Brooks of the artillery; captain M'Glassin of the 15th; lieutenants de Russy and Trescott of the corps of engineers; lieutenants Smyth, Mountford, and Cromwell, of the artillery; also my aid-de-camp, lieutenant Root, who have all distinguished themselves by their uncommon zeal and activity, and have been greatly instrumental in producing the happy and glorious result of the siege.

I have the honour to be, with sentiments of profound respect, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ALEX. MACOMB.

The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, since his first appearance, cannot fall short of two thousand five hundred, including many officers, among whom is colonel Wellington of the Buffs.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, at Plattsburgh, from the 6th to the 11th September, 1814.

Killed—1 subaltern, 1 serjeant, 1 musician, 34 privates; total 37.

Wounded—2 subalterns, 1 serjeant-major, 4 serjeants, 2 corporals, 4 musicians, 49 privates; total 62.

Total killed and wounded 99.

Missing—1 serjeant, 19 privates; total 20.

Copy of a letter from Commodore M'Donough to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States Ship Saratoga, Plattsburgh Bay, September 13th, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to give you the particulars of the action which took place on the 11th instant on this lake.

For several days the enemy were on their way to Plattsburgh by land and water, and it being well understood that an attack would be made at the same time by their land and naval forces, I determined to await at anchor the approach of the latter.

At 7, A. M., the look-out boat announced the approach of the enemy. At 9 he anchored in a line ahead, at about 300 yards distance from my line; his ship opposed to the Saratoga, his brig to the Eagle, captain Robert Henley, his gallies, thirteen in number, to the schooner, sloop, and a division of our gallies; one of his sloops assisting their ship and brig, the other assisting their gallies. Our remaining gallies with the Saratoga and Eagle.

In this situation the whole force on both sides became engaged, the Saratoga suffered much from the heavy fire of the Confiance. I could perceive at the same time, however, that our fire was very destructive to her. The Ticonderoga, lieutenant commandant Cassin, gallantly sustained her full share of the action. At half past 10 o'clock the Eagle, not being able to bring her guns to bear, cut her cable and anchored in a more eligible position, between my ship and the Ticonderoga, where she very much annoyed the enemy, but unfortunately leaving me exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's brig. Our guns on the starboard side being nearly all dismounted, or not manageable, a stern anchor was let go, the bower cable cut, and the ship winded with a fresh broadside on the enemy's ship, which soon after surrendered. Our broadside was then sprung to bear on the brig, which surrendered in about 15 minutes after.

The sloop that was opposed to the Eagle had struck some

time before, and drifted down the line; the sloop which was with their gallies having struck also. Three of their gallies are said to be sunk, the others pulled off. Our gallies were about obeying with alacrity the signal to follow them, when all the vessels were reported to me to be in a sinking state; it then became necessary to annul the signal to the gallies, and order their men to the pumps.

I could only look at the enemy's gallies going off in a shattered condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron that could stand to make sail on; the lower rigging, being nearly all shot away, hung down as though it had been just placed over the mast-heads.

The Saratoga had fifty-five round-shot in her hull, the Confiance one hundred and five. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there were not twenty whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action, which lasted two hours and twenty minutes.

The absence and sickness of lieutenant Raymond Perry, left me without the services of that excellent officer; much ought fairly to be attributed to him for his great care and attention in disciplining the ship's crew, as her first lieutenant. His place was filled by a gallant young officer, lieutenant Peter Gamble, who, I regret to inform you, was killed early in the action. Acting lieutenant Vallette worked the first and second divisions of guns with able effect. Sailing master Brum's attention to the springs, and in the execution of the order to wind the ship, and occasionally at the guns, meets with my entire approbation; also captain Youngs, commanding the acting marines, who took his men to the guns. Mr. Beale, purser, was of great service at the guns, and in carrying my orders throughout the ship, with midshipman Montgomery. Master's mate Joshua Justin, had command of the third division; his conduct during the action was that of a brave and correct officer. Midshipmen Monteath, Graham, Williamson, Platt, Thwing, and acting midshipman Baldwin, all behaved well, and gave evidence of their making valuable officers.

The Saratoga was twice set on fire by hot shot from the enemy's ship.

I close, sir, this communication, with feelings of gratitude for the able support I received from every officer and man attached to the squadron which I have the honour to command.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant, T. MACDONOUGH.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

P. S. Accompanying this is a list of killed and wounded, a list of prisoners, and a precise statement of both forces engaged. Also letters from captain Henley and lieutenant commandant Cassin. T. M.

Return of killed and wounded on board the United States Squadron on Lake Champlain, in the engagement with the British fleet on the 11th September, 1814.

	Killed.	Wounded.
Saratoga, - -	28	29
Eagle, - - -	13	20
Ticonderoga, - -	6	6
Preble - - -	2	
Borer, - - -	3	1
Centipede, - - -		1
Wilmer, - - -		1
	52	58

Gun-boats Nettle, Allen, Viper, Burrows, Ludlow, Alwyn, Ballard, none killed or wounded.

GEORGE BEALE,
Junior purser.

Statement of the American force engaged, on the 11th September, 1814.

Saratoga,	8 long 24-pounders, 6 42-pound carronades, 12 32-pound do. - - Total	26
Eagle,	12 32-pound carronades and 8 long 18 pounders, - - - -	20
Ticonderoga,	8 long 12-pounders, 4 18 do. 5 32-pound carronades, - -	17
Preble,	7 long 9 pounders, - - -	7
Ten gallies, viz.		
Allen,	1 long 24 p. and 1 18 p. Columbiad -	2
Burrows,	1 24 and 1 18 p. do. -	2
Borer,	1 24 and 1 18 p. do. -	2
Nettle,	1 24 and 1 18 p. do. -	2
Viper,	1 24 and 1 18 p. do. -	2
Centipede,	1 24 and 1 18 p. do. -	2
Ludlow,	1 12 - - - -	1
Wilmer,	1 12 - - - -	1
Alwin,	1 12 - - - -	1
Ballard	1 12 - - - -	1
	Guns	86

Recapitulation—14 long 24-pounders,
6 42-pound carronades,
29 32-p. do.
12 long 18-pounders,
12 12 do.
7 9 do.
6 18-pound Columbiads.

Total 86 guns.

T. MACDONOUGH.

Statement of the enemy's force engaged on the 11th September, 1814.

Frigate Confiance,	27 long 24-pounders, 4 32-pound carronades, 6 24-pound do and 2 long 18-pounders on birth deck,	39
Brig Linnet,	16 long 12-pounders, - -	16
Sloop *Chub,	10 18-pound carronades, 1 long 6-pounder, - -	11
Sloop *Finch,	6 18-pound carronades, 1 18-pound Columbiad, and 4 long 6-pounders, - -	11
Thirteen gallies, viz.		
Sir James Yeo,	1 long 24 p. and 1 32 p. carronade,	2
Sir George Prevost,	1 24 p. and 1 32 p. do.	2
Sir Sy. Beckwith,	1 24 p. and 1 32 p. do.	2
Broke,	1 18 p. and 1 32 p. do.	2
Murray,	1 18 p. and 1 18 p. do.	2
Wellington,	1 18 p. - - - -	1
Tecumseh,	1 18 p. - - - -	1
name unknown,	1 18 p. - - -	1
Drummond, - - -	1 32 p. do.	1
Simcoe, - - - -	1 32 p. do.	1
unknown, - - - -	1 32 p. do.	1
unknown, - - - -	1 32 p. do.	1
unknown, - - - -	1 32 p. do.	1
	Total, guns	95

* These sloops were formerly the United States Growler and Eagle.

Recapitulation—30	long 24	-pounders.
7	18	do.
10	12	do.
5	6	do.
13	32	-p. carronades
6	24	do.
17	18	do.
1	18	p. Columbiad.
Total, 95	guns.	

T. MACDONOUGH.

Colonial Department.

Downing street, November 29.

A despatch of which the following is a copy, has been received from lieutenant-general sir George Prevost, bart., addressed to earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state.

Head-Quarters, Plattsburgh,
State of New York, September 11, 1814.

My Lord,

Upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Garonne, I lost no time in assembling three brigades on the frontier of Lower Canada, extending from the river Richelieu to the St. Lawrence; and in forming them into a division, under the command of major-general De Rottenburg, for the purpose of carrying into effect his royal highness the prince regent's commands, which had been conveyed to me by your lordship in your despatch of the 3d of June last. As the troops concentrated and approached the line of separation between this province and the United States, the American army abandoned its entrenched camp on the river Chazy, at Champlain, a position I immediately seized, and occupied in force on the 3d instant. The following day the whole of the left division advanced to the village of Chazy, without meeting the least opposition from the enemy.

On the 5th, it halted within eight miles of this place, having surmounted the difficulties created by the obstructions in the road, from the felling of trees, and the removal of bridges. The next day, the division moved upon Plattsburgh, in two columns, on parallel roads; the right column led by major-general Power's brigade, supported by four companies of light infantry, and a demi-brigade under major-general Robinson; the left by major-general Brisbane's brigade. The enemy's militia, supported by his regulars, attempted to impede the

advance of the right column, but were driven before it from all their positions, and the column entered Plattsburgh. This rapid movement having reversed the strong position taken up by the enemy at Dead creek, it was precipitately abandoned by him, and his gun-boats alone left to defend the ford, and to prevent our restoring the bridges, which had been imperfectly destroyed, an inconvenience soon surmounted. Here I found the enemy in the occupation of an elevated ridge of land on the north branch of the Saranac, crowned with three strong redoubts and other field-works, and block-houses armed with heavy ordnance, with their flotilla, (the Saratoga, 26 guns; Surprise, 20 guns; Thunderer, 16 guns; Preble, 20 guns; 10 gun-boats, 14 guns), at anchor out of gun-shot from the shore, consisting of a ship, a brig, a schooner, a sloop, and 10 gun-boats. I immediately communicated the circumstance to captain Downie, who had been recently appointed to command the vessels on Lake Champlain, consisting of a ship, a brig, two sloops, 12 gun-boats (the Confiance, 36 guns; Linnet 18 guns; Broke, 10 guns; Shannon, 10 guns; twelve gun-boats, 16 guns), and requested his co-operation; and in the mean time batteries were constructed for the guns brought from the rear.

On the morning of the 11th, our flotilla was seen over the isthmus which joins Cumberland head. I immediately ordered that part of the brigade under major-general Robinson, which had been brought forward, consisting of four light infantry companies, 3d battalion 27th and 76th regiments, and major-general Powers' brigade, consisting of the 3d, 5th, 1st battalion 27th and 58th regiments, to force the ford of the Saranac, and advance, provided with scaling-ladders, to escalade the enemy's works on the heights—this force was placed under the command of major-general Robinson. The batteries opened the fire the instant the ships engaged.

It is now with deep concern I inform your lordship, that, notwithstanding the intrepid valour with which captain Downie led his flotilla into action, my sanguine hopes of complete success were not long afterwards blasted, by a combination as it appeared to us, of unfortunate events, to which naval warfare is peculiarly exposed. Scarcely had his majesty's troops forced a passage across the Saranac, and ascended the heights on which stand the enemy's works, when I had the extreme mortification to hear the shout of victory from the enemy's works, in consequence of the British flag being lowered on board the Confiance and Linnet; and to see our gun-boats seeking their safety in flight. This unlooked-for

event depriving me of the co-operation of the fleet, without which the further prosecution of the service was become impracticable, I did not hesitate to arrest the course of the troops advancing to the attack, because the most complete success would have been unavailing, and the possession of the enemy's works offered no advantage to compensate for the loss we must have sustained in acquiring possession of them.

I have ordered the batteries to be dismantled, the guns withdrawn, and the baggage with the wounded men who can be removed, to be sent in the rear, in order that the troops may be sent to Chazy to-morrow, and on the following day to Champlain, where I propose to halt until I have ascertained the use the enemy propose making of the naval ascendancy they have acquired on Lake Champlain. I have the honour to transmit herewith returns of the loss sustained by the left division of the army on the advance to Plattsburgh, and in forcing a passage across the river Saranac.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE PREVOST.

Right honourable earl Bathurst.

Admiralty Office, November 26.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, commander in chief of his Majesty's ships and vessels on the lakes of Canada, to J. W. Croker, Esq., dated on board his Majesty's ship St. Lawrence, at Kingston, 24th September, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, a copy of a letter from captain Pring, late commander of his majesty's brig Linnet. It appears to me, and I have good reason to believe, that captain Downie was urged, and his ship hurried into action before she was in a fit state to meet the enemy. I am also of opinion, that there was not the least necessity for our squadron giving the enemy such decided advantages, by going into their bay to engage them; even had they been successful, it would not in the least have assisted the troops in storming the batteries; whereas, had our troops taken their batteries first, it would have obliged the enemy's squadron to quit the bay, and give ours a fair chance.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) JAMES LUCAS YEO,

Commodore, and commander in chief.

United States ship Saratoga, Plattsburgh Bay,
Sir, *Lake Champlain, September* 12, 1814.

The painful task of making you acquainted with the circumstances attending the capture of his majesty's squadron, yesterday, by that of the Americans, under commodore M'Donough, it grieves me to state, becomes my duty to perform, from the ever-to-be-lamented death of that worthy and gallant officer, captain Downie, who unfortunately fell early in the action.

In consequence of the earnest solicitation of his excellency sir George Prevost, for the co-operation of the naval force in this lake to attack that of the enemy, who were placed for the support of their works at Plattsburgh, which it proposed should be stormed by the troops, at the same moment the naval action should commence in the bay; every possible exertion was used to accelerate the armament of the new ship, that the military movements might not be postponed at such an advanced season of the year, longer than was absolutely necessary. On the 3d instant, I was directed to proceed in command of the flotilla of gun-boats to protect the left flank of our army advancing towards Plattsburgh, and on the following day, after taking possession and parolling the militia of isle La Motte, I caused a battery of three long eighteen-pounder guns to be constructed for the support of our position a-breast of Little Chazy, where the supplies for the army were ordered to be landed.

The fleet came up on the 8th instant, but for want of stores for the equipment of the guns, could not move forward until the 11th; at daylight we weighed, and at 7 were in full view of the enemy's fleet, consisting of a ship, brig, schooner, and one sloop, moored in line, a-breast of their encampment, with a division of five gun-boats on each flank; at 40 minutes past 7, after the officers commanding vessels and the flotilla had received their final instructions as to the plan of attack, we made sail in order of battle. Captain Downie had determined on laying his ship athwart-hause of the enemy's, directing lieutenant M'Ghee, of the Chub, to support me in the Linnet, in engaging the brig to the right, and lieutenant Hicks, of the Finch, with the flotilla of gun-boats, to attack the schooner and sloop on the left of the enemy's line.

At 8 the enemy's gun-boats and smaller vessels commenced a heavy and galling fire on our line; at 10 minutes after 8, the Confiance having two anchors shot away from her larboard bow, and the wind baffling, was obliged to anchor (though not in the situation proposed) within two ca-

bles length of her adversary; the Linnet and Chub soon afterwards took their allotted stations, something short of that distance, when the crews on both sides cheered, and commenced a spirited and close action; a short time, however, deprived me of the valuable services of lieutenant M'Ghee who, from having his cables, bow-sprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within the enemy's line, and was obliged to surrender.

From the light airs and smoothness of the water, the fire on each side proved very destructive from the commencement of the engagement, and with the exception of the brig, that of the enemy appeared united against the Confiance. After two hours severe conflict with our opponent, she cut her cable, run down, and took shelter between the ship and schooner, which enabled us to direct our fire against the division of the enemy's gun-boats and ship, which had so long annoyed us during our close engagement with the brig, without any return on our part; at this time the fire of the enemy's ship slackened considerably, having several of her guns dismounted, when she cut her cable and winded her larboard broadside to bear on the Confiance, who in vain endeavoured to effect the same operation; at 33 minutes after 10, I was much distressed to observe that the Confiance struck her colours. The whole attention of the enemy's force then became directed towards the Linnet; the shattered and disabled state of the masts, sails, rigging, and yards, precluded the most distant hope of being able to effect an escape by cutting the cable; the result of doing so, must in a few minutes have been her drifting alongside the enemy's vessels, close under our lee; but in the hope the flotilla of gun-boats, who had abandoned the object assigned them, would perceive our wants and come to our assistance, which would afford a reasonable prospect of being towed clear, I determined to resist the then destructive cannonading of the whole of the enemy's fleet, and at the same time despatched lieutenant H. Drew, to ascertain the state of the Confiance. At 45 minutes after 10, I was apprised of the death of her brave commander (whose merits it would be presumption in me to extol), as well as the great slaughter which had taken place on board; and observing from the manœuvres of the flotilla that I could enjoy no further expectations of relief, the situation of my gallant comrades, who had so nobly fought and even now fast falling by my side, demanded the surrender of his majesty's brig entrusted to my command, to prevent an useless waste

of valuable lives, and at the request of the surviving officers and men, I gave the painful orders for the colours to be struck.

Lieutenant Hicks, of the Finch, had the mortification to strike on a reef of rocks, to the eastward of Crab Island, about the middle of the engagement, which prevented his rendering that assistance to the squadron, that might, from an officer of such ability, have been expected.

The misfortune which this day befel us by capture, will, sir, I trust, apologize for the lengthy detail which, in justice to the sufferers, I have deemed necessary to give of the particulars which led to it; and when it is taken into consideration that the Confiance was 16 days before on the stocks, with an organized crew, composed of several drafts of men who had recently arrived from different ships at Quebec, many of whom only joined the day before, and were totally unkown either to the officers or to each other, with the want of gunlocks, as well as other necessary appointments not to be procured in this country, I trust you will feel satisfied of the decided advantage the enemy possessed, exclusive of their great superiority in point of force, a comparative statement (the account of the British force has not been transmitted) of which I have the honour to annex. It now becomes the most pleasing part of my duty to notice to you the determined skill and bravery of the officers and men in this unequal contest; but it grieves me to state that the loss sustained in maintaining it has been so great; that of the enemy, I understand, amounts to something more than the same number.

The fine style in which captain Downie conducted the squadron into action, amidst a tremendous fire, without returning a shot until secured, reflects the greatest credit to his memory, for his judgment and coolness, as also, on lieutenants M'Ghee and Hicks for so strictly attending to his example and instructions; their own accounts of the capture of their respective vessels, as well as that of lieutenant Robertson, who succeeded to the command of the Confiance, will, I feel assured, do ample justice to the merits of the officers and men serving under their immediate command; but I cannot omit noticing the individual conduct of lieutenants Robertson, Creswick, and Hornby, and Mr. Bryden, master, for their particular exertion in endeavouring to bring the Confiance's starboard side to bear on the enemy, after most of their guns were dismounted on the other,

It is impossible for me to express to you my admiration of the officers and crew serving under my personal orders;

their coolness and steadiness, the effect of which was proved by their irresistible fire directed towards the brig opposed to us, claims my warmest acknowledgments, but more particularly for preserving the same so long after the whole strength of the enemy had been directed against the Linnet alone. My first lieutenant, Mr. William Drew, whose merits I have before had the honour to report to you, behaved on this occasion in the most exemplary manner.

By the death of Mr. Paul, acting second lieutenant, the service has been deprived of a most valuable and brave officer; he fell early in the action. Great credit is due to Mr. Giles, purser, for volunteering his services on deck; to Mr. Mitchell, surgeon, for the skill he evinced in performing some amputations required at the moment, as well as his great attention to the wounded during the action, at the close of which the water was nearly a foot above the lower deck, from the number of shot which struck her between wind and water. I have to regret the loss of the boatswain, Mr. Jackson, who was killed a few minutes before the action terminated. The assistance I received from Mr. Muckle, the gunner, and also from Mr. Clark, master's mate, Messrs. Towke and Sinclair, midshipmen, the latter of whom was wounded in the head, and Mr. Guy, my clerk, will, I hope, recommend them, as well as the whole of my gallant crew, to your notice. I have much satisfaction in making you acquainted with the humane treatment the wounded have received from commodore M'Donough; they were immediately removed to his own hospital on Crab Island, and were furnished with every requisite. His generous and polite attention also, to myself, officers, and men, will ever hereafter be gratefully remembered.

I have, &c. DAN. PRING.

BOMBARDMENT OF STONINGTON.

Extract of a letter from Brigadier-General Cushing, commanding military district No. 2, to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, New London, 10th August, 1814, half past 9 o'clock, P. M.

"During the afternoon of yesterday a British ship of 74 guns, a frigate, a sloop of war, and an armed brig, passed into Fisher's Island Sound, and anchored, the first off Long Point, about five miles to the eastward of this harbour, and two

and a half miles from the main, and the other three at the mouth of Stonington harbour, and within point blank-shot of the town. A flag was then sent on shore to inform the inhabitants that in one hour their town would be in flames, and to admonish them to remove the women and children.

"On receipt of this information, which was brought to me by a citizen of Stonington about 9 o'clock, I addressed the note marked A. to major-general Williams of this town, who gave immediate orders for assembling one regiment of militia at Stonington, one at the head of Mystic river, a company of artillery and one regiment of infantry at Norwich Landing, a little to the rear of the public vessels, and one company of artillery, and one regiment of infantry in the neighbourhood and a little in advance of this town. This disposition was made under an idea that the menace at Stonington was but a mask to another object, and intended to draw our attention and our force from the forts at the mouth of this harbour, when a party of troops might be landed two or three miles to the south-east of fort Griswold, for the purpose of carrying that post by escalade (which if successful would give them the complete command of the harbour), or march direct to the shipping above, and there co-operate with another force to be sent up the river in barges.

"From half past 9 to 11 o'clock last night, and from daylight to 11 this morning, a constant fire of shot, shells, and rockets, was maintained against the devoted village of Stonington, in which there were only a few militia and one six and two eighteen-pounders on travelling carriages; but the village is yet standing, and the ships have hauled off to a distance of from one and an half to three miles (the brig, from all appearances, very much injured in her hull, spars, and rigging), after expending an immense quantity of ammunition and rockets without killing a single person or firing a single building."

CAPTURE OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THE PENOBSCOT AND PASSAMAQUODDY BAY.

Downing-street, October 9, 1814.

Major Addison has arrived with the following despatch from lieutenant-general Sherbroke, dated

Castine, at the entrance of the Penobscot, September 18.

My Lord,

I have now the honour to inform your lordship, that after

closing my despatch on the 26th ultimo, in which I mentioned my intention of proceeding to the Penobscot, rear-admiral Griffith and myself lost no time in sailing from Halifax, with such a naval force as he deemed necessary, and the troops as per margin*, to accomplish the object we had in view.

Very early in the morning of the 30th, we fell in with the Rifleman sloop of war, when captain Pearce informed us, that the United States frigate Adams had got into the Penobscot; but from the apprehension of being attacked by our cruisers, if she remained at the entrance of the river, she ran up as high as Hamden, where she had landed her guns, and mounted them on shore for her protection.

On leaving Halifax it was my original intention to have taken possession of Machias, on our way hither; but on receiving this intelligence, the admiral and myself were of opinion that no time should be lost in proceeding to our destination, and we arrived here very early on the morning of the 1st instant.

The fort at Castine, which is situated upon a peninsula of the eastern side of the Penobscot, near the entrance of that river, was summoned a little after sunrise; but the American officer refused to surrender it, and immediately opened a fire from four 24-pounders, upon a small schooner that had been sent with lieutenant-colonel Nicholls (commanding royal engineers) to reconnoitre the works.

Arrangements were immediately made for disembarking the troops; but before a landing could be effected the enemy blew up his magazine, and escaped up the Majectaquadous river, carrying off in the boats with them two field-pieces.

As we had no means of ascertaining what force the Americans had on this peninsula, I landed a detachment of royal artillery, with two rifle companies of the 60th and 98th regiments, under colonel Douglass, in the rear of it, with orders to secure the isthmus, and to take possession of the heights which commanded the town; but I soon learned that there were no regulars at Castine, except the party which had blown up the magazine, and escaped; and that the militia which were assembled there had dispersed immediately on our landing.

Rear-admiral Griffith and myself next turned our attention to obtaining possession of the Adams, or, if that could not be done, to destroying her. The arrangements for this service having been made, the rear-admiral entrusted the exe-

* First company royal artillery, two rifle companies of the 7th battalion, 60th regiment, 29th, 62d, and 98th regiments.

cution of it to captain Barrie, royal navy, and as the co-operation of a land force was necessary, I directed lieutenant-colonel Johns, with a detachment of artillery, the flank companies of the 29th, 62d, and 98th regiments, and one rifle company of the 60th, to accompany and co-operate with captain Barrie on this occasion; but as Hamden is twenty-seven miles above Castine, it appeared to me a necessary measure of precaution first to occupy a post on the western bank, which might afford support, if necessary, to the forces going up the river, and at the same time prevent the armed population, which is very numerous to the southward and westward, from annoying the British in their operations on the Adams.

Upon inquiry I found that Belfast, which is upon the high road leading from Hamden to Boston, and which perfectly commands the bridge, was likely to answer both these purposes, and I consequently directed major-general Gosselin to occupy that place with the 29th regiment, and to maintain it till further orders.

As soon as this was accomplished, and the tide served, rear-admiral Griffith directed captain Barrie to proceed to his destination, and the remainder of the troops were landed that evening at Castine.

Understanding that a strong party of militia from the neighbouring townships had assembled at about four miles from Castine on the road leading to Blue Hill, I sent out a strong patrole on the morning of the 2d, before day-break. On arriving at the place, I was informed that the militia of the country had assembled there on the alarm guns being fired at fort Castine upon our first appearance, but that the main body had since dispersed, and returned to their respective homes. Some stragglers were, however, left, who fired upon our advanced guard, and then took to the woods; a few of whom were made prisoners. No intelligence having reached us from captain Barrie on Saturday night, I marched with about seven hundred men and two light field-pieces upon Buckstown, at three o'clock on Sunday morning, the 4th instant, for the purpose of learning what progress he had made, and of affording him assistance if required. This place is about eighteen miles higher up the Penobscot than Castine, and on the eastern bank of the river. Rear-admiral Griffith accompanied me on this occasion, and as we had reason to believe that the light guns which had been taken from Castine were secreted in the neighbourhood of Buckstown, we threatened to destroy the town unless they were delivered up,

and the two brass 3-pounders, on travelling carriages, were, in consequence, brought to us in the course of the day, and are now in our possession.

At Buckstown we received very satisfactory accounts of the success which had attended the force employed up the river. We learned that captain Barrie had proceeded from Hamden up to Bangor; and the admiral sent an officer in a boat from Buckstown to communicate with him, when finding there was no necessity for the troops remaining longer at Buckstown, they marched back to Castine the next day.

Having ascertained that the object of the expedition up the Penobscot had been attained, it was no longer necessary for me to occupy Belfast; I, therefore, on the evening of the 6th, directed major-general Gosselin to embark the troops and to join me here.

Machias being the only place now remaining where the enemy had a post between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay, I ordered lieutenant-colonel Pilkington to proceed with a detachment of royal artillery and the 29th regiment to occupy it; and as naval assistance was required, rear-admiral Griffith directed captain Parker of the Tenedos, to co-operate with lieutenant-colonel Pilkington on this occasion.

On the morning of the 9th, captain Barrie, with lieutenant-colonel John, and the troops which had been employed with him up the Penobscot, returned to Castine. It seems the enemy blew up the Adams, on his strong position at Hamden being attacked; but all his artillery, two stand of colours, and a standard, with several merchant vessels, fell into our hands. This, I am happy to say, was accomplished with very little loss on our part; and your lordship will perceive, by the return sent herewith, that the only officer wounded in this affair is captain Gell, of the 29th grenadiers.

(Signed) J. C. SHERBROKE.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Johns to General Sir John Sherbroke.

Bangor, on the Penobscot River, September 3d, 1814.

Sir,

In compliance with your excellency's orders of the 1st instant, I sailed from Castine with the detachment of royal artillery, the flank companies of the 29th, 62d, and 98th regiments, and one rifle company of the 7th battalion, 60th regiment, which composed the force when your excellency did me the honour to place under my command, for the purpose

of co-operating with captain Barrie, of the royal navy, in an expedition up that river.

On the morning of the 2d, having proceeded above the town of Frankfort, we discovered some of the enemy on their march towards Hamden, by the eastern shore, which induced me to order brevet-major Croasdale, with a detachment of the 98th, and some riflemen of the 60th regiment, under lieutenant Wallace, to land and intercept them, which was accomplished, and that detachment of the enemy (as I have since learned) were prevented from joining the main body, assembled at Hamden.

On this occasion the enemy had one man killed, and some wounded. Major Croasdale re-embarked without any loss. We arrived off Bald Head Cove, three miles distant from Hamden, about five o'clock that evening, when captain Barrie agreed with me in determining to land the troops immediately. Having discovered that the enemy's pickets were advantageously posted on the north side of the cove, I directed brevet-major Riddle, with the grenadiers of the 62d, and captain Ward, with the rifle company of the 60th, to dislodge them, and take up that ground, which duty was performed under major Riddle's directions, in a most complete and satisfactory manner, by about 7 o'clock; and before 10 at night, the whole of the troops, including eighty marines, under captain Carter (whom captain Barrie had done me the honour to attach to my command), were landed and bivouacked for the night, during which it rained incessantly. We got under arms at 5 o'clock this morning, the rifle company forming the advance under captain Ward; brevet-major Keith, with the light company of the 62d, bringing up the rear; and the detachment of marines under captain Carter moving upon my flanks, while captain Barrie with the ships and gun-boats under his command, advanced at the same time up the river, on my right towards Hamden. In addition to the detachment of royal artillery, under lieutenant Garston, captain Barrie had landed one six-pounder, a six and a half inch howitzer, and a rocket apparatus, with a detachment of sailors under lieutenants Symonds, Botley, and Slade, and Mr. Sparling, master of his majesty's ship Bulwark.

The fog was so thick, it was impossible to form a correct idea of the features of the country, or to reconnoitre the enemy, whose number were reported to be 1400, under the command of brigadier-general Blake. Between 7 and 8 o'clock, our skirmishers in advance were so sharply engaged with the enemy, as to induce me to send forward one half of the light

company of the 29th regiment, under captain Coaker, to their support. The column had not advanced much farther before I discovered the enemy drawn out in line, occupying a very strong and advantageous position in front of the town of Hamden, his left flanked by a high hill commanding the road and river, on which were mounted several heavy pieces of cannon; his right extending considerably beyond our left, resting upon a strong *point d'appui*, with an eighteen-pounder and some light field-pieces in advance of his centre, so pointed as completely to rake the road, and a narrow bridge at the foot of a hill, by which we were obliged to advance upon his position. As soon as he perceived our column approaching, he opened a very heavy and continued fire of grape and musketry upon us; we, however, soon crossed the bridge, deployed, and charged up the hill to get possession of his guns, one of which we found had already fallen into the hands of captain Ward's riflemen in advance. The enemy's fire now began to slacken, and we pushed on rapidly, and succeeded in driving him at all points from his position; while captain Coaker, with the light company of the 29th, had gained possession of the hill on his left, from whence it was discovered that the Adams frigate was on fire, and that the enemy had deserted the battery which defended her.

We were now in complete possession of the enemy's position above, and captain Barrie with the gun-boats had secured that below the hill. Upon this occasion twenty pieces of cannon fell into our hands of the naval and military force, the return of which I inclose; after which captain Barrie and myself determined on pursuing the enemy towards Bangor, which place we reached without opposition; and here two brass three-pounders, and three stand of colours, fell into our possession. Brigadier-general Blake, also, in this town, surrendered himself prisoner, and with other prisoners, to the amount of twenty-one, were admitted to their paroles. Eighty prisoners taken at Hamden are in our custody. The loss sustained by the enemy I have not had it in my power correctly to ascertain: report states it to be from thirty to forty in killed, wounded, and missing.

Our loss, I am happy to add, is but small, viz. one rank and file killed; one captain, seven rank and file wounded; one rank and file missing. Captain Gell, of the 29th, was wounded when leading the column, which deprived me of his active and useful assistance; but I am happy to add, he is recovering. I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY JOHNS, *Lieut.-col.*

From Colonel Pilkington to General Sherbroke, dated Machias, September 14, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint your excellency, that I sailed from Penobscot Bay with the brigade you was pleased to place under my command, consisting of a detachment of royal artillery, with a howitzer, the battalion companies of the 9th regiment, and a party of the 7th battalion, 69th foot, on the morning of the 9th instant, and arrived at Bucks Harbour, about ten miles from this place, on the following evening.

As the enemy fired several alarm guns on our approaching the shore, it was evident he was apprehensive of an attack; I therefore deemed it expedient to disembark the troops with as little delay as possible, and captain Hyde Parker, commanding the naval force, appointed captain Staufell to superintend this duty, and it was executed by that officer with the utmost promptitude and decision.

Upon reaching the shore, I ascertained that there was only a pathway through the woods by which we could advance and take fort O'Brien, and the battery in reserve; and as the guns of these works commanded the passage of the river upon which the town is situated, I decided upon possessing ourselves of them, if practicable, during the night.

We moved forward at 10 o'clock, P. M., and after a most tedious an harassing march, only arrived near to the fort at break of day, although the distance does not exceed five miles.

The advanced guard, which consisted of two companies of the 29th regiment, and a detachment of riflemen of the 60th regiment, under major Tod, of the former corps, immediately drove in the enemy's pickets, and upon pursuing him closely, found the fort had been evacuated, leaving their colours, about five minutes before we entered it. Within it, and the battery, there are two 24-pounders, three 18-pounders, several dismounted guns, and a block-house. The party which escaped amounted to about seventy men of the 40th regiment of American infantry, and thirty of the embodied militia; the retreat was so rapid, that I was not enabled to take any prisoners. I understood there were a few wounded, but they secreted themselves in the wood.

Having secured the fort, we lost no time in advancing upon Machias, which was taken without any resistance; and also two field-pieces.

The boats of the squadron, under the command of lieutenant Bouchier, of the royal navy, and the royal marines, under lieutenant Welchman, were detached to the eastern side of the river, and were of essential service in taking two field-pieces in that quarter.

Notwithstanding that the militia were not assembled to any extent in the vicinity of the town, I was making the necessary arrangements to advance into the interior of the country, when I received a letter from brigadier-general Brewer, commanding the district, wherein he engages that the militia forces within the county of Washington, shall not bear arms, or in any way serve against his Britannic majesty during the present war. A similar offer having been made by the civil officers and principal citizens of the county, a cessation of arms was agreed upon, and the county of Washington has passed under the dominion of his Britannic majesty.

I beg leave to congratulate you upon the importance of this accession of territory which has been wrested from the enemy: it embraces one hundred miles of sea-coast, and includes that intermediate tract of country which separates the province of New-Brunswick from Lower Canada.

We have taken twenty-six pieces of ordnance (serviceable and unserviceable), with a proportion of arms and ammunition, returns of which are inclosed; and I have the pleasing satisfaction to add, that this service has been effected without the loss of a man on our part.

[Here follows the usual compliments to officers, &c.]

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. PILKINGTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, deputy adjutant-general.

To lieut.-gen. sir John C. Sherbroke, K. B. &c.

Return of ordnance, arms, ammunition, &c. taken at Machias by the troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pilkington, 11th September, 1814.

Ordnance, total 26—Arms, 161 muskets, 99 bayonets, 100 pouches, 41 belts, 2 drums—Ammunition, 20 barrels serviceable gunpowder, 75 paper cartridges filled for 18 and 24-pounders, 2938 musket-ball cartridges, 3 barrels of grape and case shot, 553 round shot for 18 and 24-pounders; 6 kegs of gunpowder, 25 lbs. each; 28 paper cartridges filled for 4-pounders.

J. DANIEL,
Lieutenant Royal Artillery.

Copy of a letter from Captain Morris to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sir, *Boston, September 20th*, 1814.

I have the honour to forward a detailed report of the circumstances attending the destruction of the United States' ship Adams, at Hampden, on the 3d instant.

On the 1st instant, at noon, I received intelligence by express, that the enemy with a force of sixteen sail were off the harbour of Castine, thirty miles below us. This intelligence was immediately forwarded to brigadier-general Blake, with a request that he would direct such force as could be collected, to repair immediately to Hampden. As our ship was prepared for heaving down, was in no situation to receive her armament, our attention was immediately directed to the occupation of such positions on shore as would best enable us to protect her. By great and unremitted exertions, and the prompt assistance of all the inhabitants in our immediate vicinity, during the 1st and 2d instant, nine pieces were transported to a commanding eminence near the ship, one to the place selected by general Blake for his line of battle, fourteen upon a wharf commanding the river below, and one on a point covering the communication between our hill and wharf batteries; temporary platforms of loose plank were laid, and such other arrangements made as would enable us to dispute the passage of a naval force.

Want of time prevented our improving all the advantages of our position, and we were compelled to leave our rear and flanks to the defence of the militia in case of attack by land troops. Favoured by a fresh breeze, the enemy had advanced to within three miles of our position at sunset on the 2d, with the Sylph mounting 26, and Peruvian 11 guns, and one transport, one tender, and ten barges, manned with seamen from the Bulwark and Dragon, under the command of commodore Barrie. Troops were landed under command of colonel Johns, opposite their shipping, without any opposition, their numbers unknown, but supposed to be about 350. To oppose these troops about 370 militia were then collected, assisted by lieutenant Lewis of the United States artillery, who by a forced march had arrived from Castine with his detachment of 28 men. Many of the militia were without arms, and most of them without any ammunition, and as our numbers were barely sufficient to man our batteries, I ordered the ship's muskets to be distributed among the militia, and further ordered them to be supplied with ammunition. Our sick were sent across a creek, with orders for such as

were able, to secure themselves in the woods in case of our defeat.

These arrangements were not concluded until late on the evening of the 2d. As the wind was fair for the enemy's approach, and the night dark, rainy, and favourable for his attempting a surprise, our men were compelled, notwithstanding previous fatigue, to remain at their batteries. At daylight, on the 3d, I received intelligence from general Blake, that he had been reinforced by three companies, and that the enemy were then advancing upon him. A thick fog concealed their early movements, and their advance of barges and rocket-boats was not discovered until about 7 o'clock. Believing from their movements that they intended a simultaneous attack by land and water, I placed the hill battery under my first lieutenant, Wadsworth, assisted by lieutenant Madison, and Mr. Rogers the purser, and directed lieutenant Watson to place his small detachment of 20 marines in a position to watch the movements of the enemy's main body, assist in covering our flank, and finally to cover our retreat in case that became necessary. I had but just joined the wharf battery under the direction of lieutenants Parker and Beatty, and sailing master M'Culloh, when the enemy's infantry commenced their attack upon the militia. The launches still held their position beyond the reach of our fire, ready to improve any advantage their troops might obtain. A few minutes only had elapsed when lieutenant Wadsworth informed me that our troops were retreating, and immediately after that they were dispersed and flying in great confusion. We had now no alternative but precipitate retreat or captivity. Our rear and flanks entirely exposed, without other means of defence on that side than our pikes and cutlasses. The only bridge across the creek above us nearer the enemy than ourselves, and the creek only fordable at low water, with the tide then rising. I therefore ordered lieutenant Wadsworth to spike his guns, and retire across the bridge, which was done in perfect order, the marines under lieutenant Watson covering their rear. Orders were given at the same time to fire the ship, spike the guns of the lower battery and join our companions across the creek. Before these orders were fully executed the enemy appeared on the hill from which our men just retired, and were exposed to their fire for a short time while completing them. Retreating in front of them for about five hundred yards, we discovered it impossible to gain the bridge, forded the creek, ascended the opposite bank, and gained our companions without receiving the slightest injury

from the ill-directed fire of the enemy. We continued our retreat towards Bangor, when we found and retired upon a road leading to the Kennebec by a circuitous route of sixty-five miles. Perceiving it impossible to subsist our men in a body through a country almost destitute of inhabitants, they were ordered to repair to Portland as speedily as they might be able. The entire loss of all personal effects rendered us dependent on the generosity of the inhabitants between the Penobscot and Kennebec for subsistence, who most cheerfully and liberally supplied our wants to the utmost extent of their limited means. Our warmest thanks are also due to the inhabitants of Waterville, Augusta, and Hallowell, for their liberality and attention. Our loss was but one marine and one seaman, made prisoners. That of the enemy was estimated at eight or ten killed, and from forty to fifty wounded, principally by the 18-pounder under charge of lieutenant Lewis of the United States artillery.

The character of my first lieutenant Wadsworth was already too well established to require the additional evidence he gave of richly deserving the entire confidence of the department and his country. His brother officers of the navy and marines, equally zealous and attentive, are equally entitled to my thanks and their country's approbation. The bravery of the seamen and marines is unquestioned, their uncommon good conduct upon their march, those feelings which induced them to rally round their flag at a distance of two hundred miles from the place of their dispersion, without one instance of desertion, entitle them to particular approbation, and render them an example which their brother tars may ever be proud to emulate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. MORRIS.

Hon. William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

EXPEDITION AGAINST MICHILLIMACKINAC.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, to the Secretary of War, dated United States Sloop of War Niagara, off Thunder Bay, 9th August, 1814.

Sir,

We left Fort Gratiot (head of straits St. Clair), on the 13th ultimo, and imagined that we should arrive, in a few days, at Malchadash Bay. At the end of a week, however,

the commodore, from the want of pilots acquainted with that unfrequented part of the lake, despaired of being able to find out a passage through the island into that bay; and made for St. Joseph's, where he anchored on the 20th day of July. After setting fire to the fort of St. Joseph, which seemed not to have been recently occupied, a detachment of infantry and artillery, under major Holmes, was ordered up to sault St. Mary's, for the purpose of breaking up the enemy's establishment at that place. For particulars relative to the execution of this order, I beg leave to refer you to major Holmes' report herewith inclosed. Finding, on my arrival at Michillimackinac, on the 26th ultimo, that the enemy had strongly fortified the height overlooking the old fort of Mackinac, I at once despaired of being able, with my small force, to carry the place by storm, and determined (as the only course remaining), on landing and establishing myself on some favourable position, whence I could be enabled to annoy the enemy by gradual and slow approaches, under cover of my artillery, in which I should have the superiority in point of metal. I was urged to adopt this step by another reason, not a little cogent; could a position be taken and fortified on the island, I was well aware that it would either induce the enemy to attack me in my strong holds, or force his Indians and Canadians (his most efficient, and only disposable force), off the island, as they would be very unwilling to remain in my neighbourhood after a permanent footing had been taken. On inquiry, I learned from individuals, who had lived many years on the island, that a position as desirable as I might wish, could be found on the west end, and therefore immediately made arrangements for disembarking. A landing was effected on the 4th instant, under cover of the guns of the shipping, and the line being quickly formed, had advanced to the edge of the field spoken of for a camp, when intelligence was conveyed to me, that the enemy was a-head; a few seconds more brought us a fire from his battery, of four pieces, firing shot and shells. After reconnoitring his position, which was well selected, his line reaching along the edge of the woods, at the further extremity of the field, and covered by a temporary breast-work, I determined on changing my position (which was now two lines, the militia forming the front), by advancing major Holmes' battalion of regulars on the right of the militia, thus to out-flank him, and by a vigorous effort to gain his rear. This movement was immediately ordered, but before it could be executed, a fire was opened by some Indians posted in a thick wood near our right, which proved

fatal to major Holmes, and severely wounded captain Desha, the officer next in rank. This unlucky fire, by depriving us of the services of our most valuable officers, threw that part of the line into confusion, from which the best exertions of the officers were not able to recover it. Finding it impossible to gain the enemy's left, owing to the impenetrable thickness of the woods, a charge was ordered to be made by the regulars immediately against the front. This charge, although made in some confusion, served to drive the enemy back into the woods, from whence an annoying fire was kept up by the Indians.

Lieutenant Morgan was ordered up with a light piece to assist the left, now particularly galled; the excellent practice of this piece brought the enemy to fire at a longer distance. Discovering that this disposition from whence the enemy had just been driven (and which had been represented to me as so high and commanding), was by no means tenable, from being interspersed with thickets, and intersected in every way by ravines; I determined no longer to expose my force to the fire of an enemy deriving every advantage which could be obtained from numbers and a knowledge of the position, and therefore ordered an immediate retreat towards the shipping.

This affair, which cost us many valuable lives, leaves us to lament the fall of that gallant officer major Holmes, whose character is so well known to the war department. Captain Vanhorn, of the 19th infantry, and lieutenant Jackson, of the 24th infantry, both brave intrepid young men, fell mortally wounded at the head of their respective commands. The conduct of all my officers on this occasion merits my approbation. Captain Desha of the 24th infantry, although severely wounded, continued with his command until forced to retire from faintness through loss of blood. Captains Saunders, Hawkins, and Sturgus, with every subaltern of that battalion, acted in the most exemplary manner. Ensign Bryan, second rifle regiment acting-adjutant to the battalion, actively forwarded the wishes of the commanding officer. Lieutenants Hickman, 28th infantry, and Hyde, of the United States marines, who commanded the reserve, claim my particular thanks for their activity in keeping that command in readiness to meet any exigency. I have before mentioned lieutenant Morgan's activity: his two assistants, lieutenant Pickett and Mr. Peters, conductor of artillery, also merit the name of good officers.

The militia were wanting in no part of their duty. Colonel

Cotgreave, his officers and soldiers, deserve the warmest approbation. My acting assistant adjutant-general, captain N. H. Moore, 28th infantry, with volunteer adjutant M'Comb, were prompt in delivering my orders. Captain Gratiot of the engineers, who volunteered his services as adjutant on the occasion, gave me valuable assistance.

On the morning of the 5th, I sent a flag to the enemy, to inquire into the state of the wounded (two in number), who were left on the field, and to request permission to bring away the body of major Holmes, which was also left, owing to the unpardonable neglect of the soldiers in whose hands he was placed. I am happy in assuring you, that the body of major Holmes is secured, and will be buried at Detroit with becoming honours.

I shall discharge the militia to-morrow, and will send them down, together with two regular companies, to Detroit. With the remaining three companies I shall attempt to destroy the enemy's establishment in the head of Naw-taw-wa-sa-ga river, and if it be thought proper, erect a post at the mouth of that river.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

G. CROGHAN,
Lieutenant-colonel 2d riflemen.

Honourable J. Armstrong, Secretary of War.

Copy of a letter from Major A. H. Holmes, to Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, dated on board United States Schooner Scorpion, 27th July, 1814.

Sir,

Pursuant to your orders of the instant, I left the squadron with lieutenant Turner of the navy, and arrived at the Sault St. Mary's, at noon the day after; two hours before, the north-west agent had received notice of our approach, and succeeded in escaping with a considerable amount of goods, after setting fire to the vessel above the falls. The design of this latter measure was frustrated only by the intrepid exertions of Mr. Turner, with his own men and a few of captain Saunders' company. The vessel was brought down the falls on the 25th, but, having bilged, Mr. Turner destroyed her. Much of the goods we have taken were found in the woods on the American side, and were claimed by the agent of John Johnston, an Indian trader.

I secured this property, because it was good prize by the

maritime law of nations, as recognized in the English courts, (witness the case of admiral Rodney, adjudged by lord Mansfield). Further, because Johnston has acted the infamous part of a traitor, having been a citizen and a magistrate of the Michigan territory, before the war, and at its commencement, and is now discharging the functions of magistrate under the British government. Because his agents armed the Indians from his store-house at our approach; and lastly, because those goods or a considerable part were designed to be taken to Michillimackinac. Pork, salt, and groceries compose the chief part. Johnston himself passed to Michillimackinac since the squadron arrived at St. Joseph's.

With high respect, &c.

A. H. HOLMES,
Major 32d infantry.

Lieutenant-colonel Croghan, 2d rifle, commanding.

A true copy from the original report.

N. H. MOORE,
Acting adjutant-general.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of a detachment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel G. Croghan, in the affair of the 4th August, 1814.

One major, 12 privates, killed; 2 captains, 1 lieutenant, 6 serjeants, 3 corporals, 1 musician, 28 privates, wounded; 2 privates, missing.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, to Brigadier-general M'Arthur, commanding Eighth Military District, dated Detroit, August 23, 1814.

Dear Sir,

I communicated, in my report of the 11th instant, my intention of continuing on Lake Huron with three companies, for the purpose of breaking up any depots which the enemy might have on the east side of the lake.

We were fortunate in learning that the only line of communication from York to Mackinaw, &c. was by the way of Lake Simcoe and Nautauwasaga river, which empties into Lake Huron, about 100 miles south-east of Cabot's Head. To that river, therefore, our course was directed, in hope of finding the enemy's schooner Nancy, which was thought to be in that quarter. On the 13th instant, the fleet anchored off the mouth of that river, and my troops were quickly disembarked on the peninsula formed between the river and lake, for the purpose of fixing a camp.

On reconnoitring the position thus taken, it was discovered that the schooner Nancy was drawn up in the river a few hundred yards above us, under cover of a block-house, erected on a commanding situation on the opposite shore.

Having landed with nothing larger than four-pounders, and it being now too late in the evening to establish a battery of heavy guns, I determined on remaining silent until I could be enabled to open with effect.

On the following morning a fire for a few minutes was kept up by the shipping upon the block-house, but with little effect, as the direction towards it only could be given, a thin wood intervening to obscure the view. About 12 o'clock two howitzers (an eight and a half and five and a half inch) being placed within a few hundred yards of the block-house, commenced a fire which lasted but a few minutes, when the house blew up; at the same time communicated the fire to the Nancy, which was quickly so enveloped in flames, as to render any attempts which might have been made to save her unavailing. My first impression on seeing the explosion was, that the enemy, after having spiked his guns, had set fire to the magazine himself; but upon examination it was found to have been occasioned by the bursting of one of our shells, which, firing some combustible matter near the magazine, gave the enemy but barely time to escape before the explosion took place. The commodore secured and brought off the guns which were mounted within the block-house (two twenty-four-pound carronades, and one long six-pounder), together with some round shot, grape, and canister. The enemy will feel sensibly the loss of the Nancy, her cargo consisting (at the time of her being on fire) of several hundred barrels of provisions, intended as a six months supply for the garrison at Mackinac.

Having executed (so far as my force could effect) the orders of the 2d of June, given by the secretary of war, I left Nautauwasaga on the 15th, and arrived on the 21st at the mouth of the river St. Clair with my whole force, except a few soldiers of the 17th infantry, who were left as marines on board two small vessels, which still continue to cruize on that lake.

I am, most respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

GEORGE CROGHAN,

Lieutenant-colonel 2d rifle regiment.

Brigadier-general D. M'Arthur,
commanding eighth military district,

Copy of a letter from Captain Sinclair, commanding on Lake Erie, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States Sloop of War Niagara, off St. Joseph's, 22d July, 1814.

Sir,

The wind became favourable on the evening of the 3d instant, the troops were embarked, and I sailed from Detroit that night; but such were the difficulties I had to encounter on the flats off Lake St. Clair, where, instead of ten feet, as I had been led to believe there was, I only found eight, and the rapid current of that river, that I did not reach Lake Huron till the 12th. From thence I shaped my course, as directed, for Matchadash bay, and used every possible effort to gain it; but not being able to procure a pilot for that unfrequented part of the lake, and finding it filled with islands and sunken rocks, which must inevitably prove the destruction of the fleet, as it was impossible to avoid them, on account of the impenetrable fog with which this lake is almost continually covered, and finding the army was growing short of provisions from the time already elapsed, it was agreed between colonel Croghan and myself to push for this place, where we should procure such information as would govern our future operations. We were favoured in winds, and arrived here on the 20th. The enemy had abandoned his work, consisting of a fort, and large block-house, &c.; those we destroyed, but left untouched the town and N. W. Company's store-houses.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

A. SINCLAIR.

The honourable William Jones, secretary of the navy.

Copy of a letter from Captain Sinclair, commanding on Lake Erie, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States Sloop of War Niagara, off Michillimackinac, July 30th, 1814.

Sir,

Whilst wind-bound at St. Joseph's, I captured the N. W. company's schooner Mink, from Michillimackinac to St. Mary's, with a cargo of flour—receiving intelligence through this source, that the schooner Perseverance was lying above the Falls, at the lower end of Lake Superior, in waiting to transport the Mink's cargo to Fort Williams, I despatched the ship's launches under lieutenant Turner, of the Scorpion, an active and enterprising officer, to capture her, and if pos-

sible to get her down the Falls. Colonel Croghan attached major Holmes with a party of regulars to co-operate in the expedition, in which the capture of St. Mary's was included. The official report of the result, made by lieutenant Turner, I herewith inclose you. The capture of the Perseverance gave us the complete command of Lake Superior—and had it not been for the strong force at Michillimackinac, forbidding a separation of our means of attacking that place, and feeling myself bound by my instructions to do so, before I was at liberty to enter into any extensive enterprize of my own planning, I should have availed myself of this unlooked-for advantage, and have broken up all their important establishments on Lake Superior. The capture of Fort William alone would have nearly destroyed the enemy's fur trade, as that is his grand depot and general rendezvous, from which his extensive trade branches in all directions, and at which place there is never less than a million in value of property, and at this season of the year, it is said, there is twice that amount.—I fear such another opportunity may never occur. The capture of those two vessels and the provisions, will, however, prove of very serious inconvenience to the enemy in that remote quarter, where the loss cannot possibly be retrieved.—Flour was, before this loss worth 60 dollars per barrel with them, and salt provisions 50 cents per pound, &c.

I have the honour to remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

A. SINCLAIR.

The honourable William Jones, secretary of the navy.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Turner, to captain A. Sinclair, commanding on Lake Erie, dated United States Schooner Scorpion, off Michillimackinac, July 28th, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, that agreeable to your orders of the 22d instant, I proceeded on the expedition to Lake Superior with the launches. I rowed night and day; but having a distance of sixty miles against a strong current, information had reached the enemy at St. Mary's of our approach about two hours before I arrived at that place, carried by Indians in their light canoes; several of whom I chased, and by firing on them and killing some, prevented their purposes; some I captured and kept prisoners until my arrival, others escaped. The force under major Holmes prevented any thing like resistance at the fort, the enemy with their Indians carrying with them all the light valuable articles, pel-

try, clothes, &c. I proceeded across the strait of Lake Superior without a moment's delay; and on my appearance, the enemy finding they could not get off with the vessel I was in quest of, set fire to her in several places, scuttled, and left her. I succeeded in boarding her, and by considerable exertions extinguished the flames, and secured her from sinking. I then stripped her and prepared for getting her down the falls. Adverse winds prevented my attempting the falls until the 26th, when every possible effort was used, but I am sorry to say without success, to get her over in safety. The fall in three quarters of a mile is forty-five feet, and the channel very rocky; the current runs from twenty to thirty knots, and in one place there is a perpendicular leap of ten feet between three rocks; here she bilged, but was brought down so rapidly that we succeeded in running her on shore below the rapids before she filled, and burned her. She was a fine new schooner, upwards of 100 tons, called the Perseverance, and will be a severe loss to the north-west company. Had I succeeded in getting her safe, I could have loaded her to advantage from the enemy's store-houses. I have, however, brought down four captured boats loaded with Indian goods to a considerable amount; the balance contained in four large and two small store-houses were destroyed, amounting in value from 50 to 100,000 dollars. All private property was according to your orders respected. The officers and men under my command behaved with great activity and zeal, particularly midshipman Swartwout.

I have the honour to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL TURNER.

Copy of a letter from Captain Sinclair to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States' Sloop of War Niagara, off Thunder Bay, August 9th, 1814.

Sir,

I arrived off Michillimackinac on the 26th July; but owing to a tedious spell of bad weather, which prevented our reconnoitring, or being able to procure a prisoner who could give us information of the enemy's Indian force, which, from several little skirmishes we had on an adjacent island, appeared to be very great, we did not attempt a landing until the 4th instant, and it was then made more with a view to ascertain positively the enemy's strength, than with any possible hope of success; knowing, at the same time, that I could effectually cover their landing and retreat to the ships, from the

position I had taken within three hundred yards of the beach. Colonel Croghan would never have landed, even with this protection, being positive, as he was, that the Indian force alone on the island, with the advantages they had, were superior to him, could he have justified himself to his government, without having stronger proof than appearances, that he could not effect the object in view.

Mackinac is, by nature, a perfect Gibraltar, being a high inaccessible rock on every side, except the west, from which to the heights you have nearly two miles to pass through a wood, so thick that our men were shot in every direction, and within a few yards of them, without being able to see the Indians who did it; and a height was scarcely gained before there was another within 50 or 100 yards commanding it, where breast-works were erected and cannon opened on them. Several of those were charged and the enemy driven from them; but it was soon found the further our troops advanced the stronger the enemy become, and the weaker and more bewildered our force were; several of our commanding officers were picked out and killed or wounded by the savages, without seeing any of them. The men were getting lost, and falling into a confusion natural under such circumstances, which demanded an immediate retreat, or a total defeat and general massacre must have ensued. This was conducted in a masterly manner by colonel Croghan, who had lost the aid of that valuable and ever-to-be-lamented officer major Holmes, who, with captain Vanhorn, was killed by the Indians. The enemy were driven from many of their strong holds; but such was the impenetrable thickness of the woods, that no advantage gained could be profited by. Our attack would have been made immediately under the lower fort, that the enemy might not have been able to use his Indian force to such advantage as in the woods, having discovered by drawing a fire from him in several instances, that I had greatly the superiority of metal of him; but its scite being about 130 feet above the water, I could not, when near enough to do him an injury, elevate sufficiently to batter it. Above this, nearly as high again, he has another strong fort, commanding every point of the island, and almost perpendicular on all sides. Colonel Croghan not deeming it prudent to make a second attempt upon this place, and having ascertained to a certainty that the only naval force the enemy have upon the lakes consists of one schooner of four guns, I have determined to despatch the Lawrence and Caledonia to lake Erie immediately, believing their services in transporting our

armies there will be wanting; and it being important that the sick and wounded, amounting to about 100, and that part of the detachment not necessary to further our future operations here, should reach Detroit without delay. By an intelligent prisoner captured in the Mink, I ascertained this, and that the mechanics and others sent across from York during the winter, were for the purpose of building a flotilla to transport reinforcements and supplies to Mackinac. An attempt was made to transport them by the way of Matchadash, but it was found impracticable, from all the portages being a morass; that they then resorted to a small river called Nautauwasaga, situated to the south of Matchadash, from which there is a portage of three leagues over a good road to Lake Simcoe. This place was never known until pointed out to them last summer by an Indian. This river is very narrow, and has six or eight feet water in it about three miles up, and is then a muddy rapid, shallow for 45 miles up to the portage, where their armada was built, and their store-houses are now situated. The navigation is dangerous and difficult, and so obscured by rocks and bushes, that no stranger could ever find it. I have, however, availed myself of the means of discovering it. I shall also blockade the mouth of French River until the fall; and those being the only two channels of communication by which Mackinac can possibly be supplied; and their provisions at this time being extremely short, I think they will be starved into a surrender. This will also cut off all supplies to the north-west company, who are now nearly starving, and their furs on hand can only find transportation by the way of Hudson Bay. At this place I calculate on falling in with their schooner, which, it is said, has gone there for a load of provisions, and a message sent to her not to venture up while we are on the lake.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

ARTHUR SINCLAIR.

The honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Extract of a letter from Captain A. Sinclair, to the Honourable William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, dated on board United States Sloop Niagara, Erie, September 3d, 1814.

Sir,

Immediately after the attack on Michillimackinac, I despatched the Lawrence and Caledonia, with orders to lieutenant-commandant Dexter to make all possible despatch to Lake Erie, and there co-operate with our army, &c. while I

shaped my course in pursuit of the enemy's force, supposed to be about Nautauwasauga; and I cannot but express my surprise at having passed those vessels and arrived at Erie before them. By that opportunity I apprised you of my movements up to the 9th ultimo, since which time I have been fortunate enough to find his Britannic majesty's schooner Nancy, laden with provisions, clothing, &c. for the troops at Mackinac.

She was two miles up the Nautauwasauga River, moored under a block-house, strongly situated on the south-east side of the river, which, running nearly parallel with the bay shore for that distance, forms a narrow peninsula; this and the wind being off shore, afforded me an opportunity of anchoring opposite to him, and within good battering distance; but finding the sand-hills and trees frequently interrupting my shot, I borrowed an eight-inch howitzer from colonel Croghan, mounted it on one of my carriages, and sent it on the peninsula, under command of lieutenant Holdup; a situation was chosen, by captain Gratiot of the engineers, from which it did great execution. The enemy defended himself very handsomely, until one of those shells burst in his block-house, and in a few minutes blew up his magazine. This set fire to a train which had been laid for the destruction of the vessel, and in an instant she was in flames. I had made the necessary preparation with boats for getting on board of her; but frequent and heavy explosions below deck made the risk of lives too great to attempt saving her. She was, therefore, with her valuable cargo, entirely consumed. I cannot say whether those who defended her were blown up in the block-house, or whether they retreated in the rear of their work, which they might have done unseen by us, as it afforded a descent into a thick wood. I hope the latter. A number of articles were picked up at a considerable distance off; among them was the commander's desk, containing copies of letters, &c. several of which I herewith inclose you for your information. They serve to show the vessel to have been commanded by lieutenant Worsley of the royal navy; of what infinite importance her cargo was to the garrison at Mackinac, and that they have nothing afloat now on that lake. The Nancy appeared to be a very fine vessel, between the size of the Queen Charlotte and Lady Prevost. There were three guns on the block-house, two 24-pounders, and one 6-pounder. I cannot say what was on the vessel, as all her ports were closed. I also got a new boat, called by them a gun-boat, but

unworthy the name, being calculated to mount only a 24-pound carronade.

The Nautauwasauga is too narrow, and overhung with bushes, for a vessel to get up, except by warping, which prevented my sending gun-boats in, or colonel Croghan from attempting to turn his rear; as we saw a number of Indians skulking, and occasionally firing across from the banks; it was in this way the only man we had touched, was wounded.

You will see, by the inclosed letters, the short state they are in for provisions at Michillimackinac; and I am assured, from the best authority, that this is the only line of communication by which they can be supplied, that of the Grand River being rendered impassable for any thing heavier than a man to carry on his back, by sixty portages; I have therefore left the Scorpion and Tigress to blockade it closely, until the season becomes too boisterous for boat transportation. Colonel Croghan thought it not advisable to fortify and garrison Nautauwasauga, as the enemy's communication from York is so short and convenient, that any force he could leave there would be cut off in the winter.

I was unfortunate in getting embayed, in a gale of wind, on a rocky, iron-bound shore, which occasioned the loss of all the boats I had in tow, amongst which was the captured gun boat and my launch: I felt fortunate, however, in saving my vessel, lumbered as she was with 450 souls on board, and shipping such immense quantities of water as to give me very serious alarm for some hours. I was compelled to strike some of my guns below, and nothing saved her, at last, but a sudden shift of wind, as there is nothing like anchorage in Lake Huron, except in the mouths of rivers, the whole coast being a steep perpendicular rock. I have been several times in great danger of total loss, in this extremely dangerous navigation, entirely unknown to our pilots, except direct to Mackinac, by falling suddenly from no soundings into three fathoms, and twice into one quarter less twain, all a craggy rock. Those dangers might be avoided, from the transparency of the water, but for the continued thick fogs which prevail almost as constantly as on the Grand Bank.

By the arrival of the mail a few hours after I anchored at Detroit, I learned the critical state of our army on the peninsula, and that the Somers and Ohio had been captured. The craft from the flats, with part of my guns and shot, had not yet arrived, but being certain my presence would be necessary at the earliest possible moment, I availed myself of a fair wind, and sailed for this place, where I am happy to

learn that our army feel themselves perfectly secure where they are. I have, however, sent the Lawrence, Lady Prevost, and Porcupine, to Buffaloe, there to render any assistance which may be required, and shall follow myself, in the course of 24 hours. There is such an imminent risk of the loss of the fleet, at this season of the year, lying to an anchor near Buffaloe, where the bottom is composed entirely of sharp rock, a strong current setting down, and exposed to the open lake, from whence the heaviest gales are experienced, that I shall not, unless ordered positively to do so from the department, continue there a moment longer than I can ascertain the commanding general's views, and in what way the fleet can co-operate with him. Daily and dear-bought experience teaches us we ought not to risk our fleet in a situation where they are so liable to be lost. Lieutenant Kennedy has, no doubt, informed you of the total loss of the Ariel, after being on float and ready to move from there.

I have the honour to remain, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

A. SINCLAIR.

N. B. A company of riflemen from Sandusky, has just arrived here, and have been forwarded on to Fort Erie without delay.

Extract of a Letter from A. Sinclair, Esq., commanding the United States Naval Force on the Upper Lakes, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States Ship Niagara, Roads off Erie, October 28, 1814.

Sir,

I am under the mortifying necessity of stating to you that the report mentioned in my last letter of the vessels left in the Upper Lake having been surprised and captured by boats of the enemy, has turned out to be correct. The boatswain and four men from the Scorpion made their escape, on their way to Kingston, and crossed Lake Ontario in skiffs from the bay of Quinte to the Gennessee river, from thence to this place. The man's story is a most unfavourable one, and such as I am loth to believe true, from the well-known character of lieutenant Turner. He says the blockade of the Nautawasauga river was raised a short time after my departure—that the lieutenant who commanded the navy (and who had escaped in the woods when she was destroyed) had passed up to Mackinac in boats, and it was by him and his crew they were captured. The Tigress had been separated from him five days among the islands, in which time she had been

captured. They came in sight of her, lying at anchor, in the evening; the wind being light, they anchored some distance from her, without passing signals. In the morning there was only four or five men, and no officer on deck. The Tigress got under way, run down, fired into them, and were on board without any report ever being made to Mr. Turner, nor was there an officer of any grade on deck when she was captured. The wind was light, the Scorpion had the advantage of a long 12-pounder over the other, and could have recaptured her with much ease. The Tigress had made great resistance, but was overpowered by an overwhelming force. Her commander (sailing-master Champlain) and all her officers were wounded, as were many of his men, and some killed. I had given lieutenant Turner a picked crew from this vessel, with my sailing master, and had added to both their crews twenty-five chosen men, borrowed from colonel Croghan, to act as marines. I had also left him a boarding netting; indeed, there was no precaution I did not take in anticipation of every effort, I knew the enemy would make, to regain their line of communication, on which their very existence depended.

I herewith inclose you my instructions to lieutenant Turner, after which I cannot express to you, sir, my chagrin at learning the little regard which appears to have been paid to them, and the evil consequences growing out of such neglect; consequences but too well known to you and to the government. You must first believe the infinite interest I had taken in the expedition from the moment I had been entrusted with the conducting it, and the sanguine hope I had formed of its complete success, and the benefits resulting from it to my country, to enable you to form an adequate idea of the mortification I now experience.

I have the honour to remain, with high respect, sir, your obedient servant,

A. SINCLAIR.

Honourable William Jones, secretary of the navy.

Extract of a Letter from Captain Arthur Sinclair, commanding the United States Naval Force on the Upper Lakes, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Erie Roads, 11th November, 1814.

Sailing-master Champlain, who commanded the Tigress, has arrived here in the cartel from Mackinac, with some of the wounded. He has his thigh shattered by a grape shot, and has not yet been able to make out a detailed report of

his capture. He appears not to have been surprised, but defended his vessel bravely, killing and wounding a number of the enemy, who overpowered him with 150 sailors and soldiers, and 250 Indians, the latter headed by Dickson. The Scorpion was overpowered, as mentioned in my letter of the 27th ult. The conduct of the enemy to our prisoners thus captured, and the inhuman butchery of those who fell into their hands, at the attack of Mackinac, has been barbarous beyond a parallel. The former have been plundered of almost every article of clothing they possessed—the latter had their hearts and livers taken out, which were actually cooked and feasted on (and that too in the quarters of the British officers, sanctioned by colonel M'Dowall) by the savages.

This cannibal act, which has capped the climax of British atrocity, and must ever be viewed with indignant horror by the christian world, will be sworn to by two respectable ladies, who came down in the cartel, and who were witnesses to it. I am further assured by Mr. Astor, who was detained there with his cartel for nearly two months, that it was not disowned by the garrison at Mackinac, and that when remonstrance was made by some who had not lost all sense of feeling and honour, they were threatened with arrest by the colonel, if they checked the Indians in any of their wishes. One of the prisoners was inhumanly murdered, by one of their militia, to decide a dispute between him and an Indian, of who had the best claim to the reward of his body or scalp, and no notice was taken of it by the colonel. To relate to you, sir, all the acts of horror which have been practised upon those unfortunate victims who fell into the enemy's hands on the 4th of August, would go far beyond the limits of a letter.

GENERAL ORDER.

Cornwall, Upper Canada, October 7th, 1814.

His excellency the commander of the forces has received from lieutenant-general Drummond, a report from lieutenant-colonel M'Donall, dated Mackinaw, the 9th September, conveying the gratifying intelligence of the capture of two armed schooners, Tigress and Scorpion, which the enemy had stationed at the Detour, near St. Joseph's, for the purpose of cutting off all supplies from the garrison at Mackinaw.

This gallant enterprise was planned and executed by lieutenant Worsley of the royal navy, and a detachment of 50 of the Royal Newfoundland regiment, under the command

of lieutenant Bulger, attached for this service to the division of seamen under that officer.

The United States schooner Tigress was carried by boarding at 9 o'clock on the night of the 3d instant, and the schooner Scorpion at dawn of day on the morning of the 6th instant.

The skilful conduct and intrepidity, displayed in the execution of this daring enterprize, reflects the highest credit on lieutenant Worsley of the royal navy, and the officers, seamen, and soldiers under his command. Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Radenhurst, of the Royal Newfoundland regiment, are noticed by lieutenant-colonel M'Donall; as also Mr. Dickson and Livingston of the Indian department, who volunteered their services on this occasion.

The enemy's loss was three seamen killed, and all the officers of the Tigress and three seamen severely wounded.

The Scorpion mounted one long 24-pounder and a long 12; the Tigress, one long 24-pounder. They were commanded by lieutenant Turner of the American navy, and had crews of 30 men each.

The British loss is two seamen killed.

Lieutenant Bulger, Royal Newfoundland regiment, and several soldiers, slightly wounded.

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-general, N. A.

WAR WITH THE CREEK INDIANS.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Claiborne, of volunteers, to the Secretary of War, dated Fort Claiborne, east bank of the Alabama, 85 miles above Fort Stoddart, January 1st, 1814.

Sir,

On the 13th ultimo, I marched a detachment from this post with a view of destroying the towns of the inimical Creek Indians, on the Alabama, above the mouth of the Cahaba. After having marched about 80 miles, from the best information I could obtain, I was within 30 miles of a town newly erected on a ground called Holy, occupied by a large body of the enemy, under the command of Witherford, the half breed chief, who was one of those who commanded the Indians that destroyed the garrison at Mims in August last, and who has committed many depredations on

the frontier inhabitants. I immediately caused a stockade to be erected for the security of the heavy baggage and sick. On the morning of the 22d the troops resumed their line of march, chiefly through woods without a track to guide them. When near the town on the morning of the 23d. my disposition for attack was made.—The troops advanced in three columns. With the centre column I advanced myself, ordering Lester's guards and Wells' troop of dragoons to act as a corps of reserve. About noon the right column, composed of twelve months' volunteers, commanded by colonel Joseph Carson, came in view of the town called Eccanachaca (or Holy Ground), and was immediately vigorously attacked by the enemy, who were apprised of our approach, and had chosen their field of action.

Before the centre, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Russell, with a part of the 3d regiment of United States' infantry and mounted militia riflemen, or the left column, which was composed of militia and a party of Choctaws under Pushamuttaha, commanded by major Smoot of the militia, who were ordered to charge, could come generally into action, the enemy were repulsed and were flying in all directions, many of them were casting away their arms.

Thirty of the enemy were killed, and judging from every appearance many were wounded. The loss on our part, was one corporal killed, and one ensign, two serjeants, one corporal, and two privates wounded.

A pursuit was immediately ordered; but from the nature of the country, nothing was effected. The town was nearly surrounded by swamps and deep ravines, which rendered our approach difficult, and facilitated the escape of the enemy. In the town we found a large quantity of provisions, and immense property of various kinds, which the enemy, flying precipitately, were obliged to leave behind, and which, together with two hundred houses, were destroyed. They had barely time to remove their women and children across the Alabama, which runs near where the town stood. The next day was occupied in destroying a town consisting of 60 houses, eight miles higher up the river, and in taking and destroying the enemy's boats. At the town last destroyed was killed three Indians of some distinction. The town first destroyed was built since the commencement of hostilities, and was established as a place of security for the inhabitants of several villages. The leader Witherford, Francis, and the Choctaw Sinquistur's son, who were principal prophets, resided here. Three Shawnese were among the slain.

Colonel Carson of the volunteers, lieutenant-colonel Russell of the 3d regiment United States infantry, and major Smoot of the militia, greatly distinguished themselves. The activity and zeal of the assistant deputy quarter-master-general, captain Wert, and of my brigade-major, Kennedy, merit the appropation of government. I was much indebted to my aid-de-camp lieutenant Calvit of volunteers, to lieutenant Robeson of the 3d regiment, and major Caller of militia, who acted as my aids on that day, for the promptness and ability with which they performed their several duties. The officers of the different corps behaved handsomely, and are entitled to distinction.—Courage animated every countenance, and each vied with the other in rendering service. I have taken the liberty of communicating to you directly, in consequence of the distant station of the general commanding the district, and also for the purpose of forwarding to you the inclosed original document which was found in the house of Witherford. It shows partially the conduct of the Spaniards towards the American government.

The third regiment has returned to this place, and volunteers are on their march to Mount Vernon near Fort Stoddart for the purpose of being paid off and discharged, their terms of service having generally expired.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

FERD. L. CLAIBORNE,
Brigadier-general of volunteers.

His excellency John Armstrong.

The following letter from the governor of Pensacola to the Creek Indians was inclosed in the above.

Gentlemen, *Pensacola, 29th September*, 1814.

I received the letter that you wrote me in the month of August, by which, and with great satisfaction, I was informed of the advantages which your brave warriors obtained over your enemies.

I represented, as I promised you, to the captain-general in Havanna, the request (which the last time I took you by the hand ye made me), of arms and munitions; but until now I cannot yet have an answer. But I am in hopes, that he will send me the effects which I requested; and as soon as I receive them, I shall inform you.

I am very thankful for your generous offers to procure me the provisions and warriors necessary, in order to re-take the post of Mobile; and you ask me at the same time, if we have

given up the post of Mobile to the Americans? To which I answer, for the present, I cannot profit of your generous offer, not being at war with the Americans; who did not take Mobile by force, since they purchased it from the miserable officer, destitute of honour, who commanded there, and delivered it without authority: by which reason, the sale and delivery of that place is totally void and null, and I hope that the Americans will restore it again to us, because nobody can dispose of a thing that is not his own property: in consequence of which, the Spaniards have not lost their right to it; and I hope that you will not put in execution the project which you tell me of, to burn the town; since those houses and properties do not belong to Americans, but to true Spaniards.

To the bearers of your letter, I have ordered some small presents to be given. And I remain, forever, your good father and friend.

(Signed) MANXIQUE.

Copy of a letter from General Jackson, of the Tennessee volunteers, to General Pinckney.

Head-Quarters, Fort Strother, Jan. 9.

Sir,

I had the honour of informing you, in a letter of the 31st ultimo, forwarded by Mr. M'Candles (express), of an excursion I contemplated making still further into the enemy's country, with the new-raised volunteers from Tennessee. I had ordered those troops to form a junction with me on the 10th instant, but they did not arrive until the 14th. Their number, including officers, was about 800; and on the 15th I marched them across the river to graze their horses. On the next day I followed with the remainder of my force, consisting of the artillery company, with one six-pounder, one company of infantry of 48 men, two companies of spies, commanded by captains Gordon and Russel, of about 30 men each, and a company of volunteer officers, headed by general Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men, and who still remained in the field awaiting the order of the government; making my force, exclusive of Indians, 930.

The motives which influenced me to penetrate still further into the enemy's country, with this force, were many and urgent. The term of service of the new-raised volunteers was short, and a considerable part of it was expired; they were expensive to the government, and were full of ardour to meet the

enemy. The ill effects of keeping soldiers of this description long stationary and idle, I had been made to feel but too sensibly already—other causes concurred to make such a movement not only justifiable but absolutely necessary. I had received a letter from captain M'Alpin of the 5th instant, who commanded at Fort Armstrong in the absence of colonel Snodgrass, informing me that 14 or 15 towns of the enemy, situated on the waters of the Tallapoosa, were about uniting their forces and attacking that place, which had been left in a very feeble state of defence. You had, in your letter of the 24th ultimo, informed me that general Floyd was about to make a movement to the Tallapoosa, near its junction with the Coosee; and in the same letter had recommended temporary excursions against such of the enemy's towns or settlements as might be within striking distance, as well to prevent my men from becoming discontented, as to harass the enemy. Your ideas corresponded exactly with my own, and I was happy in the opportunity of keeping my men engaged, distressing the enemy, and at the same time making a diversion to facilitate the operations of general Floyd.

Determined by these and other considerations, I took up the line of march on the 17th instant, and on the night of the 18th encamped at Talledega Fort, where I was joined by between 200 and 300 friendly Indians; 65 of whom were Cherokees, the balance Creeks. Here I received your letter of the 9th instant, stating that general Floyd was expected to make a movement from Cowetau the next day, and that in eighteen days thereafter he would establish a firm position at Tuckabotchee; and also a letter from colonel Snodgrass, who had returned to Fort Armstrong, informing me that an attack was intended soon to be made on that fort by 900 of the enemy. If I could have hesitated before, I could now hesitate no longer. I resolved to lose no time in meeting this force, which was understood to have been collected from New Yorcau, Oakfuskee, and Ufauley towns, and were concentrated in the bend of the Tallapoosa, near the mouth of the creek called Emucfau, on an island below New Yorcau.

On the morning of the 29th, your letter of the 10th instant, forwarded by Mr. M'Candles, reached me at the Hillabee Creek, and that night I encamped at Entochapco, a small Hillabee village about twelve miles from Emuckfau. Here I began to perceive very plainly how little knowledge my spies had of the country, of the situation of the enemy, or of the distance I was from them. The insubordination of the new troops and the want of skill in most of their officers, also became

more and more apparent. But their ardour to meet the enemy was not diminished; and I had a sure reliance upon the guards, and a company of old volunteer officers, and upon the spies, in all about 125. My wishes and my duty remained united, and I was determined to effect, if possible, the objects for which the excursion had been principally undertaken.

On the morning of the 21st, I marched from Enotachopco, as direct as I could for the bend of the Tallapoosa, and about 2 o'clock, P. M., my spies having discovered two of the enemy, endeavoured to catch them, but failed. In the evening I fell in upon a large trail, which led to a new road, much beaten and lately travelled. Knowing that I must have arrived within the neighbourhood of a strong force, and it being late in the day, I determined to encamp, and reconnoitre the country in the night. I chose the best scite the country would admit, encamped in a hollow square, sent out my spies and pickets, doubled my sentinels, and made the necessary arrangements before dark, for a night attack. About ten o'clock at night, one of the pickets fired at three of the enemy and killed one, but he was not found until the next day. At 11 o'clock, the spies whom I had sent out returned with the information, that there was a large encampment of Indians at the distance of about three miles, whom from their whooping and dancing seemed to be apprized of our approach. One of these spies, an Indian, in whom I had great confidence, assured me that they were carrying off their women and children, and that the warriors would either make their escape or attack me before day. Being prepared at all points, nothing remained to be done but await their approach, if they meditated an attack, or to be in readiness, if they did not, to pursue and attack them at day-light. While we were in this state of readiness, the enemy about 6 o'clock in the morning commenced a vigorous attack on my left flank, which was vigorously met; the action continued to rage on my left flank, and on the left of my rear, for about half an hour. The brave general Coffee, with colonel Sittler, the adjutant-general, and colonel Carroll, the inspector-general, the moment the firing commenced, mounted their horses and repaired to the line, encouraging and animating the men to the performance of their duty. So soon as it became light enough to pursue, the left wing, having sustained the heat of the action and being somewhat weakened, was reinforced by captain Ferrill's company of infantry, and was ordered and led on to the charge by general Coffee, who was well supported by colonel Higgins and the inspector-general, and by all the officers and pri-

vates who composed that line. The enemy was completely routed at every point, and the friendly Indians joining in the pursuit, they were chased about two miles with great slaughter.

The chase being over, I immediately detached general Coffee, with 400 men and all the Indian force, to burn their encampment; but it was said by some to be fortified. I ordered him, in that event, not to attack it, until the artillery could be sent forward to reduce it. On viewing the encampment and its strength, the general thought it most prudent to return to my encampment, and guard the artillery thither. The wisdom of this step was soon discovered; in half an hour after his return to camp, a considerable force of the enemy made its appearance on my right flank, and commenced a brisk fire on a party of men who had been on picket-guard the night before, and were then in search of the Indains they had fired upon, some of whom they believe had been killed. General Coffee immediately requested me to let him take 200 men and turn their left flank, which I accordingly ordered; but, through some mistake, which I did not then observe, not more than 54 followed him, among whom were the old volunteer officers. With these, however, he immediately commenced an attack on the left flank of the enemy; at which time I ordered 200 of the friendly Indians to fall in upon the right flank of the enemy, and co-operate with the general. This order was promptly obeyed, and in the moment of its execution, what I expected was realized. The enemy had intended the attack on the right as a feint, and, expecting to direct all my attention thither, meant to attack me again and with their main force on the left flank, which they had hoped to find weakened and in disorder; they were disappointed. I had ordered the left flank to remain firm to its place, and the moment the alarm gun was heard in that quarter, I repaired thither, and ordered captain Ferrill, part of my reserve, to support it. The whole line met the approach of the enemy with astonishing intrepidity, and having given a few fires, they forthwith charged with great vigour. The effect was immediate and inevitable. The enemy fled with precipitation, and were pursued to a considerable distance, by the left flank and the friendly Indians, with a galling and destructive fire. Colonel Carroll, who ordered the charge, led on the pursuit, and colonel Higgins and his regiment again distinguished themselves.

In the mean time general Coffee was contending with a superior force of the enemy. The Indians whom I had ordered to his support, and who had set out for the purpose, hearing

the firing on the left, had returned to that quarter, and when the enemy were routed there entered into the chase. That being now over, I forthwith ordered Jim Fife, who was one of the principal commanders of the friendly Creeks, with 100 of his warriors, to execute my first order; so soon as he reached general Coffee, the charge was made and the enemy routed: they were pursued about three miles, and 45 of them slain, who were found General Coffee was wounded in the body, and his aid-de-camp, A. Donaldson, killed, together with three others. Having brought in and buried the dead, and dressed the wounded, I ordered my camp to be fortified, to be the better prepared to repel any attack which might be made in the night; determined to commence a return march to Fort Strother the following day. Many causes concurred to make such a measure necessary: as I had not set out prepared or with a view to make a permanent establishment, I considered it worse than useless to advance and destroy an empty encampment.

I had, indeed, hoped to have met the enemy there, but having met and beaten them a little sooner, I did not think it necessary or prudent to proceed any farther: not necessary, because I had accomplished all I could expect to effect by marching to their encampment; and because if it was proper to contend with and weaken their forces still farther, this object would be more certainly attained by commencing a return, which, having to them the appearance of a retreat, would inspire them to pursue me. Not prudent, because of the number of my wounded; of the reinforcements from below, which the enemy might be expected to receive; of the starving condition of my horses, they having had neither corn nor cane for two days and nights; of the scarcity of supplies for my men, the Indians who joined me at Talladega having drawn none, and being wholly destitute; and because, if the enemy pursued me, as it was likely they would, the diversion in favour of general Floyd would be the more complete and effectual. Influenced by these considerations, I commenced my return march at half after 10 on the 23d, and was fortunate enough to reach Enotachopco before night, having passed without interruption a dangerous defile, occasioned by a hurricane. I again fortified my camp, and having another defile to pass in the morning, across a deep creek, and between two hills, which I had viewed with attention as I passed on, and where I expected I might be attacked, I determined to pass it at another point, and gave directions to my guide and fatigue men accordingly. My expectation of an attack in the

morning was increased by the signs of the night, and with it my caution. Before I moved the wounded from the interior of my camp, I had my front and rear guards formed, as well as my right and left columns, and moved off my centre in regular order, leading down a handsome ridge to Enotachopco creek, at a point where it was clear of reed, except immediately on its margin. I had previously issued a general order, pointing out the manner in which the men should be formed in the event of an attack on the front or rear, or on the flanks, and had particularly cautioned the officers to halt and form accordingly, the instant the word should be given.

The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering the creek, when an alarm gun was heard in the rear. I heard it without surprise, and even with pleasure, calculating with the utmost confidence on the firmness of my troops, from the manner in which I had seen them act on the 22d. I had placed colonel Carroll at the head of the centre column of the rear-guard: its right column was commanded by colonel Perkins, and its left by colonel Stump. Having chosen the ground, I expected there to have entirely cut off the enemy by wheeling the right and left columns on their pivots, recrossing the creek above and below, and falling in upon their flanks and rear. But to my astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by colonel Carroll to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately give way. This shameful retreat was disastrous in the extreme: it drew along with it the greater part of the centre column, leaving not more than twenty-five men, who being formed by colonel Carroll, maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain it, and it brought consternation and confusion into the centre of the army; a consternation which was not easily removed, and a confusion which could not soon be restored to order. There was then left to repulse the enemy, the few who remained of the rear guard, the artillery company, and captain Russell's company of spies. They however realized and exceeded my highest expectations. Lieutenant Armstrong, who commanded the artillery company in the absence of captain Deadrick (confined by sickness), ordered them to form and advance to the top of the hill, whilst he and a few others dragged up the six-pounder. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion. Amidst the most galling fire from the enemy, more than ten times their number, they ascended the hill and maintained their position un-

til their piece was hauled up, when, having levelled it, they poured upon the enemy a fire of grape, reloaded and fired again, charged and repulsed them.

The most deliberate bravery was displayed by Constantine Perkins and Craven Jackson of the artillery, acting as gunners. In the hurry of the moment, in separating the gun from the limbers, the rammer and picker of the cannon were left tied to the limber. No sooner was this discovered, than Jackson, amidst the galling fire of the enemy, pulled out the ramrod of his musket and used it as a picker; primed with a cartridge and fired the cannon. Perkins, having pulled off his bayonet, used his musket as a rammer, drove down the cartridge; and Jackson, using his former plan, again discharged her. The brave lieutenant Armstrong, just after the first fire of the cannon, with captain Hamilton, of E. Tennessee, Bradford, and M'Govock, all fell, the lieutenant exclaiming as he lay, "my brave fellows, some of you may fall, but you must save the cannon." About this time, a number crossed the creek and entered into the chace. The brave captain Gordon of the spies, who had rushed from the front, endeavoured to turn the left flank of the enemy, in which he partially succeeded, and colonel Carroll, colonel Higgins, and captains Elliot and Pipkins pursued the enemy for more than two miles, who fled in consternation, throwing away their packs, and leaving 26 of their warriors dead on the field. This last defeat was decisive, and we were no more disturbed by their yells. I should do injustice to my feelings if I omitted to mention that the venerable judge Cocke, at the age of 65, entered into the engagement, continued the pursuit of the enemy with youthful ardour, and saved the life of a fellow-soldier by killing his savage antagonist.

Our loss in this affair was —— killed and wounded; among the former was the brave captain Hamilton, from East Tennessee, who had, with his aged father and two others of his company, after the period of his engagement had expired, volunteered his services for this excursion, and attached himself to the artillery company. No man ever fought more bravely or died more gloriously; and by his side fell with equal bravery and glory, Bird Evans, of the same company. Captain Quarles, who commanded the centre column of the rear guard, preferring death to the abandonment of his post, having taken a firm stand, in which he was followed by 25 of his men, received a wound in his head, of which he has since died.

In these several engagements our loss was 20 killed and 75

wounded, four of whom have since died. The loss of the enemy cannot be accurately ascertained; 189 of their warriors were found dead; but this must fall considerably short of the number really killed. Their wounded can only be guessed at.

Had it not been for the unfortunate retreat of the rear guard in the affair of the 24th instant, I think I could safely have said, that no army of militia ever acted with more cool and deliberate bravery; undisciplined and inexperienced as they were, their conduct in the several engagements of the 22d could not have been surpassed by regulars. No men ever met the approach of an enemy with more intrepidity, or repulsed them with more energy. On the 24th, after the retreat of the rear guard, they seemed to have lost all their collectedness, and were more difficult to be restored to order than any troops I have ever seen. But this was no doubt owing in a great measure or altogether to that very retreat, and ought rather to be ascribed to the want of conduct in many of their officers than to any cowardice in the men, who on every occasion have manifested a willingness to perform their duty so far as they knew it.

All the effects which were designed to be produced by this excursion, it is believed have been produced. If an attack was meditated against fort Armstrong, that has been prevented. If general Floyd is operating on the east side of the Tallapoosee, as I suppose him to be, a most fortunate diversion has been made in his favour. The number of the enemy has been diminished, and the confidence they may have derived from the delays I have been made to experience, has been destroyed. Discontent has been kept out of my army, while the troops who would have been exposed to it have been beneficially employed. The enemy's country has been explored, and a road cut to the point where their force will probably be concentrated when they shall be driven from the country below. But in a report of this kind, and to you who will immediately perceive them, it is not necessary to state the happy consequences which may be expected to result from this excursion. Unless I am greatly mistaken, it will be found to have hastened the termination of the Creek war, more than any measure I could have taken with the troops under my command.

I am, sir, with sentiments of high respect, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general.

Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Floyd, to Major-General Pinckney, dated Camp Defiance (48 *miles west of Chatahouchie*), *January* 27, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint your excellency that this morning at 20 minutes past 5 o'clock, a very large body of hostile Indians made a desperate attack upon the army under my command. They stole upon the sentinels, fired on them, and with great impetuosity rushed upon our line. In 20 minutes the action became general, and our front, right, and left flanks were closely pressed, but the brave and gallant conduct of the field and line officers, and the firmness of the men, repelled them at every point.

The steady firmness, and incessant fire of captain Thomas's artillery, and captain Adams' riflemen, preserved our front lines; both of these companies suffered greatly. The enemy rushed within thirty yards of the artillery, and captain Broadnax, who commanded one of the picket guards, maintained his post with great bravery, until the enemy gained his rear, and then cut his way through them to the army—on this occasion, Timpooche Barnard, a half breed, at the head of the Uchies, distinguished himself, and contributed to the retreat of the picket guard; the other friendly Indians took refuge within our lines, and remained inactive, with the exception of a few who joined our ranks—as soon as it became light enough to distinguish objects, I ordered majors Watson's and Freeman's battalions to wheel up at right angles with majors Booth's and Cleveland's battalions (who formed the right wing), to prepare for the charge. Captain Duke Hamilton's cavalry (who had reached me but the day before) was ordered to form in the rear of the right wing, to act as circumstances should dictate. The order for the charge was promptly obeyed, and the enemy fled in every direction before the bayonet. The signal was given for the charge of the cavalry, who pursued and sabred fifteen of the ene my, who left 37 dead on the field—from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses and war-clubs found in various directions, their loss must have been considerable, independent of their wounded.

I directed the friendly Indians, with Merriwether's and Ford's rifle companies, accompanied by captain Hamilton's troop, to pursue them through Caulebee swamp, where they were trailed by their blood, but they succeeded in overtaking but one of the wounded.

Colonel Newman received three balls in the commencement of the action, which deprived me of the services of that gallant and useful officer. The assistant adjutant-general Hardin was indefatigable in the discharge of his duty, and rendered important services; his horse was wounded under him. The whole of the staff were prompt, and discharged their duty with courage and fidelity. Their vigilance, the intrepidity of the officers and firmness of the men, meet my approbation, and deserve the praise of their country.

I have to regret the death of many of my brave fellows, who have found honourable graves, in the voluntary support of their country.

My aid-de-camp, in executing my orders, had his horse killed under him; general Lee and major Pace, who acted as additional aids, rendered me essential services, with honour to themselves; and usefulness to the cause in which they have embarked. Four waggon and several other horses were killed, and two of the artillery horses wounded. While I deplore the loss sustained on this occasion, I have the consolation to know, that the men whom I have the honour to command have done their duty. I herewith transmit you a list of the killed and wounded, and have the honour to be, most repectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN FLOYD,
Brigadier-general.

Total killed, 17; total wounded, 132.

(Signed) CHARLES WILLIAMSON,
Hospital-surgeon.

N. B. One of the wounded since dead—5 of the friendly Indians killed, 15 wounded.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Jackson to Major-General Pinckney, dated on the battle ground, in the bend of the Talapoosie, 28th March, 1814.

Sir,

I feel peculiarly happy in being able to communicate to you the fortunate eventuation of my expedition to the Talapoosie. I reached the bend near Emucfau (called by the whites the Horse Shoe), about 10 o'clock in the forenoon of yesterday, where I found the strength of the neighbouring towns collected; expecting our approach, they had gathered in from Oakfuskee, Oakchaga, New Yaucau, Hillibees, the Fish Pond, and Enfaulee towns, to the number it is said of 1000. It is difficult to conceive a situation more eligible for defence than they had chosen, or one rendered more secure by the skill

with which they had erected their breast-work. It was from five to eight feet high, and extended across the point in such a direction, as that a force approaching it would be exposed to a double fire, while they lay in perfect security behind. A cannon planted at one extremity could have raked it to no advantage.

Determining to exterminate them, I detached General Coffee with the mounted men and nearly the whole of the Indian force early on the morning of yesterday, to cross the river about two miles below their encampment, and to surround the bend in such a manner, as that none of them should escape by attempting to cross the river.

With the infantry I proceeded slowly and in order along the point of land which led to the front of their breast-work; having planted my cannon (one six and one three-pounder) on an eminence at the distance of 150 to 200 yards from it, I opened a very brisk fire, playing upon the enemy with the muskets and rifles whenever they shewed themselves beyond it; this was kept up, with short interruptions, for about two hours, when a part of the Indian force, and captain Russell's and lieutenant Bean's companies of spies, who had accompanied general Coffee, crossed over in canoes to the extremity of the bend, and set fire to a few of the buildings which were there situated; they then advanced with great gallantry towards the breast-work, and commenced a spirited fire upon the enemy behind it. Finding that this force, notwithstanding the bravery they displayed, was wholly insufficient to dislodge them, and that general Coffee had entirely secured the opposite bank of the river, I now determined to take their works by storm. The men by whom this was to be effected had been waiting with impatience to receive their order, and hailed it with acclamation.

The spirit which animated them was a sure augury of the success which was to follow. The history of warfare I think furnishes few instances of a more brilliant attack—the regulars, led on by their intrepid and skilful commander colonel Williams, and by the gallant major Montgomery, soon gained possession of the works, in the midst of a most tremendous fire from behind them, and the militia of the venerable general Doherty's brigade accompanied them in the charge with a vivacity and firmness which would have done honour to regulars. The enemy were completely routed.—Five hundred and fifty-seven were left dead on the peninsula, and a great number of them were killed by the horsemen

in attempting to cross the river; it is believed that no more than ten had escaped.

The fighting continued with some severity above five hours, but we continued to destroy many of them who had concealed themselves under the banks of the river until we were prevented by the night. This morning we killed 16 which had been concealed. We took 250 prisoners, all women and children except two or three. Our loss is 106 wounded and 26 killed. Major M'Intosh (the Cowetau) who joined my army with a part of his tribe, greatly distinguished himself. When I get an hour's leisure I will send you a more detailed account.

According to my original purpose, I commenced my return march to Fort Williams to-day, and shall, if I find sufficient supplies there, hasten to the Hickory Ground. The power of the Creeks is, I think, for ever broken.

I send you a hasty sketch, taken by the eye, of the situation on which the enemy were encamped, and of the manner in which I approached them.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general.

Major-general Pinckney.

REPULSE OF THE BRITISH AT MOBILE.

Copy of a letter from Major Lawrence, to Major-General Jackson, dated Fort Bowyer, September 15, 1814, 12 *o'clock at night.*

Sir,

After writing the inclosed, I was prevented by the approach of the enemy from sending it by an express. At meridian they were under full sail, with an easy and favourable breeze, standing directly for the fort, and at 4, P. M., we opened our battery, which was returned from two ships and two brigs, as they approached. The action became general at about 20 minutes past 4, and was continued without intermission on either side until 7, when one ship and two brigs were compelled to retire. The leading ship, supposed to be the commodore, mounting twenty-two thirty-two-pound carronades, having anchored nearest our battery, was so much disabled, her

cable being cut by our shot, that she drifted on shore, within 600 yards of the battery, and the other vessels having got out of our reach, we kept such a tremendous fire upon her that she was set on fire and abandoned by the few of the crew who survived. At 10, P. M., we had the pleasure of witnessing the explosion of her magazine. The loss of lives on board must have been immense, as we are certain no boats left her except three, which had previously gone to her assistance, and one of these I believe was sunk; in fact, one of her boats was burned along side of her.

The brig that followed her I am certain was much damaged both in hull and rigging. The other two did not approach near enough to be so much injured, but I am confident they did not escape, as a well-directed fire was kept on them during the whole time.

During the action a battery of a twelve-pounder and a howitzer was opened on our rear, but without doing any execution; and was silenced by a few shot. Our loss is four privates killed and five privates wounded.

Towards the close of the action the flag-staff was shot away; but the flag was immediately hoisted on a sponge staff over the parapet. While the flag was down the enemy kept up their most incessant and tremendous fire; the men were withdrawn from the curtains and north-east bastion, as the enemy's own shot completely protected our rear, except the position they had chosen for their battery.

Where all behaved well it is unnecessary to discriminate. Suffice it to say, every officer and man did his duty—the whole behaved with that coolness and intrepidity which is characteristic of the true American, and which could scarcely have been expected from men most of whom had never seen an enemy, and were now for the first time exposed for nearly three hours to a force nearly or quite four guns to one.

We fired during the action between four and five hundred guns, most of them double-shotted, and after the first half hour but few missed an effect.

September 16*th*, 11 *o'clock*, *A. M.*

Upon an examination of our battery, this morning, we find upwards of 300 shot-holes in the inside of the north and east curtains, and north-east bastion of all calibres, from musket-balls to thirty-two-pound shot. In the north-east bastion there were three guns dismounted; one of which, a four-pounder, was broken off near the trunnions by a thirty-two-pound shot,

and another much battered. I regret to say that both the twenty-four-pounders are cracked in such a manner as to render them unfit for service.

I am informed by two deserters from the land force, who have just arrived here, and whom I send for your disposal, that a reinforcement is expected, when they will doubtless endeavour to wipe off the stain of yesterday.

If you will send the Amelia down,we may probably save most or all of the ship's guns, as her wreck is lying in six or seven feet water, and some of them are just covered. They will not, however, answer for the fort, as they are too short.

By the deserters, we learn that the ship we have destroyed was the Hermes, but her commander's name they did not recollect. It was the commodore, and doubtless fell on his quarter-deck, as we had a raking fire upon it at about two hundred yards distance for some time.

To captain Sands, who will have the honour of handing you this despatch, I refer you for a more particular account of the movements of the enemy than may be contained in my letters; his services both before and during the action were of great importance, and I consider fully justify me in having detained him. Captain Walsh and several men were much burned by the accidental explosion of two or three cartridges. They are not included in the list of wounded heretofore given.

The enemy's fleet, this morning at day-break, were at anchor in the channel about four miles from the fort; shortly after it got under way and stood to sea; after passing the bar they hove too, and boats have been constantly passing between the disabled brig and the others. I presume the former is so much injured as to render it necessary to lighten her.

Fifteen minutes after 1, P. M.—The whole fleet have this moment made sail, and are standing to sea.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. LAWRENCE.

Major-general Andrew Jackson, commanding seventh military district.

DESTRUCTION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF BARRATARIA.

Copies of letters from Commodore Patterson to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New Orleans, 10th October, 1814.

Sir,

I have very great satisfaction in reporting to you, that the contemplated expedition against the pirates, so long and strongly established among the western islands and waters of this state, of which I had the honour to inform you in my letter of the 10th ultimo, has terminated in the capture and destruction of all their vessels in port, their establishments on the island of Grand Terre, Grand Isle, and Cheniere Caminada, and the dispersion of the band themselves. The succesful issue of this attack upon them will, I trust, prevent their ever collecting again in force sufficient to injure the commerce of this state.

The force of the pirates was twenty pieces of cannon, mounted, of different calibres, and, as I have learned since my arrival, from eight hundred to one thousand men of all nations and colours.

I have brought with me to this city six fine schooners and one felucca, cruizers and prizes of the pirates, and one armed schooner under Carthagenian colours found in company and ready to oppose the force under my command.

Herewith I have the honour to transmit a detailed account of this expedition, which, I hope, will prove satisfactory to the department, as also a copy of a letter from Lafitte, the chief of the pirates, to captain Lockyer, of H. B. M. brig Sophia, which forms the conclusion of a correspondence entered into between the English commanders in the Gulf of Mexico and the Floridas, and the pirates, copies of which his excellency governor Claiborne informs me he transmitted to the department of state. This correspondence shows the importance of the expedition, and the important species of force we have prevented the enemy's receiving by their proposed alliance with the pirates, and added to our own.

I have the honour to be, with great consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL T. PATTERSON.

The honourable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

Sir, *New Orleans, October 10th*, 1813.

I have the honour to inform you that I departed from this city on the 11th ultimo, accompanied by colonel Ross, with

a detachment of seventy of the 44th regiment of infantry, on the 12th reached the schooner Carolina, at Plaquemine, and formed a junction with the gun-vessels at the Balize on the 13th, sailed from the south-west pass on the evening of the 15th, and at half past 8, A. M., on the 16th, made the island of Grand Terre (Barrataria), and discovered a number of vessels in the harbour, some of which showed Carthagenain colours. At 9 perceived the pirates forming their vessels, ten in number, including prizes, into a line of battle near the entrance of the harbour, and making every preparation to offer me battle; at 10, wind light and variable, formed the order of battle with the six gun-vessels, viz. Nos. 5, 23, 156, 162, 163, and 65, the Seahorse tender, mounting one six-pounder and fifteen men, and a launch mounting one twelve-pound carronade; the schooner Carolina drawing too much water to cross the bar; at half past 10 perceived several smokes along the coast as signals, and at the same time a white flag hoisted on board a schooner, at the fore, an American flag at the main-mast head, and a Carthagenian flag (under which the pirates cruize) at her topping lift; replied with a white flag at my main; at 11 discovered that the pirates had fired two of their best schooners; hauled down my white flag and made the signal for battle, hoisting with it a large white flag bearing the words "pardon to deserters," having heard there were a number from the army and navy there, who wished to return if assured of pardon, and which the president's proclamation offered till the 17th. At a quarter past 11 gun-vessels No. 23 and 156 (the latter bearing my pendant) grounded, and were passed agreeably to my previous order, by the other four which entered the harbour; manned my barge and the boats belonging to the grounded vessels, and proceeded in, when to my great disappointment I perceived that the pirates had abandoned their vessels, and were flying in boats, in all directions. I immediately sent the launch and two gun-barges with small boats in pursuit of them; at meridian took possession of all their vessels in the harbour, consisting of six schooners and one felucca, cruizers and prizes of the pirates, one brig, a prize, and two armed schooners under the Carthagenian flag, both in the line of battle, with the armed vessels of the pirates, and apparently with an intention to aid them in any resistance they might make against me, as their crews were at quarters, tompions out of their guns, and matches lighted. Colonel Ross at the same time landed, and with his command took possession of their establishment on the shore,

consisting of about forty houses of different sizes, badly constructed, and thatched with palmetto leaves.

When I perceived the enemy forming their vessels into a line of battle, I felt confident, from their number and advantageous position, and their number of men, that they would have fought me; their not doing so I regret; for had they, I should have been enabled more effectually to destroy or make prisoners of them and their leaders; but it is a subject of great satisfaction to me, to have effected the object of my enterprize, viz. capturing all their vessels in port, and dispersing the band without having one of my brave fellows hurt.

The enemy had mounted on their vessels twenty pieces of cannon of different calibre; and, as I have since learnt, from 800 to 1000 men, of all nations and colours.

Early in the morning of the 20th, the Carolina at anchor, about five miles distant, made the signal of a " strange sail in sight to the eastward;" immediately after, she weighed anchor, and gave chase, the strange sail standing for Grand Terre, with all sail; at half past 8 the chase hauling her wind off shore to escape; sent acting-lieutenant Robert Spedden with four boats manned and armed to prevent her passing the harbour; at 9, A. M., the chase fired upon the Carolina, which was returned; each vessel continued firing during the chase, when their long guns could reach; at 10 the chase grounded outside the bar, at which time the Carolina was, from the shoalness of the water, obliged to haul her wind off shore, and give up the chase; opened a fire upon the chase across the island from the gun-vessels; at half past 10 she hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by lieutenant Spedden; she proved to be the armed schooner called the General Bolivar, under the Carthagenian flag; by grounding she broke both her rudder pintles, and made water; hove her off in the course of the day, and at day-light on the 21st sent out a small prize schooner to lighten her, took from her her armament, consisting of one long brass eighteen-pounder, one long brass six-pounder, two twelve-pound carronades, small arms, &c. and twenty-one packages of dry goods, and brought her into port; and as I could not wait for the repairs necessary for her rudder, ordered her to this port for adjudication. I am well convinced that she is one of the vessels belonging to, or connected with the pirates, as signals of recognition for her were found on board one of the pirate's cruizers, and at the time she was discovered, she was standing directly for Grand Terre, which she still endeavoured

to gain, after being chased by the Carolina, not knowing of our being in possession of it; she fired several shots at the Carolina, after the latter had shown her colours.

On the afternoon of the 23d got under way, with the whole squadron, in all seventeen vessels—(but during the night one schooner under Carthagenian colours escaped)—on the morning of the 24th entered the south-west pass of this river, and on the 1st instant arrived opposite this city with all my squadron.

The amount of the prizes and prize goods will probably be considerable; but at present cannot be ascertained.

Three of the schooners are admirably adapted for the public service on this station, being uncommonly fleet sailers and light draught of water, and would be of infinite public utility.

I cannot speak in too high terms of commendation of the good conduct of the officers, seamen, and marines, whom I have the honour to command; nothing could exceed the zeal shown by all on this occasion.

Great credit is due to lieutenant Louis Alexis and Mr. Thomas Shields, purser, for gallantly leading in, in the face of the enemy; the former in the Seahorse tender; and the latter in the launch, when they had every reason to believe the enemy would open their whole battery upon them, supported by gun-vessel No. 5, astern of them, commanded by Mr. J D. Ferris; Mr. Shields very handsomely volunteered his services on this expedition, and has from his being a seaman rendered me great assistance in taking charge of and bringing one of the prizes to this city.

Lieutenant Thomas A. C. Jones, particularly distinguished himself by boarding one of the schooners which had been fired, and extinguishing the fire after it had made great progress; a quantity of powder being left in her open cabin, evidently designed to blow her up; he is also with lieutenant Norris, and acting-lieutenant Thomas S. Cunningham, entitled to my thanks for the severe duty performed by them in open boats for several days and nights.

Acting-lieutenant Spedden merits particular notice for the handsome manner in which he led the boats to cut off the General Bolivar, and afterwards bringing her into port.

I am also greatly indebted to lieutenant Alexis, acting-lieutenants Spedden and M'Keever, sailing-masters J. D. Ferris, George Ulrick, and William Johnson, for their indefatigable exertions in fitting the prizes for sea; to acting-lieutenant M'Keever, also, for his extreme attention to the duties devolving on him from my pendant being hoisted on board

No. 23, under his command. I beg leave, sir, to seize this opportunity of recommending these officers to your particular notice, and to solicit a confirmation of their present rank for acting-lieutenants Robert Spedden, Isaac M'Keever, and Thomas S. Cunningham.

It affords me great satisfaction to inform you that the most cordial co-operation of colonel Ross, and the detachment of his regiment, in every measure adopted or duty performed, the utmost harmony existing between the two corps during the whole expedition, himself, officers, and men sharing in every enterprise or arduous duty where their services could be useful.

Had it been possible for the Carolina to have entered the harbour, or prudent to have drawn her officers and men from her, when anchored in an open roadstead, and where I had every reason to expect the appearance of enemy's cruisers, I should have derived great aid from captain Henley, his officers, and crew, who all expressed the strongest desire to partake of our toils, and any danger there might be to encounter. I have no doubt the appearance of the Carolina in the squadron had great effect upon the pirates.

I have the honour to be, with great consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

DANIEL T. PATTERSON.

The honourable William Jones,
secretary of the navy, Washington.

CAPTURE OF PENSACOLA.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Andrew Jackson, to the Governor of Tennessee.

Head-Quarters, 7th Military District,
Tensaw, November 14, 1814.

Sir,

On last evening I returned from Pensacola to this place—I reached that post on the evening of the 6th. On my approach sent major Pierre with a flag, to communicate the object of my visit to the governor of Pensacola. He approached Fort St. George with his flag displayed, and was fired on by the cannon from the fort—he returned and made a report thereof to me. I immediately went with the adjutant-general and the major with a small escort, and viewed the fort, and found it defended by both British and Spanish troops. I immediately determined to storm the town, retired and en-

camped my troops for the night, and made the necessary arrangements to carry my determination into effect the next day.

On the morning of the 7th, I marched with the effective regulars of the 3d, 39th, and 44th infantry, part of general Coffee's brigade, the Mississippi dragoons, and part of the West Tennessee regiment, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Hammonds (colonel Lowry having deserted and gone home), and part of the Choctaws led by major Blue, of the 39th, and major Kennedy of Mississippi territory. Being encamped on the west of the town, I calculated they would expect the assault from that quarter, and be prepared to rake me from the fort, and the British armed vessels, seven in number, that lay in the bay. To cherish this idea I sent out part of the mounted men to show themselves on the west, whilst I passed in the rear of the fort undiscovered to the east of the town. When I appeared within a mile, I was in full view. My pride was never more heightened than viewing the uniform firmness of my troops, and with what undaunted courage they advanced, with a strong fort ready to assail them on the right, seven British armed vessels on the left, strong block-houses and batteries of cannon in their front, but they still advanced with unshaken firmness, entered the town, when a battery of two cannon was opened upon the centre column, composed of the regulars, with ball and grape, and a shower of musketry from the houses and gardens. The battery was immediately stormed by captain Levall and company, and the musketry was soon silenced by the steady and well-directed fire of the regulars.

The governor met colonels Williamson and Smith, who led the dismounted volunteers, with a flag, begged for mercy, and surrendered the town and fort unconditionally; mercy was granted, and protection given to the citizens and their property—and still Spanish treachery kept us out of possession of the fort until nearly 12 o'clock at night.

Never was more cool, determined bravery displayed by any troops; and the Choctaws advanced to the charge with equal bravery. On the morning of the 8th, I prepared to march and storm the Barancas, but before I could move tremendous explosions told me that the Barancas, with all its appendages, was blown up. I despatched a detachment of two hundred men to explore it, who returned in the night with the information that it was blown up, all the combustible parts burnt, the cannon spiked and dismounted, except two: this being the case I determined to withdraw my troops, but

before I did I had the pleasure to see the British depart. Colonel Nicholls abandoned the fort on the night of the 6th, and betook himself to his shipping, with his friend captain Woodbine, and their red friends.

The steady firmness of my troops has drawn a just respect from our enemies. It has convinced the Red Sticks, that they have no strong hold or protection, only in the friendship of the United States—the good order and conduct of my troops whilst in Pensacola, has convinced the Spaniards of our friendship, and our prowess, and has drawn from the citizens an expression, that our Choctaws are more civilized than the British.

In haste, I am, respectfully, sir,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general, commanding.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST NEW ORLEANS.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Thomas Ap Catesby Jones to Captain Daniel T. Patterson, dated New Orleans, 12th March, 1815.

Sir,

Having sufficiently recovered my strength, I do myself the honour of reporting to you the particulars of the capture of the division of United States' gun-boats late under my command.

On the 12th December, 1814, the enemy's fleet off Ship Island had increased to such a force as to render it no longer safe or prudent for me to continue in that part of the lakes with the small force which I commanded. I therefore determined to gain a station near the Malheureux Islands as soon as possible, which situation would better enable me to oppose a further penetration of the enemy up the lakes, and at the same time afford me an opportunity of retreating to the Petites Coquilles, if necessary.

At 10, A. M., on the 13th, I discovered a large flotilla of barges had left the fleet (shaping their course towards the Pass Christian), which I supposed to be a disembarkation of troops intending to land at that place. At about 3, P. M., the enemy's flotilla having gained the Pass Christian, and continuing their course to the westward, convinced me that an attack on the gun-boats was their design. At this time the

water in the lakes was uncommonly low, owing to the westerly wind which had prevailed for a number of days previous, and which still continued from the same quarter. Nos. 156, 162, and 163, although in the best channel, were in 12 or 18 inches less water than their draught. Every effort was made to get them afloat by throwing overboard all articles of weight that could be dispensed with. At 3 30, the flood tide had commenced; got under way, making the best of my way towards the Petite Coquille. At 3 45, the enemy despatched three boats to cut out the schooner Seahorse, which had been sent into the Bay St. Louis that morning to assist in the removal of the public stores, which I had previously ordered. There finding a removal impracticable, I ordered preparations to be made for their destruction, lest they should fall into the enemy's hands. A few discharges of grape shot from the Seahorse, compelled the three boats which had attacked her to retire out of the reach of her gun, until they were joined by four others, when the attack was recommenced by the seven boats. Mr. Johnson having chosen an advantageous position near the 26-pounders on the bank, maintained a sharp action for near 30 minutes, when the enemy hauled off, having one boat apparently much injured, and the loss of several men killed and wounded. At 7 30, an explosion at the bay, and soon after a large fire, induced me to believe the Seahorse was blown up and the public store-house set on fire, which proved to be the fact.

About 1, A. M., on the 14th, the wind having entirely died away, and our vessels become unmanageable, came to anchor in the west end of Malheureux Island's passage. At day-light next morning, still a perfect calm, the enemy's flotilla was about nine miles from us at anchor, but soon got in motion and rapidly advanced towards us. The want of wind, and the strong ebb tide which was setting through the pass, left me but one alternative, which was, to put my vessels in the most advantageous position, to give the enemy as warm a reception as possible. The commanders were all called on board, and made acquainted with my intentions, and the position which each vessel was to take, the whole to form a close line abreast across the channel, anchored by the stern with springs on the cables, &c. &c. Thus we remained anxiously awaiting an attack from the advancing foe, whose force I now clearly distinguished to be composed of forty-two heavy launches and gun-barges, with three light gigs, manned with upwards of one thousand men and officers. About 9 30, the Alligator (tender), which was to the southward and eastward,

and endeavouring to join the divisi n, was captured by several of the enemy's barges, when the whole flotilla came to, with their grapnels a little out of reach of our shot, apparently making arrangements for the attack. At 10 30, the enemy weighed, forming a line abreast in open order, and steering direct for our line, which was unfortunately in s me degree broken by the force of the current d iving Nos. 156 and 163 about 100 yards in advance.

As soon as the enemy came within reach of our shot, a deliberate fire from our long guns was opened upon him, but without much effect, the objects being of so small a size. At 10 minutes before 11 the enemy opened a fire from the whole of his line, when the action became general and destructive on both sides. About 11 49, the advance boats of the enemy, three in number, attempted to board No. 156, but were repulsed with the loss of nearly every officer killed or wounded, and two boats sunk. A second attempt to board was then made by four other boats, which shared almost a similar fate. At this moment I received a severe wound in my left shoulder, which compelled me to leave the deck, leaving it in charge of Mr. George Parker, master's mate, who gallantly defended the vessel until he was severely wounded, when the enemy, by his superior numbers, succeeded in gaining possession of the deck about ten minutes past 12 o'clock. The enemy immediately turned the guns of his prize on the other gun-boats, and fired several shot previous to striking the American colours. The action continued with unabating severity until 40 minutes past 12 o'clock, when it terminated with the surrender of No. 23, all the other vessels having previously fallen into the hands of the enemy.

In this unequal contest our loss in killed and wounded has been trifling, compared to that of the enemy, which amounts to nearly 400.

Inclosed you will receive a list of the killed and wounded, and a correct statement of the force which I had the honour to command at the commencement of the action, together with an estimate of the force I had to contend against, as acknowledged by the enemy, which will enable you to decide how far the honour of our country's flag has been supported in this conflict.

With much respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) THOS. AP CATESBY JONES,
Lieutenant commandant, U. S. navy.

Captain Daniel T. Patterson,
commanding U. S. naval forces, N. Orleans station.

Copies of letters from General Andrew Jackson, to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, Seventh Military District, Camp below New-Orleans, 27th December, in the morning.

Sir,

The loss of our gun-boats near the pass of Rigolets, having given the enemy command of Lake Borgne, he was enabled to choose his point of attack. It became therefore an object of importance to obstruct the numerous bayous and canals leading from that lake to the highlands on the Mississippi. This important service was committed, in the first instance, to a detachment from the seventh regiment, afterwards to colonel De Laronde, of the Louisiana militia, and lastly, to make all sure, to major-general Villere, commanding the district between the river and the lakes, and who, being a native of the country, was presumed to be best acquainted with all those passes. Unfortunately, however, a picket which the general had established at the mouth of the bayou Bienvenu, and which, notwithstanding my orders, had been left unobstructed, was completely surprised, and the enemy penetrated through a canal leading to his farm, about two leagues below the city, and succeeded in cutting off a company of militia stationed there. This intelligence was communicated to me about 12 o'clock of the 23d. My force, at this time, consisted of parts of the seventh and forty-fourth regiments, not exceeding 600 together, the city militia, a part of general Coffee's brigade of mounted gunmen, and the detached militia from the western division of Tennessee, under the command of major-general Carrol. These two last corps were stationed four miles above the city. Apprehending a double attack by the way of Chief-Menteur, I left general Carrol's force and the militia of the city posted on the Gentilly road; and at 5 o'clock P., M., marched to meet the enemy, whom I was resolved to attack in his first position, with major Hind's dragoons, general Coffee's brigade, parts of the seventh and forty-fourth regiments, the uniformed companies of militia under the command of major Planche, 200 men of colour, chiefly from St. Domingo, raised by colonel Savary and acting under the command of major Dagwin, and a detachment of artillery under the direction of colonel M'Reo, with two six-pounders under the command of lieutenant Spots; not exceeding in all 1500. I arrived near the enemy's encampment about seven, and immediately made my disposition for the attack. His forces amounting at that time on land to about 3000, extended half a mile on the river, and in the rear nearly

to the wood. General Coffee was ordered to turn their right, while, with the residue of the force, I attacked his strongest position on the left near the river. Commodore Patterson having dropped down the river in the schooner Caroline, was directed to open a fire upon their camp, which he executed at about half after 7. This being the signal of attack, general Coffee's men with their usual impetuosity rushed on the enemy's right, and entered their camp, while our right advanced with equal ardour. There can be but little doubt that we should have succeeded on that occasion, with our inferior force, in destroying or capturing the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about 8 o'clock, occasioned some confusion among the different corps. Fearing the consequences, under this circumstance, of the further prosecution of a night attack with troops then acting together for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field that night; and at 4 in the morning assumed a stronger position about two miles nearer to the city. At this position I remain encamped, waiting the arrival of the Kentucky militia and other reinforcements. As the safety of the city will depend on the fate of this army, it must not be incautiously exposed.

In this affair the whole corps under my command deserves the greatest credit. The best compliment I can pay to general Coffee and his brigade, is to say they behaved as they have always done while under my command. The seventh, led by major Pierre, and the forty-fourth, commanded by colonel Ross, distinguished themselves. The battalion of city militia, commanded by major Planche, realised my anticipations, and behaved like veterans. Savary's volunteers manifested great bravery; and the company of city-riflemen having penetrated into the midst of the enemy's camp were surrounded, and fought their way out with the greatest heroism, bringing with them a number of prisoners. The two field-pieces were well-served by the officers commanding them.

All my officers in the line did their duty, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the whole of my field and staff. Colonels Butler and Piatt, and major Chotardy, by their intrepidity, saved the artillery. Colonel Haynes was every where that duty or danger called. I was deprived of the services of one of my aids, captain Butler, whom I was obliged to station, to his great regret, in town. Captain Reid, my other aid, and Messrs. Livingston, Duplissis, and Davizac, who had volunteered their services, faced danger wherever

it was to be met, and carried my orders with the utmost promptitude.

We made one major, two subalterns, and sixty-three privates prisoners; and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been at least —. My own loss I have not as yet been able to ascertain with exactness, but suppose it to amount to 100 in killed, wounded, and missing. Among the former I have to lament the loss of colonel Lauderdale, of general Coffee's brigade, who fell while bravely fighting. Colonels Dyer and Gibson of the same corps were wounded, and major Kavenaugh taken prisoner.

Colonel De Laronde, major Villere, of the Louisiana militia, major Latour of engineers, having no command, volunteered their services, as did Drs. Kerr and Hood, and were of great assistance to me.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general, commanding.

Honourable James Monroe, Secretary of War.

Head-Quarters, Seventh Military District,
Sir, *Camp below New Orleans, Dec.* 29, 1814.

The enemy succeeded on the 27th in blowing up the Caroline (she being becalmed), by means of hot shot, from a land battery which he had erected in the night. Emboldened by this event, he marched his whole force the next day up the level, in the hope of driving us from our position, and with this view opened upon us, at the distance of about half a mile, his bombs and rockets. He was repulsed, however, with considerable loss—not less, it is believed, than 120 in killed. Ours was inconsiderable—not exceeding half a dozen in killed, and a dozen wounded.

Since then he has not ventured to repeat his attempt, though lying close together. There has been frequent skirmishing between our pickets.

I lament that I have not the means of carrying on more offensive operations. The Kentucky troops have not arrived, and my effective force at this point does not exceed 3000. Theirs must be at least double—both prisoners and deserters agreeing in the statement that 7000 landed from their boats.

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general, commanding.

Honourable James Monroe, secretary of war, Washington.

Copy of a letter from Major General Jackson to the Secretary of War, dated Camp, four miles below Orleans, 9th January, 1815.

Sir,

During the days of the 6th and 7th, the enemy had been actively employed in making preparations for an attack on my lines. With infinite labour they had succeeded on the night of the 7th in getting their boats across from the lake to the river, by widening and deepening the canal on which they had effected their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack; added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive offensive movements in an open country, against a numerous and well-disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view. General Morgan, with the Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia, and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an entrenched camp on the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the bank, erected and superintended by commodore Patterson.

In my encampment every thing was ready for action, when, early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy, after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right and left, to storm my entrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach; more could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour, the fire of the small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery, too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left, was repulsed by the troops of general Carroll, those of general Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less

than 1500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Upwards of 300 have already been delivered over for burial; and my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines, and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field, during and since the action, and to those who have since died of the wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to 10 killed, and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river. Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. These having landed, were hardy enough to advance against the works of general Morgan; and, what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements, in whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding to the enemy that most important position. The batteries which had rendered me, for many days, the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned; not however until the guns had been spiked.

This unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side the river. It became therefore an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means in my power, which I could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps, however, it was owing somewhat to another cause that I succeeded even beyond my expectations. In negociating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis, among which this was one; that although hostilities should cease on this side the river until 12 o'clock of this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the other side; but that no reinforcements should be sent across by either army until the expiration of that day.

His excellency major-general Lambert begged time to consider of those propositions until 10 o'clock of to-day, and in the mean time re-crossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus hastily quitted.

The enemy having concentered his forces, may again attempt to drive me from my position by storm. Whenever he does, I have no doubt my men will act with their usual firmness, and sustain a character now become dear to them.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general, commanding.

Head-Quarters, left bank of the Mississippi, five miles below New Orleans, January 10th, 1815.

Sir,

I have the honour to make the following report of the killed, wounded, and prisoners taken at the battle of Larond's plantation, on the left bank of the Mississippi, on the night of the 23d December, 1814, seven miles below New Orleans.

Killed, left on the field of battle, - - - - 100
Wounded, left on the field of battle, - - - 280

Prisoners taken—1 major, 2 lieutenants, 1 midshipman, 66 non-commissioned officers and privates, making a grand total of 400.

I have the honour to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. P. HAYNE,
Inspector-general.

Major-general Andrew Jackson, commanding the army of the Mississippi.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Jackson to the Secretary of War, dated Head-Quarters, 7th Military District, Camp 4 miles below New Orleans, 19th January, 1815.

Last night at 12 o'clock the enemy precipitately decamped and returned to his boats, leaving behind him under medical assistance, eighty of his wounded, including two officers, 14 pieces of his heavy artillery, and a quantity of shot, having destroyed much of his powder. Such was the situation of the ground which he abandoned, and of that through which he retired, protected by canals, redoubts, entrenchments, and swamps on his right, and the river on his left, that I could not, without encountering a risk which true po-

licy did not seem to require, or to authorise, attempt to annoy him much on his retreat. We took only eight prisoners.

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to abandon the expedition altogether, or to renew his efforts at some other points, I do not pretend to determine with positiveness. In my own mind, however, there is but little doubt that his last exertions have been made in this quarter, at any rate for the present season, and by the next, I hope we shall be fully prepared for him. In this belief I am strengthened not only by the prodigious loss he has sustained at the position he has just quitted, but by the failure of his fleet to pass Fort St. Philip.

His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of his troops, as stated by all the last prisoners and deserters, and as confirmed by many additional circumstances, must have exceeded four thousand; and was greater in the action of the 8th than was estimated, from the most correct data then in his possession, by the inspector-general, whose report has been forwarded to you. We succeeded, on the 8th, in getting from the enemy about 1000 stand of arms of various descriptions.

Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed very little respite—my artillery from both sides of the river being constantly employed, till the night, and indeed until the hour of their retreat in annoying them. No doubt they thought it quite time to quit a position in which so little rest could be found.

I am advised by major Overton, who commands at Fort St. Philip, in a letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for eight or nine days from 13-inch mortars without effect, had, on the morning of that day, retired. I have little doubt that he would have been able to have sunk their vessels had they attempted to run by.

Giving the proper weight to all these considerations, I believe you will not think me too sanguine in the belief that Louisiana is now clear of its enemy. I hope, however, I need not assure you, that wherever I command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that the moment when the enemy is opposing us is not the most proper moment to provide them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ANDREW JACKSON,
Major-general, commanding.

P. S. On the 18th our prisoners on shore were delivered to us, an exchange having been previously agreed to. Those

who are on board the fleet will be delivered at Petit Coquille —after which I shall have in my hands an excess of several hundred. A. J.

20th—Mr. Shields, purser in the navy, has to day taken 54 prisoners: among them are four officers. A. J.

Honourable James Monroe, secretary of war.

Head-Quarters, 7th Military District, Adjutant-General's Office, Jackson's lines, below Orleans, January 16th, 1815.

Sir,

I have the honour herewith to inclose, for the information of the war department, a report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of major-general Jackson, in the different actions with the enemy since their landing.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT BUTLER,
Adjutant-general.

Brig.-general D. Parker,
Adjutant and inspector-general, Washington.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Major-General Andrew Jackson, in the actions of the 23d and 28th December, 1814, *and 1st and 8th of January*, 1815, *with the enemy.*

Action of December 23d, 1814.

Killed—Artilleryman, 1; 7th United States infantry, 1 lieutenant (M'Clellan), 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 4 privates; 44th ditto, 7 privates; general Coffee's brigade, volunteer mounted gun-men, 1 lieutenant-colonel (Lauderdale), 1 captain (Pace), 1 lieutenant (lieutenant Samuel Brooks), 2 serjeants, 4 privates.—Total killed, 24.

Wounded—General staff, 1 colonel (colonel Piatt),—7th, United States infantry, 1 captain (A. A. White), 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 2 corporals, 23 privates; 44th ditto, 2 lieutenants, 3 serjeants, 2 corporals, 19, privates; general Coffee's brigade, 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 quarter-master serjeant, 3 serjeants, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 30 privates; New Orleans volunteer corps, 1 captain, 2 serjeants, 7 privates; volunteers of colour, 1 adjutant, and 6 privates.—Total wounded, 115.

Missing—General Coffee's brigade, 1 major, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 quarter-master, 3 ensigns or cornets, 4 serjeants, 1 corporal, 2 musicians, 57 privates.—Total missing, 74.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, on the 23d—213.

Action of December 28, 1814.

Killed—General Coffee's brigade, 1 private; New Orleans volunteer company, 1 private; general Carroll's division of Tennessee militia, 1 colonel (Henderson), 1 serjeant, 3 privates.—Total 7.

Wounded—Marines, 1 major (Cormick), New Orleans volunteer company, 3 privates; general Carroll's division, 1 lieutenant, 3 privates.—Total wounded, 8.

Missing—None.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, on this day, 15.

Action of January 1st, 1815.

Killed—Artillery, navy, and volunteers at batteries, 8 privates; 44th ditto, 1 private; general Coffee's brigade, 1 serjeant, general Carroll's division, 1 private.—Total, 11.

Wounded—Artillery, navy, and volunteers at batteries, 8; 7th United States infantry, 1 private; 44th ditto, 3; Coffee's brigade, 2; New Orleans volunteers, 3 privates; Carroll's division, 1 serjeant, 2 privates; volunteers of colour, 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 1 private.—Total, 23.

Missing—None.

Total of killed, wounded, and missing, this day, 34.

Action on both sides the river, 8th January, 1815.

Killed—Artillery, navy, and volunteers at batteries, 3 privates—7th United States infantry, 1 serjeant, 1 corporal—Coffee's brigade, 1 private—Carroll's division, 1 serjeant, 3 privates—Kentucky militia, 1 private—majors Lacoste and Dacquin's volunteers of colour, 1 private—general Morgan's militia, 1 private.—Total killed, 13.

Wounded—Artillery, &c., 1 private—7th United States infantry, 1 private—general Carroll's division, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 6 privates—Kentucky militia, 1 adjutant, 1 corporal, and 10 privates—volunteers of colour, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 1 corporal, 8 privates—general Morgan's militia, 2 serjeants, 2 privates—Total wounded, 39.

Missing—Kentucky militia, 4 privates; Morgan's militia, 15 privates.—Total 19.

Total killed, wounded, and missing, this day, 71.

Note. Of the killed, wounded, and missing, on this day, but 6 killed and 7 wounded in the action on the east bank of the river, the residue in a sortie after the action, and in the action on the west bank.

Recapitulation.

Total killed, - - - - - -	55
Total wounded, - - - - - -	185
Total missing, - - - - - -	93
Grand total,	333

Truly reported from those on file in this office.

ROBERT BUTLER,
Adjutant-general.

Adjutant-general's office, New Orleans, January 16, 1815.

Copy of a letter from Mr. Thomas Shields, purser to Commodore Patterson, dated New-Orleans, 25th January, 1815.

Sir,

I have the honour to report my arrival in this city last night from the expedition ordered by you on the 17th instant, and which you did me the honour to entrust to my command.

On the night of the 19th I left the Pass Chef Menteur, having made the necessary observations on the enemy's situation before sunset, with five boats and your gig, manned and armed with fifty men. At 10, P. M., discovered a boat at anchor, which I captured by surprise, no resistance being made. She had 40 men of the 14th light dragoons, including officers, and 14 seamen of the British navy, under command of a master's mate.

The number of troops exceeding my own, I thought it most prudent to convoy them into the picket guard, from whence they could be more conveniently sent to New-Orleans by land than by water, and by which means I should also avoid weakening my own force, in itself already too limited for the completion of the object in view.

After landing the prisoners and putting them in charge of the army, I again left the Pass about 2, A. M., and stood on to gain the enemy's track, in the hope of intercepting some of them about day-light, but without success. I returned to the Pass on the 20th, at 8, A. M., where I was detained until the morning of the 21st. Three gun-boats having arrived from the fleet below with four transports, all of whom were soon filled with troops, from the shore; at 4, A. M. 21st, I again got out and fell into their track to the fleet about day-light. Finding it impossible to make any captures without being discovered, I determined to run down among them in disguise, and strike at every opportunity—hoisted English

colours, and took a transport boat with five men; ordered her to follow, and stood on for a transport schooner, who was beating up for the army. At 9, I boarded and took her without opposition, with eight men; she had ten on board. From this time until 12, we were in the midst of their boats going up to the army, and during which time we took five others, having on board about 70 men. The wind at this time had unfortunately hauled to north-west, and blew with great violence; ordered the boats with their prizes to make the best of their way to the Rigolets. Finding the transport's draft of water too great to take her over the shoals; having already taken the ground, I set her on fire and joined the boats on shore. The wind still increasing, and many boats approaching full of men from the army, induced a belief they had discovered my character from the burning of the schooner, and meant to attack me. My force was unfortunately divided; the large launch with a twelve-pound carronade, and some of my best men, with 20 prisoners, having drifted below, were compelled, from the strength of the current to anchor on the other side nearly half a mile distant. Every disposition was made by our little band to defend ourselves to the last extremity, and fire was prepared to burn the marsh, should the enemy land in my rear. Six boats approached us at one time crowded with men, and three made a feint to attack the launch, but a well-directed shot from the carronade compelled them to haul off, and a few discharges of our musketry drove the others also. In about two hours we were entirely clear of them. The violence of the wind and tide drove two of the prizes from their anchorage, on board of which were about 20 prisoners, with three of my own men, who were taken off, the prisoners having overpowered them so soon as they got out of the reach of our musketry. This is the only loss I have experienced during the expedition. Finding it totally impracticable to stem the strength of the current, and the wind being directly a-head for the fort at Coquilla, my own safety, and the preservation of the men entrusted to my command, induced me to parole the prisoners and let them go with their boats, particularly as a number of them were officers attached to the civil department, and could not, as I believe, be considered as prisoners of war.

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit a list of their numbers, names, and rank.

The damage done the enemy on this occasion, is the loss of a transport, burnt, a large flat boat taken, one sunk, and 78 prisoners taken and brought in, with three slaves, two be-

longing to citizens of this state, and one stolen by the enemy from a Mr. Edward Thomas, near Washington City, when they destroyed our capitol.

To captain Newman, commanding at Coquil, I owe my best thanks for his uniform, cheerful, and friendly assistance. He furnished me with a boat and eight volunteers under lieutenant Brush, of the United States artillery, who were of great service. To captain Collins, commanding the picket guard at Chef Menteur, I am under many obligations. He also assisted me with eight volunteers.

To sailing-master Dealey, who commanded the launch, and master's-mate Thomas Boyd, commanding a cutter, I am much indebted. Doctor Morrell, the surgeon who attended me, was particularly active; and though I had fortunately but little use for the exercise of his professional skill, his advice and assistance were always at hand.

Very respectfully, I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS SHIELDS.

Copy of a letter from Sailing-Master Johnson, to Commodore Patterson.

Sir, *New-Orleans, January 7th*, 1815.

I have the pleasure to inform you of my succeeding in burning one of the enemy's transport brigs in Lake Borgne yesterday morning at 4, A. M. The following are the particulars: after receiving a reinforcement of the launch and twelve men, and, with the assistance of an officer and twelve men from captain Newman, commanding Fort Petite Coquilles, I manned the launch and three small boats, and on the 4th instant, proceeded down Pass Chef Menteur, as far as Bayou Sauvage, where colonel Morgan, with a detachment of militia are stationed; we encamped there for the night.

On the 5th instant, in the afternoon, I proceeded down to the east mouth of Pass Chef Menteur, with one of the small boats, to ascertain the position of the enemy in Lake Borgne; finding at anchor there, one brig, three gun-boats, three schooners, and several barges, rowing from vessel to vessel; the brig lying at a distance of about two miles from the other vessels; I returned to the camp, determined on making an attempt to destroy her. I received the assistance of six men from colonel Morgan; we then making in number 38 men; with this force I was conscious I should be able to destroy her, though I had been previously informed she mounted

four pieces of cannon, and equipped accordingly; at midnight proceeded down Pass Chef Menteur, and on the 6th instant, at 4 o'clock, A. M., took possession of the brig, only one man on deck; about five minutes after 4, A. M., one of the enemy's launches came along side, fired two muskets into her, when she surrendered; but owing to its blowing very fresh from the northward, making considerable of a sea, she parted her painter and was not able to regain the vessel, and the sea being too heavy to tow her with my boat, I abandoned her; it being nearly day-light, I immediately ordered the prisoners into the launch, and set fire to the brig; at half past 5 o'clock, A. M., she was totally destroyed—she proved to be the British transport brig Cyrus, a captain, a sailing-master, and eight men of the British navy on board, laden about half full, with rum, bread, and a quantity of soldiers' clothing for the British army at Bayou Bien Venue; at day-light we arrived at the camp at Chef Menteur, delivered to colonel Morgan the prisoners, who will be sent to the city, after which I returned to Fort Petites Coquilles.

Finding my provisions almost out, and being short of arms, I have returned to town with the launch, leaving Mr. Boyd, master's-mate, and five men, at Petites Coquilles, to watch the movements of the enemy, and give every information in his power.

I have the pleasure to say, that on this occasion the conduct of the officers and men whom I had the honour to command, convinced me clearly, that, had she been of the force expected, we could have burned her with ease.

Sir, I have the honour to be, your obedient humble servant,

WM. JOHNSON.

P. S.—I think the brigs lying at anchor at the east mouth of the Rigolets may easily be destroyed.

Commodore Daniel T. Patterson, New-Orleans.

Copy of a letter from Major Overton, commanding Fort St. Philip, to Major-General Jackson.

Sir, *Fort St. Philip, January 19th,* 1815.

On the first of the present month I received the information that the enemy intended passing this fort to co-operate with their land forces in the subjugation of Louisiana, and the destruction of the city of New Orleans. To effect this with more facility, they were first with their heavy bomb-vessels to bombard this place into compliance. On the grounds of this information, I turned my attention to the security of my

command. I erected small magazines in different parts of the garrison, that if one blew up I could resort to another: built covers for my men to secure them from the explosion of the shells, and removed the combustible matter without the work. Early in the day of the 8th instant I was advised of their approach, and on the 9th, at a quarter past 10, A. M., hove in sight two bomb-vessels, one sloop, one brig, and one schooner; they anchored two and one quarter miles below—at half past 11, and at half-past 12, they advanced two barges, apparently for the purpose of sounding, within one and a half miles of the fort; at this moment I ordered my water battery, under the command of lieutenant Cunningham, of the navy, to open on them; its well-directed shot caused a precipitate retreat. At half past 3 o'clock, P. M., the enemy's bomb-vessels opened their fire from four sea mortars, two of thirteen inches, two of ten, and to my great mortification I found they were without the effective range of my shot, as many subsequent experiments proved; they continued their fire with little intermission during the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th. I occasionally opened my batteries on them with great vivacity, particularly when they shewed a disposition to change their position. On the 17th in the evening our heavy mortar was said to be in readiness. I ordered that excellent officer captain Wolstonecraft, of the artillerists, who previously had charge of it, to open a fire, which was done with great effect, as the enemy from that moment became disordered, and at day-light on the 18th commenced their retreat, after having thrown upwards of a thousand heavy shells, besides small shells from howitzers, round-shot and grape, which he discharged from boats under cover of the night.

Our loss in this affair has been uncommonly small, owing entirely to the great pains that was taken by the different officers to keep their men under cover; as the enemy left scarcely ten feet of this garrison untouched.

The officers and soldiers through this whole affair, although nine days and nights under arms in the different batteries, the consequent fatigue and loss of sleep, have manifested the greatest firmness and the most zealous warmth to be at the enemy. To distinguish individuals would be a delicate task, as merit was conspicuous every where. Lieutenant Cunningham, of the navy, who commanded my water battery, with his brave crew, evinced the most determined bravery and uncommon activity throughout; and in fact, sir, the only thing to be re-

gretted is that the enemy was too timid to give us an opportunity of destroying him.

I herewith inclose you a list of the killed and wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

W. H. OVERTON,
Major 3d R. R., commanding.

Major-general Jackson.

A list of the killed and wounded during the bombardment on Fort St. Philip, commencing on the 9th and ending on the 18th January, 1815.

Captain Wolstoncraft's artillery—wounded, 3.
Captain Murray's artillery—killed, 2; wounded, 1.
Captain Bronten's infantry—wounded, 1.
Captain Wade's infantry—wounded, 2.
Total—killed, 2; wounded, 7.

Colonial Department, March 9th.
Downing-street, March 8th, 1815.

Despatches, of which the following are copies, have this day been received by earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, from major-general sir John Lambert, K. C. B., commanding on the coast of Louisiana.

Camp in front of the enemy's lines,
My lord, *below New Orleans, Jan. 10th*, 1815.

It becomes my duty to lay before your lordship, the proceedings of the force lately employed on the coast of Louisiana, under the command of major-general the honourable sir E. M. Packenham, K. B., and acting in concert with vice-admiral sir A. Cochrane, K. B.

The report which I inclose from major-general Keane, will put your lordship in possession of the occurrences which took place until the arrival of major-general the honourable sir E. Packenham to assume the command; from that period I send an extract of a journal of major Forrest, assistant quarter-master-general, up to the time of joining the troops (which sailed on the 26th of October last, under my command) and which was on the 6th of January; and from that period, I shall detail, as well as I am able, the subsequent events.

I found the army in position in a flat country, with the Mississippi on its left, and a thick extensive wood on its right; and open in its front, from which the enemy's line was quite distinguishable.

It seems sir E. Packenham had waited for the arrival of the fusileers and 43d regiment, in order to make a general attack upon the enemy's line; and on the 8th the army was formed for that object.

In order to give your lordship as clear a view as I can, I shall state the position of the enemy. On the left bank of the river it was simply a straight line of about a front of 1000 yards with a parapet, the right resting on the river, and the left on a wood, which had been made impracticable for any body of troops to pass. This line was strengthened by flank works, and had a canal of about four feet deep generally, but not altogether of an equal width; it was supposed to narrow towards their left; about eight heavy guns were in a position on this line. The Mississippi is here about 800 yards across, and they had on the right bank a heavy battery of 15 guns, which infiladed the whole front of the position on the left bank.

Preparations were made on our side by very considerable labour to clear out and widen a canal that communicated with a stream by which the boats had passed up to the place of disembarkation, to open it into the Mississippi, by which means troops could be got over to the right bank, and the co-operation of armed boats could be secured.

The disposition for the attack was as follows: a corps, consisting of the 85th light infantry, 200 seamen, and 400 marines, the 5th West India regiment, and four pieces of artillery, under the command of colonel Thornton, of the 85th, was to pass over during the night, and move along the right bank towards New Orleans, clearing its front until it reached the flanking battery of the enemy on that side, which it had orders to carry.

The assailing of the enemy's line in front of us, was to be made by the brigade composed of the 4th, 21st, and 44th regiments, with three companies of the 98th, under major-general Gibbs, and by the 3d brigade, consisting of the 93d, two companies of the fusileers, and 43d, under major-general Keane; some black troops were destined to skirmish in the wood on the right; the principal attack was to be made by major-general Gibbs; the 1st brigade, consisting of the fusileers and 43d, formed the reserve; the attacking columns were to be provided with fascines, scaling ladders, and rafts; the whole to be at their stations before day-light. An advanced battery in our front of six 18-pounders, was thrown up during the night, about 800 yards from the enemy's line. The attack was to be made at the earliest hour. Unlooked-for

difficulties, increased by the falling of the river, occasioned considerable delay in the entrance of the armed boats, and those destined to land colonel Thornton's corps, by which four or five hours were lost, and it was not until past five in the morning that the first division, consisting of 500 men, were over. The ensemble of the general movement was lost, and in a point which was of the last importance to the attack on the left bank of the river, although colonel Thornton, as your lordship will see in his report, which I inclose, ably executed in every particular his instructions, and fully justified the confidence the commander of the forces placed in his abilities. The delay attending that corps occasioned some on the left bank, and the attack did not take place until we were discernible from the enemy's line at more than 200 yards distance; as they advanced, a continued and most galling fire was opened from every part of their line, and from the battery on the right bank.

The brave commander of the forces, who never in his life could refrain from being at the post of honour, and sharing the danger to which the troops were exposed, as soon from his station he had made the signal for the troops to advance, galloped on to the front to animate them by his presence, and he was seen with his hat off, encouraging them on the crest of the glacis; it was there (almost at the same time) he received two wounds, one on his knee, and another, which was instantly fatal, in his body; he fell in the arms of major M'Dougal, aid-de-camp.

The effect of this, in the sight of the troops, together with major-general Gibbs and major-general Keane being borne off wounded at the same time, with many other commanding officers, and further, the preparations to aid in crossing the ditch not being so forward as they ought to have been, from, perhaps, the men being wounded who were carrying them, caused a wavering in the column, which in such a situation became irreparable; and as I advanced with the reserve, at about 250 yards from the line, I had the mortification to observe the whole falling back upon me in the greatest confusion.

In this situation, finding that no impression had been made, and though many men had reached the ditch, and were either drowned or were obliged to surrender, and that it was impossible to restore order in the regiments where they were, I placed the reserve in position, until I could obtain such information as to determine me how to act to the best of my judgment, and whether or not I should resume the attack, and if so, I

felt it could only be done by the reserve. The confidence I have in the corps composing it would have encouraged me greatly, though not without loss, which might have made the attempt of serious consequence, as I know it was the opinion of the late distinguished commander of the forces that the carrying of the first line would not be the least arduous service. After making the best reflection I was capable of, I kept the ground the troops then held, and went to meet vice-admiral sir Alexander Cochrane, and to tell him, that under all the circumstances I did not think it prudent to renew the attack that day. At 10 o'clock I learnt the success of colonel Thornton's corps on the right bank. I sent the commanding officer of the artillery, colonel Dickson, to examine the situation of the battery, and to report if it was tenable; but informing me that he did not think it could be held with security by a smaller corps than 2000 men, I consequently ordered lieutenant-colonel Gubbins, on whom the command had devolved (colonel Thornton being wounded), to retire.

The army remained in position until night, in order to gain time to destroy the 18-pound battery we had constructed the preceding night in advance. I then gave orders for the troops resuming the ground they occupied previous to the attack.

Our loss has been very severe, but I trust it will not be considered, notwithstanding the failure, that this army has suffered the military character to be tarnished. I am satisfied, had I thought it right to renew the attack, that the troops would have advanced with cheerfulness. The services of both army and navy, since their landing on this coast, have been arduous beyond any thing I have ever witnessed, and difficulties have been got over with an assiduity and perseverance beyond all example by all ranks, and the most hearty co-operation has existed between the two services.

It is not necessary for me to expatiate to you upon the loss the army has sustained in major-general the honourable sir Edward Packenham, commander in chief of this force, nor could I in adequate terms. His services and merits are so well known that I have only, in common with the whole army, to express my sincere regret, and which may be supposed at this moment to come peculiarly home to me.

Major-general Gibbs, who died of his wounds the following day, and major-general Keane, who were both carried off the field within twenty yards of the glacis, at the head of their brigades, sufficiently speak, at such a moment, how they

were conducting themselves. I am happy to say major-general Keane is doing well.

Captain Wylly, of the fusileers, military secretary to the late commander of the forces, will have the honour of delivering to your lordship these despatches. Knowing how much he enjoyed his esteem and was in his confidence, from a long experience of his talents, I feel I cannot do less than pay this tribute to what I conceive would be the wishes of his late general, and to recommend him strongly to your lordship's protection.

I have, &c. JOHN LAMBERT,
Major-general, commanding.

[Here follows the reports from major-general Keane and colonel Thornton, and the extract from the journal of major Forrest, which detail subordinate circumstances.]

Tonnant, off Chandeleur's Island, January 28.

My Lord,

After maturely deliberating on the situation of this army, after the command had unfortunately devolved upon me, on the 8th instant, and duly considering what probability now remained of carrying on with success, on the same plan, an attack against New Orleans, it appeared to me that it ought not to be persisted in. I immediately communicated with vice-admiral sir Alexander Cochrane, that I did not think it would be prudent to make any farther attempt at present, and that I recommended re-embarking the army as soon as possible, with a view to carry into effect the other objects of the force employed upon this coast; from the 9th instant, it was determined that the army should retreat, and I have the satisfaction of informing your lordship that it was effected on the night of the 18th instant, and ground was taken up on the morning of the 19th, on both sides of the bayou or creek which the troops had entered on their disembarkation, 14 miles from their position before the enemy's line, covering New Orleans, on the left bank of the Mississippi, and one mile from the entrance into Lac Borgne; the army remained in bivouac until the 27th instant, when the whole were re-embarked.

In stating the circumstances of this retreat to your lordship, I shall confidently trust that you will see, that good order and discipline ever existed in this army, and that zeal for the service and attention was ever conspicuous in officers of all ranks.

Your lordship is already acquainted with the position the

army occupied, its advance post close up to the enemy's line, and the greater part of the army were exposed to the fire of his batteries which was unremitting day and night since the 1st of January, when the position in advance was taken up; the retreat was effected without being harassed in any degree by the enemy; all the sick and wounded with the exception of eighty, whom it was considered dangerous to remove, field artillery, ammunition, hospital, and other stores of every description, which had been landed on a very large scale, were brought away, and nothing fell into the enemy's hands, excepting six iron 18-pounders, mounted on sea-carriages, and two carronades, which were in position on the left bank of the Mississippi; to bring them off at the moment the army was retiring was impossible, and to have done it previously would have exposed the whole force to any fire the enemy might have sent down the river. These batteries were of course destroyed, and the guns rendered perfectly unserviceable. Only four men were reported absent next morning, and these I suppose must have been left behind, and have fallen into the hands of the enemy: but when it is considered the troops were in perfect ignorance of the movement, until a fixed hour during the night, that the battalions were drawn off in succession, and that the pickets did not move off till past three in the morning, and that the whole had to retire through the most difficult new made road, cut in marshy ground, impassable for a horse, and where, in many places, the men could only go in single files, and that the absence of men might be accounted for in so many ways, it would be rather a matter of surprise the number was so few.

An exchange of prisoners has been effected with the enemy upon very fair terms, and their attention to the brave prisoners and wounded, that have fallen into their hands, has been kind and humane, I have every reason to believe.

However unsuccessful the termination of the late service the army and navy have been employed upon, has turned out, it would be injustice not to point out how much praise is due to their exertions; ever since the 13th December, when the army began to move from the ships, the fatigue of disembarking and bringing up artillery and supplies from such a distance has been incessant; and I must add, that owing to the exertions of the navy, the army has never wanted provisions. The labour and fatigue of the seamen and soldiers were particularly conspicuous on the night of the 7th instant, when fifty boats were dragged through a canal into the Mississippi, in which there was only 18 inches of water, and I

am confident that vice-admiral sir Alexander Cochrane, who suggested the possibility of this operation, will be equally ready to admit this, as well as the hearty co-operation of the troops on all occasions.

From what has come under my own observation since I joined this army, and from official reports that have been made to me, I beg to call your lordship's attention to individuals, who from their station have rendered themselves peculiarly conspicuous. Major Forrest at the head of the quarter-master-general's department, I cannot say too much of. Lieutenant Evans and Poddie, of the same, have been remarkable for their exertions and indefatigability; sir John Tylden, who has acted in the field as assistant-adjutant-general with me (lieutenant-colonel Stoven having been wounded on the 23d ultimo, though doing well, not as yet being permitted to take active service), has been very useful; on the night of the 7th, previous to the attack, rear-admiral Malcolm reports the great assistance he received from him in forwarding the boats in the Mississippi. Captain Wood of the 4th regiment, deputy assistant-adjutant-general, has filled that situation, since the first disembarkation of the troops, with zeal and attention.

During the action of the 8th instant, the command of the 2d brigade devolved upon lieutenant-colonel Brooke, 4th regiment; that of the 3d upon colonel Hamilton, 5th West Indian regiment; and the reserve upon colonel Blakeney, royal fusileers, to all these officers I feel myself much indebted for their services. Lieutenant-colonel Dickson, royal artillery, has displayed his usual abilities and assiduity; he reports to me his general satisfaction of all the officers under his command, especially major Munro, senior officer of the royal artillery, previous to his arrival, and of the officers commanding companies.

Lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, royal engineers, afforded me every assistance that could be expected from his known talents and experience; that service lost a valuable and much esteemed officer in lieutenant Wright, who was killed when reconoit ing on the evening of the 31st ultimo.

Lieutenant-colonel Mein, of the 43d, and lieutenant-colonel Gubbins, 85th regiment, field-officers of the pickets on the 8th, have great credit for the manner in which they withdrew the out-posts on the morning of the 19th, under the direction of colonel Blakeney, royal fusileers.

I request in a particular manner to express how much this army is indebted to the attention and diligence of Mr. Rabb,

deputy-inspector of hospitals. He met the embarrassments of crowded hospitals, and their immediately removed, with such excellent arrangements, that the wounded were all brought off with every favourable circumstance, except such as would have rendered their removal dangerous.

Captain sir T. Troubridge, royal navy, who commanded a battalion of seamen, and who was attached to act with the fusileers, rendered the greatest service by his exertions in whatever way they were required—colonel Dickson, royal artillery, particularly mentions how much he was indebted to him.

The conduct of two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, lately under the command of lieutenant-colonel Baker, previously by major Hills, has been the admiration of every one, by the cheerfulness with which they have performed all descriptions of service. I must also mention the exertions of the royal staff corps under major Dodd, so reported by the deputy quarter-master-general.

Permit me to add the obligations I am under to my personal staff, lieutenant the honourable E. Curson, of the royal navy, who was selected as naval aid-de-camp to the commanding officer of the troops on their first disembarkation, each of whom have expressed the satisfaction they had in his appointment, to which I confidently add my own.

Major Smith, 9th regiment, now acting as military secretary, is so well known for zeal and talents, that I can with great truth say, that I think he possesses every qualification to render him hereafter one of the brightest ornaments of his profession.

I cannot conclude without expressing how much indebted the army is to rear-admiral Malcolm, who had the immediate charge of landing and re-embarking the troops; he remained on shore to the last, and by his abilities and activity smoothed every difficulty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAMBERT,
Major-general commandant.

To the right honourable earl of Bathurst.

P. S. I regret to have to report, that during the night of the 25th, in very bad weather, a boat containing two officers, viz. lieutenant Brydges and cornet Hammond, with 37 of the 14th light dragoons, unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy off the mouth of the Rigolets: I have not been able to ascertain correctly particular circumstances.

Return of casualties in the actions with the enemy, near New Orleans, on the 23d and 24th December, 1814.

Total—4 captains, 1 lieutenant, 7 serjeants, 1 drummer, 33 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 10 serjeants, 4 drummers, 141 rank and file wounded; 1 major, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 58 rank and file missing.

Return of casualties between the 25th and 31st December, 1814.

Total—1 captain, 1 drummer, 14 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 1 serjeant, 34 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

Return of casualties between the 1st and 5th January, 1815.

Total—3 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 27 rank and file killed; 4 lieutenants, 40 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.

Return of casualties on the 8th January, 1815.

Total loss—1 major-general, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 5 captains, 4 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 11 serjeants, 1 drummer, 266 rank and file killed; 2 major-generals, 8 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 18 captains 38 lieutenants, 9 ensigns, 1 staff, 54 serjeants, 9 drummers, 1126 rank and file wounded; 3 captains, 12 lieutenants, 13 serjeants, 4 drummers, 452 rank and file missing.

Return of casualties between the 9th and 26th January, 1815.

Total—1 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 3 rank and file wounded.

Return of the ordnance taken from the enemy by a detachment of the army acting on the right bank of the Mississippi, under the command of Colonel Thornton.

Redoubt, right bank of the Mississippi, January 8, 1815.

1 brass 10-inch howitzer, 2 brass 4-pound field-pieces, 8 24-pounders, 3 12-pounders, 6 9-pounders, 1 12-pound carronade, not mounted.

On the howitzer is inscribed, "Taken at the surrender of Yorktown, 1781."

(Signed) J. MITCHELL,
Captain royal artillery.

The return of the killed and wounded, in the action of the gun-boats, gives 17 of the former, and 77 of the latter.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE SURRENDER OF FORT BOWYER.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, to Major-General Jackson.

Sir, *Fort Bowyer, February* 12, 1815.

Imperious necessity has compelled me to enter into articles of capitulation with major-general John Lambert, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in front of Fort Bowyer, a copy of which I forward you for the purpose of effecting an immediate exchange of prisoners. Nothing but the want of provisions, and finding myself completely surrounded by thousands—batteries erected on the sand—mounds which completely commanded the fort—and the enemy having advanced, by regular approaches, within thirty yards of the ditches, and the utter impossibility of getting any assistance or supplies, would have induced me to adopt this measure. Feeling confident, and it being the unanimous opinion of the officers, that we could not retain the post, and that the lives of many valuable officers and soldiers would have been uselessly sacrificed, I thought it most desirable to adopt this plan. A full and correct statement will be furnished you as early as possible.

Captain Chamberlain, who bears this to E. Livingston, esq., will relate to him every particular, which will, I hope, be satisfactory.

I am, with respect, your obedient humble servant,

W. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-colonel, commanding.

Major-general Jackson.

Articles of capitulation agreed upon between Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence and Major-General Lambert, for the surrender of Fort Bowyer, on the Mobile Point, 11th February, 1815.

1. That the fort shall be surrendered to the arms of his Britannic majesty in its existing state as to the works, ordnance, ammunition, and every species of military stores.

2. That the garrison shall be considered as prisoners of war; the troops marching out with their colours flying, and drums beating, and ground their arms on the glacis—the officers retaining their swords, and the whole to be embarked in such ships as the British naval commander in chief shall appoint.

3. All private property to be respected.

4. That a communication shall be made immediately of the same to the commanding officer of the seventh military district of the United States, and every endeavour made to effect an early exchange of prisoners

5. That the garrison of the United States remain in the fort until 12 o'clock to-morrow, a British guard being put in possession of the inner gates at 3 o'clock to day, the guard remaining on the glacis, and that the British flag be hoisted at the same time—an officer of each service remaining at the head-quarters of each commander until the fulfilment of these articles.

H. G. SMITH,
Major, and military secretary.

Agreed on the part of the royal navy.

T. H. RICKETTS,
Captain H. M. ship Vengeur.
R. CHAMBERLAIN,
Second regiment United States infantry.
WM. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-colonel second infantry, commanding.

APPROVED,

ALEXANDER COCHRANE,
Commander in chief of his majesty's shipping.
JOHN LAMBERT,
Major-general, commanding.

A true copy, Test—*John Reid, aid-de-camp.*

Colonial Department.

Downing-street, April 17th, 1815.

A despatch, of which the following is a copy, has been this day received by earl Bathurst, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, from major-general sir John Lambert, K. C. B., commanding on the coast of Louisiana.

Head-Quarters, Isle Dauphine,
My lord, *Feb. 14th*, 1815.

My despatch dated January 29th, will have informed your lordship of the re-embarkation of this force, which was completed on the 30th; the weather came on so bad on that night, and continued so until the 5th of February, that no communication could be held with the ships at the inner anchorage, a distance of about seventeen miles.

It being agreed between vice-admiral sir Alexander Cochrane and myself that operations should be carried towards

Mobile, it was decided that a force should be sent against Fort Bowyer, situated on the eastern point of the entrance of the bay, and from every information that could be obtained, it was considered a brigade would be sufficient for this object, with a respectable force of artillery. I ordered the 2d brigade, composed of the 4th, 21st, and 44th regiments, for this service, together with such means in the engineer and artillery departments, as the chief and commanding officer of the royal artillery might think expedient. The remainder of the force had orders to disembark on Isle Dauphine, and encamp; and major-general Keane, whom I am truly happy to say has returned to his duty, superintended their arrangement.

The weather being favourable on the 7th, for the landing to the eastward of Mobile Point, the ships destined to move on that service, sailed under the command of captain Ricketts, of the Vengeur, but did not arrive in sufficient time that evening to do more than determine the place of disembarkation, which was about three miles from Fort Bowyer.

At day-light the next morning the troops got into the boats, and 600 men were landed under lieutenant-colonel Debbeig of the 44th, without opposition, who immediately threw out the light companies under lieutenant Bennett, of the fourth regiment, to cover the landing of the brigade. Upon the whole being disembarked, a disposition was made to move on towards the fort, covered by the light companies. The enemy was not seen until about 1000 yards in front of their works; they gradually fell back, and no firing took place, until the whole had retired into the fort, and our advance had pushed on nearly to within three hundred yards. Having reconnoitred the fort with lieutenant-colonels Burgoyne and Dickson, we were decidedly of opinion, that the work was formidable only against an assault; that batteries being once established, it must speedily fall. Every exertion was made by the navy to land provisions, and the necessary equipment o' the battering train and engineer stores. We broke ground on the night of the 8th, and advanced a firing party to within one hundred yards of the fort during the night. The position of the batteries being decided upon the next day, they were ready to receive their guns on the night of the 10th, and on the morning of the 11th, the fire of a battery of four eighteen-pounders on the left, and two eight-inch howitzers on the right, each about one hundred yards distant, two six-pounders at about three hundred yards, and eight small cohorns ad-

vantageously placed on the right, with intervals between of one hundred and two hundred yards, all furnished to keep up an incessant fire for two days, were prepared to open. Preparatory to commencing, I summoned the fort, allowing the commanding officer half an hour for decision upon such terms as were proposed. Finding he was inclined to consider them, I prolonged the period at his request, and at 3 o'clock the fort was given up to a British guard, and British colours hoisted; the terms being signed by major Smith, military secretary, and captain Ricketts, R. N., and finally approved of by the vice-admiral and myself, which I have the honour to inclose. I am happy to say our loss was not very great; and we are indebted for this, in a great measure, to the efficient means attached to this force. Had we been obliged to resort to any other mode of attack, the fall could not have been looked for under such favourable circumstances.

We have certain information of a force having been sent from Mobile, and disembarked about 12 miles off, in the night of the 10th, to attempt its relief; two schooners with provisions and an intercepted letter fell into our hands, taken by captain Price, royal navy, stationed in the bay.

I cannot close this despatch without naming to your lordship, again, lieutenant-colonels Dickson, royal artillery, and Burgoyne, royal engineers, who displayed their usual zeal and abilities; and lieutenant Bennett, of the 4th, who commanded the light companies, and pushed up close to the enemy's works.

Captain the honourable R. Spencer, royal navy, who had been placed with a detachment of seamen under my orders, greatly facilitated the service in every way by his exertions.

From captain Ricketts, of the royal navy, who was charged with the landing and disposition of the naval force, I received every assistance.

(Signed) JOHN LAMBERT,
Major-general, commanding.

Earl Bathurst, &c.

Fort Bowyer, February 14, 1815.

Return of ordnance, ammunition, and stores, captured from the enemy in this place, on the 12*th instant:*

1 24-pounder, 2 9-pounders, outside of the fort.

Guns.

Iron—3 32-pounders, 8 24-pounders, 6 12-pounders, 5 9-pounders.

Brass—1 4-pounder.
Mortar—1 8-inch.
Howitzer—1 5½-inch.

Shot.

32-pounder—856 round, 64 grape, 11 case.
24-pounder—851 round, 176 bar, 286 grape, 84 case.
12-pounder—535 round, 74 grape, 439 case.
9-pounder—781 round, 208 grape, 429 case.
6-pounder—15 round, 75 bar, 13 case.
4-pounder—231 round, 38 grape, 147 case.
Shells—25 8-inch, 74 5½-inch.
183 hand grenades.
5,519 pounds of powder.
1 triangle gin, complete.
16,976 musket-ball cartridges.
500 flints.
351 muskets, complete, with accoutrements.

(Signed) JAMES PERCIVAL,
Assistant-commissary, royal artillery.

(Signed) A. DICKSON,
Lieutenant-colonel, commanding royal artillery.

Return of casualties in the army under the command of Major-General Lambert, employed before Fort Bowyer, between the 8th and 12th of February, 1815.

Royal sappers and miners—1 rank and file wounded.

4th foot—8 rank and file killed; 2 serjeants, 13 rank and file wounded.

21st foot—2 serjeants, 2 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

40th foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

Total—13 killed, 18 wounded.

(Signed) F. STOVEN,
Deputy-adjutant-general.

Return of the American garrison, of Fort Bowyer, which surrendered to the force under major-general Lambert, 11th February, 1815.

1 field officer, 3 captains, 10 subalterns, 2 staff, 16 serjeants, 16 drummers, 327 rank and file, 20 women, 16 children, 3 servants not soldiers.

(Signed) FRED. STOVEN,
Deputy-adjutant-general.

CRUIZE OF THE ESSEX IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN.

Copy of a letter from Captain Porter, to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sir, *Essex Junior, July* 3, 1814, *at Sea.*

I have done myself the honour to address you, repeatedly, since I left the Delaware; but have scarcely a hope that one of my letters has reached you; therefore, consider it necessary to give you a brief history of my proceedings since that period.

I sailed from the Delaware on the 27th of October, 1812, and repaired with all diligence (agreeably to instructions from commodore Bainbridge), to Port Praya, Fernando de Noronho, and Cape Frio; and arrived at each place on the day appointed to meet him. On my passage from Port Praya to Fernando de Noronho, I captured his Britannic majesty's packet Nocton; and after taking out about 11,000*l.* sterling in specie, sent her under command of lieutenant Finch for America. I cruized off Rio de Janeiro and Cape Frio until the 12th January, 1813, hearing frequently of the commodore by vessels from Bahia. I here captured but one schooner with hides and tallow; I sent her into Rio. The Montague, the admiral's ship being in pursuit of me, my provisions now getting short, and finding it necessary to look out for a supply, to enable me to meet the commodore by the 1st of April, off St. Helena, I proceeded to the island of St. Catherine's (the last place of rendezvous on the coast of Brazil), as the most likely to supply my wants, and at the same time afford me that secrecy necessary to enable me to elude the British ships of war on the coast and expected there. I here could procure only wood, water, and rum, and a few bags of flour; and hearing of the commodore's action with the Java, the capture of the Hornet by the Montague, and of a considerable augmentation of the British force on the coast, and of several being in pursuit of me, I found it necessary to get to sea as soon as possible. I now, agreeably to the commodore's plan, stretched to the southward, scouring the coast as far as Rio de la Plata. I heard that Buenos Ayres was in a state of starvation and could not supply our wants; and that the government of Monteviedo was very inimical to us. The commodore's instructions now left it completely discretionary with me what course to pursue, and I determined on following that which had not only met his approbation but the approbation of the then secretary of the navy. I accordingly shaped my course for the Pacific; and af-

ter suffering greatly from short allowance of provisions and heavy gales off Cape Horn (for which my ship and men were illy provided), I arrived at Valparaiso on the 14th March, 1813. I here took in as much jerked beef and other provisions as my ship would conveniently stow, and ran down the coast of Chili and Peru; in this tract I fell in with a Peruvian corsair, which had on board twenty-four Americans as prisoners, the crews of two whale ships which she had taken on the coast of Chili. The captain informed me that, as the allies of Great Britain, they would capture all they should meet with, in expectation of a war between Spain and the United States. I consequently threw all his guns and ammunition into the sea, liberated the Americans, wrote a respectful letter to the vice-roy, explaining the cause of my proceedings, which I delivered to her captain. I then proceeded for Lima, and re-captured one of the vessels as she was entering the port. From thence I proceeded for the Gallapagos islands, where I cruized, from the 17th April until the 3d October, 1813; during which time I touched only once on the coast of America, which was for the purpose of procuring a supply of fresh water, as none is to be found among those islands, which are perhaps the most barren and desolate of any known.

While among this group, I captured the following British ships, employed chiefly in the spermaceti whale fishery, viz.

Letters of Marque.

	tons.	men.	guns.	pierced for
Montezuma,	270	21	2	
Policy,	175	26	10	18
Georgiana,	280	25	6	18
Greenwich,	338	25	10	20
Atlantic,	355	24	8	20
Rose,	220	21	8	20
Hector,	270	25	11	20
Catharine,	270	29	8	18
Seringapatam,	357	31	14	26
Charlton,	274	21	10	18
New Zealander,	259	23	8	18
Sir A. Hammond,	301	31	12	18
	3465	302	107	

As some of those ships were captured by boats, and others by prizes, my officers and men had several opportunities of shewing their gallantry.

The Rose and Charlton were given up to the prisoners; the Hector, Catharine, and Montezuma, I sent to Valparaiso, where they were laid up; the Policy, Georgiana, and New Zealander, I sent for America; the Greenwich I kept as a store-ship to contain the stores of my other prizes necessary for us; and the Atlantic, now called the Essex Junior, I equipped with twenty guns and gave command of her to lieutenant Downes.

Lieutenant Downes had convoyed the prizes to Valparaiso, and, on his return, brought me letters, informing me that a squadron under the command of commodore James Hillyar, consisting of the frigate Phoebe, of 36 guns, the Racoon and Cherub sloops of war, and a store-ship of 20 guns, had sailed on the 6th of July for this sea. The Racoon and Cherub had been seeking me for some time on the coast of Brazil, and, on their return from their cruize, joined the squadron sent in search of me to the Pacific. My ship, as it may be supposed, after being nearly a year at sea, required some repairs to put her in a state to meet them; which I determined to do, and bring them to action, if I could meet them on nearly equal terms. I proceeded, now, in company with the remainder of my prizes, to the island of Nooaheva, or Madison's island, lying in the Washington groupe, discovered by a captain Ingraham of Boston; here I caulked and completely overhauled my ship, made for her a new set of water casks, her old ones being entirely decayed, and took on board from my prizes provisions and stores for upwards of four months, and sailed for the coast of Chili on the 12th December, 1813. Previous to sailing, I secured the Seringapatam, Greenwich, and sir Andrew Hammond, under the guns of a battery, which I erected for their protection (after taking possession of this fine island for the United States, and establishing the most friendly intercourse with the natives). I left them under the charge of lieutenant Gamble of the marines, with twenty-one men, with orders to repair to Valparaiso after a certain period.

I arrived on the coast of Chili on the 12th January, 1814; looked into Conception and Valparaiso, found at both places only three English vessels, and learned that the squadron which sailed from Rio de Janeiro for that sea had not been heard of since their departure, and were supposed to be lost in endeavouring to double Cape Horn.

I had completely broken up the British navigation in the Pacific; the vessels which had not been captured by me, were laid up and dared not venture out. I had afforded the most

ample protection to our own vessels, which were, on my arrival, very numerous and unprotected. The valuable whale fishery there is entirely destroyed, and the actual injury we have done them may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars, independent of the expenses of vessels in search of me. They have furnished me amply with sails, cordage, cables, anchors, provisions, medicines, and stores of every description; and the slops on board them have furnished clothing for the seamen. We had in fact lived on the enemy since I had been in that sea, every prize having proved a well-found store-ship for me. I had not yet been under the necessity of drawing bills on the department for any object, and had been enabled to make considerable advances to my officers and crew on account of pay.

For the unexampled time we had kept the sea, my crew had continued remarkably healthy; I had but one case of the scurvy, and had lost only the following men by death, viz:

John S. Cowan, lieutenant,
Robert Miller, surgeon,
Levi Holmes, O. seaman,
Edward Sweeny, do.
Samuel Groce, seaman,
James Spafford, gunner's-mate,
Benjamin Geers, } quarter-gunners,
John Rodgers, }
Andrew Mahan, corporal of marines,
Lewis Price, private marine.

I had done all the injury that could be done to the British commerce in the Pacific, and still hoped to signalize my cruize by something more splendid before leaving that sea. I thought it not improbable that commodore Hillyar might have kept his arrival secret, and believing that he would seek me at Valparaiso, as the most likely place to find me, I therefore determined to cruize about that place, and should I fail of meeting him, hoped to be compensated by the capture of some merchant ships, said to be expected from England.

The Phoebe, agreeably to my expectations, came to seek me at Valparaiso, where I was anchored with the Essex, my armed prize the Essex Junior, under the command of lieutenant Downes, on the look out off the harbour; but, contrary to the course I thought he would pursue, commodore Hillyar brought with him the Cherub sloop of war, mounting 28 guns, eighteen 32-pound carronades, eight 24s and two long 9s on the quarter deck and forecastle, and a complement of 180 men. The force of the Phoebe is as follows:

thirty long 18-pounders, sixteen 32-pound carronades, one howitzer, and six 3-pounders in her tops, in all 53 guns, and a complement of 320 men; making a force of 81 guns and 500 men; in addition to which, they took on board the crew of an English letter of marque lying in port. Both ships had picked crews, and were sent into the Pacific, in company with the Racoon of 22 guns, and a store-ship of 20 guns, for the express purpose of seeking the Essex, and were prepared with flags bearing the motto, "God and country; British sailors' best rights; traitors offend both." This was intended as a reply to my motto, "free trade and sailors' rights," under the erroneous impression that my crew were chiefly Englishmen, or to counteract its effect on their own crews. The force of the Essex was 46 guns, forty 32-pound carronades and six long 12s, and her crew, which had been much reduced by prizes, amounted only to 255 men. The Essex Junior, which was intended chiefly as a store-ship, mounted 20 guns, ten 18-pound carronades, and ten short 6s, with only 60 men on board. In reply to their motto, I wrote at my mizen, "God, our country, and liberty; tyrants offend them."

On getting their provisions on board they went off the port for the purpose of blockading me, where they cruized for nearly six weeks, during which time I endeavoured to provoke a challenge, and frequently, but ineffectually, to bring the Phoebe alone to action, first with both my ships, and afterwards with my single ship, with both crews on board. I was several times under way, and ascertained that I had greatly the advantage in point of sailing, and once succeeded in closing within gun-shot of the Phoebe, and commenced a fire on her, when she ran down for the Cherub, which was two and a half miles to leeward. This excited some surprise and expressions of indignation, as previous to my getting under way she hove too off the port, hoisted her motto flag, and fired a gun to windward. Commodore Hillyar seemed determined to avoid a contest with me on nearly equal terms; and from his extreme prudence in keeping both his ships ever after constantly within hail of each other, there were no hopes of any advantages to my country from a longer stay in port. I therefore determined to put to sea the first opportunity which should offer; and I was the more strongly induced to do so, as I had gained certain intelligence that the Tagus, rated 38, and two other frigates, had sailed for that sea in pursuit of me, and I had reason to expect the arrival of the Racoon from the north-west coast of America, where she had been

sent for the purpose of destroying our fur establishment on the Columbia. A rendezvous was appointed for the Essex Junior, and every arrangement made for sailing, and I intended to let them chase me off, to give the Essex Junior an opportunity of escaping. On the 28th March, the day after this determination was formed, the wind came on to blow fresh from the southward, when I parted my larboard cable, and dragged my starboard anchor directly out to sea. Not a moment was to be lost in getting sail on the ship. The enemy were close in with the point forming the west side of the bay; but on opening them, I saw a prospect of passing to windward, when I took in my top-gallant-sails, which were set over single reefed top-sails, and braced up for this purpose; but on rounding the point a heavy squall struck the ship and carried away her main-top-mast, precipitating the men who were aloft into the sea, who were drowned. Both ships now gave chase to me, and I endeavoured, in my disabled state, to regain the port; but in finding I could not recover the common anchorage, I ran close into a small bay, about three quarters of a mile to leeward of the battery, on the east side of the harbour, and let go my anchor within pistol-shot of the shore, where I intended to repair my damages as soon as possible. The enemy continued to approach, and showed an evident intention of attacking, regardless of the neutrality of the place where I was anchored; and the caution observed in their approach to the attack of the Essex was truly ridiculous, as was their display of their motto flags, and the number of jacks at all their mast-heads. I, with as much expedition as circumstances would admit of, got my ship ready for action, and endeavoured to get a spring on my cable, but had not succeeded when the enemy, at 54 minutes after 3, P. M., made his attack, the Phoebe placing herself under my stern, and the Cherub on my starboard bow; but the Cherub soon finding her situation a hot one, bore up and ran under my stern also, where both ships kept up a hot raking fire. I had got three long twelve-pounders out of the stern ports, which were worked with so much bravery and skill that in half an hour we so disabled both as to compel them to haul off to repair damages. In the course of this firing I had, by the great exertions of Mr. Edward Barnewall, the acting sailing-master, assisted by Mr. Linscott, the boatswain, succeeded in getting springs on our cable three different times; but the fire of the enemy was so excessive that before we could get our broadside to bear they were shot away; and thus rendered useless

to us. My ship had received many injuries, and several had been killed and wounded; but my brave officers and men, notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances under which we were brought to action, and the powerful force opposed to us, were no ways discouraged—all appeared determined to defend their ship to the last extremity, and to die in preference to a shameful surrender. Our gaff, with the ensign and the motto flag at the mizen, had been shot away, but free trade and sailors' rights continued to fly at the fore. Our ensign was replaced by another, and to guard against a similar event, an ensign was made fast in the mizen rigging, and several jacks were hoisted in different parts of the ship. The enemy soon repaired his damages for a fresh attack; he now placed himself, with both his ships, on my starboard quarter, out of the reach of my carronades, and where my stern guns could not be brought to bear; he there kept up a most galling fire, which it was out of my power to return, when I saw no prospect of injuring him without getting under way and becoming the assailant. My top-sail sheets and halyards were all shot away, as well as the jib and fore-top-mast-stay-sail-halyards. The only rope not cut was the flying-jib-halyards; and that being the only sail I could set, I caused it to be hoisted, my cable to be cut, and ran down on both ships, with an intention of laying the Phoebe on board. The firing on both sides was now tremendous; I had let fall my fore-top-sail and fore-sail, but the want of tacks and sheets rendered them almost useless to us; yet we were enabled, for a short time, to close with the enemy; and, although our decks were now strewed with dead, and our cockpit filled with wounded, although our ship had been several times on fire, and was rendered a perfect wreck, we were still encouraged to hope to save her, from the circumstance of the Cherub, from her crippled state, being compelled to haul off. She did not return to close action again, although she apparently had it in her power to do so, but kept a distant firing with her long guns. The Phoebe, from our disabled state, was enabled, however, by edging off, to choose the distance which best suited her long guns, and kept up a tremendous fire on us, which mowed down my brave companions by the dozen. Many of my guns had been rendered useless by the enemy's shot, and many of them had had their whole crews destroyed. We manned them again from those which were disabled, and one gun, in particular, was three times manned; fifteen men were slain at it in the course of the action! but, strange

as it may appear, the captain of it escaped with only a slight wound.

Finding that the enemy had it in his power to choose his distance, I now gave up all hopes of closing with him, and as the wind for the moment seemed to favour the design, I determined to endeavour to run her on shore, land my men, and destroy her. Every thing seemed to favour my wishes. We had approached the shore within musket-shot, and I had no doubt of succeeding, when, in an instant, the wind shifted from the land (as is very common in this port in the latter part of the day), and payed our head down on the Phœbe, where we were again exposed to a dreadful raking fire. My ship was now totally unmanageable; yet, as her head was toward the enemy, and he to leeward of me, I still hoped to be able to board him. At this moment lieutenant commandant Downes came on board to receive my orders, under the impression that I should soon be a prisoner. He could be of no use to me in the then wretched state of the Essex; and finding (from the enemy's putting his helm up), that my last attempt at boarding would not succeed, I directed him after he had been about ten minutes on board, to return to his own ship, to be prepared for defending or destroying her in case of attack. He took with him several of my wounded, leaving three of his boat's crew on board to make room for them. The Cherub had now an opportunity of distinguishing herself, by keeping up a hot fire on him during his return. The slaughter on board my ship had now become horrible, the enemy continuing to rake us, and we unable to bring a gun to bear. I therefore directed a hawser to be bent to the sheet anchor, and the anchor to be cut from her bows to bring her head round; this succeeded, we again got our broadside to bear, and as the enemy was much crippled and unable to hold his own, I have no doubt he would soon have drifted out of gunshot before he discovered we had anchored, had not the hawser unfortunately parted. My ship had taken fire several times during the action, but alarmingly so forward and aft at this moment; the flames were bursting up each hatchway, and no hopes were entertained of saving her; our distance from the shore did not exceed three quarters of a mile, and I hoped many of my brave crew would be able to save themselves should the ship blow up, as I was informed the fire was near the magazine, and the explosion of a large quantity of powder below served to increase the horrors of our situation; our boats were destroyed by the enemy's shot; I therefore, directed those who could swim to jump overboard, and en-

deavour to gain the shore. Some reached it, some were taken by the enemy, and some perished in the attempt; but most preferred sharing with me the fate of the ship. We, who remained, turned our attention wholly to extinguishing the flames; and when we had succeeded went again to the guns, where the firing was kept up for some minutes, but the crew had by this time become so weakened, that they declared to me the impossibility of making further resistance, and entreated me to surrender my ship to save the wounded, as all further attempt at opposition must prove ineffectual, almost every gun being disabled by the destruction of their crews. I now sent for the officers of divisions to consult them; but what was my surprise to find only acting-lieutenant Stephen Decatur M'Knight remaining (who confirmed the report respecting the condition of the guns on the gun-deck, those on the spar-deck were not in a better state). Lieutenant Wilmer, after fighting most gallantly throughout the action, had been knocked overboard by a splinter while getting the sheet anchor from the bows, and was drowned. Acting-lieutenant John G. Cowell had lost a leg; Mr. Edward Barnewall, acting-sailing-master, had been carried below, after receiving two severe wounds, one in the breast and one in the face; and acting-lieutenant William H. Odenheimer had been knocked overboard from the quarter an instant before, and did not regain the ship till after the surrender. I was informed that the cockpit, the steerage, the ward-room, and the birth-deck could contain no more wounded; that the wounded were killed while the surgeons were dressing them, and that unless something was speedily done to prevent it, the ship would soon sink from the number of shot-holes in her bottom. And on sending for the carpenter, he informed me that all his crew had been killed or wounded, and that he had once been over the side to stop the leaks, when his slings had been shot away, and it was with difficulty he was saved from drowning. The enemy, from the smoothness of the water, and the impossibility of our reaching him with our carronades, and the little apprehension that was excited by our fire, which had now become much slackened, was enabled to take aim at us as at a target; his shot never missed our hull, and my ship was cut up in a manner which was perhaps never before witnessed; in fine, I saw no hopes of saving her, and at 20 minutes after 6, P. M., gave the painful order to strike the colours. Seventy-five men, including officers were all that remained of my whole crew, after the action, capable of doing duty, and many of them severely wounded, some of whom

have since died. The enemy still continued his firing, and my brave, though unfortunate companions were still falling about me. I directed an opposite gun to be fired, to show them we intended no further resistance; but they did not desist; four men were killed at my side, and others in different parts of the ship. I now believed he intended to show us no quarter, and that it would be as well to die with my flag flying as struck, and was on the point of again hoisting it, when about ten minutes after hauling the colours down he ceased firing.

I cannot speak in sufficiently too high terms of the conduct of those engaged for such an unparalleled length of time (under such circumstances) with me, in the arduous and unequal contest. Let it suffice to say that more bravery, skill, patriotism, and zeal, were never displayed on any occasion. Every one seemed determined, to die in defence of their much-loved country's cause, and nothing but views to humanity could ever have reconciled them to the surrender of the ship—they remembered their wounded and helpless shipmates below. To acting-lieutenants M'Knight and Odenheimer I feel much indebted for their great exertions and bravery throughout the action, in fighting and encouraging the men at their divisions, for the dextrous management of the long-guns, and for their promptness in re-manning their guns as their crews were slaughtered. The conduct of that brave and heroic officer, acting-lieutenant John G. Cowell, who lost his leg in the latter part of the action, excited the admiration of every man in the ship, and after being wounded would not consent to be taken below until loss of blood rendered him insensible. Mr. Edward Barnewall, acting-sailing-master, whose activity and courage was equally conspicuous, returned on deck after his first wound, and remained after receiving his second until fainting with loss of blood. Mr. Samuel B. Johnson, who had joined me the day before, and acted as marine officer, conducted himself with great bravery, and exerted himself in assisting at the long guns; the musketry after the first half hour being useless (from our long distance).

Mr. M. W. Bostwick, whom I had appointed acting-purser of the Essex Junior, who was on board my ship, did the duties of aid, in a manner which reflects on him the highest honour, and midshipmen Isaacs, Farragut, and Ogden, as well as acting-midshipmen James Ferry, James R. Lyman, and Samuel Duzenbury, and mater's-mate William Pierce, exerted themselves in the performance of their respective

duties, and gave an earnest of their value to the service; the three first are too young to recommend for promotion, the latter I beg leave to recommend for your confirmation, as well as the acting-lieutenants, and Messrs. Barnewall, Johnson, and Bostwick.

We have been unfortunate but not disgraced—the defence of the Essex has not been less honourable to her officers and crew than the capture of an equal force; and I now consider my situation less unpleasant than that of commodore Hillyar, who, in violation of every principle of honour and generosity, and regardless of the rights of nations, attacked the Essex in her crippled state, within pistol-shot of a neutral shore, when for six weeks I had daily offered him fair and honourable combat, on terms greatly to his advantage; the blood of the slain must be for ever on his head, and he has yet to reconcile his conduct to heaven, to his conscience, and to the world. The annexed extract of a letter from commodore Hillyar, which was written previous to his returning me my sword, will shew his opinion of our conduct.

My loss has been dreadfully severe, 58 killed, or have since died of their wounds, and among them lieutenant Cowell; 39 were severely wounded, 27 slightly, and 31 are missing; making in all 154 killed, wounded, and missing.

The professional knowledge of doctor Richard Hoffman, acting-surgeon, and doctor Alexander Montgomery, acting surgeon's-mate, added to their assiduity, and the benevolent attentions and assistance of Mr. D. P. Adams, the chaplain, saved the lives of many of the wounded; those gentlemen have been indefatigable in their attentions to them; the two first I beg leave to recommend for confirmation, and the latter to the notice of the department.

I must, in justification of myself, observe, that with our six 12-pounders only we fought this action, our carronades being almost useless.

The loss in killed and wounded, has been great with the enemy; among the former is the first lieutenant of the Phoebe, and of the latter captain Tucker of the Cherub, whose wounds are severe. Both the Essex and Phoebe were in a sinking state, and it was with difficulty they could be kept afloat until they anchored in Valparaiso next morning. The battered state of the Essex, will, I believe, prevent her ever reaching England, and I also think it will be out of their power to repair the damages of the Phoebe, so as to enable her to double Cape Horn. All the masts and yards of the Phoebe and Che-

rub are badly crippled, and their hulls much cut up, the former had eighteen 12-pound shot through her, below her water line, some three feet under water. Nothing but the smoothness of the water saved both the Phoebe and Essex.

I hope, sir, that our conduct may prove satisfactory to our country, and that it will testify it by obtaining our speedy exchange, that we may again have it in our power to prove our zeal.

Commodore Hillyar (I am informed) has thought proper to state to his government that the action lasted only 45 minutes. Should he have done so, the motive may be easily discovered; but the thousands of disinterested witnesses who covered the surrounding hills can testify that we fought his ships nearly two hours and a half. Upwards of fifty broadsides were fired by the enemy, agreeable to their own accounts, and upwards of seventy-five by ours. Except the few minutes they were repairing damages, the firing was incessant.

Soon after my capture I entered into an agreement with commodore Hillyar to disarm my prize the Essex Junior, and proceed with the survivors of my officers and crew in her to the United States, taking with me all her officers and crew. He consented to grant her a passport to secure her from re-capture. The ship was small, and we knew we had much to suffer, yet we hoped soon to reach our country in safety, that we might again have it in our power to serve it. This arrangement was attended with no additional expense, as she was abundantly supplied with provisions and stores for the voyage.

In justice to commodore Hillyar, I must observe, that (although I can never be reconciled to the manner of his attack on the Essex, or to his conduct before the action) he has, since our capture, shewn the greatest humanity to my wounded (whom he permitted me to land, on condition that the United States should bear their expenses), and has endeavoured, as much as lay in his power, to alleviate the distresses of war by the most generous and delicate deportment towards myself, my officers, and crew. He gave orders that the property of every person should be respected; his orders, however, were not so strictly attended to as might have been expected: besides being deprived of books, charts, &c. both myself and officers lost many articles of our clothing—some to a considerable amount. I should not have considered this last circumstance of sufficient importance to notice, did it not

mark a striking difference between the navy of Great Britain and that of the United States, highly creditable to the latter.

By the arrival of the Tagus, a few days after my capture, I was informed, that besides the ships which had arrived in the Pacific in pursuit of me, and those still expected, others were sent to cruize for me in the China seas, off New Zealand, Timor, and New Holland, and that another frigate was sent to the River la Plata.

To possess the Essex it has cost the British government nearly six millions of dollars, and yet, sir, her capture was owing entirely to accident; and if we consider the expedition with which naval contests are now decided, the action is a dishonour to them. Had they brought their ships boldly into action, with a force so very superior, and having the choice of position, they should either have captured or destroyed us in one-fourth the time they were about it.

During the action, our consul-general Mr. Poinsett called on the governor of Valparaiso, and requested that the batteries might protect the Essex. This request was refused, but he promised that if she should succeed in fighting her way to the common anchorage, he should send an officer to the British commander and request him to cease firing, but declined using force under any circumstances, and there is no doubt of a perfect understanding existing between them; this conduct, added to the assistance given to the British, and their friendly reception after the action, and the strong bias of the faction which govern Chili in favour of the English, as well as their hostility to the Americans, induced Mr. Poinsett to leave that country. Under such circumstances I did not conceive it would be proper for me to claim the restoration of my ship, confident that the claim would be made by my government to more effect. Finding some difficulty in the sale of my prizes, I had taken the Hector and Catharine to sea, and burnt them with their cargoes.

I exchanged lieutenant M'Knight, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Lyman, and eleven seamen, for part of the crew of the sir Andrew Hammond, and sailed from Valparaiso on the 27th of April, where the enemy were still patching up their ships to put them in a state for proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, previous to going to England.

Annexed is a list of the remains of my crew to be exchanged, as also a copy of the correspondence between commodore Hillyar and myself on that subject. I also send you a list

of the prisoners I have taken during my cruize, amounting to 343.

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. PORTER.

The honourable secretary of the Navy of the United States, Washington.

P. S.—To give you a correct idea of the state of the Essex at the time of her surrender, I send you the boatswain's and carpenter's report of damages; I also send you a report of the divisions.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, on board the Essex, in the action fought in the port of Valparaiso, with the Phoebe and Cherub.

Killed, and have since died of their wounds,	58
Severely wounded,	89
Slightly wounded,	25
Missing,	31
Total,	154

Copy of a letter from Captain Porter to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sir, *New York, July* 13, 1814.

There are some facts relating to our enemy, and, although not connected with the action, serve to shew his perfidy, and should be known.

On commodore Hillyar's arrival at Valparaiso, he ran the Phoebe close along side of the Essex, and inquired politely after my health, observing that his ship was cleared for action and his men prepared for boarding. I observed, " sir, if you, by any accident, get on board of me, I assure you that great confusion will take place; I am prepared to receive you, but shall only act on the defensive." He observed, coolly and indifferently, " oh sir, I have no such intentions;" at this instant his ship took aback on my starboard bow, her yards nearly locking with those of the Essex. I called all hands to board the enemy; and in an instant my crew were ready to spring on her decks. Commodore Hillyar exclaimed, with great agitation, " I had no intention of getting on board of you;—I had no intention of coming so near you; I am sorry I came so near you." His ship fell off with her jib-boom over my decks; her bows exposed to my broadside, her stern to the fire of the Essex Junior, her crew in the greatest confu-

sion, and in fifteen minutes I could have taken or destroyed her. After he had brought his ship to anchor, commodore Hillyar, and captain Tucker of the Cherub, visited me on shore, when I asked him if he intended to respect the neutrality of the port. "Sir," said he, "you have paid such respect to the neutrality of this port, that I feel myself bound, in honour, to do the same."

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

DAVID PORTER.

Copy of a letter from Captain Hillyar, of his Majesty's Ship Phoebe, to John Wilson Croker, Esq., dated Valparaiso Bay, March 30, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, that a little past 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th instant, after nearly five months anxious search, and six weeks still more anxious look out for the Essex and her companion to quit the port of Valparaiso, we saw the former under way, and immediately, accompanied by the Cherub, made all sail to close with her. On rounding the outer point of the bay, and hauling her wind for the purpose of endeavouring to weather us and escape, she lost her main-top-mast, and afterwards, not succeeding in an effort to regain the limits of the port, bore up and anchored so near the shore (a few miles to the leeward of it) as to preclude the possibility of passing ahead of her without risk to his majesty's ships. As we drew near, my intention of going close under her stern was frustrated by the ship breaking off, and from the wind blowing extremely fresh. Our first fire, commencing a little past 4, and continuing about 10 minutes, produced no visible effect; our second, a few random shot only, from having increased our distance by wearing, was not apparently more successful, and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances were a little inauspicious. On standing again towards her, I signified my intention of anchoring, for which we were not ready before, with springs, to captain Tucker, directing him to keep under way, and take a convenient station for annoying our opponent. On closing with the Essex, at 35 minutes past 5, the firing recommenced, and before I gained my intended position, her cable was cut, and a serious conflict ensued. The guns of his majesty's ship gradually becoming more

destructive, and her crew, if possible, more animated, which lasted until 20 minutes past 6, when it pleased the Almighty disposer of events to bless the efforts of my gallant companions and my personal very humble ones, with victory. My friend, captain Tucker, an officer worthy of their lordships' best attentions, was severely wounded at the commencement of the action, but remained on deck until it terminated, using every exertion against the baffling winds and ocasional calms which followed the heavy firing, to close near the enemy. He informs me that his officers and crew, of whose loyalty, zeal, and discipline I entertain the highest opinion, conducted themselves to his satisfaction.

I have to lament the death of four of my brave companions and one of his: with real sorrow I add that my first lieutenant, Ingram, is among the number. He fell early—is a great loss to his majesty's service. The manly tears which I observed this morning, while performing the last mournful duty at his funeral, on shore, more fully evinced the respect and affection of his afflicted companions than any eulogium my pen is equal to. Our lists of wounded are small, and there is only one for whom I am under anxiety. The conduct of my officers and crew, without an individual exception that has come to my knowledge, before, during, and after battle, was such as became good and loyal subjects, zealous for the honour of their much-loved though distant king and country.

The defence of the Essex, taking into consideration our superiority of force, the very discouraging circumstance of her having lost her main-top-mast, and being twice on fire, did honour to her brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of captain Porter and those under his command. Her colours were not struck until the loss in killed and wounded was so awfully great, her shattered condition so seriously bad, as to render further resistance unavailing.

I was much hurt at hearing that her men had been encouraged, when the result of the action was evidently decided, some to take to their boats, and others to swim on shore; many were drowned in the attempt—sixteen were saved by the exertions of my people, and others, I believe between thirty and forty, effected their landing; I informed captain Porter that I considered the latter in point of honour as my prisoners. He said the encouragement was given when the ship was in danger from fire, and I have not pressed the point. The Essex is completely stored and provisioned for at least six months, and al-

though much injured in her upper works, masts, and rigging, is not in such a state as to give the slightest cause of alarm, respecting her being able to perform a voyage to Europe with perfect safety. Our main and mizen-masts and main-yard are rather seriously wounded: these, with a few shot holes between wind and water, which we can get at without lightening, and a loss of canvas and cordage, which we can partly replace from our well-stored prize, are the extent of the injuries his majesty's ship has sustained.

I feel it a pleasant duty to recommend to their lordships' notice my now senior lieutenant, Pearson, and Messrs. Allen, Gardner, Porter, and Daw, midshipmen. I should do very great injustice to Mr. George O'Brien, the mate of the Emily, merchantman, who joined a boat's crew of mine in the harbour, and pushed for the ship the moment he saw her likely to come into action, were I to omit recommending him to their lordships. His conduct, with that of Mr. N. Murphy, master of the English brig Good Friends, were such as to entitle them both to my lasting regard, and prove that they were ever ready to hazard their lives in their country's honourable cause. They came on board when the attempt was attended with great risk, and both their boats were swamped. I have before informed their lordships that Mr. O'Brien was once a lieutenant in his majesty's service—(may now add that youthful indiscretions appear to have given place to great correctness of conduct)—and, as he has proved his laudable zeal for its honour, I think, if restored, he will be found one of its greatest ornaments. I inclose returns of the killed and wounded; and if conceived to have trespassed on their lordships' time by this very long letter, hope it will be kindly ascribed to the right cause—an earnest wish that merit may meet its due reward.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JAMES HILLYAR.

P. S. There has not been found a ship's book or paper of any description (charts exepted) on board the Essex, or any document relative to the number serving in her previous to the action. Captain Porter informs me that he had upwards of 260 victualled. Our prisoners, including 42 wounded, amount to 161; 23 were found dead on her decks; three wounded were taken away by captain Downes, of the Essex Junior, a few minutes before the colours were struck, and I believe 20 or 30 reached the shore; the remainder were killed or drowned.

List of killed and wounded, in his Majesty's Ships undermentioned, in action with the United States frigate Essex, on the 28th March, 1814.

Phoebe—4 killed—7 wounded,
Cherub—1 killed—3 wounded.
Total—5 killed—10 wounded.

CAPTURE OF THE EPERVIER.

Copies of letters from Captain Warrington to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States Sloop Peacock, at sea, lat. 27° 47′, *long.* 80° 9′, 29*th April*, 1814.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that we have this morning captured, after an action of forty-two minutes, his majesty's brig Epervier, rating and mounting eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades, with 128 men, of whom eight were killed and 15 wounded (according to the best information we could obtain). Among the latter is her first lieutenant, who has lost an arm and received a severe splinter-wound on the hip. Not a man in the Peacock was killed; and only two wounded, neither dangerously so. The fate of the Epervier would have been determined in much less time, but for the circumstance of our fore-yard being totally disabled by two round shot in the starboard quarter from her first broadside, which entirely deprived us of the use of our fore and fore-top-sails, and compelled us to keep the ship large throughout the remainder of the action.

This, with a few top-mast and top-gallant back-stays cut away, a few shot through our sails, is the only injury the Peacock has sustained. Not a round shot touched our hull; our masts and spars are as sound as ever. When the enemy struck, he had five feet water in his hold, his main-top-mast was over the side, his main-boom shot away, his fore-mast cut nearly in two and tottering, his fore-rigging and stays shot away, his bowsprit badly wounded, and forty-five shot-holes in his hull, twenty of which were within a foot of his water line. By great exertion we got her in sailing order, just as the dark came on.

In fifteen minutes after the enemy struck, the Peacock was ready for another action, in every respect but her fore-yard, which was sent down, fished, and had the fore-sail set again in forty-five minutes: such was the spirit and activity of our

gallant crew. The Epervier had under her convoy an English hermaphrodite brig, a Russian and a Spanish ship, which all hauled their wind, and stood to the east north-east. I had determined upon pursuing the former, but found that it would not answer to leave our prize in her then crippled state, and the more particularly so, as we found she had in specie 120,000 dollars, which we soon transferred to this sloop.

Every officer, seaman, and marine did his duty, which is the highest compliment I can pay them.

I am, respectfully,

L. WARRINGTON.

P. S. From lieutenant Nicholson's report, who was counting up the Epervier's crew, there were eleven killed and fifteen wounded.

L. W.

United States Ship Peacock,
Savannah, 5th May, 1814.

As my letter of yesterday was too late for the mail, I address you again in the performance of a duty which is pleasing and gratifying to me in a high degree, and is but doing justice to the merits of the deserving officers under my command, of whom I have hitherto refrained from speaking, as I considered it most correct to make it the subject of a particular communication.

To the unwearied and indefatigable attention of lieutenant Nicholson (1st), in organizing and training the crew, the success of this action is in a great measure to be attributed. I have confided greatly in him, and have never found my confidence misplaced. For judgment, coolness, and decision, in times of difficulty, few can surpass him.

This is the second action in which he has been engaged this war, and in both he has been successful. His greatest pride is to earn a commander's commission by fighting for, instead of heiring it.

From lieutenant Henry (second) and lieutenant Voorhees (acting-third, who has also been twice successfully engaged), I received every assistance that zeal, ardour, and experience could afford. The fire from their two divisions was terrible, and directed with the greatest precision and coolness. In sailing-master Percival, whose great wish and pride it is to obtain a lieutenant's commission, and whose unremitting and constant attention to duty, added to his professional knowledge, entitles him to it in my opinion, I found an able as

well as willing assistant. He handled the ship as if he had been working her into a roadstead. Mr. David Cole, acting-carpenter, I have also found such an able and valuable man in his occupation, that I must request in the most earnest manner, that he may receive a warrant, for I feel confident, that to his uncommon exertions, we in a great measure owe the getting our prize into port. From 11, A. M., until 6, P. M., he was over her side stopping shot-holes, on a grating, and when the ordinary resources failed of success, his skill soon supplied him with efficient ones. Mr. Philip Myers, master's-mate, has also conducted himself in such a manner as to warrant my recommendation of him as a master. He is a seaman, navigator, and officer; his family in New York is respectable, and he would prove an acquisition to the service. My clerk, Mr. John S. Townsend, is anxious to obtain through my means a midshipman's warrant, and has taken pains to qualify himself for it by volunteering, and constantly performing a midshipman's duty—indeed I have but little use for a clerk, and he is as great a proficient as any of the young midshipmen, the whole of whom behaved in a manner that was pleasing to me, and must be gratifying to you, as it gives an earnest of what they will make in time; three only have been to sea before, and one only in a man of war, yet they were as much at home and as much disposed to exert themselves as any officer in the ship. Lieutenant Nicholson speaks in high terms of the conduct of Messrs. Greeves and Rodgers (midshipmen), who were in the prize with him.

I have the honour to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. WARRINGTON.

Honourable William Jones, &c. &c.

CAPTURE OF THE REINDEER.

Copy of a letter from Captain Johnson Blakely to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States loop of War, Wasp, L'Orient, 8th July, 1814.

Sir,

On Tuesday the 28th ultimo, being then in latitude 48° 36′ north, and longitude 11° 15′ west, we fell in with, engaged, and, after an action of nineteen minutes, captured his Britannic majesty's sloop of war the Reindeer, William Man-

ners, esq., commander. Annexed are the minutes of our proceeding on that day, prior to and during the continuance of the action.

Where all did their duty, and each appeared anxious to excel, it is very difficult to discriminate. It is, however, only rendering them their merit due, when it is declared of lieutenants Reily and Bury, first and third of this vessel, and whose names will be found among those of the conquerors of the Guerriere and Java, and of Mr. Tillinghast, second lieutenant, who was greatly instrumental in the capture of the Boxer; that their conduct and courage on this occasion fulfilled the highest expectation, and gratified every wish. Sailing-master Carr is also entitled to great credit for the zeal and ability with which he discharged his various duties.

The cool and patient conduct of every officer and man, while exposed to the fire of the shifting-gun of the enemy, and without an opportunity of returning it, could only be equalled by the animation and ardour exhibited when actually engaged, or by the promptitude and firmness with which every attempt of the enemy to board was met, and successfully repelled. Such conduct may be seen, but cannot well be described.

The Reindeer mounted sixteen 24-pound carronades, two long 6 or 9-pounders, and a shifting 12-pound carronade, with a complement of on board 118 men. Her crew were said to be the pride of Plymouth.

Our loss in men has been severe, owing in part to the proximity of the two vessels, and the extreme smoothness of the sea, but chiefly in repelling boarders. That of the enemy, however, was infinitely more so, as will be seen by the list of killed and wounded on both sides.

Six round shot struck our hull, and many grape, which did not penetrate far. The fore-mast received a 24-pound shot, which passed through its centre, and our rigging and sails were a good deal injured.

The Reinder was literally cut to pieces in a line with her ports; her upper works, boats and spare spars were one complete wreck. A breeze springing up next afternoon, her foremast went by the board.

Having received all the prisoners on board, which from the number of wounded occupied much time, together with their baggage, the Reindeer was on the evening of the 29th set on fire, and in a few hours blew up.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, J. BLAKELEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy.

Minutes of the action between the United States' Sloop Wasp, and his Britannic Majesty's Sloop Reindeer, on the 28th June, 1814, lat. 48° 36′ N. long. 11° 15′ W.

At 4, A. M., light breezes and cloudy; at a quarter after 4 discovered two sails, two points before the lee-beam, kept away in chase; shortly after discovered one sail, on the weather-beam; altered the course and hauled by in chase of the sail to windward. At 8, sail to windward bore E. N. E., wind very light; at 10 the stranger sail, bearing E. by N., hoisted an English ensign and pendant, and displayed a signal at the main (blue and yellow diagonally). Meridian, light airs and clouds, at half past 12, P. M., the enemy showed a blue and white flag, diagonally, at the fore, and fired a gun, 1 hour 15 minutes called all hands to quarters and prepared for action, 1 hour 22 minutes, believing we could weather the enemy, tacked ship and stood for him, 1 hour 50 minutes, the enemy tacked ship and stood from us, 1 hour 56 minutes, hoisted our colours and fired a gun to windward, which was answered by the enemy with another to windward, 2 hours 20 minutes, the enemy still standing from us, set the royals, 2 hours 25 minutes, set the flying-jib, 2 hours 29 minutes, set the upper stay-sails, 2 hours 32 minutes, the enemy having tacked for us, took in the stay-sails, 2 hours 47 minutes, furled the royals, 2 hours 51 minutes, seeing that the enemy would be able to weather us, tacked ship, 3 hours 3 minutes, the enemy hoisted his flying-jib; brailed up our mizen, 3 hours 15 minutes, the enemy on our weather-quarter, distant about 60 yards, fired his shifting-gun, a 12-pound carronade at us, loaded with round and grape-shot, from his top-gallant forecastle, 3 hours 17 minutes, fired the same gun a second time, 3 hours 19 minutes, fired it a 3d time, 3 hours 21 minutes fired it a fourth time, 3 hours 24 minutes, a fifth shot, all from the same gun. Finding the enemy did not get sufficiently on the beam to enable us to bring our guns to bear, put the helm a-lee, and at 26 minutes after 3 commenced the action, with the after-carronade on the starboard side, and fired in succession, 3 hours 4 minutes, hauled up the main-sail, 3 hours 40 minutes, the enemy having his larboard bow in contact with our larboard quarter endeavoured to board us, but was repulsed in every attempt; at 3 hours 44 minutes, orders were given to board in turn, which were promptly executed, when all resistance immediately ceased, and at 3 hours 45 minutes, the enemy hauled down his flag.

J. BLAKELEY.

List of killed and wounded on board the Wasp.

Killed, - - - - - - -	5
Wounded, - - - - - -	21

Killed and wounded on board the Reindeer.

Killed, - - - - - - - -	25
Wounded dangerously, - - - - -	10
do. severely, - - - - - -	17
do. slightly, - - - - -	15
Whole number wounded, - - -	42
Whole number killed and wounded, - -	67

N. B. More than half the wounded were, in consequence of the severity and extent of their wounds, put on board a Portuguese brig called the Lisbon Packet, on the third day after the action, to wit, on the 1st July, bound to Plymouth, England.

CAPTURE OF THE LEVANT AND CYANE.

Copy of a letter from Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, dated United States' Frigate Constitution, May —, 1815.

Sir,

On the 20th of February last, the island of Madeira bearing about W. S. W., distant 60 leagues, we fell in with his Britannic majesty's two ships of war, the Cyane and Levant, and brought them to action about 6 o'clock in the evening, both of which, after a spirited engagement of 40 minutes, surrendered to the ship under my command.

Considering the advantages derived by the enemy, from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in the weight and number of guns, I deem the speedy and decisive result of this action the strongest assurance which can be given to the government, that all under my command did their duty, and gallantly supported the reputation of American seamen.

Inclosed you will receive the minutes of the action, and a list of the killed and wounded on board this ship; also inclosed you will receive for your information a statement of the actual force of the enemy, and the number killed and wounded on board their ships, as near as could be ascertained.

I have the honour to remain, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

CHARLES STEWART.

Honourable B. W. Crowninshield,
secretary of the navy, Washington.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States' frigate Constitution, of forty-four guns, (mounting thirty-two twenty-four-pounders, and twenty thirty-two-pound carronades), on the 20th February, 1815, in action with his Britannic Majesty's ships Cyane and Levant.

Killed, 3—wounded, 12—total, 15.

Statement of the actual force of his Britannic Majesty's ships Levant, Captain the Honourable George Douglass, commander; and Cyane, Captain Gordon Falcon, commander, with the number killed and wounded on board each ship, on the 20th February, 1815, as near as could be ascertained, while engaged with the United States' frigate Constitution.

Levant.

18 thirty-two-pounders, carronades.
1 twelve-pounder, do.
2 nine-pounders, long guns.

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21 guns, 156 officers, seamen, and marines.
Prisoners, 133 officers, seamen, and marines.
Killed, 23—wounded, 16—total killed and wounded, 39.

Cyane.

22 thirty-two-pounders, carronades.
10 eighteen-pounders, do.
2 twelve-pounders, long guns.

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34 guns, 180 officers, seamen, and marines.
2 brass swivels.
Prisoners, 168, officers, seamen, and marines.
Killed, 12—wounded, 26—total, killed and wounded, 38.

Minutes of the action between the United States' frigate Constitution, and his Britannic Majesty's ships Cyane and Levant, on the 20th February, 1815.

Commences with light breezes from the east, and cloudy weather—at 1, discovered a sail two points on the larboard bow—hauled up and made sail in chase—1-4 past 1, made the sail to be a ship; at 3-4 past 1, discovered another sail a-head; made them out at 2, P. M., to be both ships,

standing close hauled, with their starboard tacks on board; at 4, P. M., the weathermost ship made signals, and bore up for her consort, then about ten miles to leeward; we bore up after her, and set lower, topmast, top-gallant, and royal studding-sails in chase; at half past 4, carried away our main royal mast; took in the sails and got another prepared; at 5, P. M., commenced firing on the chase from our two larboard bow guns; our shot falling short, ceased firing; at half past 5, finding it impossible to prevent their junction, cleared ship for action, then about four miles from the two ships; at forty minutes after 5, they passed within hail of each other, and hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, hauled up their courses, and prepared to receive us; at forty-five minutes past 5, they made all sail close hauled by the wind, in hopes of getting to windward of us; at fifty-five minutes past 5, finding themselves disappointed in their object, and we were closing with them fast, they shortened sail, and formed on a line of wind, about half a cable's length from each other. At 6, P. M., having them under command of our battery, hoisted our colours, which was answered by both ships hoisting English ensigns; at five minutes past 6, ranged up on the starboard side of the sternmost ship, about 300 yards distant, and commenced the action by broadsides, both ships returning our fire with great spirit for about fifteen minutes, then the fire of the enemy beginning to slacken, and the great column of smoke collected under our lee induced us to cease our fire to ascertain their positions and conditions; in about three minutes, the smoke clearing away, we found ourselves abreast of the headmost ship, the sternmost ship luffing up for our larboard quarter; we poured a broadside into the headmost ship, and then braced aback our main and mizen top-sails, and backed astern under cover of the smoke, abreast the sternmost ship, when the action was continued with spirit and considerable effect until thirty-five minutes past 6, when the enemy's fire again slackened, and we discovered the headmost bearing up; filled our top-sails, shot ahead, and gave her two stern rakes; we then discovered the sternmost ship wearing also; wore ship immediately after her, and gave her a stern rake, she luffing too on our starboard bow, and giving us her larboard broadside; we ranged up on her larboard quarter, within hail, and was about to give her our starboard broadside when she struck her colours, fired a lee gun and yielded. At fifty minutes past 6, took possession of his Britannic majesty's ship Cyane, captain Gordon Falcon, mounting thirty-four guns. At 8, P. M., filled away after her consort,

which was still in sight to leeward. At half past 8, found her standing towards us, with her starboard tacks close hauled with top-gallant sails set and colours flying. At fifty minutes past 8, ranged close along side to windward of her, on opposite tacks, and exchanged broadsides—wore immediately under her stern and raked her with a broadside; she then crowded all sail and endeavoured to escape by running—hauled on board our tacks, set spanker, and flying jib in chase. At half past 9, commenced firing on her from our starboard bow chaser; gave her several shot, which cut her spars and rigging considerably. At 10, P. M., finding they could not escape, fired a gun, struck her colours, and yielded. We immediately took possession of his Britannic majesty's ship Levant, honourable captain George Douglass, mounting twenty-one guns. At 1, A. M., the damages of our rigging was repaired, sails shifted, and the ship in fighting condition.

Minutes of the chase of the United States' frigate Constitution, by an English squadron of three Ships, from out the harbour of Port Praya, Island of St. Jago.

Commences with fresh breezes and thick foggy weather. At five minutes past 12, discovered a large ship through the fog standing in for Port Praya. At eight minutes past 12 discovered two other large ships astern of her, also standing in for the port. From their general appearance, supposed them to be one of the enemy's squadrons, and from the little respect hitherto paid by them to neutral waters, I deemed it most prudent to put to sea. The signal was made to the Cyane and Levant to get under weigh. At 12, A. M., with our top-sails set, we cut our cable and got under weigh (when the Portuguese opened a fire on us from several of their batteries on shore), the prize-ships following our motions, and stood out of the harbour of Port Praya, close under East Point, passing the enemy's squadron about gun-shot to windward of them; crossed our top-gallant yards and set foresail, mainsail, spanker, flying jib, and top-gallant sails. The enemy seeing us under weigh, tacked ship and made all sail in chase of us. As far as we could judge of their rates, from the thickness of the weather, supposed them two ships of the line and one frigate. At half past meridian cut away the boats towing astern, first cutter and gig. At 1, P. M., found our sailing about equal with the ships on our lee quarter, but the frigate luffing up gaining our wake and rather dropping astern of us, finding the Cyane dropping astern and to leeward, and the frigate gaining on her fast, I found it impossible to save

her if she continued on the same course, without having the Constitution brought to action by their whole force. I made the signal at ten minutes past 1, P. M., to her to tack ship, which was complied with. This manœuvre, I conceived, would detach one of the enemy's ships in pursuit of her, while at the same time, from her position, she would be enabled to reach the anchorage at Port Praya, before the detached ship could come up with her; but if they did not tack after her, it would afford her an opportunity to double their rear, and make her escape before the wind. They all continued in full chase of the Levant and this ship; the ship on our lee quarter firing, by divisions, broadsides, her shot falling short of us. At 3, P. M., by our having dropped the Levant considerably, her situation became (from the position of the enemy's frigate) similar to the Cyane. It became necessary to separate also from the Levant, or risk this ship being brought to action to cover her. I made the signal at five minutes past 3, for her to tack, which was complied with. At twelve minutes past 3, the whole of the enemy's squadron tacked in pursuit of the Levant and gave up the pursuit of this ship. This sacrifice of the Levant became necessary for the preservation of the Constitution. Sailing-master Hixon, midshipman Varnum, one boatswain's-mate, and 12 men were absent on duty in the fifth cutter to bring the cartel brig under our stern.

CAPTURE OF THE PENGUIN.

Copy of a letter from Captain Biddle to commodore Decatur, dated United States' Sloop Hornet, off Tristan d'Acunha, March 25, 1815.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you, that on the morning of the 23d instant, at half past ten, when about to anchor off the north end of the island of Tristan d'Acunha, a sail was seen to the southward and eastward, steering to the westward, the wind fresh from the south-south-west.—In a few minutes she had passed on to the westward so that we could not see her for the land. I immediately made sail for the westward, and shortly after getting in sight of her again, perceived her to bear up before the wind. I hove too for her to come down to us. When she had approached near, I filled the main-top-sail, and continued to yaw the ship,

while she continued to come down, wearing occasionally to prevent her passing under our stern. At 1 40, P. M., being within nearly musket-shot distance, she hauled her wind on the starboard tack, hoisted English colours and fired a gun. We immediately luffed too, hoisted our ensign, and gave the enemy a broadside. The action being thus commenced, a quick and well-directed fire was kept up from this ship, the enemy gradually drifting nearer to us, when at 1 55 minutes he bore up, apparently to run us on board. As soon as I perceived he would certainly fall on board, I called the boarders so as to be ready to repel any attempt to board us. At the instant every officer and man repaired to the quarter deck, where the two vessels were coming into contact, and eagerly pressed me to permit them to board the enemy; but this I would not permit, as it was evident from the commencement of the action that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and effect. The enemy's bowsprit came in between our main and mizen rigging, on our starboard side, affording him an opportunity to board us, if such was his design, but no attempt was made.—There was a considerable swell on, and as the sea lifted us ahead, the enemy's bowsprit carried away our mizen shrouds, stern-davits, and spanker-boom, and he hung upon our larboard quarter. At this moment an officer, who was afterwards recognized to be Mr. M'Donald, the first lieutenant, and the then commanding officer, called out that they had surrendered. I directed the marines and musketry-men to cease firing, and, while on the taffrail asking if they had surrendered, I received a wound in the neck. The enemy just then got clear of us, and his fore-mast and bowsprit being both gone, and perceiving us wearing to give him a fresh broadside, he again called out that he had surrendered. It was with difficulty I could restrain my crew from firing into him again, as he had certainly fired into us after having surrendered. From the firing of the first gun, to the last time the enemy cried out he had surrendered, was exactly 22 minutes by the watch. She proved to be his Britannic majesty's brig Penguin, mounting 16 32-pound carronades, two long 12s, a 12-pound carronade on the top-gallant forecastle, with swivels on the capstern in the tops. She had a spare port forward, so as to fight both her long guns of a side. She sailed from England in September last. She was shorter upon deck than this ship by two feet, but she had a greater length of keel, greater breadth of beam, thicker sides, and higher bulwarks, than this ship, and was in all respects a remarkakly fine vessel of her class. The enemy

acknowledge a complement of 132; 12 of them supernumerary marines from the Medway, 74, received on board in consequence of their having been ordered to cruise for the American privateer Young Wasp. They acknowledge, also, a loss of 14 killed and 28 wounded; but Mr. Mayo, who was in charge of the prize, assures me that the number of killed was certainly greater. Among the killed is captain Dickenson, who fell at the close of the action, and the boatswain; among the wounded, is the second lieutenant, purser, and two midshipmen; each of the midshipmen lost a leg. We received on board, in all, 118 prisoners, four of whom have since died of their wounds. Having removed the prisoners, and taken on board such provisions and stores as would be useful to us, I scuttled the Penguin, this morning before daylight, and she went down. As she was completely riddled by our shot, her fore-mast and bowsprit both gone, and her main-mast so crippled as to be incapable of being secured, it seemed unadvisable, at this distance from home, to attempt sending her to the United States.

This ship did not receive a single round shot in her hull, nor any material wound in her spars; the rigging and sails were very much cut; but having bent a new suit of sails, and knotted and secured our rigging, we are now completely ready, in all respects, for any service. We were eight men short of complement, and had nine upon the sick list the morning of the action.

Inclosed is a list of killed and wounded. I lament to state that lieutenant Conner is wounded dangerously. I feel great solicitude on his account, as he is an officer of much promise, and his loss would be a serious loss to the service.

It is a most pleasing part of my duty to acquaint you, that the conduct of lieutenants Conner and Newton, Mr. Mayo, acting-lieutenant Brownlow of the marines, sailing-master Rommey, and the other officers, seamen, and marines I have the honour to command, was in the highest degree, creditable to them, and calls for my warmest recommendation. I cannot indeed do justice to their merits. The satisfaction which was diffused throughout the ship when it was ascertained that the stranger was an enemy's sloop of war, and the alacrity with which every one repaired to quarters, fully assured me that their conduct in action would be marked with coolness and intrepidity.

I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,

J. BIDDLE.

CAPTURE OF THE PRESIDENT FRIGATE.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Decatur, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated his Britannic Majesty's ship Endymion, at sea, January 18, 1815.

Sir,

The painful duty of detailing to you the particular causes which preceded and led to the capture of the late United States' frigate President, by a squadron of his Britannic majesty's ships (as per margin), has devolved upon me. In my communication of the 14th, I made known to you my intention of proceeding to sea on that evening. Owing to some mistake of the pilots, the ship, in going out, grounded on the bar, where she continued to strike heavily for an hour and a half; although she had broken several of her rudder braces, and had received such other material injury as to render her return into port desirable, I was unable to do so from the strong westerly wind which was then blowing. It being now high water it became necessary to force her over the bar before the tide fell; in this we succeeded by 10 o'clock, when we shaped our course along the shore of Long Island for fifty miles; and then steered S. E. by E. At 5 o'clock, three ships were discovered ahead, we immediately hauled up the ship and passed two miles to the northward of them. At daylight we discovered four ships in chase, one on each quarter, and two astern, the leading ship of the enemy a razee—she commenced a fire upon us, but without effect. At meridian, the wind became light and baffling, we had increased our distance from the razee, but the next ship astern, which was also a large ship, had gained and continued to gain upon us considerably; we immediately occupied all hands to lighten ship, by starting water, cutting away the anchors, throwing overboard provisions, cables, spare spars, boats, and every article that could be got at, keeping the sails wet from the royals down. At 3, we had the wind quite light; the enemy, who had now been joined by a brig, had a strong breeze, and were coming up with us rapidly. The Endymion (mounting 50 guns, 24-pounders on the main deck) had now approached us within gun-shot, and had commenced a fire with her bow guns, which we returned from our stern. At 5 o'clock, she had obtained a position on our starboard quarter within half point blank shot, on which neither our stern nor quarter guns would bear; we were now steering E. by N., the wind N. W.

I remained with her in this position for half an hour, in the hope that she would close with us on our broadside, in which case I had prepared my crew to board, but from his continuing to yaw his ship to maintain his position, it became evident that to close was not his intention. Every fire now cut some of our sails or rigging.

To have continued our course under these circumstances, would have been placing it in his power to cripple us, without being subject to injury himself, and to have hauled up more to the northward to bring our stern guns to bear would have exposed us to his raking fire. It was now dusk, when I determined to alter my course south, for the purpose of bringing the enemy abeam, and although their ships astern were drawing up fast, I felt satisfied I should be enabled to throw him out of the combat before they could come up, and was not without hopes, if the night proved dark (of which there was every appearance), that I might still be enabled to effect my escape. Our opponent kept off at the same instant we did, and our fire commenced at the same time. We continued engaged, steering south, with steering sails set, two hours and a half, when we completely succeeded in dismantling her. Previously to her dropping entirely out of the action, there were intervals of minutes when the ships were broadside and broadside, in which she did not fire a gun. At this period (half past 8 o'clock), although dark, the other ships of the squadron were in sight, and almost within gun-shot. We were of course compelled to abandon her. In resuming our former course for the purpose of avoiding the squadron, we were compelled to present our stern to our antagonist—but such was his state, though we were thus exposed and within range of his guns for half an hour, that he did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity of raking us. We continued this course until 11 o'clock, when two fresh ships of the enemy (the Pomona and Tenedos) had come up. The Pomona had opened her fire on the larboard bow, within musket-shot; the other about two cables' length astern, taking a raking position on our quarter; and the rest (with the exception of the Endymion) within gun-shot.—Thus situated, with about one-fifth of my crew killed and wounded, my ship crippled, and a more than four-fold force opposed to me, without a chance of escape left, I deemed it my duty to surrender.

It is with emotions of pride I bear testimony to the gallantry and steadiness of every officer and man I had the honour to command on this occasion, and I feel satisfied that the

fact of their having beaten a force equal to themselves, in the presence and almost under the guns of so vastly a superior force, when, too, it was almost self-evident, that whatever their exertions might be, they must ultimately be captured, will be taken as evidence of what they would have performed had the force opposed to them been in any degree equal.

It is with extreme pain I have to inform you, that lieutenants Babbit, Hamilton, and Howell, fell in the action. They have left no officers of superior merit behind them.

If, sir, the issue of this affair had been fortunate, I should have felt it my duty to have recommended to your attention lieutenants Shubrick and Gallagher. They maintained throughout the day the reputation they had acquired in former actions.

Lieutenant Twiggs, of the marines, displayed great zeal; his men were well supplied and their fire incomparable, so long as the enemy continued within musket range.

Midshipman Randolph, who had charge of the forecastle division, managed it to my entire satisfaction.

From Mr. Robinson, who was serving as a volunteer, I received essential aid, particularly after I was deprived of the services of the master, and severe loss I had sustained in my officers on the quarter-deck.

Of our loss in killed and wounded, I am unable at present to give you a correct statement; the attention of the surgeon being so entirely occupied with the wounded, that he was unable to make out a correct return when I left the President, nor shall I be able to make it until our arrival in port, we having parted company with the squadron yesterday. The inclosed list, with the exception I fear of its being short of the number, will be found correct.

For 24 hours after the action it was nearly calm, and the squadron were occupied in repairing the crippled ships. Such of the crew of the President as were not badly wounded, were put on board the different ships; myself and a part of my crew were put on board this ship. On the 17th we had a gale from the eastward, in which this ship lost her bowsprit, fore, and main-masts, and mizen-top-mast, all of which were badly wounded, and was in consequence of her disabled condition, obliged to throw overboard all her upper-deck guns; her loss in killed and wounded must have been very great. I have not been able to ascertain the extent. Ten were buried after I came on board (36 hours after the action); the badly wounded, such as are obliged to keep their cots, occupy the starboard side of the gun-deck, from the cabin bulk-head to

the main-mast. From the crippled state of the President's spars, I feel satisfied she could not have saved her masts, and I feel serious apprehensions for the safety of our wounded left on board.

It is due to captain Hope, to state, that every attention has been paid by him to myself and officers that have been placed on board his ship, that delicacy and humanity could dictate.

I have the honour to be, with much respect, sir, your obedient servant, STEPHEN DECATUR.

Hon. Benjamin W. Crowninshield, secretary of the navy.

British squadron referred to in the letter.

Majestic, razee; Endymion, Pomone, and Tenedos, frigates; and the Dispatch, brig.

List of killed and wounded on board the United States frigate, President. Killed 24—Wounded 55.

Extract of a letter from commodore Stephen Decatur, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated New York, March 6th, 1815.

"In my official letter of the 18th January, I omitted to state, that a considerable number of my killed and wounded was from the fire of the Pomone, and that the Endymion had on board, in addition to her own crew, one lieutenant, one master's-mate, and 50 men belonging to the Saturn, and when the action ceased, was left motionless and unmanageable until she bent new sails, rove new rigging, and fished her spars, nor did she join the squadron for six hours after the action, and three hours after the surrender of the President. My sword was delivered to captain Hays, of the Majestic, the senior officer of the squadron, on his quarter-deck, which he with great politeness immediately returned. I have the honour to inclose you my parole, by which you will perceive the British admit that the President was captured by the squadron. I should have deemed it unnecessary to have drawn your attention to this document, had not the fact been stated differently by the Bermuda Gazette on our arrival there, which statement, however, the Editor was compelled to retract through the interference of the governor and some of the British officers of the squadron.

"The great assiduity of Dr. Trevett, and surgeon's-mates Dix and Wickes, to the wounded, merit the highest approbation. The only officer badly wounded, is midshipman Richard Dale, who lost a leg, a circumstance to be particularly regretted, as he is a young man possessed of every quality to make a distinguished officer."

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